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WHAT IS SOCIAL AESTHETICS?
Georgina Born, Eric Lewis, and Will Straw
Although the social sciences directed their attention toward the produc-
tion, circulation, and consumption of art from at least the early twentieth 
century, the dominant academic discourse on art and aesthetics for a long 
time has been, and in some quarters continues to be, an expression of neo- 
Kantian and neo- Humean philosophies. While the details and the value of 
both Kant’s and Hume’s aesthetics continue to be debated, it is fair to say 
that both theories, in different yet related ways, have neglected the ways in 
which one’s location and embeddedness in a particular culture and social 
milieu affect one’s aesthetic judgments, the role that such social location 
might play in aesthetics, and questions of whether and how social experi-
ence might itself be immanent in aesthetic experience.1 Instead, both tradi-
tions have looked to what they consider to be universal human capacities 
and cross- cultural generalities to elucidate the sources of aesthetic pleasure 
and judgment. Such a focus on the perceptual and cognitive aspects of aes-
thetic experience and belief—and, in particular, the attempt to treat them 
as human capabilities that transcend culture, time, and place—has led to a 
focus on such issues as the existence or nature of aesthetic connoisseurship 
and the possible objectivity of aesthetic evaluation, as well as to attempts to 
isolate a distinctive aesthetic attitude and even a distinctive aesthetic mode 
of perception. In this respect, such aesthetic theories are atomic in that they 
elevate individual agents and their mental beliefs and perceptual capacities 
as the primary concern.2
The result is that the historical roots of aesthetics as a distinct field of 
inquiry has precluded any potential development of a social aesthetics, 
and this has occurred for two broad reasons. First, the Kantian claims that 
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“pure” judgments of beauty follow from a disinterested feeling of pleasure, 
coupled with the purposeless nature of art as art, would seem to rule out 
of court any consideration of the social in aesthetics. Second, the norma-
tive Humean claim that the proper theory of taste entails concurrence of 
aesthetic judgments among all aesthetic “experts” presumes that aesthetics 
can and should be neutral with regard to social status, position, history, and 
function. The influence views such as these had (and in some quarters con-
tinue to have) on demarcating the boundaries of the aesthetic are respon-
sible for the absence of any consideration in prior theories both of what a 
social aesthetics might represent and of the diverse forms it might take. The 
chapters that follow explore and develop a number of distinct yet mutually 
resonant formulations of a social aesthetics, a social aesthetics that, in part 
by virtue of its rejection of the universality implied by this early history, is 
per force plural and varied. What ties these approaches together is a rejec-
tion of the claim, however grounded, that one can or should disentangle 
the social, in all its varied modalities, from experiences and conceptions 
of the aesthetic. In this sense, art objects and events are thought to tran-
scend their narrow material, temporal, and spatial boundaries and to par-
ticipate vitally, richly, and vigorously in the larger socio- material assem-
blages within which they are created, circulated, and consumed—within 
which they and the subjects of aesthetic experience that they elicit and en-
counter together live their lives.3
Early aesthetic theories, and subsequent theories indebted to them, have 
helped to explain much about our aesthetic worlds, including differences 
and similarities between our beliefs about artworks and their effects on us, 
as well as our experiences of and interactions with other kinds of objects. 
Yet at the same time, the failure of such models of aesthetic inquiry to en-
gage from the outset with the social and cultural dimensions of our aesthetic 
lives has resulted in theories that are peculiarly barren of nuance, unable to 
understand actual aesthetic attitudes, and blind to how such social relations 
as those pertaining to class, race, ethnicity, religion, gender, sexuality, or na-
tionality, and the histories and power relations in which they are entwined, 
as well as the socialities animated by art objects and events, inflect aesthetic 
experience—often in ways that precisely deny that they are so inflected.
Recognition of the powerfully social nature both of aesthetic judgment 
and of aesthetic experience not only suggests that more than just the phi-
losopher’s normal toolkit needs to be brought to bear in the analysis of aes-
thetics (i.e., the philosopher’s concern with conceptual analysis, logical 
argumentation, and the impact of a given theory on related theories). It 
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suggests also that sociological, anthropological, and cultural- historical re-
search should inform future investigation into and theorization of the aes-
thetic (Born 2010c; Bourdieu 1984). Aesthetics as a field of inquiry, in this 
view, needs to move beyond the individual or atomic and toward the social 
or molecular, interrogating, for example, such pervasive social and cultural 
processes as the role of aesthetic experience in the formation of affective 
alliances (Straw 1991) or aggregations of those affected by art and music 
(Born 2011). It needs to consider the many ways in which individual aes-
thetic judgments are influenced by social processes and pressures that may 
be fluid or rigid and enduring. It needs to address how social entities them-
selves—social groups, populations, cultural institutions, disciplinary forma-
tions, governments—adopt, invent, forge, promote, and/or police certain 
aesthetic tendencies and positions. And it needs to register and theorize how 
particular socialities and social relations can themselves “get into,” partake 
in, and animate aesthetic imagination and experience.
In this light, the notion of a “social aesthetics” can be seen both as a 
broadening of the traditional subject matter of aesthetics (i.e., individual be-
liefs about art objects, the cognitive and perceptual processes behind them, 
and the ontology of art objects that underlie such attitudes) and, emphati-
cally, as a critique of it. A social aesthetics is, then, less concerned with de-
marcating a class of aesthetically valuable objects than it is with explaining 
how and why a given set of objects or experiences—those associated with, 
say, Beethoven or Bird, Brancusi or Beuys, Beach Boys or Blackalicious—
is judged to be valuable, or its value contested, by some social group or 
other, or is taken to be the entangled locus of social- aesthetic experience. 
By rejecting what is often seen as a Kantian view of the functionlessness of 
art, a social aesthetics argues for, and investigates the details of, the many 
ways in which our interactions with art participate in or serve an array 
of political orientations and social and cultural processes: from signaling 
our membership in and commitment to particular social identities (Marx-
ist, African American, queer, and so on) or culturally imagined communities 
(punk, psytrance, death metal, and so on), to reifying, contesting, or model-
ing alternatives to existing social formations. These concerns lead the con-
tributors to this book to focus on the aesthetic orientations of entities that 
are larger than the individual—to examine, for example, the diverse ways 
in which institutions or elite social groups may codify their power and pres-
tige through certain aesthetic commitments or aesthetically informed prac-
tices, but equally the manner in which social groups and collective projects 
as well as individual artists can develop or promote aesthetic practices that 
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are intended to counteract prevailing cultural norms, dominant social mores 
or political discourses, or that may become a locus for enacting alternative 
social relations.
One might think, therefore, that there are few points of contact between 
traditional aesthetics and a social aesthetics—that a social aesthetics is con-
cerned with anything but the aesthetic. But this would be a mistake in two 
ways, as the chapters in this volume attest—first, because a social aesthet-
ics continues to realize the reality and the importance of aesthetic pleasures 
and displeasures, while recognizing that discussions, theories, and conflicts 
about aesthetic judgments will at the same time often signal, consciously 
or unconsciously, either a commitment to or a questioning of given social 
identifications and political positions; and second, because a social aesthet-
ics questions the utility of the very separation of the categories “aesthetic” 
and “social” when analyzing the nature of artistic objects and processes and 
the aesthetic experiences they elicit—a stance most obviously relevant, but 
not limited, to the performing arts (music, theater, dance, performance art, 
sound art, and so on).
Far from saying that aesthetic judgments are unimportant, then, a so-
cial aesthetics argues that they are much more important and less confined 
than has been realized by traditional aesthetics, in that they are judgments 
that we may employ to demarcate ourselves from others, to glorify or vilify 
others, to help define the communities in which we claim membership and 
to which we claim allegiance, as well as to imagine and experiment with new 
socialities and social identifications at the limits of present arrangements. 
To embrace a social aesthetics, then, is to believe that aesthetics matters in 
ways far beyond those previously assumed, for a social aesthetics recognizes 
that our aesthetic pronouncements and embodied experiences are saturated 
with social meaning, are routinely enrolled to serve multiple social and cul-
tural purposes, and are as much about the subjects of aesthetic experience as 
they are about aesthetic objects. Indeed, in this sense a social aesthetics both 
depends on and augurs a relational, historically situated conception of aes-
thetic subject and object (Born 2009, 80–81; cf. Paddison 1993, 216). At the 
same time, by arguing that the sensory, perceptual, and embodied modes of 
experience at the heart of aesthetic theory should be grasped as immanently 
encultured and social,4 a social aesthetics ushers in novel and long- overdue 
means of analyzing aesthetic experiences themselves.
The recognition that the social, broadly construed, is an ineliminable 
part of aesthetic experience and that we cannot isolate or purify the ob-
jects of aesthetic appreciation from their social entanglement serves also to 
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broaden the class of objects toward which aesthetic theory might be turned. 
This broadening has been witnessed across the humanities and social sci-
ences since the 1970s, as popular culture and music, noncanonical forms 
of visual culture, mass- media content, and so- called para- literatures have 
taken their place within university curricula and in the research activities 
of scholars across these fields. Indeed, it is these developments that ushered 
in from the 1970s the new interdisciplinary fields of cultural and media 
studies. Admittedly, this is a shift that remains unsteady and ambivalent: 
media and popular- culture texts and artifacts are still not accorded the same 
status and value in elite academic circles as the objects of the traditional 
humanities, and admission of interest in any social dimension of culture 
often remains a trigger for fears and accusations of that grave sin, socio-
logical reductionism. Nonetheless, with these openings, the boundaries of 
what constitutes an artwork have come to be seen as more porous than 
previously believed. No longer are art objects thought to consist solely of 
a distinct class of entities, produced under certain conditions, for certain 
reasons, and usually by a prescribed class of art creators. This expansion of 
the range of cultural phenomena deemed worthy of cultural analysis has 
been accompanied by a recognition of the fluid, often contradictory ways in 
which social processes, conventions, and norms shape aesthetic objects, just 
as aesthetic discourses can in turn shape social processes and even socio-
cultural institutions (Born 1995, 2004). Yet this broadening of the objects of 
cultural analysis has commonly not been accompanied by a concern with 
the aesthetic per se. Rather, for decades the kinds of textual analysis that 
prevailed in film, media, and cultural studies took its bearings from ideol-
ogy critique, certain Foucauldian orientations, psychoanalytic theories, and 
formal or narrative analysis—theories and methodologies from which ques-
tions of the aesthetic are invariably absent. At the time of this writing, for 
example, the challenge of conceptualizing the aesthetic in relation to media, 
especially new media, remains at the cutting edge of media studies. Thus, 
while efforts to characterize the interconnections between the aesthetic and 
the social should have been central to key currents in cultural theory in re-
cent decades—from semiology, Anglo- American cultural studies, and film 
and media studies to the sociology of culture and analyses of cultural pro-
duction—they have been halting. From the social- science side, Pierre Bour-
dieu’s sociology of art and culture is indicative,5 for despite his sustained 
commitment to theorizing cultural production, Bourdieu (1984) produced 
mainly a negative critique of aesthetics.6
The main exception in this history is the anthropology of art, in which 
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social and cultural analysis has been accompanied by a conviction that mat-
ters of aesthetic and affective experience, as well as “form and the rela-
tive autonomy of form” (Morphy and Perkins 2006, 18), lie within its scope 
(see, e.g., Coote and Shelton 1992; Layton 1991). A great deal of work in the 
anthropology of art has been concerned with charting indigenous art sys-
tems and their aesthetic discourses, often by exploring their difference from 
Western romantic and modernist idioms. Form and aesthetics, then, have 
been central problematics, despite continuing controversy about whether 
the concept of the aesthetic can legitimately be employed cross- culturally 
as an analytical category.7
In parallel with these developments in the academy, since the early 1960s 
a spate of artistic and musical movements developed—among them Fluxus, 
happenings, and installation and intermedia art—that drew attention to 
the ways in which social relations and social situations can participate in 
aesthetic phenomena or contribute to aesthetic experience, a trajectory 
that culminated recently in the upsurge of curatorial, art- critical, and art- 
theoretical writings and debates that erupted around the concept of rela-
tional aesthetics.8 It is in the wake of these movements within art and music 
over the past half- century that a further step in the conceptual apparatus 
underpinning a social aesthetics has become necessary, because together 
these movements foster the recognition not only that art and music are con-
ditioned and shaped by wider social and cultural processes, but also that art 
and music themselves have the potential both to influence social processes 
and to put into practice, model, enact, and experiment with novel sociali-
ties and social relations of diverse kinds. In this light, recent anthropologies 
and sociologies of art and music have proposed that the relationship be-
tween art or music and the social should be conceptualized in terms of bi-
directional influences or mutual mediation (Born 2005, 2011, 2012; DeNora 
2003, 2010; Hennion 1993, 2003). In short, just as social (and economic and 
political) conditions and processes shape art and music, so do art and music 
shape social (and economic and political) life.
It is worth dwelling a little longer, however, on the historical develop-
ments alluded to in the previous paragraph, for the emergence of an array 
of post- formalist, socially inflected artistic movements since the 1960s went 
along with a widespread rejection of the very idea of the aesthetic on the 
part of those propounding what was pointedly termed “anti- aesthetic” art, 
of which conceptual art is generally taken to be the vanguard (Skrebowski 
2009). Indeed, for Peter Osborne (2013, 37), art from the mid- 1960s entailed 
a “struggle over art’s relationship to [the] aesthetic,” a “campaign . . . at 
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once anti- institutional and the bearer of an alternative institutionalization, 
following the temporal logic of artistic avant- gardes.” This campaign “so 
fundamentally transformed the field of practices . . . recognized as ‘art’ . . . 
as to constitute a change in art’s ‘ontology’ or very mode of being. The new, 
postconceptual artistic ontology that was established [was] ‘beyond aes-
thetic’” (37). Against this background, for some commentators, the present 
swell of interest in relational aesthetics should be understood as a belated, 
possibly tamed (and perhaps even ironic) recuperation of elements of the 
earlier, more socially critical stances enunciated by key strands of 1960s and 
post- 1960s art. Hence, Luke Skrebowski (2009) argues compellingly that the 
systematic conceptual art associated with the artist and theorist Jack Burn-
ham, as well as with Hans Haacke, Daniel Buren, Michael Asher, Marcel 
Broodthaers, and others, should be understood genealogically as a precursor 
of later socially oriented art movements, in particular what became known 
as institutional critique,9 as well as relational aesthetics.
Judith Rodenbeck (2011; see also n. 9) contends, in turn, that today’s re-
lational aesthetics and participatory art form part of a genealogy, previ-
ously unrecognized, that should encompass not only such ancestors as John 
Cage’s 4′33″ of 1952, Marcel Duchamp’s lecture, “The Creative Act” of 1957, 
and Umberto Eco’s concept of the “open work” of 1962, but also, above all, 
Allen Kaprow’s invention of happenings and the advent of the Fluxus move-
ment. Running through Rodenbeck’s genealogy are emphases on partici-
pation, the everyday, and the “actively critical, experimental, and funda-
mentally social” nature of these art practices (xiii). As she continues, both 
happenings and Fluxus events were “radically material, immersive, hybrid, 
and performative; they were funky, amateurish, and [again] fundamentally 
social. . . . [Moreover] both happenings and Fluxus events were devised 
as critiques of the dealer- gallery- museum system” (250–51). Indeed, for 
Rodenbeck, it was these movements and their “engagements with process” 
that engendered the “twinned performative, immaterial, hybrid projects 
of conceptual and systems art” (250–51). Benjamin Buchloh (1990) argues 
similarly that conceptual art originates in an “aesthetics of administration” 
where, in Skrebowski’s (2009, 29) words, “ ‘administration’ is understood as 
a direct mimicry of the operating logic of late capitalism and its positivist in-
strumentality.” Buchloh traces the “aesthetics of administration” from roots 
in Joseph Kosuth’s conceptual work through its extension in Haacke’s and 
Buren’s critiques of “the social institutions from which the laws of positivist 
instrumentality and the logic of administration emanate in the first place” 
(Skrebowski 2009, 30). Whatever stance one takes on these complex and en-
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tangled genealogies, commentators appear to agree on the amnesia evident 
in the fact that the earlier era and its “fundamentally social” practices de-
mand a “historical perspective that [the proponents of relational aesthetics 
have] willfully rejected” (Rodenbeck 2011, 247).
In light of these genealogical rereadings, we might observe that the po-
litically and socially inflected movements from the 1960s to the 1980s— 
happenings, Fluxus, conceptual art, and post- conceptual developments such 
as institutional critique—were engaged at the same time in both radically 
expanding and emptying out, to the extent of its absolute negation, the then 
prevailing concept of the aesthetic. Given that it did not seem an option to 
recast the notion of the aesthetic to encompass either the social, participa-
tory, and “lifelike” aspects of 1960s art or its “low theater, cheap entertain-
ment” and carnivalesque (Rodenbeck 2011, 251) qualities, it seems that the 
term was generally abandoned, along with its formalist and essentialist bag-
gage, rather than revised in that era. Equally striking, however, is the soft-
ening evident in a recent return to the notion of the aesthetic in art theory 
and criticism, perhaps in part because of its neglect by key lineages of cul-
tural theory for decades, a return of the repressed that entails a freeing up 
and an overcoming of the earlier rigid dualisms in which formalism was 
equated with the aesthetic and post- or anti- formalism with its negation. 
No doubt, this book—one of whose key terms, “social aesthetics,” originally 
arose independently of the lineages just outlined10—is another, convergent 
emanation of the wider current interest in re- theorizing the aesthetic for 
post- formalist and post- conceptual conditions.11 But the aim of the chapters 
gathered here is not to rehabilitate or return to old conceptions of the aes-
thetic or simply to register the bankruptcy of the old terms and dualisms. It 
is instead to make progressive conceptual leaps toward a radically enlarged, 
productively denatured conception of the aesthetic that is suited to contem-
porary practices, as well as to those earlier practices and genealogies that 
are being recovered by writers like Skrebowski and Rodenbeck—a concep-
tion of the aesthetic as immanently social.12
A social aesthetics can therefore be seen as expanding the traditional 
bounds of aesthetics in two counter- movements. It takes into account the 
social conditions bearing on experiences of and judgments about art objects, 
including how these conditions inform the creation, dissemination, recep-
tion, and import of such judgments. At the same time, a social aesthetics 
enlarges or dissolves the very boundaries that have previously defined art, 
musical, and performance processes and events themselves, showing not 
only how they are mediated by wider social conditions and institutions but 
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also how they are immanently social and may in turn proffer—or better em-
practise—novel realms of social experience, new modes of sociality.13 The 
domains of art, music, and performance therefore cross- fade with the so-
cial, in this way eroding the inflexible categorization of what constitutes 
aesthetic experience and its art or musical objects characteristic of earlier 
aesthetic theories. The essays in this collection take both of these directions, 
sometimes at once. On the one hand, they unpick the social and political 
conditions bearing on aesthetic experiences, objects, and practices; on the 
other hand, they direct attention to the social relations and social dynam-
ics immanent in art, musical, and performance works and practices as aes-
thetic events.
In addition to expounding a social aesthetics, a second theme is central to 
this collection: that of the relation between a social aesthetics and impro-
visation. The aforementioned aspects of social aesthetics make it particu-
larly appropriate to an analysis of improvisatory art, since improvisation, 
regardless of its medium, has often been conceived by both its practition-
ers and its theorists as being intimately inflected by the social formations 
in which it is created and as being, in aesthetically relevant ways, a social 
practice in itself. Improvised art is often created partially as a social com-
mentary—perhaps on an existing art scene, perhaps on a wider set of social 
or political issues (see, e.g., Heble 2000; Jones 1963; Monson 2007); while, 
crucially, the artwork itself—the “object of aesthetic appreciation” in tra-
ditional aesthetics—entails, more obviously than in the non- or less impro-
vised arts, processes of social interaction. In other words, there are both 
social and historical reasons and aesthetic reasons for why the improvised 
arts can be seen as a key conduit for the development of a social aesthetics.14 
First, and with particular regard to improvised music, improvisation is often 
seen as a response and a corrective to the normative ontology of Western art 
music, in which experience of the “work” comes to us embedded in a rigid 
hierarchy descending from composer through performer to audience (Goehr 
1992). From this perspective, the very act of improvising enacts an alterna-
tive to, and embodies a critique and rejection of, the social relations—the 
particular musical division of labor—constructed by the Western art music 
tradition, and is in this critical respect an act not only of social commentary 
but, potentially, of social experimentation.15 Of course, one may consider 
the account of hierarchical relations between composition and improvisa-
tion that grounds this analysis both historically mistaken and musically and 
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conceptually misguided—as, for example, Nicholas Cook does in his chap-
ter in this volume.
Second, and less controversial, group improvisation involves essentially 
dialogical engagements between the improvisers, so that they are compelled 
to communicate with one another, all parties receiving, negotiating, re-
sponding to, and attempting to create meaningful (musical or performance) 
utterances and gestures in real time.16 The precise way this dialogue un-
folds has often been portrayed as the primary locus of the aesthetic distinc-
tiveness of improvisation (Monson 1996), but—the pivotal point—the dia-
logical aesthetic practice is also, immanently, a social interaction. In other 
words, and most obviously with respect to music (but also, as several chap-
ters aver, in the other performance arts), improvisation cannot but emprac-
tise or manifest a social aesthetics. Again, while music- making techniques 
that do not foreground improvisation can themselves enact or inflect social 
processes, and invariably also involve dialogue among performers (Schutz 
1964), differences in degree perhaps do, in this case, result in a difference 
in kind. Music- making practices centered on scores and their interpreta-
tion, and powered by individual author- composers, have for decades at-
tracted the primary attention of the disciplines of musicology, music theory, 
and music analysis, generating copious textual exegeses from a variety of 
theoretical perspectives. Not until the improvisatory arts and their asso-
ciated social aesthetics receive sustained attention of the sort initiated by 
the chapters that follow will we be in a position from which critically to 
judge how and to what degree the improvisatory arts differ from the non- 
improvisatory, and what sort of distinction, if any, can be drawn between 
the social entanglement of and the socialities engendered by these two 
meta- artistic formations.17
The essays in this collection speak to and complement one another in 
 assorted ways, from obvious affinities such as the art form they investigate 
or the theoretical paradigms they use, through the forms of mediation they 
examine or the particular points of contact between the social and the aes-
thetic on which they focus. All of the contributors are aware of the dangers 
that arise from the very outset in discussing improvisation, whose defini-
tion and limits remain contested.18 Rather than attempt to define improvi-
sation in any pure or essential terms, all of the essays identify an improvi-
sational moment or aspect of the practices they examine. In this sense, they 
are all acutely aware that the very notion of improvisation is itself con-
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tested ground—aesthetically and socially—and that distinct practitioners 
and communities, with their particular histories and concerns, character-
ize and theorize improvisation differently. What emerges is a wide- ranging 
series of accounts not just of how the social and the aesthetic relate within 
the context of particular improvisatory arts, but also of how the very notion 
of an improvisatory art is a product of specific aesthetic and social condi-
tions—conditions that often pull in contradictory directions and that may 
themselves be the sites of potent contestation.
Attempts to offer a definitive account of improvisation quickly encounter 
the very different senses that the term has accrued in relation to particular 
media and art forms, their cultures of production, and their communities of 
practice. Improvisation in the cinema, for example, may be taken to center 
on the activity of actors, of technicians (such as those controlling cameras or 
sound- recording devices), or of audiences, or on those elements of everyday 
life (such as crowds or moving vehicles) whose behavior, captured on film, 
is unplanned and unanticipated. In the visual arts, abstract expressionism 
in general, and action painting more specifically, is often said to be paradig-
matic of improvisation, while in music jazz is usually considered the form 
that most obviously brings improvisation to the fore. Yet the connections 
here between the cultures of improvisation at play are far from straight-
forward. In the popular imagination, Jackson Pollock’s middle- period drip 
paintings are said to be visual analogues of bebop, with its casting aside of 
many harmonic rules, its free invention of melody, and its reckless energy.19 
These features of be- bop are often seen as paradigmatic of the emphasis on 
personal agency in jazz improvisation, the fact that jazz solos are a product 
of the improviser’s own decisions and are an expression of his or her indi-
vidual creative voice. Yet at the same time, drip painting by its very nature 
breaks the intentional bonds between artist and canvas, as the precise pat-
tern of paint is to a large degree a result of chance. So improvisation in jazz 
is understood as a highly personal and intentional practice, while action 
painting is analyzed as improvisational yet lacking this grounding in artistic 
intentionality—in fact, as rejecting it.
It is, then, the differences in how the term “improvisation” may be em-
ployed, and the ways in which practices, discourses, and cultures of impro-
visation diverge or are in tension, that are of greatest interest, since they 
point to the radically contingent nature of improvisation as it is understood 
and empractised, and as it has developed historically in relation to specific 
artistic media. Thus, in jazz, improvisatory elements are commonly taken to 
be grounded in the music’s highly intentional nature and its embeddedness 
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in and continuation of a particular musical history, while in abstract expres-
sionism, both intentionality and history are downplayed with an emphasis 
instead on the unconscious and the act of creation. Neither account is false, 
but any attempt to place them both under some unifying concept is bound 
to obscure more than it illuminates—at the same time as ignoring actual 
artistic and social practices and discourses. In attending to these traditions, 
we learn more about the historically path- dependent nature of such prac-
tices and discourses of improvisation—notably, why jazz has been thought 
to be improvisatory, why action painting was seen as a painterly cognate to 
jazz, and how a particular school of free improvisation problematizes these 
connections—than we reveal about any sort of essence of improvisation ap-
plicable across media, art forms, and cultures. At this point, we turn to an 
overview of the chapters, grouped according to key themes and affinities in 
analysis and outlook.
Part I: The Social and the Aesthetic
In distinctive ways, the four chapters in the book’s opening part all ad-
dress improvisation and social aesthetics primarily in relation to music—
or, in one case, music and machines. Improvisation studies in the field of 
music labor under the long history of a musicology that has been directed 
almost exclusively toward Western art music, as well as fixated primarily on 
the analysis of orthodox musical scores, and the inevitable Platonism con-
cerning musical works that follows.20 The substance or content of music is 
equated with music’s notatable or scoreable parameters, and as a corollary 
the aesthetic properties of music have by and large been assumed to be ex-
hausted by those properties that can be scored.21 Improvisation has invari-
ably ended up defined negatively: as a musical practice lacking characteris-
tics of composed music.22 The rise of both the New Musicology and popular 
music studies in the 1980s, with their common engagement with the social 
relations and political circumstances in which music is produced and re-
ceived, signaled a willingness to turn scholarly attention toward so- called 
popular and vernacular musics.
In this historical light, from multiple directions within the study of cul-
tural production, Georgina Born (2010c) has observed, we find calls for a 
theoretical rethinking of the relationship between art and/or music and the 
social. Her chapter opens by remarking how difficult it has proved, none-
theless, to develop an approach adequate to conceptualizing how the social 
enters into the aesthetic operations of both music and art; indeed, music and 
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art, she argues, set some of the most general and obdurate interdisciplinary 
challenges to the humanities and social sciences in this regard, and improvi-
sation poses them particularly acutely. In parallel, Born notes a crisis within 
anthropological and social theory over the past two decades centered on the 
need to reconceptualize the social—or “sociality”—itself, suggesting that 
attending to music and art can advance these wider debates focused on re-
theorizing the social. Born then clarifies a number of ways in which the so-
cial is put into practice and conceptualized in several lineages of contempo-
rary art practice and commentary, from the relational aesthetics of Nicholas 
Bourriaud (2002), through the experimental institutional interventions of 
the Artist Placement Group, to the avowedly activist nature of socially en-
gaged art. She follows the art theorist Claire Bishop (2004) in her important 
challenge to Bourriaud: as Bishop asks, if art is engaged in producing social 
relations, then the question is, “What types of relations are being produced, 
for whom, and why?” In this way, Born highlights the need to develop con-
ceptual tools adequate to the task of disentangling and identifying the dis-
tinctive forms of sociality produced by art and musical practices so as to 
avoid their elision, foster a more acute appreciation of both their singularity 
and their mutual interrelations, and enable fertile comparisons to be drawn 
between contemporary art and improvised music.
Turning to music, Born shows how the primary way in which a social 
aesthetics has been identified is in relation to the immediate “microsociali-
ties” of musical practice and performance, which tend to be idealized and 
to occlude several additional ways that music, and the aesthetic experiences 
that it engenders, mediate and are mediated by social processes. To advance 
 beyond the preoccupation with music’s microsocialities, in the main body of 
the chapter Born proposes an analytical framework centered on four planes 
of the social mediation of music. She then takes this framework to impro-
vised music, in which the articulation of the four planes is manifest in richly 
reticulate socialities, while drawing comparison between the varieties of so-
cial aesthetics in contemporary art and those evident in improvised music. 
Born addresses two improvised music ensembles to exemplify the modes of 
analysis opened up by her framework: the Association for the Advancement 
of Creative Musicians (AAcm), an African American musicians’ collective 
founded in Chicago in 1965, and, particularly, the practices of one of its core 
groups, the Art Ensemble of Chicago; and the Feminist Improvising Group, 
an experimental, all- woman European ensemble working at the borders of 
improvised music and performance art founded in London in 1977 (in which 
Born herself played cello and bass guitar). In an era in which post- formalist 
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music, art, and interdisciplinary practices are vastly expanding the very na-
ture and definition of “art,” “music,” “performance,” and “work,” Born sug-
gests, it is imperative to develop subtler categories of analysis with regard 
to how variously the social enters into and transforms, and may in turn be 
transformed by, the aesthetic.
In chapter 2, Nicholas Cook assails the still common notion that impro-
visation and work performance should be conceived as totally opposed 
“others,” showing that a focus on performance as a social phenomenon can 
reveal their similarities and how they are, in effect, interpenetrating prac-
tices. Taking Corelli’s Violin Sonatas as a case study, he argues that there is 
no categorical distinction between the performance of works and impro-
visation: all score- based performance involves the deconstruction, or situ-
ated interpretation, of preexisting structures, while, conversely, all impro-
visation involves reference to, or the elaboration of, preexisting schemata. 
One result of this is that the notated musical work is itself revealed to be 
a socially and historically contingent construction that emerges out of the 
interactions of musicians whose collective creativity produces the mean-
ing seen retroactively to reside in the musical work. The consequence of 
this analysis is to relocate the generator of aesthetic experience from the 
supposedly inherent qualities of musical works to the social interactions 
that constitute their performances as such interactions are orchestrated by 
scores. Meaning emerges from the only partially predictable engagements 
between individuals, historically conditioned circumstances, and an open 
range of stimuli or signifiers that may be auditory, kinesthetic, visual, or cul-
tural—or, indeed, that may belong, in principle, to any humanly perceptible 
medium.23 Aesthetic ideologies, Cook contends, are what power the false 
dichotomies set up between improvisation and work performance, just as 
they overlook the socialities at play in musical work performance, instead 
concentrating narrowly on the features of scores. Only once we return per-
formance to the center of aesthetic analysis, even when considering Western 
art music, according to Cook, will we be in a position to compare and con-
trast the socialities at play in both improvisational and work- performance 
settings and, in particular, to recognize commonalities between these forms 
of social aesthetics.
Chapter 3, by Ingrid Monson, asks us to guard against another sort of 
a priori, generalizing assumption—namely, that the relationship between 
improvised music and political movements for black equality in the United 
States is easily transferred to other improvising communities concerned 
with issues of cultural identity and politics. Her chapter takes a compara-
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tive perspective on the relationship between improvisation, the aesthetic, 
and the social by contrasting the development of an Afro- modernist aes-
thetic politics in American jazz improvisation of the 1950s and 1960s with 
the concept and process of sensibilisation in the contemporary musical aes-
thetics of Mali. Both musical traditions are highly improvisational and virtu-
osic, but each articulates the connections between social, ethical, religious, 
and musical currents in different ways. In American jazz of the 1950s and 
1960s, the linking of aesthetics and the social involved the connection of 
explicitly modernist aesthetic values—among them originality, formal ex-
perimentation, and vanguardism—to the political and cultural struggle for 
civil rights and black power in a white- majority nation. In Mali, the idea of 
sensibilisation as an important and valorized activity on the part of popu-
lar artists involves the imperative to educate broad audiences about major 
issues of social, political, ethical, and medical concern through lyrics and 
performance styles that raise awareness through a combination of contem-
porary information and traditional modalities of expression. Rather than 
take a critical stance on nationalism, many Malian artists give it a positive 
orientation by exhorting the populace to place their skills and labor in the 
service of developing the country and its international profile. Race was the 
primary social formation examined and articulated in the social aesthet-
ics of American jazz in the 1950s and 1960s; gender, health, and economic 
aspirations provide the central themes articulated by the social aesthetics 
of contemporary Mali.
Monson’s comparative analysis is salutary in showing how the aesthetics 
of improvisation can mediate a variety of relationships to the social, as well 
as diverse political priorities. It also warns against assuming at the outset 
what such a relationship might be. Moreover, Monson’s essay productively 
anatomizes two classic types of the relationship between the aesthetic and 
the social: in the modernist terms in which aesthetic gestures are under-
stood to be inherently negational of the larger social and political order, 
and in the “functional” terms in which long- valued performance idioms are 
taken to be the bearers or carriers of a wider, positive, and transformative 
politics.
Taken together, Cook’s and Monson’s essays serve as useful guides for any-
one studying improvised music, warning against assuming from the outset 
improvisation’s unique and pure status—itself often a product of roman-
tic or essentialist accounts of improvisation’s emancipatory political poten-
tial—and reminding us that careful historical and ethnographic research on 
particular scenes and eras of improvisation are necessary if we are to avoid 
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a “one size fits all” account of the social aesthetics of improvisation. Born’s 
chapter, in turn, offers a rich blueprint for future research by urging us to at-
tend to how the four planes of social mediation that she identifies enter into 
social- aesthetic experience. Her framework also highlights the distinctive 
ways in which the multifaceted socialities enacted by improvised practices 
both operate within particular social, cultural, and historical conditions and 
have the potential strenuously to contribute to their transformation.
In chapter 4, George Lewis adds another crucial dimension by raising the 
need for a detailed and nuanced historical account of the relationships be-
tween improvisation, social aesthetics, and the variable status of the human 
within assemblages of people and machines. While the dominant drift in 
studies of technology- based artistic expression has often been in the direc-
tion of a dehumanization, in which people come to be seen as nodes in 
networked relations, Lewis traces the countervailing tendency to endow 
machines with characteristics that are conventionally human. The call, in 
certain computer- music improvisation practices, to “let the network play” 
expresses the conviction that machines themselves possess attributes con-
ventionally regarded as human, such as subjectivity, affectivity, autonomy, 
and individuality—indeed, that networked machines should be conceived 
of as “quasi- subjects.” Lewis’s genealogy of these practices challenges the 
long- standing, almost unquestioned humanism of theories of improvisation, 
while also participating in the broader enterprise, observable across a broad 
swath of recent writing in aesthetics, of rewriting the history of relational 
aesthetics. For critic- historians such as Bishop, Bourriaud’s account of rela-
tional aesthetics is insufficiently attentive to conceptual and post- conceptual 
art practices from the 1960s onward; but Lewis’s corrective finds a differ-
ent point of departure. Key ideas about the “sociality” of artistic expression 
may be found, Lewis suggests, in landmark works that rethink the relation-
ship between humans and machines. These works include the cybernetics of 
Gregory Bateson and Norbert Weiner, and the insights of Gordon Pask into 
the ways in which machines learn. They include also such works as the Little 
Computer People experiments of Rich Gold and David Crane, in which the 
interactions between humans and computers are marked by attention and 
affection rather than primarily by instrumental transactions from which 
any sense of social relations and human mutuality are absent. While the 
overarching direction in studies of human- computer interaction has been 
toward imagining forms of shared consciousness, Lewis’s richly textured 
history points to the ideal of a common human- machine sociality analogous 
to that which is often claimed for practices of musical  improvisation.
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Part II: Genre and Definition
In traditional philosophical aesthetics, categories of art such as “painting” 
or “sculpture” affect the aesthetic primarily by establishing properties that 
are considered standard, variable, or counter- standard for members of that 
category, and it is the particular combination of such properties that deter-
mines the aesthetic value of the artwork in question.24 Yet such categories 
are often presented as if they were determined solely by consideration of 
the media at play—for example, paint applied in two dimensions, sound, or 
three- dimensionally sculpted solids—and the specificity of the categories 
is deemed to stop at the level of such media. The reasons for this approach 
in traditional aesthetics are complex, but much headway can be made in 
understanding them once it is realized that this project is at its heart onto-
logical and a direct outgrowth of other historical taxonomic enterprises that 
also focused on the materiality and gross form of the entities under con-
sideration—whether they were zoological categories or the periodic table. 
In this approach, the autonomy of the various arts, and the hierarchical re-
lationships assumed to exist between them, were considered to be based 
on the medium associated with each art form and the unique potential for 
crafting each medium that they afforded.
Genre theory, which initially emerged out of a similar program in relation 
to the literary arts (Frow 2005), came with time to shed its natural scientific 
and taxonomic ontological skin. From the early 1980s, particularly under 
the influence of film theory (Altman 1981, 1987, 1996; Neale 1980, 1990), the 
analysis of genre developed in less formalist directions and became increas-
ingly focused on how genre categories are themselves intimately entangled 
in social processes, from the production and marketing operations of the 
media and culture industries and their attempted construction of reliable 
audiences, to the responses of actual viewers—where the latter process can 
entail both the reproduction of existing social identity formations and the 
forging of new coalitions or articulations between such social formations 
(Brackett 2005, 2016; Born 2005, 2011). Commitment to a certain artistic, 
literary, or musical genre (abstract expressionism, free verse, death metal) 
can be understood, then, both as expressing a constellation of social com-
mitments and as partially constitutive of such commitments.
In this light, the chapters by David Brackett and Eric Lewis examine the 
dual aesthetic and social processes at work in the constitution and evolu-
tion of musical genres, investigating, in particular, the social dimensions 
of disputes about genre—dimensions often obscured by the overtly aes-
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thetic language in which they are conducted. Brackett uncovers the com-
plex history of the creation and reception of what may appear to be just a 
“novelty item” in Count Basie’s catalogue (although it was his biggest hit): 
the track “Open the Door, Richard!” By examining the history of Basie’s 
version alongside that of others, Brackett reveals a series of complex social 
and political battles that were set in motion concerning the whole notion of 
“popular music” and who could, or should, lay claim to this meta- genre. As 
Brackett argues, genres are invariably embroiled in plays of power and pres-
tige, struggles in which social relations and aesthetics are intertwined but 
in which the evolving connections between the social and the aesthetic, as 
they fuel the formation and transformation of genres, are rarely publicly ac-
knowledged. He uncovers how the concept of improvisation was understood 
in the particular historical situation surrounding “Open the Door, Richard!” 
and how improvisation figured into the distinctions made between different 
genres of music and their social connotations. In this way, Brackett estab-
lishes the often hidden ways in which the real or perceived presence or ab-
sence of improvisation can influence the social meanings attributed to, as 
well as the social constituencies reached by, particular musical genres.
Brackett emphasizes that what was at stake in the “battle” between popu-
lar music and jazz in the genre constellations of this era concerned at its 
core issues of racial identity and of the representation of nonwhite others 
in music—issues that turned on and stirred up the inflammatory percep-
tion that music encoded social identities and social relationships. This is a 
theme picked up by Lewis, in chapter 6, in his discussion of the practices, 
reception, and commentary surrounding the music of the AAcm in Paris 
in 1969. The Association’s works were often received against a backdrop of 
black radical politics and interpreted in such terms. Lewis shows how the 
members of the AAcm refused to limit their music to membership of one 
musical genre; indeed, going further, he argues that they consciously prob-
lematized the genre membership of their own works, in this way forcing 
critics and audiences to question the genre designations at play. By doing so, 
Lewis contends, the members of the AAcm were “aesthetically thickening” 
their works, while at the same time guarding against any assumption that 
there was a single social (antiracist) agenda behind their music. Lewis there-
fore extends Brackett’s claim that genres bring social relations and musical 
sounds into mobile interrelations by suggesting that the AAcm transformed 
the socially charged debates about the genre membership of their music into 
an aesthetic value. In this way, the AAcm members took a stand against both 
aesthetic and social essentialism, as well as against any social reductionism 
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in the interpretation of their music and practice. Arguably, Lewis suggests, 
they were at the same time resisting and articulating alternatives to the 
forms of racial essentialism to which they were often subjected.
Chapter 7, by Darren Wershler, adopts a quite different approach to genre 
in the contemporary arts. It addresses what is at stake in the contestation of 
genres and, particularly, those that foreground improvisation, arguing that 
such contestation comes focally to how the nature and location of creativity 
are understood. Wershler asks whether there is such a thing as “uncreative” 
improvisation, and if so, how it would operate. Pointing to the pervasive 
backdrop of modernist assumptions concerning the nature and value of cre-
ativity in the arts, Wershler suggests that uncreative improvisation may well 
be able to animate and articulate social critique more effectively than those 
kinds of improvisation that continue to take creativity as the hallmark of the 
artistically transgressive.
To develop his arguments, Wershler focuses on the work of the writer and 
artist Kenneth Goldsmith, particularly in his capacity as a disc jockey for the 
free- form New Jersey radio station wFmu. It has become increasingly com-
mon for critics, theorists, and practitioners to invoke the dj as the paradig-
matic authorial figure in contemporary culture, a figure taken to engage in 
practices of selection and combination of preexistent elements from the ar-
chive as a wellspring of new cultural forms (e.g. Bourriaud 2005; cf. Oswald 
2006). What often remain uninterrogated, however, are a number of mod-
ernist formulations lying behind this valorization, in particular the view 
that creativity, novelty, and even “true art” are the inherently valuable re-
sults of the dj’s inspired curations and manipulations. Wershler argues that 
since the 1950s, when business culture began to claim creativity for itself, 
the arts have seen a corresponding movement into the deliberately boring 
and the uncreative. Against this background, he suggests, novelty and cre-
ativity can no longer signify in the manner that modernist thinking presup-
poses. Wershler examines a variety of Goldsmith’s on- air performances in 
light of his writings on the subject of uncreativity to reexamine key terms 
in the discourse around improvisation and creativity. Goldsmith’s oeuvre 
is shown to be worthy of consideration precisely because it works explic-
itly with categories that many practitioners and critics extolling the virtues 
of improvisation and improvisatory creativity exclude: the uncreative and 
the useless. Goldsmith’s work, Wershler contends, intervenes in the ways 
in which ideas of the creative and creativity circulate within contemporary 
culture, moving between discourses that are, variously, legal, entrepreneur-
ial, technology- centered, and aesthetic in character.
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Part III: Sociality and Identity
The third part of the book is concerned with two dimensions of a social 
aesthetics: on the one hand, with the particular types of social relations 
that take shape in collaborative improvised practices as they relate to—
and potentially critique or reimagine—the standard social arrangements, 
or division of labor, and the dominant institutional forms that support art, 
film, or music making; and, on the other hand, with how certain lived cate-
gories of social identity and social difference—those relating, for example, 
to sexuality, gender, race, or class—“get into” improvised practices and may 
also be transformed by those practices. The chapters therefore engage not 
only with issues of social identity as they are mediated by an aesthetics of 
improvisation, but also with improvisation as a locus for the generation of 
social relations—including the inherent potential for experimentation, and 
for the cultivation of interpersonal empathy, in those relations.
In chapter 8, Lisa Barg begins her essay on Billy Strayhorn, best known as 
the longtime arranger for Duke Ellington, with a fruitful question: “What so-
cialities are involved in the aesthetic practices of arranging?” As her analysis 
shows, improvisation may serve as a potent site for the articulation of his-
torically marginalized identities, in part through the forms of intimacy and 
negotiation that improvisation typically necessitates. Barg focuses on Stray-
horn’s works as a vocal arranger, arguing that these collaborations both 
paralleled and articulated his status as a gay, but largely closeted, African 
American man. Strayhorn’s dissident sexual identity required that he work 
in the shadows, as a collaborator, in a distanced but empathetic space from 
which his musical voice could merge with and give shape to the voices of 
others. The very act of arranging, it might be suggested, is itself a difficult, 
almost a “queer,” practice, given traditional musicological categories, in-
asmuch it situates or insinuates itself ambiguously within the composer- 
conductor- performer division of labor central to Western art music. Barg 
shows how the “queerness” of arranging as an aesthetic enterprise, particu-
larly given its ambiguous relationship to both the scored and the improvisa-
tory elements of Ellington’s music, marked it as an ideal social location from 
which to enact queer labor.
Strayhorn’s collaborations with singers in the activity of vocal arrang-
ing opened up spaces of interpersonal dialogue, but they were not (or not 
always) spaces of transparent and full communication. As Barg shows, 
Strayhorn’s own “queer” identity moved between presence and absence, 
manifesting itself subtly in musical inflections and transgressions. While the 
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music that resulted from these partnerships is easily read as proof of suc-
cessful collaborations, it is more usefully grasped as having been produced 
through complex negotiations in which Strayhorn’s “sonic empathy” was 
key even if it often went unrecognized.
In her afterword to the anthology Black Popular Culture, Michele Wallace 
(1998, 345) offered a dissent from the ways in which music had come fully 
to circumscribe what she called “the parameters of intellectual discourse in 
the African- American community.” Among other things, Wallace called for 
greater attention to the histories and accomplishments of African American 
visual cultures. In chapter 9, Tracey Nicholls does not set music against the 
visual arts. Instead, she centers her essay on the role played by improvisa-
tion in the often overlooked visual- art criticism of the African American cul-
tural theorist bell hooks. Nicholls argues that hooks’s theory of the visual 
arts is grounded in an ethics of love that is informed by her appreciation of 
jazz and of the plurality of creative voices that improvisatory arts such as 
jazz both presume and place in dialogue.
One key reason for the neglect of hooks’s writings on art, Nicholls sug-
gests, is her emphasis on the aesthetics of ordinary craft objects, often cre-
ated by individuals who stand outside the institutionally sanctioned art 
worlds. From the perspective of dominant art discourses, such individuals 
and their art are marked as deviant. The art objects they produce are often 
viewed as “mere” arrangements, put together to serve practical purposes 
(e.g., quilts); such art objects therefore occupy an ambiguous space between 
that of autonomous artworks and wholly functional things. The improvisa-
tory, in this kind of art making, is most evident in the use of discarded, frag-
mented, and everyday materials. For Nicholls, drawing on hooks, salvage 
art, mosaic forms, and graffiti art all involve ways of drawing on everyday 
environments in order to bring aesthetic value to such environments and 
thus participate in processes of empowerment. Moreover, the vernacular 
space of art making is one in which the possibility of participation is ex-
tended to ever increasing numbers of people, refuting the social and cultural 
closures inherent in the institutionalization of the arts and music, just as the 
ongoing improvisation of novel and hybrid artistic forms challenges the ex-
clusionary conceptions of artistic legitimacy that prevail in the art world.
Complementing the previous two chapters, chapter 10, by Marion Froger, 
examines an often forgotten moment in the history of improvisatory art 
practices. In the early 1960s, the filmmakers who made up the French New 
Wave turned to improvisation in a number of ways. To arrive on a film set (or 
a real street) with a camera and a minimal script was to leave oneself open 
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to the unpredictable unfolding of real- life events, which filmmakers might 
follow or in which they might intervene. In this respect, the fiction films of 
the New Wave drew on principles of unscripted spontaneity that had already 
proved revolutionary in the field of documentary film. At the same time, by 
allowing actors to improvise their dialogue, filmmakers such as Jean- Luc 
Godard produced situations in which the relationships between characters 
on screen developed through processes of adjustment and negotiation simi-
lar to those that mark relationships in real life.
As Froger makes clear in her detailed study of responses to these films, 
improvisation raised the question of social relations at multiple levels. For 
craftspeople working in the mainstream film industry, improvisation repre-
sented a challenge to long- standing protocols and trade union agreements 
in which professional roles were clear, dialogue and camera angles were 
planned in advance, and a polished quality was the ultimate objective. 
With their disregard for such protocols, the improvising filmmakers of the 
New Wave were viewed widely as self- indulgent, privileged upstarts. The 
changes in profilmic practice were, then, dual: improvisation on screen en-
gendered novel social relations, which in turn fueled, and were entangled 
with, aesthetic changes; while experimentation with professional roles also 
amounted to a challenge to the established division of labor in filmmaking. 
At the same time, audiences might respond to improvisatory practices in at 
least two distinct ways. From one perspective, improvising was a gesture 
of generosity on the part of filmmakers, who invited viewers to enter into 
something akin to their own social worlds and to watch intimate relation-
ships take shape before the camera. From another perspective, improvisa-
tion was a gesture of disdain toward audiences, who found themselves ex-
cluded from the seemingly frivolous interactions of an in- group accused 
of lacking any sense of professional or artistic responsibility. Froger shows 
how the controversies and critical dissension that surrounded New Wave 
films were often based on judgments of filmmakers’ relationship to society 
at large. Had these filmmakers produced a new, inclusive cinema that simul-
taneously challenged decaying industry structures and outdated aesthetic 
codes while embracing audiences in new and democratic ways? Or were 
they simply the bearers of a generational self- centeredness marked by con-




The three chapters in this final part of the collection all focus in distinc-
tive ways on how a social aesthetics might be conceived primarily in re-
lation to performance. In addition, Susan Kozel and Winfried Siemerling 
both address how new technologies, when employed in the creation of art, 
can mediate both aesthetic and social change. More specifically, they dem-
onstrate how social limitations often seen to be inherent in the very tech-
nology at hand can be transcended in aesthetically productive ways via di-
verse improvisatory gestures. Siemerling’s chapter focuses on the practice 
of “turntablism” and, in particular, the use of hip hop by the Canadian poet 
and writer Wayde Compton to channel and rearticulate local black history 
and diasporic subjectivities. Siemerling argues that Compton’s precise ways 
of employing turntablism and the spoken word operate both as a mode of 
performance and as a means by which to present and remix very specific 
aspects of black British Columbian history in nuanced terms. He contends 
that this is the case despite the common complaint against turntablism spe-
cifically, and against bricolage art more generally, that such cut- and- paste 
methods occlude cultural specificity and lack the ability to mediate any con-
tent with real cultural depth and specificity. Siemerling shows how Compton 
manages to transcend such charges through his highly improvisatory use of 
turntablism grounded in the signifying tradition,25 in which repetition with 
a signal difference is considered a crucial means by which personal and 
community narratives can be both retained and modified to speak to new, 
pressing social concerns. In this way, the chapter enables us to understand 
Compton’s artistic choices as contributions to a transformative, improvisa-
tional social aesthetics that is transcultural in its reach yet articulates a very 
particular and local sense of social identity and community.
In chapter 12, Kozel addresses how a social aesthetics attuned to the senses 
might be developed in relation to contact improvisation in dance, with par-
ticular attention to touch—between audience members and performers, and 
between dancers as mediated through mobile technologies. Kozel’s interest 
is in interpreting the aesthetics of dance improvisation through a variant of 
phenomenology to reveal “the dynamic ebb and flow of states of encounter 
of all the participants,” in which everyone is, in some sense, a performer. 
To do this, Kozel focuses on the interplay between improvisation and inter- 
corporeality in two dance events—one of them, IntuiTweet, entailing re-
flexive analysis of a collaborative dance and media project, employing the 
networked digital space of Twitter and sms messaging, in which she was 
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herself involved. With reference to Rancière’s (2009a) framing of aesthet-
ics as a reconfiguration of perception, as well as Derrida’s (2005) interest 
in the place of the anaesthetic in the aesthetic, Kozel highlights how the 
interactions immanent in these dance improvisations point to the social as 
innately inter- corporeal—where, through the late work of Merleau- Ponty, 
inter- corporeality is understood as a field of multiple embodied exchanges.
The first dance event, Small Acts, centered on “undecided situations” con-
structed for audience members as they followed dancers moving through a 
series of rooms and corridors, producing ambiguous transformations with 
the effect that audience members shifted between being spectators and 
participants. Through this fluid movement—across spaces and roles—the 
rhythm of the event was infused, Kozel suggests, with collective waves of 
affective anticipation. The fabric of aesthetic experience derived, she ar-
gues, from the improvised, anticipatory movements through diverse spaces 
of performers and audience, so that those who “watched” also contributed 
their own improvised movements to the event. In contrast, IntuiTweet, an 
experimental collaboration between three dancer- researchers, points to 
how social media can enhance and choreograph a social aesthetics. Tasked 
with noticing moments of their own “movement intuition,” the dancers used 
Twitter to convey to one another what they were sensing and how they 
were moving at any given moment. When a tweet was received as a text, 
the dancer was expected to improvise the movement received, enacting a 
shift in bodily state or repositioning of limbs, and then to respond. This gen-
erated a flurry of movement messages, an asynchronous flow of kinesthe-
tic exchanges afforded by the convergence between dance improvisation 
and social networking. While the contact improvisation in Small Acts con-
sisted of inter- corporeal improvisation between audience and performers, 
in IntuiTweet it was fostered by movement translated into and disseminated 
as texts and then retranslated and reenacted through a distributed network 
of bodies. These improvisations, Kozel contends, offer an understanding of 
the anaesthetic not as the opposite of the aesthetic but as a field of less 
categorizable qualities of social interaction; at the same time, in Rancière’s 
terms, they create and re- create bonds between people, giving rise to new 
modes of confrontation or participation.
In contrast to Siemerling and Kozel, Zoë Svendsen is concerned in chap-
ter 13 with the contributions of improvisation to the socialities immanent 
in theatrical work, and thereby to a social aesthetics—given that theater is 
“always already relational, always rehearsing the possibility of social com-
munities.” She observes that the socialities produced by the spatial and lit-
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erary codes of the theater are rarely remarked on by theater scholars. She 
sets out, however, from Michael Fried’s infamous call to “defeat theater,” 
since for Fried theater—with its acknowledgment of co- presence in the re-
lation between artwork and audience—is an affront to “modernist sensi-
bility.” It is precisely against such a view, Svendsen argues, that a great deal 
of contemporary theatrical practice has been predicated on theater’s inher-
ent “doubleness”: “its capacity not only for representing social relations, but 
also for shaping the [actual] sociality of the occasion.” Svendsen traces the 
history of changing conventions of the social relations of theater, noting, 
for example, how George Devine, the founder of the Royal Court in London, 
promoted Friedian artistic autonomy, denying the permeability of social and 
aesthetic practices specific to theater. But in parallel, she notes those many 
movements—“from the anti- institutional avant- garde practices of Surreal-
ists, Dadaists, and Futurists, to Brechtian epic, to the socialist theater com-
panies that took theater directly ‘to the people’” in Britain between the 
1960s and the 1980s—that have experimented in diverse ways with direct 
social engagements between writers, actors, and audiences.
This history forms the backdrop to Svendsen’s reflexive analysis of the 
place of improvisation within dramaturgical practice today. She notes that 
although improvisation plays a key role in theater as a socially oriented 
practice, its provenance is unclear. In some accounts, all acting is taken to 
be improvisatory; in others, improvisation is equated with values of intu-
ition, immediacy, or spontaneity; in yet others, improvisation stands as a 
supposed bulwark against theater’s reification and commodification. Three 
case studies allow Svendsen to convey a range of ways in which improvisa-
tion can enliven the social aesthetics of theater. The first, Discombobulator, 
highlights through improvisation the violence of a traditional proscenium- 
arched theatrical space that frames every action as spectacle. The perfor-
mance thematizes entrapment within an aesthetic structure and the limita-
tions of human agency while inviting the ready, empathic collusion of the 
audience. Four Men and a Poker Game demonstrates, in turn, how improvisa-
tion in performance can collapse the distance implicitly posited by the the-
atrical frame between fictional time and real- time experience in the venue, 
allowing the performance to converge with actual social engagements be-
tween audience and performers. 3rd Ring Out: Rehearsing the Future goes 
further, dramatizing the porousness of social and aesthetic relations in 
theatrical process. Premised on the uncanny parallels between the sce-
narios provided to the civil servant “players” of nuclear war exercises and 
the instructions given to actors when improvising in rehearsal, the project 
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 rehearses the ethical dilemmas likely to be thrown up by the crises brought 
about by climate change. Combining performance, game, simulation, and 
artistic event, 3rd Ring Out invites audience members both to encounter 
and to improvise around these ethical dilemmas. The piece elides artistic 
and social practice in the production of an emergency planning- style event; 
through research, discussion, and voting, participants shape both dramatic 
narrative and potential human futures, while the sometimes tense and vola-
tile socialities that arise during the performance problematize the equation 
of participation with the creation of “community” that is so central to Bour-
riaud’s relational aesthetics.
As a group, the three chapters in part IV reveal the varied, subtle, and 
often reflexive ways in which new performance techniques traversing the-
ater, dance, music, poetry, and new media propose or presume new relation-
ships between the social and the aesthetic. The chapters point, as well, to the 
productive role played by improvisation as the historical divisions between 
artistic disciplines are challenged and as new assemblages of technologies 
and people are brought into being.
Across different artistic disciplines, improvisation has meant different 
things, followed distinct (though sometimes intersecting) historical trajec-
tories, and been theorized with varying degrees of complexity. If this seems 
like an opportune time in which to pursue a more integrated account of 
improvisation, it is in part because paradigms of performance and improvi-
sation have become so prevalent in social theory today, just as present- day 
cultural theory is also preoccupied with a set of issues whose pertinence for 
thinking about improvisation seems clear. Such issues include the status of 
the creative gesture, the mutability of the performing body, scrutiny of the 
work concept, and the multiple ways in which social relations may be artis-
tically, dramaturgically, and musically located, constructed, or (re)imag-
ined. Concerns such as these are at the heart of productive new ways of 
thinking about improvisation, but as this volume demonstrates, they have 
also animated the common project of a social aesthetics, which necessarily 
grapples with their fertile entanglement. This entanglement is a thread 
woven through the chapters in this book, inviting further dialogue and both 
attesting to and calling for the creation of new modes and spaces of inter- 




1. It will not concern us here whether such critiques of Kantian aesthetics are 
accurate. The single most influential Kantian text concerning aesthetics is his third 
and final critique, The Critique of Judgment (Kritik der Urteilskraft), published in 
1790. A potted history of the reception and critique of Kant with respect to the aes-
thetic issues central to this volume would have one focus on the distinction Kant 
draws, but does not always flag, between free ( frei) and adherent (anhangend) 
beauty (see esp. section 16 of The Critique), and his focus on free beauty, coupled 
with his claim that music is an example of an art that manifests free beauty. For 
discussions of this distinction, see Kalar 2006; Lorand 1989; Scarré 1981; Zuck-
ert 2007. This distinction, which suggests a purely formalist aesthetics, was later 
taken up by Eduard Hanslick, whose influential formalist aesthetics of music in 
turn became a model for later formalist aesthetics applied to visual art: see Hans-
lick 1986. For Kant’s influence on Hanslick, see Kivy 2009. Kant’s theory suggests 
to many that abstract nonrepresentational art also manifests free beauty and so 
is open to formalist aesthetic analysis. Of course, the rise of formalist aesthetics 
more generally, to which social aesthetics in part aspires to be a response and a 
corrective, parallels the growth of nonrepresentational art as it became character-
istic of modernism. A related point of criticism is the Kantian belief, the details of 
which are open to assorted interpretations, that aesthetic judgments have norma-
tive force—that when one makes an aesthetic judgment, it is with the conviction 
that others should share it—and that, in some sense or other, such judgments have 
an objective weight. While much philosophical aesthetics in the Anglo- American 
tradition continues to grapple with Kantian aesthetics, even when critical of it 
either wholly or in part, Continental philosophical traditions have tended to re-
ject the Kantian paradigm. Indeed, at the risk of overgeneralizing, it is fair to say 
that Continental aesthetics is unified by its rejection of the Kantian paradigm 
and, in particular, what is seen as its failure to investigate critically the actual 
lived conditions under which aesthetic judgments are made, and thus a failure 
to recognize and note the centrality of the social and political dimensions of our 
aesthetic lives, which may indeed partially constitute them. Taking such failures 
seriously has led to the development of aesthetic theories that have emerged hand 
in hand with new theoretical paradigms in sociological, anthropological, and cul-
tural theory (along with new theories in art history), and that are all the richer 
for this. For these reasons, among others, anti- Kantian aesthetics tend to focus on 
how our aesthetic lives operate as parts of greater systems and to argue that the 
constellations of relations we stand in with respect to other individuals, groups, 
institutions, and social or political processes must be part of any useful aesthetic 
inquiry. Perhaps the single most developed criticism of a Kantian paradigm, and 
one that indicates the productivity of empirical research into the structures and 
dynamics of the consumption of art and culture, is Bourdieu 1984. In his lengthy 
introduction, Bourdieu makes clear the anti- Kantian nature of his work and what 
he sees as shortcomings in the Kantian program.
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2. This critical observation has parallels with criticisms of methodological indi-
vidualism in the social sciences, in that methodological individualism takes social 
and cultural processes to be explicable primarily in terms of the summation of 
individual actions and intentions.
3. One important reference for adopting such a general stance in regard to mat-
ter and materiality is Bennett 2010. In this volume, we add to this general stance, 
however, a series of explorations of the particular, especially vital contributions 
of art objects and events, and the forms of experience they engender, to such 
socio- material assemblages.
4. The locus classicus of such arguments is the work of the anthropologist 
Steven Feld: see, among others, Feld 1982, 1988, 1994, 1996.
5. For a critical overview of these developments, including an assessment of 
Bourdieu’s contributions to the sociology of art and culture, as well as the limi-
tations of his work, see Born 2010c. Born’s article centers, however, on dem-
onstrating the wider significance and fertility of anthropological approaches to 
music, art, and performance because of their commitment to addressing, in non-
reductive ways, the interrelations between their aesthetic, social, and material 
dimensions.
6. The most interesting alternative to this negative position in Bourdieu’s 
oeuvre is his dialogue with Hans Haacke, in which he engages sympathetically 
with an artist the subtlety of whose aesthetic and other decisions are inevitably 
central to the conversation: see Bourdieu and Haacke 1995.
7. See the debate over the proposition “Aesthetics is a cross- cultural category” 
in Ingold 1996. The debate moves between, on the one hand, a critique of the 
cultural- historical specificity of Kantian aesthetic discourses and, on the other, 
the view that the aesthetic can usefully be employed as an analytical category to 
sensitize anthropologists to the existence (or nonexistence), and the nature, of 
“emic” discourses concerning form and sensory experience, pleasure and value.
8. The founding text is Bourriaud 2002; see also Kester 2004. Critical responses 
include Bishop 2004, 2005; Downey 2007; Foster 2006; Martin 2007. Arguably, 
the kinds of practices gathered under this debate extend, and participate in, a 
long line of development from the Fluxus- inspired performance art and happen-
ings of the 1960s, in which the lines between artist and audience were blurred 
and the site and the events and socialities taking place within it became the focus 
of aesthetic experience: see, among others, Baas 2011; Friedman 1998; Higgins 
2002; Rodenbeck 2011.
9. On the art movement that has become known as institutional critique, see 
Alberro and Stimson 2009; Fraser 2005; Möntmann 2006.
10. The term “social aesthetics” as employed in this volume, and the project for 
this book, arose from the Improvisation and Social Aesthetics research group set 
up in 2007 at the start of the Improvisation, Community and Social Practice major 
research program funded mainly by Canada’s Social Science and Humanities Re-
search Council and based at the University of Guelph, the University of British 
Columbia, and McGill University. The research group was convened by Georgina 
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Born and included many of the scholars who have contributed to this volume. 
The conceptual basis of the book was further developed by a conference held at 
McGill in 2010 at which all the contributors gave papers.
11. In this vein, and symptomatically, Osborne (2013, 116) has recently written 
about post- conceptual art as “both aesthetic and conceptual” and about concep-
tual art itself as “the experience of the impossibility/fallacy of the absolutization 
of the anti- aesthetic.”
12. It is striking how for some theorists this conclusion—fueled by the burgeon-
ing art history of the 1960s to the 1990s—is unsustainable, even unthinkable, per-
haps due to the haunting specter, particularly for those espousing philosophical 
aesthetics, of sociological reduction. Having worked through certain social fea-
tures of post- conceptual art, such as its alternative institutionalization and the 
collectivization of the “artist- function,” Osborne (2013, 48), for example, arrives 
at six “insights” or characteristics that, he argues, constitute the “condition of 
possibility of a postconceptual art.” But none of the six touch on art’s social di-
mensions, even those that Osborne himself has adumbrated. Instead, they dwell 
on art’s “conceptuality,” materiality, and “radically distributive” or “irreducibly 
relational” nature. Rather than re- theorize art’s “ineliminable” aesthetic dimen-
sion, Osborne ultimately develops a post- Adornian conception of the aesthetic 
dimension by equating it with art’s “materialization,” that is, its “felt, spatio- 
temporal” presentation—where this excludes from feeling, space, and time any 
social dimension. Indeed, here and elsewhere, for Osborne the “spatial” (in the 
guise of the geopolitical, or art’s transnationalization or globalization) appears 
to represent an inadequate stand- in, theoretically, for any diagnosis of art’s  plural 
social mediations.
13. The term “empractise” is intended to work against any Cartesian fallacy 
concerning the nature of dialogism, for the dialogical nature of improvised prac-
tices cannot be understood in the terms of cognitive processes that “direct” the 
performing body or the social processes inherent in dialogism. Rather, the dialo-
gism is a matter of how embodied gestures and responses directly put into prac-
tice—that is, empractise—processes and interactions that are at once both aes-
thetic and social.
14. Two extreme theoretical positions concerning the relationship of musical 
improvisation (directed toward jazz in both cases) to social and political com-
mentary and action, both of which form the loci of major schools of thought 
on this issue, are Theodor Adorno’s writings on jazz and Jacques Attali’s Noise 
(1985). For a useful, though not exhaustive, collection of Adorno’s writings on 
jazz, see Adorno 2002a. The two authors form the poles of a continuum that, at 
one end, portrays jazz as devoid of any political effectiveness due to its commodi-
fied and standardized tendencies, and, at the other end, views jazz improvisation 
as having the potential to model or perform new forms of social and political re-
lation. The essays in this collection, which address improvisation in a number of 
media, adopt a range of views gathered toward the latter pole while contending 
emphatically that any analysis of this propensity cannot be culled from a raw ac-
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count of improvisation as a technique or practice, but requires consideration of 
the social and historical conditions within which particular media, genres and 
acts of improvisation proceed.
15. For a striking analysis of the construction of a hierarchical relation between 
composition and improvisation in a non- Western classical musical tradition, see 
Nooshin 2003.
16. While dialogism is foregrounded in group musical improvisations, it is also 
characteristic of other forms of improvisation—notably, in dance, theater, and 
performance art: cf. the chapters by Kozel and Svendsen in this volume.
17. For example, while both a free improvisation ensemble and a string quar-
tet require careful acts of listening, responding, and communicating among 
their members, in the former case responsibility for the sounds produced resides 
wholly with each member of the ensemble, while in the latter case the responsi-
bility for many aesthetically relevant decisions resides outside the ensemble, with 
the composer, thereby being predetermined and imposed. For a contrary view, 
however, see Benson 2003.
18. But for a productive attempt and an overview, see Bailey 1992.
19. Indeed, it is often claimed that Pollock was a fan of Charlie Parker, listening 
to him while creating his drip paintings. Yet this is inaccurate: Pollock’s interest 
in jazz was limited to trad and Dixieland. Helen Harrison, curator of the Pollock- 
Krasner House and Study Center, has lectured on this topic (see https://www 
.youtube.com/watch?v=3H5hPbb3sPg), as well as on the links often drawn be-
tween Pollock and jazz.
20. For discussions and developments of musical Platonism, see Dodd 2007; 
Kivy 1993a, 1993b; Levinson 1990a, 1990b. For a critical discussion of the history 
of musical Platonism, see Goehr (1992).
21. It is important to note, however, that many types of music—not all of them 
centered on improvisation—have been subject to neglect in terms of aesthetic 
analysis because of the primacy accorded by musicology to those musical parame-
ters that can be readily notated in the orthodox score. Musicology has been slow, 
then, to respond to a series of developments since the 1950s—experimental 
music, electronic, electroacoustic and computer music, interactive, site- specific, 
and installation- based sound art, and electronic popular music—in which musi-
cal thought and practice focus on timbral, rhythmic, pitch- based, performance, 
or conceptual gestures that are difficult to capture in orthodox musical notation, 
where the ontological distinction between music, sound, and environment may 
be disturbed, and where the creative possibilities of recording and amplification, 
live performance and installations are brought aesthetically to the fore.
22. For a seminal analysis of this kind of “othering” of improvisation, but with 
reference to a non- Western classical music tradition, see, again, Nooshin 2003.
23. For a compatible analysis of how music produces meaning, see Born 1993b.
24. For the classic article on this topic, see Walton 1970.
25. For the most extensive discussion of signifying, see Gates 1988.
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chApter 1
AFTER RELATIONAL AESTHETICS
Improvised Music, the Social, and 
(Re)Theorizing the Aesthetic
Georgina Born
What does it mean to speak of a social aesthetics and, in particular, to do 
so in relation to improvised music? In this mainly conceptual chapter I de-
velop some proposals concerning the relations between improvised music 
and the social and pursue the implications for retheorizing the aesthetic. I 
will be concerned with the social mediation of music, where mediation is 
conceived as a two- way or co- productive process. As we will see, music en-
genders certain kinds of socialities, yet it also refracts or transforms exist-
ing social formations. This conceptual project responds to a series of over-
lapping movements: the demand issued by scholarship in ethnomusicology, 
musicology, popular music studies, jazz studies, and sociology of music for 
progress in theorizing the heterogeneity and the different scales of music’s 
social mediation; the drive in art theory and criticism to take seriously and 
analyze those facets of recent art practices in which the social features as 
a dimension of aesthetic experience; and the concern within anthropologi-
cal and social theory to reconceptualize the social—or “sociality”—itself 
(Latour 2005; Long and Moore 2012a, 2012b; Strathern 1990). These move-
ments do not exist in isolation: that they are intertwined is evident in the 
way that ethnography, the method of anthropology, has become involved in 
contemporary collaborative art (Foster 1995; Rutten et al. 2013; Schneider 
and Wright 2006, 2010) and music practices (Born 2013a).
Despite this convergence, it has proved surprisingly difficult to develop 
an approach adequate to the challenge of conceptualizing how the social 
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enters into the aesthetic operations of both music and art. Indeed, music 
and art set general challenges to social theory in this regard, and improvised 
music poses them acutely. As I will show, however, it is precisely because 
of these challenges that music and art, and improvised music in particular, 
can also be generative and advance the wider debates about theorizing the 
social. This chapter therefore bears on the conceptual heart of this volume 
as a whole.
To begin, let us consider a number of symptomatic and contrasting ways 
in which the social enters into contemporary art practices and critical dis-
courses. The most prominent is the paradigm of relational aesthetics enun-
ciated by the critic and curator Nicholas Bourriaud (2002), often taken to be 
emblematic in the analysis of present- day art. Relational aesthetics places 
art’s orchestration of socialities at the core of a new conception of the aes-
thetic. Bourriaud contends, in a programmatic text, that art from the 1990s 
has revolved around “practices which take as their theoretical and practical 
point of departure the whole of human relations and their social context,” 
which he equates with the production of a “specific sociability” (16, 113). 
Relational aesthetics is therefore committed to assessing contemporary art 
practices “on the basis of the inter- human relations which they represent, 
produce or prompt” (112). Bourriaud’s explanation for this turn concerns the 
“extraordinary upsurge of social exchanges” given by greater mobility, rapid 
urbanization, and the expansion of travel and telecommunications since the 
Second World War. At the same time, pervasive commercialization reaches 
into human affairs so that “the social bond has turned into a standardized 
artifact” and “the space of current relations is . . . severely affected by gen-
eral reification” (9). In reaction, the new practices, which he locates within 
a genealogy of post- conceptual art, take as their point of departure intersub-
jectivity, interaction, and proximity, with the effect that “alternative forms 
of sociability, critical models and moments of constructed conviviality are 
worked out” (43–54). “Artistic praxis,” he contends in a resonant phrase, 
“appears these days to be a rich loam for social experiments” (9).
In one direction, “the artwork of the 1990s turns the beholder into a neigh-
bour, a direct interlocutor” (Bourriaud 2002, 43); in another direction, the 
exploration of social bonds takes the form of “recreating socio- professional 
models,” such that the artist takes “the real field of the production of goods 
and services, and aims to set up a certain ambiguity . . . between the utili-
tarian function of the objects he is presenting, and their aesthetic function” 
(35). A precursor of the latter turn, Bourriaud argues, was the Artist Place-
ment Group (ApG), which from the late 1960s to the 1980s placed artists 
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in branches of government and industry, an alternative institutional set-
ting to the gallery and exhibition. An example of the former direction for 
Bourriaud, art as interlocution, is the performance event “Turkish Jokes” in 
1994, in which Jens Hanning broadcast funny stories in Turkish through a 
loudspeaker in a square in Copenhagen, producing “in that split second a 
micro- community, one made up of immigrants brought together by collec-
tive laughter which upset their exile situation,” a micro- community “formed 
in relation to the work and in it.” Bourriaud concludes, “Depending on the 
degree of participation required of the onlooker by the artist, along with . . . 
the model of sociability proposed . . . , an exhibition will give rise to a spe-
cific ‘arena of exchange’” (17). Indeed, in his concern with proximity, form, 
and movement, Bourriaud flirts ambiguously with the antihumanist stance 
of the theorists of circulation and inter- object relations (Gaonkar and Povi-
nelli 2003; Straw 2010), who find their ancestor in the recently rediscovered 
sociology of Gabriel Tarde. For Tarde, it is the circulation of entities, affects, 
and behaviors that creates the very fabric of the social (Barry and Thrift 
2007; Born 2010b; Candea 2010).
Bourriaud’s argument is engaging, but it is hard to discern any coher-
ence in the manifold social relations and social interactions staged by the 
practices he describes. Indeed, the diversity of art practices that he relates 
far outstrips his theoretical credo: it is impossible to reduce what he sets in 
motion to his oft- cited maxim that the goal of relational aesthetics is “to 
heal the social bond.” Predictably, rather than turn to the disciplines of the 
social for assistance, he rejects sociology as a source of understanding of 
the variety of social forms that he adumbrates. Moreover, he dismisses any 
engagement with the dynamics of difference, conflict, and antagonism that 
are in part constitutive of the social. Bourriaud’s paradigm invites Hal Fos-
ter’s (2006, 190) pithy criticism of a “happy interactivity: among ‘aesthetic 
objects’ Bourriaud counts ‘meetings, encounters, events, various types of 
collaboration between people, games, festivals and places of conviviality.’ 
. . . To some readers such ‘relational aesthetics’ will . . . seem to aestheticize 
the nicer procedures of our service economy.” Bourriaud’s own rendering 
of the social—as opposed to that of the practices he relates—tends, then, 
toward reductive idealizations. Claire Bishop (2004, 65), a critic and theo-
rist who has championed participatory art, puts the key challenge acutely: 
“Bourriaud wants to equate aesthetic judgment with an ethicopolitical judg-
ment of the relationships produced by a work of art. But . . . the quality of 
the relationships in ‘relational aesthetics’ are never examined or called into 
question. . . . If relational art produces human relations, then the next logi-
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cal question to ask is what types of relations are being produced, for whom, 
and why?”
Late in his book, Bourriaud (2002, 82) reflects on the criticisms drawn 
by relational art practices, noting that “they are . . . reproached for deny-
ing social conflict and dispute, differences and divergences, and the impos-
sibility of communicating within an alienated social space, in favour of an 
illusory . . . modelling of sociability.” As a rejoinder, he states emphatically, 
“These approaches do not stem from a ‘social’ or ‘sociological’ form of art”; 
rather, the relational exhibition “is an interstice, defined in relation to the 
alienation reigning everywhere else. . . . The exhibition does not deny the 
social relationships in effect, but it does distort them and project them into 
a space- time frame encoded by the art system” (82). Crucially, he seems here 
to be arguing that relational art both participates or partakes in wider social 
relations and that it stages a microsocial space apart that may refract or “dis-
tort” them. Bishop (2012, 45) makes a similar observation: “By using people 
as a medium, participatory art has always had a double ontological status: 
it is both an event in the world, and also at a remove from it.”
Bourriaud himself fails fully to theorize this crucial point; he has no vo-
cabulary to distinguish between the several modalities of the social that 
he conflates. But Bishop’s “double ontological status” also reduces what is 
going on. For now, I will point to not two but three social dimensions of the 
social aesthetics that are immanent in Bourriaud’s examples. The first con-
sists of the socialities enlivened by Hanning’s “Turkish Jokes,” a “micro- 
community” of laughing Turkish immigrants. This indexes a realm of im-
mediate, co- present, and affective microsocial relations and interactive 
associations that are regularly set in motion by the performance arts, as 
well as by public art and site-specific works (Salter 2010). The second, again 
shown by Hanning’s performance event, consists of art’s refraction of wider, 
preexisting social relations, whether of class, race, ethnicity, gender, or sexu-
ality. In this light, Hanning’s public art event is one that in Deleuzian terms 
is crossed by, or evokes, a molar politics of common ethnic- , migration- , and 
class- based identifications (Patton 2000, 43). And the third consists of how 
art can intervene in the organizational, institutional, and political- economic 
forms in which it is embedded or with which it is articulated. It is this third 
dimension that is exemplified by ApG’s experimental engagement with, and 
expansion of, art’s institutional spheres. Such practices refract or “distort” a 
quite different order of the social.
This third dimension deserves a brief exposition. The ApG was an orga-
nization founded by John Latham with roots in conceptual art which, from 
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the late 1960s, negotiated residencies for artists inside a series of corpo-
rations, including Britain’s National Coal Board, British Rail, British Steel, 
the Scottish Office, ici, and the Esso oil company. The ApG’s orientation 
to the social therefore took the form of sustained experimental interven-
tions in institutional processes—processes that were quite independent of 
the art institutional nexus. The group’s artists were charged with becoming 
involved in the functioning of the corporation, using anything to hand and 
retaining an “open brief” (Bolt Rasmussen 2009; Metzger 1972; Slater 2001). 
As Andrew Barry (2013, 90) notes, “The artist was understood . . . as an ‘inci-
dental person’ whose presence and actions might effect change.” The ApG 
did not overtly criticize the institutions with which it worked; nor did it seek 
to provide alternatives. Instead, it sought to “introduce change in society 
through the medium of art relative to those structures with ‘elected’ respon-
sibility for shaping the future—governments, industries and academic insti-
tutions” (Barbara Steveni, quoted in Walker 2002, 55). Indeed, one of the 
ApG’s principles was that the artist must find an outcome or intervention 
that was not politically overdetermined. In this sense, the ApG’s projects 
manifested Deleuze’s minor politics of the emergent, underdetermined by 
preexisting political formations (Patton 2000). Yet it is worth noting that the 
ApG’s politics have often been misunderstood as molar politics by later art-
ists who purported to follow them.1 At this point, we might draw a link with 
Peter Bürger’s (1984, 49) focus, in his analysis of the historical avant- gardes, 
on art as institution; in his words, “The European avant- garde movements 
can be defined as an attack on the status of art in bourgeois society. What is 
negated is not an earlier form of art . . . but art as an institution that is un-
associated with the life praxis of men.” Through the ApG, then, we glimpse 
something of the spectrum and the evolution of art’s imbrication with insti-
tutions: from the critique of art as institution (Alberro and Stimson 2009; 
Fraser 2005) to experimental institutional intervention without telos.
But a final way in which the social enters recent art contrasts markedly 
with both the ApG and relational aesthetics: it is in the guise of “socially 
engaged art” (Thompson 2012), politically informed interdisciplinary prac-
tices in which “external” social and political realms become the arena 
within which art stages its interventions. These practices are emphatically 
intended to influence the “real” world via politicized interventions in larger 
institutional spheres. This is art motivated by a keen awareness that “living 
itself exists in forms that must be questioned, rearranged, mobilized, and 
undone”: “living as form” (29). With roots traced to Russian Constructivism, 
Duchamp, Artaud, Fluxus, Situationism, the “social sculpture” of Joseph 
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Beuys, and groups such as the Critical Art Ensemble, socially engaged art is 
a broad and heterogeneous lineage encompassing strategic, often sustained 
projects that defy discursive boundaries in order to produce “effects and af-
fects in the world” (32). Apparently in a similar vein to relational aesthet-
ics, “participation, sociality, and the organization of bodies in space play 
a key feature in much of this work” (21). Yet more than relational aesthet-
ics, these practices seek also to engage with judicial and governmental pro-
cesses, as in the collaborative, prison- based practice of Laurie Jo Reynolds, 
who calls her work “legislative art” by analogy with Augusto Boal’s (1998) 
“legislative theatre,” which in turn is indebted to Paolo Freire (2000). So-
cially engaged art may also become involved in community activism, as in 
the two- decades- old experimental housing project and art residency Project 
Row Houses, animated by the artist Rick Lowe, which rehabilitated a low- 
income, mainly African American neighborhood in Houston by building a 
strong base of local participation among residents.
In notable contrast to relational aesthetics, then, rather than seeking to 
“heal” the general reification or foster consensus, socially engaged art ani-
mates encounters and events marked more often by social conflict, “deep 
discord and frustration” (Thompson 2012, 24). Exemplary here is the in-
famous installation “Please Love Austria” (2000), devised by the German 
artist Christoph Schlingensief, which staged a parodic “Big Brother”– style 
media event in a public square outside the Vienna State Opera House in 
which real asylum seekers were housed in a shipping container, their activi-
ties televised live on the Internet, while the public was asked to vote daily 
on the least popular detainees, who were returned to a real detention center 
outside the city. The provocative, parodic, and politically ambiguous instal-
lation stimulated heated debate, scandalizing and antagonizing elements of 
the public.
In avowedly instrumental terms, Nato Thompson (2012, 22) notes that 
socially engaged art has “become an instructive space to gain valuable skill 
sets in the techniques of performativity, representation, aesthetics, and the 
creation of affect.” Hence, the stress on methodologies, research, and long- 
term activism, and the reflexive interest in the forms of the social, are efforts 
both at shifting the focus away from traditional aesthetic concerns and at 
enriching and transforming what is meant by the term “aesthetics” (Born 
2010c, 198–200). The critical questions to be asked of socially engaged art 
therefore differ from those raised by relational aesthetics. For the problem 
is not one of the cultivation of sociality as an end in itself but the opposite: 
that art and its socialities are mobilized and valorized primarily by refer-
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ence to given or prior political and social justice ends. As Bishop (2004, 
2006) notes, such practices risk negating the specifically aesthetic dimen-
sion, reducing “art to a question of the ethically good or bad,” as well as 
making a problematic equation between “forms of democracy in art and 
forms of democracy in society” (Bishop 2012, 41). Instead, Bishop calls for 
art that respects its own mediating role, thereby holding “artistic and social 
critiques in tension” (40).
Contemporary art therefore manifests diverse engagements with the  social 
that can be traced back at least to the 1960s. The art historian Luke Skre-
bowski (2009, 67) comments that this was a transitional era in which “the 
art and the social context were of a piece. Indeed, the recognition that art’s 
social context impacts its character constituted a fundamental tenet of the 
alternative to formalist modernism.” In the preceding paragraphs I have dis-
tinguished four modalities of the social in recent art and aesthetics, how-
ever, with the precise purpose of resisting their reduction to notions of social 
“context.” In analyzing these variants, my aim has been twofold: to show that 
while the social is increasingly manifest in contemporary art and aesthetics, 
and theorized as such, it takes distinctive forms that matter and should not 
be conceptually elided; and, on this basis, to enable fertile comparisons to be 
drawn in the remainder of this chapter between the varieties of social aes-
thetics in contemporary art practices and those evident in improvised music.
At this point it is productive to turn to music and the other performance- 
based arts. A foundational difference is immediately apparent, for it is not 
difficult to recognize that the social forms an immanent part of performance 
situations, in music as in the other performance- based arts. That is, specific 
socialities are created in performance situations among the performers, be-
tween performers and audiences, and among audiences (Born 2014). While 
the guardians of formalism or of the philosophical legacies of German ideal-
ism might strive to maintain that music is an art of pure sounding form 
and that its social manifestations are secondary, they are now matched by 
writers for whom music’s social qualities are considered in various ways in-
trinsic to aesthetic experience; indeed, this is now arguably an established 
view in ethnomusicology (Blacking 1974; Keil 1966; Turino 2008) and in 
popular music studies (Frith 1998). Of course, to highlight the social is not 
necessarily to override the significance of other components of aesthetic 
experience. Moreover, the social can be more or less reflexively grasped or 
foregrounded by musical actors—composers, musicians, listeners—as a di-
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mension of aesthetic experience. Such a reflexive awareness can in turn be 
more or less experimental or inventive in its orientation.
Strikingly, it is possible to draw a contrast between the evolving concert 
performance tradition associated with Western art music of the past two 
centuries and performance in certain lineages of improvised music since the 
1960s. In the former tradition, as historians have shown, the social is rela-
tively less foregrounded and is subject to a weak reflexivity. The emergence 
of this tradition has been traced in the first decades of the nineteenth cen-
tury by James Johnson (1995, 277), who identifies it with the rise of bour-
geois individualism and its manifestation in “intensely subjective” modes of 
musical experience in which “interior communion met . . . romantic spiritu-
ality.” Absorbed listening and attention to music’s abstract meaning were ac-
companied by a policing of manners and “anonymous and rule- bound” (233) 
allegiance to notions of decency and respectability. For the same period, 
Richard Sennett (2002, 213–14) points to a spate of urban social and archi-
tectural transformations allied to a burgeoning obsession with privacy, such 
that concert life saw the cultivation of silent, self- disciplined, contempla-
tive, and interiorized spectatorship—a bourgeois “act of purification” that, 
in his compelling phrase, amounted to “a defense against the experience 
of social relations.” For Sennett, intensifying urban processes of individu-
alization and privatization, effecting an erosion of social interaction, were 
matched by new behavioral norms and by the constitution of new modes of 
subjectivity suited to the concert and theater. By the late nineteenth cen-
tury, he concludes, “the whole rationale of public culture had cracked apart” 
(218). We might say that a defining feature of the ontology of Western art 
music from the nineteenth century to the present has been a disavowal of 
music’s social mediations (Born 2005, 2013c).
In marked contrast, the lineages of improvised music of the late twentieth 
century often manifested a heightened reflexivity about the socialities en-
gendered by performance, just as some practitioners set out to engage with 
the social in inventive ways. If we take the three modalities of the social 
identified earlier that are elided in Bourriaud’s portrayal of relational aes-
thetics—the co- present socialities set in motion by performance, how these 
socialities refract wider and preexisting social relations, and how art can 
intervene in the institutional and political- economic forms in which it is 
embedded or with which it is articulated—each has found striking expres-
sion in certain traditions of improvised music. Regarding the first: impro-
vising musicians have often demonstrated a self- conscious interest in the 
aesthetic potential or effects of the socialities of performance, including the 
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dialogical and multilateral expressive exchanges enlivened by collective im-
provisations (Monson 1996). Regarding the second: to different degrees, im-
provising musicians have shown a concern with how wider, enduring social 
relations of race, class, and gender enter into and may be reproduced, en-
trenched, refracted, or reimagined in the socialities of musical performance. 
And regarding the third: certain practitioners of improvisation have seen an 
active engagement with institutional forms, primarily those through which 
their music is produced and distributed, as a necessary or even unavoid-
able extension of their creative practice. But the fourth modality identified 
earlier is also evident in the history of improvised music. That is to say, like 
socially engaged art, improvised music in some of its manifestations has 
been engaged in catalyzing wider political struggles for social justice and 
social equality (Fischlin and Heble 2004; Fischlin et al. 2013; G. E. Lewis 
2008). I return to amplify these arguments later.
In sum, as with contemporary art, at issue in these several modalities 
is how improvised music both mediates and can transform the social—by 
animating novel socialities—and how this music is itself mediated or tra-
versed by wider social formations. In what follows I suggest that to theo-
rize these distinctive modalities, what is required is a heuristic analytical 
framework centered on music’s social mediations as they imbue music’s 
aesthetic operations. This must immediately be qualified, for improvised 
music is not unique in exhibiting these types of social mediation, which are 
shared with other musical traditions (Born 2012). However, there is perhaps 
something singular about improvisation in that improvised performances 
are marked by and enable degrees of openness, mutuality, and collaboration 
that are heightened and intensified when compared with the interpretation 
of scored works, and that necessitate participants’ real- time co- creation and 
negotiation of social- and- musical relationships. From one perspective, then, 
such performances may become sites for empractising ways of “being dif-
ferently in the world” based on a “recognition that alternatives to orthodox 
practices are available” (Fischlin and Heble 2004, 11).2
How well positioned are the academic music disciplines to address these 
questions of music’s social mediation? It is striking that when we turn to 
recent attempts to theorize the relations between music and the social—
whether in popular music studies, music sociology, or ethnomusicology—no 
adequate, encompassing paradigm is on offer. I want to outline two current 
and symptomatic positions in this regard, both of which are productive but 
neither of which is sufficient.
First, David Hesmondhalgh’s (2005) review of a series of concepts em-
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ployed in recent years to analyze the nature of collective musical identities: 
subculture, scene, and tribe. Hesmondhalgh poses them as amounting to the 
analysis of music’s social mediation per se and finds that none of the terms 
bear the explanatory weight required of them. Instead, he turns to notions 
of articulation and genre, drawing on the work of such writers as Richard 
Middleton and Jason Toynbee. The upshot is to argue against any homology 
model in which music is taken to reflect some prior meta- category such as 
class, race, or nation and for a differentiated approach to the analysis of 
music and social identities, although he generates no wider framework. In 
my view, Hesmondhalgh throws out one important conceptual gain in the 
shift from subculture to scene: the way that the concept of scene captures 
music’s autonomous capacity to generate specifically musically imagined 
communities that are irreducible to wider categories of social identity (Born 
1993b; Born and Hesmondhalgh 2000; Straw 1991).
A second perspective comes from the work of the music sociologists Tia 
DeNora and Antoine Hennion—specifically, their theorization of music’s 
mediation of subject- object relations. Expanding on Adorno’s analysis, 
both rightly point to the bidirectional mediation between music and the 
social. Music, in their distinctive accounts, mediates or co- produces human 
socialities and subjectivities; in turn, music is itself constituted by human 
imagination, enmeshed in discourses and practices, and embodied in socio- 
technical arrangements (cf. Sterne 2003; Theberge 1997). Thus, “Music is 
active within social life . . . because it offers specific materials to which 
actors may turn when they engage in the work of organizing social life. 
Music is a resource—it provides affordances—for world- building . . . Just 
as music’s meanings may be constructed in relation to things outside it, so, 
too, things outside music may be constructed in relation to music.” Music, 
moreover, can take the lead “in the world- clarification, world- building pro-
cess of meaning- making, . . . [It] serves as a kind of template against which 
feeling, perception, representation and social situation are created and sus-
tained” (DeNora 2010, 44). Hennion (2001, 3) contends, in turn, that music 
“transforms those who take possession of it” so that we can speak of “the 
co- formation of a music and of those who make and listen to it.” While their 
insistence on the bidirectional nature of mediation is invaluable, in these 
works Hennion and DeNora tend to reduce the socio- musical universe to 
the microsocial space of relations and practices favored by ethnomethodo-
logical and symbolic interactionist sociologies. For my purposes, too much 
is occluded by adopting this stance.
Both of these perspectives foreshorten music’s social mediation, neglect-
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ing other dimensions of the social in play, which are addressed by different 
areas of scholarship and which demand to be brought together and thought 
in their complex interrelations. My argument, then, is that music necessi-
tates an expansion of the conceptual framework of social mediation; that 
if music engenders myriad social forms, it is productive to analyze them in 
terms of four planes of social mediation. In what follows, I give an overview 
of the four planes before returning to improvised music.
In the first plane, music produces its own diverse socialities—in the im-
mediate microsocialities of musical performance and practice and in the so-
cial relations embodied in musical ensembles and associations. It is this first 
plane that is most apparent in all the performance arts. In the second plane, 
music has powers to animate imagined communities, aggregating its lis-
teners into affective alliances, virtual collectivities or publics based on musi-
cal and other identifications. In the third plane, music refracts wider  social 
relations, from the most concrete to the most abstract of collectivities—
music’s instantiation of the nation, of social hierarchies, or of the social re-
lations of class, race, religion, ethnicity, gender, or sexuality. In the fourth 
plane, music is bound up in the broader institutional forces that provide the 
basis for its production, reproduction, and transformation, whether elite 
or religious patronage, market or non- market exchange, public and subsi-
dized cultural institutions, or late capitalism’s multi- polar cultural economy. 
The first two planes amount to socialities, social relations, and social imagi-
naries that are assembled or affectively constituted specifically by musical 
practice and musical experience. In contrast, the last two planes amount 
to wider social relations and institutions that themselves afford or condi-
tion certain kinds of musical practice, although these relations and institu-
tions also enter into the nature of musical experience, permeating music’s 
 immediate socialities and imagined communities.
Several propositions central to this chapter follow. First, and strikingly, 
the first two planes—music’s microsocialities and imagined communities—
are underdetermined by and have a certain autonomy from the last two, 
music’s wider social conditions. Second, all four planes of social mediation 
enter into the musical assemblage—although they are invariably treated 
separately in existing discussions of music and the social. Moreover, the 
four planes are irreducible to one another, yet they are articulated in con-
tingent and nonlinear ways through relations of conditioning, affordance, 
or causality. It is precisely the mutual mediations of and complex articula-
tions among the four planes that enable musical assemblages to engender 
certain kinds of socio- musical experience that are also forms of aesthetic 
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experience, as well as offering the potential for experimentation with those 
diverse modes of social aesthetic experience.
In writing here about four planes of social mediation and of a musical 
assemblage, I draw on earlier works in which I have proposed that, more 
obviously than visual and literary media, music has no material essence 
but a plural and distributed material being and that music’s multiple simul-
taneous forms of existence—as sound, score, discourse, site, performance, 
social relations, technological media—indicate the necessity of conceiving 
of the musical object as a constellation. Compared with the visual and liter-
ary arts, then, music has to be grasped as an extraordinarily complex kind 
of cultural object—as an aggregation of sonic, visual, discursive, social, cor-
poreal, technological, and temporal mediations. It should be conceived as 
an assemblage (Deleuze 1988; Rabinow 2003), where a musical assemblage 
can be defined as a characteristic constellation of such mediations (Born 
2005, 2012). Thus, the properties (or meanings) of music must be cognized 
in terms of the assemblage—or constellation of mediations—of which it is 
composed. In its plurality, music has the oxymoronic quality of being at 
once immaterial (as sound, or code) and multiply material; it might be con-
ceived as the “paradigmatic multiply mediated, immaterial- and- material, 
fluid quasi- object” (Born 2005, 7), one in which subjects and objects are 
entangled. I describe this approach to counter any view that by foreground-
ing an analytics of the social I intend at the same time to privilege a musical 
humanism; indeed, a central aim of my approach is to combat the limited 
account of the social and material offered by theorists like Latour, and to 
argue that it is imperative to rejoin a critical analytics of the social with a 
nuanced account of mediation and materiality—that is, to proffer a com-
bined analytics of the social- and- material.
Turning to the first plane, the immediate microsocialities engendered by 
musical performance and practice: what is striking about research in this 
area is that it is divided between compelling empirical, often ethnographic 
studies from ethnomusicology, popular music studies, and music sociology 
(as in the work of DeNora, Hennion, Sara Cohen, Steven Feld, Ruth Finne-
gan, Jocelyne Guibault, Charles Keil, Ingrid Monson, and many others), 
and broad theoretical statements. Such theoretical statements invariably 
draw their inspiration from three sources: the social phenomenology of 
Alfred Schutz (1964); the post- Foucauldian stance of Jacques Attali’s Noise 
(1985), and specifically his final chapter on “Composing”; and the writings 
of Christopher Small (1998). Common to these three writers is a tendency to 
idealize the realm of microsocial relations in music through a reductive soci-
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ology that metaphysically over- codes social realities. To begin with Small: 
despite his quasi- ethnographic descriptions of the socialities of rock and 
folk festivals, rap gigs, and symphony concerts, he arrives at problematic 
normative generalizations. Thus, he writes,
What we need to keep in mind is that those taking part in performances 
of different kinds are looking for different kinds of relationships, and we 
should not project the ideals of one kind of performance onto another. 
[But a]ny performance, and that includes a symphony concert, should 
be judged finally on its success in bringing into existence for as long as 
it lasts a set of relationships that those taking part feel to be ideal and in 
enabling those taking part to explore, affirm and celebrate those relation-
ships.”3 (Small 1998, 49)
Schutz and Attali, for their part, offer compelling analyses, yet both entail 
idealizations. In Attali’s (1985, 133) frankly speculative account of “Com-
posing,” embedded as it is within a larger historical analysis of music and 
power, Free Jazz is taken as the model for a “coming order” of music making 
“exterior to the institutions” in which “creative labor is collective. . . . 
 Production takes the form of . . . collective composition, without a predeter-
mined program imposed upon the players, and without commercializa-
tion. [This is] a new practice of music among the people. . . . By subverting 
 objects, it heralds a new form of the collective imaginary, a reconciliation 
between work and play” (141). A utopian account of improvisation is there-
fore central to Attali’s speculative socio- musical vision.
Schutz is deservedly the most influential of the theorists of the micro-
social, and his social phenomenology centers on an analysis of intersubjec-
tivity in music, which he portrays as a paradigm of human communication 
and relatedness. Schutz (1964) discerns three modes of intersubjectivity in 
musical performance. The first involves performer and listener, who experi-
ence simultaneously “the polythetic steps by which the musical content ar-
ticulates itself in [music’s] inner time” (175). The second involves composer 
and listener or performer, such that, “although separated by hundreds of 
years, the latter participate with quasi- simultaneity in the [composer’s] 
stream of consciousness, performing with him (sic) . . . the ongoing articula-
tion of his musical thought” (171). Third, Schutz points to the intersubjective 
relations of musical ensembles in which “each co- performer’s action is ori-
ented . . . reciprocally by the experiences in inner and outer time of his fel-
low” performers (175). Such “tuning- in” involves not merely consciousness, 
but mutual responses among the co- performers to one another’s gestures and 
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expressions “in immediacy” and in shared space (176). While highly sugges-
tive, particularly for improvised practices in which heightened communica-
tive, social, and embodied mutualities are arguably more to the fore than in 
the collective interpretation of scored music, Schutz’s portrayal of the social 
consolations of live performance results finally in an idealized metaphysics 
of musical co- presence, one that is consonant both with the discourse of 
absolute music and with the “audiovisual litany” identified by Jonathan 
Sterne as central to the history of auditory media (Sterne 2003, 15–19).
In sum, if all three writers idealize the microsocialities of musical prac-
tice, this is made possible by how these microsocialities are illusorily “au-
tonomized” by being detached from the larger circuits of social relations in 
which they are embedded or with which they are articulated. In light of this 
tendency to focus only on the microsocialities of performance, the task is to 
rethink music’s (and art’s) social mediation across the four planes. To indi-
cate the utility of such an approach from a classic study of an African Ameri-
can improvisational music: Charles Keil’s (1966) analysis of urban blues in 
Chicago in the 1960s dwells insistently on how the microsocialities of club- 
based blues performance (first plane) were entangled in and refracted the 
wider social relations of race and class to which both musicians and audi-
ences were subject (third plane), while the affective conjoining of these 
superimposed socialities was achieved, and heightened, through the emo-
tionally charged musically imagined community assembled and animated 
by the sounds of blues music (second plane). Keil describes how, in the midst 
of performance, the blues singer Bobby Bland and his band engendered a 
sociality both between themselves and with their audience. Minute gestures 
and vocal inflections, humor and innuendo, conjured up social solidarities 
and collective catharsis in part through constant implicit references to the 
“stylistic common denominators” (143) that linked blues performance and 
religious preaching in the lives of black Chicagoans in this era.
Keil’s study points to a final dimension of the framework I am proposing: 
that it participates in a larger project of critical social theory that, in the 
words of Chantal Mouffe (2000, 125), assumes that “relations of power are 
constitutive of the social.” Thus, rather than conceive of social relations in 
a pluralistic world as integrative, or as oriented to consensus or community, 
we should address them as constituted equally by difference, as well as by 
agonism and antagonism. This is a foundational assumption in what follows. 
Only by adopting this approach, which depends on empirical work (whether 
historical or ethnographic) as a basis for critical analysis, is it possible to 
vault over Schutz and develop a less metaphysical social phenomenology, 
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one that is attentive to the microsocialities of musical practice and perfor-
mance as they are imbricated with other social relations—other planes of 
the social.
In light of these theoretical and methodological proposals, how have the 
socialities and social aesthetics of improvised music been addressed?
Initially, it is intriguing to note how often practitioners’ accounts of im-
provisation focus on the first plane: on the nature of and the potentials im-
manent in the microsocialities of performance and practice. At the same 
time, they provide a kind of autoethnography of the social in performance, 
of improvisation as a crucible of intensified and reflexive social experience, 
and of improvised performance as commonly also a space of microsocial 
experiment. Most striking is how—akin to Bourriaud—these qualities of 
soci0-musical experience are spoken of as synonymous with the aesthetic 
qualities of performance. This is evident in diverse musicians’ commen-
taries reported in Derek Bailey’s (1992) pioneering book on improvisation. 
Perhaps the most characteristic stance is to conceive of improvised perfor-
mance as fomenting a kind of free and labile movement between individual 
and collectivity so that individuality becomes a relational moment or state 
within a larger entity. As Moira Gatens and Genevieve Lloyd (2002, 73), neo- 
Spinozist philosophers concerned with conceptualizing this labile move-
ment, put it: “For Spinoza, there are collective dimensions to individual 
selfhood. For him there is no possibility of selfhood in isolation. To be an 
individual—a determinate self—at all is to be embedded in wider social 
wholes in which the power of bodies is strengthened or impeded. To be an 
individual self is to be inserted into economies of affect and imagination 
which bind us to others in relations of joy and sadness, love and hate, co- 
operation and antagonism.” The philosopher Garry Hagberg (2016) develops 
a liberal variant of this focus on the relation between individual and collec-
tivity, and one that is specifically attuned to jazz improvisation. Hagberg 
criticizes what he calls the “social contract model” in which “the collective 
is no more than a convergence of individuals who, as individuals first, choose 
. . . to join a group that offers [musical] benefits . . . that expand what the 
individual could create alone.” In this account, “the individual, as individual 
(in political and ontological terms), is present and intact from start to finish” 
and “the entire content of the collective is simply the sum of the individuals 
combined” (Hagberg 2016, 1–2, italics in the original). Instead, Hagberg de-
velops a notion of “collective” or “group- emergent intention” at the heart of 
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improvising ensembles, which he links to “de- individuation” (9–10). Such 
“shared intention,” he argues, should be understood as “(1) non- summative, 
(2) irreducible . . . to the individual . . . , and (3) [as] worked out, with lim-
ited variations, across the span of its enactment” (5).
A more radical challenge to the individual- collective dualism comes from 
the anthropologist Marilyn Strathern (1990, 5) in her attempt to supersede 
the twin reifications—“society” and asocial “individual”—that underpin 
Durkheimian social theory. For Strathern, such reifications should be aban-
doned in favor of a processual conception of sociality and a view of persons 
as both multiple and fully social. Thus, in Melanesia, for example, where she 
did ethnographic research, “persons are as ‘dividually’ as they are individu-
ally conceived. They contain a generalised sociality within”; while “society” 
should give way to a conception of social processes as involving “a constant 
movement . . . from one type of sociality to another” (Strathern 1988, 13–14), 
where sociality refers in turn to “the creating and maintaining of relation-
ships.” Such forms of sociality can result in aggregations of persons that 
entail either the elimination of difference, presenting “an image of unity . . . 
created out of internal homogeneity, a process of de- pluralization” or, on the 
contrary, the elaboration of heterogeneity.
An eloquent concretization of the preoccupation with the relation be-
tween individuality and collectivity is provided by Eddie Prévost’s reflec-
tions on the microsocialities of the influential British improvising group 
Amm:
The personalities within the ensemble are clearly defined. They have 
maintained their integrity. Part of Amm’s philosophy . . . is the idea of 
concurrent commentary: separate voices speaking at the same time, inter-
weaving and interleaving. But each voice is not atomized or individuated. 
Paradoxically, it may be that individuality can only exist and develop in a 
collective context. . . . We are part of a movement that has, arguably, re-
made music. . . . I’m inclined to think of it . . . as a meta- music. One of the 
generative themes of this meta- music is the relationship between musi-
cians. . . . I doubt if our strong friendships could survive very long with-
out the creative vehicle of Amm. It gives the meaning to our association. 
(Quoted in Bailey 1992, 129–30)
Other improvisers, in contrast, adopt more mannerist stances on the first 
plane, the microsocialities of improvised performance, conveying both how 
the orchestration of these socialities is taken to be immanent in performance 
aesthetics and how the same microsocialities are conceived of reflexively as 
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a locus of experimentation. In John Zorn’s “Game Pieces,” improvisation is 
emprastised as a kind of parodic authoritarian staging of controlled social 
encounters modeled on sports or war games:
I pick the bands and in that sense the Ellington tradition, the selection of 
the people, is very important. . . . You take one person out and the chem-
istry is going to be different. . . . You need people who are aggressive, you 
need people who are going to be docile, you need people with a sense of 
humor, you need people who are assholes. . . . I basically create a small 
society and everybody finds their own position in that society. It really be-
comes like a psycho drama. People are given power and it’s very interest-
ing to see which people like to run away from it, who are very docile and 
just do what they are told, [while] others try very hard to get more control 
and more power. So it’s very much like the political arena in a certain kind 
of way. (Quoted in Bailey 1992, 77–78)
Alternatively, musicians may link the microsocialities of performance to 
wider social arenas, as in Misha Mengelberg’s portrayal of improvisation, 
influenced by Situationist and anarchist currents (Adlington 2013), as akin 
to the everyday lifeworld: “One of the things that inspires me in making any 
gesture, musically and theoretically, is its relation with daily life in which 
there is no such thing as an exclusion. One moment I meet you and the next 
I am washing dishes or playing chess. . . . In certain respects there are par-
allels between the music and daily life. . . . The sort of improvisation I am 
interested in is the sort that everyone does in their lives” (quoted in Bailey 
1992, 131–32).
Probably the strongest historical example of improvisation as driven by 
reflexive experimentation with the microsocialities of musical practice is the 
Scratch Orchestra (so), founded in 1969 by Cornelius Cardew and others in 
the wake of Cardew’s experiences performing with Amm in the late 1960s. 
The so was an experimental music collective of about fifty people with 
mixed musical skills and experience—students, amateur musicians, avant- 
garde artists, and others. It embodied the politicized wing of British ex-
perimental music in this period and responded to “the demand of a lot of 
young people who weren’t trained musicians to get together to make what 
we called experimental music” (Cardew, quoted in Taylor 1998, 556). The 
so constitution called for a “montage of contemporary practices,” includ-
ing scratch music, popular classics, composition, “improvisation rites,” and 
research projects. Devoted to the democratization of musical expression, 
the so mobilized “a large number of enthusiasts pooling their resources 
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(not primarily material resources) and assembling for action (music making, 
performance, edification).” Tellingly, this experimental period was not sus-
tained. Following two years of growing factionalism, the fluid entity that 
had been the so morphed into a “hard- line Maoism [led by Cardew, which] 
gradually throttled any activity which did not have clear and explicit politi-
cal objectives and content.”4
In the remainder of the chapter I want to move beyond these engagements 
with the first plane microsocialities of musical practice, which represent 
only the most obvious manifestations of a social aesthetics in improvised 
music. Through commentaries on two historical cases I intend to show, first, 
how all four planes of social mediation, articulated in diverse ways, can be 
mobilized to effect a social aesthetics; second, how experimentation with 
those planes of social mediation can be the locus—as in the so—of vari-
ous kinds of politicization of improvised music (although this is not inevi-
table); and third, through reflection on an ensemble in which I was myself 
involved, how problematic it is to invest even the most apparently politically 
worthwhile experiments in social aesthetics with idealized projections that 
traduce or misrepresent the nature of the assemblage. Daniel Fischlin and 
Ajay Heble (2004, 2) argue that improvised music has often been aligned 
with antihegemonic practices of resistance: there are “identifiable and radi-
cal [forms] of improvisational practices in which concepts of alternative 
community formation, social activism, re- historicization of minority cul-
tures, and critical modes of resistance and dialogue are in evidence.” This is 
unarguable. But one intention of this chapter is to suggest, without contest-
ing these important historical truths, that we might productively be alert 
to the distinctive nature of these counter- practices, grasp how their orches-
tration of socialities is immanent in their combined aesthetic and political 
operations, and permit ourselves through critical appraisal—where appro-
priate—to acknowledge their fallibility.
Recent seminal research portrays the four planes at work in African 
American improvised music. In his writings on distinctive genealogies of 
musical improvisation, George Lewis contrasts the real- time music making 
of “two towering figures of 1950s American experimental music—Charlie 
‘Bird’ Parker and John Cage,” as well as the musical lineages they begat. 
Lewis (1996, 94) contends that the differences they exhibit are not only 
musical but concern “areas once thought of as ‘extra- musical,’ including race 
and ethnicity, class, and social and political philosophy.” On this basis, he 
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charts the commitment in the history of Bird- descended African American 
improvisation to the way that “sonic symbolism is often constructed with a 
view toward social instrumentality as well as form” (94). Tracing the goal 
of social instrumentality back to Bebop’s provision of “models of both indi-
vidual and collective creativity” (95) and its reinvention of African Ameri-
can improvisational musicality as explicitly experimental, Lewis argues that 
“this radical redefinition was viewed as a direct challenge . . . to the entire 
social order as it applied to blacks in 1940s apartheid America” (95).
Lewis’s argument is expanded onto a vast canvas in his magisterial study 
of the multiple activities and achievements of the Chicago- based Association 
for the Advancement of Creative Musicians (AAcm), a nonprofit, coopera-
tive musicians’ collective founded in Chicago in 1965. The AAcm developed 
a politics that spanned not only musical sounds and performance practices 
but also, as is evident in the organization itself, invention with regard to 
institutional form—a “communitarian institution- building” (Lewis 2008, 
xi) manifest in the evolving infrastructure created to support the AAcm’s 
burgeoning artistic and educational endeavors. Lewis points out that “the 
AAcm is part of a long tradition of organizational efforts in which African 
American musicians took leadership roles, including the early- twentieth- 
century Clef Club, the short- lived Jazz Composers Guild, the Collective [of ] 
Black Artists, and the Los Angeles- based Union of God’s Musicians and Art-
ists Ascension, or Underground Musicians Association” (x). The directions 
taken by these organizations responded to accelerating urban impoverish-
ment and decay, along with racial segregation in the music and cultural 
industries. Thus, “The Clef Club’s strategy of control of their products had 
long been pursued by black artists, notably including theater artists and 
composers Bob Cole, James Weldon Johnson, and J. Rosamond Johnson, 
who sought to maintain both creative and financial control of their pro-
ductions in the face of legal chicanery, boycotts, and blacklisting” (88). The 
AAcm, however, “became the most well known and influential of the post-
 1960 organizations, achieving lasting international significance” (x) in the 
history of experimental music.
Lewis argues throughout the book that it is only by charting both the 
AAcm’s sustained pedagogical and institution- building efforts and the 
profuse musical experimentation manifest in its members’ compositional 
and improvising activities, as well as—crucially—the synergies between 
these dimensions, that the scale and ambition of the AAcm’s interventions 
can be assessed. He contends emphatically that these efforts can only be 
understood as interventions in the musical politics of race. Focusing on 
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 performances of the Art Ensemble of Chicago, one of the best- known AAcm 
groups, it is clear that compounding the combined sonic, visual, theatrical, 
and cross- media elements of their performance aesthetic were the particu-
lar socialities orchestrated in performance. Paul Steinbeck conveys these 
dynamics well in his analysis of a performance by the Art Ensemble in 1972, 
which resonates powerfully with Strathern’s conceptualization of sociality 
outlined earlier:
At certain moments in Art Ensemble performances, all of the musicians 
seem to be moving the improvisation in the same direction, and their 
contributions . . . are easily heard as affirming a processual consensus. At 
other times the members of the Art Ensemble create interactive frame-
works that are multi- directional or “multi- centered,” in which the indi-
vidual musicians temporarily inhabit interactive roles that “function com-
pletely independently,” as Roscoe Mitchell has stated, or generate musical 
structures that are oppositional, even unstable. . . . [Indeed,] Art Ensemble 
performances characteristically pass through multiple divergent and con-
vergent stages before concluding. . . . [A]s the musicians assemble and dis-
assemble interactive frameworks, transforming one texture into another, 
the rules change: what was a divergent or multi- centered idea in the con-
text of one interactive framework can become a convergent gesture in 
another interactive framework, and vice versa. (Steinbeck 2008, 401–2)
Ultimately, the “ensemble improvisation is balanced between multiple op-
posing possibilities” (Steinbeck 2008, 409). Clearly, for the Art Ensemble, 
the microsocialities of performance play not an incidental but a formative 
part in the aesthetics—or, better, the social aesthetics—of performance.
What the AAcm and Art Ensemble show, then, is how their creative and 
musical activities were crossed by inventive and politicized engagements 
in all four planes of social mediation. Regarding the first plane, how the 
microsocialities of performance were immanent in the social aesthetics of 
performance. Regarding the fourth plane, how these social aesthetics were 
enabled, compounded, and complemented by invention in the institutional 
forms supporting the artistic work—institutional forms that themselves 
modeled creative social cooperation and the toleration of difference. Re-
garding the third plane, how the first and fourth planes, in turn, refracted 
evolving wider social formations of race and class, including the racialized 
injustices and inequalities faced by African American musicians, that char-
acterized the AAcm’s environment in and beyond Chicago’s South Side. 
And regarding the second plane, as Lewis eloquently attests, how the AAcm 
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 affectively mobilized a musically imagined community that not only en-
rolled its members and supporters in the African American community and, 
as audiences grew, transnational publics, but that projected social relations 
across space and time to African heritages. As Lewis summarizes in relation 
to the Art Ensemble, “The group’s blend of sonic, visual, and textual iconog-
raphy emanated from an overall creative environment—the AAcm—that 
encouraged the assertion of interdisciplinary responsibility for the integra-
tion of sonic, visual, and textual materials with intellectual and social his-
tory, spirituality, and community accountability.” Indeed, the Art Ensemble 
and AAcm “use of body paint . . . is transformative in terms of identity, 
evocative in terms of spirituality, and promulgative in terms of linkages 
to African cultural practices” (Lewis 1998, 90). In short, to grasp the mag-
nitude of the AAcm’s aspirations and achievements is to trace its imagi-
native contributions across all four planes of social mediation, along with 
their resonant articulations, as they produce or result in the social aesthetics 
manifest in, among others, the Art Ensemble’s compositional activities and 
improvised performances.
My second (and final) historical case is that of the Feminist Improvis-
ing Group (FiG), an experimental and occasional all- woman performing en-
semble founded in London in 1977 in which I played cello and bass guitar. 
Like the Art Ensemble, FiG was known for its extraordinary and eccentric 
performance style; along with musical and sonic improvisations, it often 
entailed the anarchic and uneven use of visual, theatrical, and performance 
elements that dramatized and parodied aspects of “women’s experience” 
as mothers, girlfriends, daughters, carers, and office workers, with a focus 
on the subversive or hilarious enactment of mundane activities such as do-
mestic labor, child care, dancing, or dressing up. But the group also paro-
died and played with the normative roles of jazz and rock groups, particu-
larly the singers’ roles as chicks and divas and others’ roles as “backing 
musicians.” Performances by FiG therefore reflexively engaged with and re-
mixed—often through hamming it up and slapstick—the socialities both of 
performance and of women’s everyday lives.
As is plain, informing the microsocialities of FiG performances were femi-
nist politics, inasmuch as these politics unified we FiG improvisers as women 
subject to common gendered experiences of subordination, inequality, and 
injustice. That is to say, the first plane microsocialities of performance were 
taken, consciously and experimentally, to refract and be refracted by the 
third plane: evolving but enduring social relations of gender in the world 
at large. But the “double ontological status” of the microsocialities of per-
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formance as they refracted the wider plane of gendered social relations was 
more complex, since we FiGgers had been subject to gendered social rela-
tions not only as women but also as musicians and improvisers. Indeed, one 
originating affective drive that fueled FiG came from conversations in which 
we shared our experiences of performing and playing with bands and im-
provising ensembles that otherwise comprised all men or mainly men, for 
we discovered that in these bands and ensembles, in different ways and to 
variable degrees, we found ourselves in situations implicitly saturated with 
gender dynamics—tiny instants or sustained passages of interactive sonic 
domination in which our musical “voice” was rendered somehow inappro-
priate, or was overwhelmed and could not emerge or be heard, or in which 
the dynamics of turn- taking seemed to be strenuously competitive or mascu-
linized and to exclude other modes of musical mutuality, relation, or being. 
These were relatively inchoate, extralinguistic, and embodied experiences 
for us as individual women musicians, but that these bands and improvis-
ing ensembles instantiated gendered musical socialities on occasion was a 
perception we shared. In this sense, our common experience both paral-
leled and embodied the gendering of the musical canon and of the pro-
cesses of evaluation, legitimization, and canonization that over time, per-
formatively, make it up (Citron 1993), just as our experience also embodied 
how, as Patrick Valiquet (2014, 228) puts it, the making and “marking of 
musical genre can be just as powerful for what and whom it excludes and 
delegitimizes as for what and whom it enshrines.” It is out of these common 
experiences of delegitimization and exclusion that the supposition origi-
nated—one of several inventive qualities of FiG’s founding—that our musi-
cal interactions might be different in FiG; that we might evade or transcend 
these prior, gendered musical socialities or otherwise empractise improvisa-
tional socialities differently. And while in some ways this was undoubtedly 
how we experienced working in FiG, the uncomfortable (antiessentialist) 
truth is that even when all performers were women, and all were informed 
by feminist and, often, lesbian feminist politics, the creation of hierarchical, 
competitive, or exclusionary musical socialities in performance could still 
occur and could sometimes even be pronounced. Nothing was ideal, then, 
about the microsocialities of FiG performance. In retrospect, this is quite 
humorous; at the time, it troubled any complacent essentialism.
The Feminist Improvising Group tended to polarize audiences and crit-
ics, as perhaps befits such an insecure and risk- taking entity. And inasmuch 
as FiG reached out affectively, mobilizing its followers and audiences into 
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a (second- plane) musically imagined community, this tended to be a fuzzy 
operation under the sign of the feminisms and lesbianisms of the time. 
The group did not seem so affectively powerful at a “purely musical” level. 
Indeed, for our critics our musical proficiency was questionable, and we 
clearly did not know what we were doing: our ambiguous, possibly feigned 
“incompetencies” and apparent lack of technical virtuosity were felt by such 
critics to be intolerable to witness. Here, gendered projections, manifest per-
haps in gendered listening and audiencing, compounded our sometimes al-
ready wobbly experimental practices. In terms of the fourth plane, FiG was 
typical of the marginal and self- managed organizational forms constructed 
by many improvising ensembles in the late 1970s and 1980s, when the do- it- 
yourself ethic of punk and that of the small- scale, “alternative” venue, label, 
and distribution networks of groups like Henry Cow and the Free Jazz scene, 
had become models. We scraped a living as freelancers working across a 
spectrum of activities, producing a cassette of FiG performances and getting 
by on the modest fees for our often publicly subsidized gigs.
The case of FiG therefore shows, like that of the Art Ensemble of Chicago, 
how the social aesthetics of performance can be grasped only through an 
analysis of both the autonomy and the entanglement of the four planes of so-
cial mediation. But through FiG I want also to point to the dangers of teleo-
logical histories of practice that smooth out differences and conflicts, and 
that render unevenness even. Of course, I write autoethnographically, with 
the attendant perils of that subjective project. By analogy with the AAcm’s 
response to a racist environment, the founding of FiG responded to the ex-
clusions and denigrations experienced routinely by women classical, jazz, 
rock, and punk musicians and improvisers. Like that of the Scratch Orches-
tra, a principle of FiG’s membership was to be inclusive of women musicians 
with regard to level of skill and experience and musical style, although from 
the start FiG’s core consisted of highly experienced performers from impro-
vised music, jazz, avant- garde rock, and performance art: Lindsay Cooper, 
Maggie Nicols, Irène Schweizer, and Sally Potter. In addition, the majority—
but not all—of FiG’s members were lesbian. There was an amusing aspect to 
this situation in that Cathy Williams and I, and a few others, would some-
times find ourselves “the only heterosexual(s)” at the feast—particularly 
at the lesbian feminist “women’s festivals” at which we often performed 
during the 1980s. Perhaps it was FiG’s happy “inversion” of norms of gen-
der and sexuality that engendered the strenuously irreverent humor, risk- 
taking, and pathos that characterized FiG performances, in which little was 
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planned and ingenious use was made of the performance site, social situa-
tion, and any other immediate resources (e.g., props, linguistic challenges) 
to hand.
But to take this analysis further, and to understand FiG performances, 
necessitates entering into the politics informing and crossing between our 
lives and our musical work at the time. The late 1970s and early 1980s were 
the height of European second-wave feminism’s discussion of political les-
bianism in Europe and the United Kingdom. This was manifest in issues of 
the leading socialist- feminist journal Feminist Review, as well as at political 
meetings called by the journal, and several of we British FiGgers partici-
pated in these debates.5 One of the key questions at stake, which fiercely 
(but productively) divided feminist opinion, was whether, or the extent to 
which, being lesbian was an involuntary result of genetic programming—
one was, in this sense, born rather than made a lesbian—or whether it was 
(also) a response to a gendered and heterosexist environment. A closely re-
lated question therefore was whether being a lesbian was first and foremost 
an issue of involuntary sexual identity and only as a result an issue of politi-
cal identity, or whether adopting a lesbian identity should be understood 
as primarily a result of political conviction, such that any woman might 
choose to take up a lesbian subject position for political reasons, with the 
assumption that her sexuality would, as it were, follow suit. These and other, 
Marxist and socialist political challenges animated some of the women who 
became members of FiG. Several of us had worked, with different levels of 
energy and conviction, with left- leaning organizations prior to FiG: Lindsay 
Cooper and I in Henry Cow; Maggie Nicols and Cathy Williams in other left-
ist musical and political groups. Indeed, FiG’s first performance was at the 
inaugural “Music for Socialism” festival held at the Almost Free Theatre in 
London. The performance style of FiG sat astride, and was informed by, this 
cauldron of unresolved, animated, and conflictual political debates. There 
was no settlement, little unity, and no foreordained politics, and there were 
plenty of undiscussed differences and fractures. Palpable tensions arose due 
to the coexistence of a willed (and, in our circles, fashionable) adoption by 
some of political lesbianism, along with others’ “lifelong” lesbianism, and 
yet others’ socialist feminism unyoked to lesbian identities. These political 
tensions and conflicts mattered, and they got into FiG performances, which 
were far from a smooth or consensual rendering of a “queer perspective” 
emanating from “queer women.” To depict this situation as an occasion “for 
women to foreground their bodies and their sounds for the pleasure of other 
women” (J. D. Smith 2004, 240–41) is a misinterpretation that essential-
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izes and subsumes FiG’s practices under an idealized queer politics. It is to 
project later categories back onto the group and its improvisations, in the 
process overlooking what remained heterogeneous, contentious, troubling, 
and unresolved—and, arguably, most productive—in the experimental and 
politicized social aesthetics set in motion by FiG.
I began this chapter by suggesting that we find social aesthetics, in different 
guises, in contemporary art practices. I pointed to several such modalities 
of the social in recent art and aesthetics—three unhelpfully elided in Bour-
riaud’s relational aesthetics, and another identifiable in socially engaged art. 
I proposed that Claire Bishop’s important rejoinder to Bourriaud— asking: 
if art is engaged in producing social relations, then “what types of rela-
tions are being produced, for whom, and why?”—shows the need to develop 
conceptual tools to disentangle and identify the distinctive forms of soci-
ality produced by art and musical practices, thereby avoiding their elision 
and fostering a more acute appreciation of both their singularity and their 
mutual refractions. To this end, the analytics of four planes of social media-
tion developed in the main body of the chapter is offered as a conceptual 
foundation, and I worked it through with reference to improvised music 
in which the articulation of the four planes is manifest in richly reticulate 
socialities. Indeed, implicit comparisons were drawn between the varieties 
of social aesthetics in contemporary art practices and those evident in im-
provised music. I have argued that close empirical and historical research is 
necessary to advance this kind of analysis, without which there is little re-
sistance to the idealization of the microsocialities of improvised practice, as 
they are disembedded from the wider social relations and formations that 
they transform or “distort” and in which they nest, as well as little resistance 
to the projection of post hoc interpretations that override historical realities 
and complexities. In an era in which post- formalist music, art, and interdis-
ciplinary practices are exploding our very understanding of “art,” “music,” 
“performance,” and “work” (Born 2013b; Born and Barry 2010), it is impera-
tive to advance our categories of analysis with regard to how variously the 
social enters into the aesthetic so as better to conceptualize the experimen-
tal and novel socialities, imagined communities, and social and institutional 
formations summoned into being by these practices. My hope is that, while 
I have indicated how this framework can assist in the analysis of improvised 
music, it may also fold back and provide a measure of rigor for those con-
cerned with theorizing art’s multiple social mediations.
58 born
Notes
1. On Deleuze’s definition of, and distinction between molar (or major) and 
minor politics, see DeLanda 2008; Patton 2000; Thoburn 2003, chaps. 1–2. For 
Deleuze, “the minor is in opposition to the molar or major. Minor and major are 
expressions that characterize not entities, but processes. . . . Essentially, major 
processes are premised on the formation and defense of a constant or a standard 
that acts as a norm and a basis of judgment. As such, major relations . . . are rela-
tions of identity.” In contrast, minor politics involves “the process of deviation or 
deterritorialization of life . . . against the molar standard.” Minor politics is not “a 
process of facilitating and bolstering identity, or ‘becoming- conscious,’ but . . . of 
innovation, of experimentation, and of the complication of life, in which forms 
of community, techniques of practice, ethical demeanors, styles, knowledges, and 
cultural forms are composed” (Thoburn 2003, 6–8).
2. As in the introduction to this volume, the term “empractise,” meaning a fully 
embodied and social putting into practice, is intended in part to avoid any Carte-
sian account in which improvisation is understood as entailing cognitive processes 
that initiate or supervise the bodily and social processes inherent in it. But it is also 
intended as an alternative to the term “enactment” introduced by science and tech-
nology studies—notably, the work of John Law, where it is endowed with an onto-
logical status linked to the performativity of the world. Hence, “the social sciences 
have always been embedded in, produced by, and productive of the social. . . . They 
participate in, reflect upon, and enact the social” (Law and Urry 2004, 392). Where 
enactment derives from a social theory focused on notions of “action,” then, em-
practise is practice- centered while carrying no ontological implications.
3. A variant of Small’s stance is enunciated by Thomas Turino (2008, 19), who, 
referencing Victor Turner’s concept of communitas, states: “For me, good music 
making or dancing is a realization of ideal—possible—human relationships where 
the identification with others is so direct and so intense that we feel . . . as if our 
selves had merged. It is the sounds we are making . . . that continually let us know 
that we have done so or that we are failing to achieve this ideal.”
4. Stefan Szczelkun, “Twenty- five Years from Scratch: icA Sunday 20th Novem-
ber 1994,” November 1995, http://www.stefan- szczelkun.org.uk/PHD- SCRATCH2 
.htm (accessed January 1, 2014).
5. Indicating the lively spectrum of feminist politics being debated in this 
period, issues of Feminist Review ranged between socialist feminist international-
ism, as in the first issue’s articles on “Women and Revolution in South Yemen” and 
“Female Sexuality in Fascist Ideology” (1979) and the twelfth issue’s articles on 
“Anc Women’s Struggles” and “Documents from the Indian Women’s Movement” 
(1982), and the burgeoning challenges from black feminism, as in the seventeenth 
issue’s theme “Many Voices, One Chant: Black Feminist Perspectives” (1984), as 
well as a growing focus on sexuality, as in the eleventh issue’s theme “Sexuality” 





and Western “Art” Music
Nicholas Cook
There is a long- standing tradition of seeing jazz, particularly free and avant- 
garde jazz, as the expression of an ideal society. This has gone along with a 
corresponding tradition of seeing Western “art” music (wAm) in precisely 
the opposite terms. For example, in a contribution to the Cambridge Com-
panion to Jazz, Bruce Johnson (2002, 102) characterizes jazz as the opposite 
of wAm along a series of dimensions. In line with today’s official, institu-
tionalized culture, Johnson says, wAm is “ocularcentric”; centered on the 
notated text, it is “a spectacle of scopic hegemony, the eye engaging with a 
‘product.’” Jazz, by contrast, is “distinguished from art- music models in the 
priority of the ear, in collective improvisational performance” (104). In this 
way it is “a vehicle for a form of musical socialization, that is peripheral to 
the tradition of the artist- as- individual, as ‘soloist’” (106). The approach is 
riddled with binaries: the eye is opposed to the ear, compositional product 
is opposed to improvisational performance, individual is opposed to com-
munity. And it does not take much knowledge of the role of jazz within 
the history of American racial politics to understand why this might be the 
case. Johnson’s binaries map directly onto Ben Sidran’s opposition of “lit-
erate” and “oral man,” where “the peculiarly ‘black’ approach to rhythm” is 
linked to “the greater oral approach to time” and the “inherently communal 
nature of oral improvisation” (Walser 1999, 299). It is also worth observ-
ing that ocular- centricity, an ontology based on the musical product, and 
the individual author together represent the foundational premises of copy-
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right law, which Eric Lewis (2007, 182) has described as “a racist and clas-
sist practice” that “attempts to hide its exclusionary nature behind a meta-
physics of the musical work which purports to be objective and universal, 
but in fact is not.”
In this context, a positive mythologization of jazz has gone hand in hand 
with a negative mythologization of wAm. This goes beyond its character-
ization by commentators from jazz and the skewed representation of music 
as an element of the capitalist economy within the courts. It is also reflected 
in the manner in which wAm is invoked, again often in opposition to jazz, 
within the context of broader cultural commentary. This can be illustrated 
from the field of urban planning, investigated by Dean Rowan in an article 
published in Critical Studies in Improvisation/Études critiques en improvisa-
tion. Rowan quotes Rutherford Platt and Jon Moloney- Merkle’s character-
ization of the uniform, statewide procedures that at one time governed the 
planning of open space in Illinois as “a classical score from which the indi-
vidual cities once uniformly played,” whereas following the removal of the 
legal basis for these procedures “the cities’ solutions were improvised, albeit 
not purely spontaneous, deviations” (2004, 16). He also writes that Leonie 
Sandercock’s approaches to planning “vibrantly accord with improvisational 
methods, employing practices of active listening, alleviation of oppressive 
hierarchy, and invitation and acceptance of differences”; by comparison, 
traditional, rational planning “has musical analogs in strict allegiance to the 
composer’s score and obeisance to the hierarchical command of the con-
ductor” (Rowan 2004). The very vocabulary adopted here (vibrant, active, 
alleviation of oppression, acceptance of difference versus strict allegiance, 
obeisance, and hierarchical command) testifies to the dense network of ide-
ology within which wAm has become enmeshed.
In “Averroes’s Search,” Jorge Luis Borges (1964, 150) recounts that the 
traveler Abulcasim al- Ashari claimed to have been to China but that his 
enemies, “with that peculiar logic of hatred, swore that he had never set 
foot in China and that in the temples of that land he had blasphemed the 
name of Allah.” In the same way, wAm is on the one hand condemned for 
the undesirability of its social content, and on the other for lacking social 
content altogether. In this chapter I aim to answer both charges, thereby 
opening up the potential for thinking of wAm in terms of social action (and 
of social action in terms of wAm). My argument is based on the assumption 
that music’s primary mode of existence lies in the act of performing it, an 
act that is inherently social. But it goes further than that. I hope to show 
how the written notations that play so conspicuous a role in wAm function 
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as vehicles for social action and interaction. And I approach this by interro-
gating the distinction between improvisation and the performance of pre-
composed scores that, in musicological terms, forms the hub of the various 
binary oppositions I have invoked. This is an issue I have explored in a previ-
ous paper, “Making Music Together, or Improvisation and Its Others.”1 There 
I set out a series of musical examples beginning with improvisation and end-
ing with performance. This second pass over the terrain can accordingly be 
brief and will focus on the question of the point at which we can identify a 
category shift from one to the other. No prizes will be awarded for guessing 
that no such point will be found.
Improvisation and Performance
At the furthest remove from the performance of precomposed scores is free 
improvisation, a term that is used in the contexts of both jazz and wAm. 
There is some variability in the practices referred to by this term, particu-
larly in terms of how far they work within or seek to transcend established 
styles or idioms, but certain features remain constant. Jared Burrows (2004, 
10), whose background as an improvising musician is in jazz, writes that 
the process of improvisation creates “its own time- dependent meanings—
let’s call them short- term archetypes—specific to each improvisation,” while 
groups that frequently perform together develop “archetypes” that persist 
from one improvisation to another. In other words, specific patterns of inter-
action between performers develop as they play together, both within an 
individual performance and across repeated performances, and these inter-
actions are as much social as musical. At the opposite end of the aesthetic 
spectrum from Burrows is Pierre Boulez, the archetypal postwar modernist 
for whom improvisation was an evasion of the real challenges of creative 
innovation in music, but his lampooning of the avant- garde improvisations 
of the 1950s reflects the same features: at first there would be some excite-
ment, he says, “and so everybody just made more activity, more activity, 
louder, louder, louder. Then they were tired so for two minutes you had 
calm, calm, calm, calm, calm. And then somebody was waking up so they 
began again, and then they were tired, sooner this time, and so the rest was 
longer. You cannot call that improvisation” (quoted in Oliver 1999, 147). 
Boulez’s basic point is that the freer the music is, in the sense of avoiding 
overt references to established idioms or predefined musical materials, the 
more it reverts to banal patterns of behavior that are not specifically musi-
cal at all. However skewed by his own compositional agenda and the larger 
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aesthetic ideology of postwar modernism, Boulez’s claim is one also found 
in the discourses around jazz. Charlie Mingus is supposed to have told Tim 
Leary, “You can’t improvise on nothin’, man. . . . You gotta improvise on 
somethin’” (quoted in Kernfeld 1995, 11). In improvisation as in other areas 
of life, freedom is relative.
Classic jazz improvisation based on jazz standards illustrates Mingus’s 
claim. The role of such standards is relatively minimal, in essence compris-
ing a series of chord changes (which, however, can be voiced very flexibly) 
that define a sectional structure (but not its repetitions, so that the struc-
ture remains open); solo improvisation may or may not reference the song 
melody, and in either case it may also reference other well- known solos, 
as well as the “ideas, licks, tricks, pet patterns, crips, clichés, and, in the 
most functional language, things you can do” that make up the fabric of 
jazz improvisation (Berliner 1994, 102). Although one speaks of, say, the 
Clifford Brown Quintet “performing” Billy Strayhorn’s “Take the ‘A’ Train,” 
audiences do not come to hear Strayhorn’s composition (they are unlikely to 
know in advance that it will be played). They come rather to hear the solo 
and collective improvisation that the song structure affords. And this focus 
is reflected in the difference between a jazz lead sheet and a classical score. 
As José Bowen (1993, 148) observes, lead sheets attempt to provide an ex-
haustive list of the typical attributes of the work in performance, a conse-
quence being that a literal performance of the lead sheet, including all of 
these attributes, “would barely be considered a performance of the tune 
at all. It would be a caricature of the tune.” In that sense, lead sheets both 
underdetermine and overdetermine the performances they afford. They sig-
nify them, but in a complex and highly mediated way.
Yet on consideration, the difference between a lead sheet and a classi-
cal score may prove elusive. Corelli’s original notations of the slow move-
ments from his Violin Sonatas, Op. 5, look equally unlike the performances 
they signify. In fact, they hardly look like violin music at all: they resemble 
nothing so much as the Renaissance- style counterpoint exercises used in 
the eighteenth century to teach basic principles of composition. However, 
these slow movements have also been transmitted in a multitude of con-
temporary notations prepared by players and pedagogues, which show how 
Corelli’s skeletal melodies were embellished through violinistic ornamen-
tation that could vary from the restrained to the wildly flamboyant. Terms 
such as “embellished” and “ornamentation” are misleading, however, be-
cause what Corelli wrote sometimes disappears completely behind the new 
violin part, and although the violone (cello) part is nowadays performed as 
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written, there is evidence that in the eighteenth century it was extempo-
rized, too (Watkin 1996). Under such circumstances, what Corelli wrote and 
what was played might have little more in common than the chord changes, 
and the similarity to jazz standards is further enhanced by striking affini-
ties between baroque continuo realization and the voicing practices of jazz 
pianists. It might, of course, be objected that these supposedly improvised 
embellishments or alternative versions of Corelli’s music may in reality have 
consisted largely of the performance of precomposed scores, as the multi-
tude of surviving notations might suggest and as is predominantly the case 
today. But then, the same is sometimes the case of jazz: witness the copy-
right deposit versions of Louis Armstrong’s music from the mid- 1920s, pro-
duced to comply with the law’s ocular- centric conception of the musical ob-
ject, which are remarkably close to the improvisations Armstrong recorded 
two or three years later with the Hot Five (Gushee 1998, 297–98). All this 
fits uneasily with Sidran’s distinction between literate and oral man: written 
and oral transmission are inextricably linked in the performance cultures of 
both jazz and wAm.
And it does not stop there. Any string quartet by Haydn, Mozart, or Bee-
thoven will suffice to make the point. Here, unlike in the previous instances, 
the musicians play the notes as written—except that, of course, they do not 
play the notes as written. The notes are represented as fixed pitches with 
proportionate durations (a quarter- note lasts twice as long as an eighth), 
with dynamics being indicated only schematically and without any speci-
fication of timbral quality. But in performance every one of these is nego-
tiated between the players, both in the course of rehearsal and in the real 
time of performance. Each player accommodates his or her intonation to 
the others’; rhythms are nuanced in the service of structural articulation or 
emotional expression and accommodated within the overall ensemble; dy-
namic and timbral values are adjusted between the players. In other words, 
the players do not do some things that are specified in the score and do 
others that are not. The way in which classical scores, like lead sheets, may 
overdetermine as well as underdetermine performances becomes particu-
larly clear when composers, such as Beethoven on occasion, include finger-
ing in their piano music. Modern orthodoxy has it that players should seek 
to understand the musical point that Beethoven is conveying through fin-
gering and then try to express that understanding using whatever fingering 
best suits them. Just as in the case of jazz lead sheets, then, the relationship 
between wAm notation and performance is highly mediated, with many 
decisions being delegated to performers and with at least some of these 
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needing to be negotiated in real time. Playing the notes is nowhere near as 
straightforward as it sounds.
In saying all of this, I have been trying to make two points. The first and 
more obvious one is that there is improvisation in wAm and performance 
of precomposed materials in jazz. The second and less obvious point is that 
there is no categorical distinction between improvisation and performance; 
rather, there is a continuum of practices. Of course, a different attitude 
toward the text informs the performance of Mozart and Strayhorn, as well 
as the way it is experienced by listeners (who, in the case of the Mozart, are 
likely to know in advance which quartet will be played and may have come 
specifically to hear it). Such obvious differences may disguise but do not 
eliminate the irreducible core of real- time determination that is shared be-
tween wAm performance and jazz improvisation, and it is this irreducible 
core that I see as grounding the social dimension of all music, wAm in-
cluded. Regarded as a lead sheet, Mozart’s score functions as a framework 
within which the players negotiate specific values in real time, and they do 
so by ear, through processes of continuous accommodation between self 
and other. To this extent, playing a Mozart quartet might be described as an 
act of “collective improvisational performance,” to repeat Johnson’s (2002, 
104) words, and another of his characterizations of jazz becomes even more 
telling when applied to wAm: it is “an earsite in an epistemology domi-
nated by eyesight.” Similarly, Ingrid Monson’s (1996, 84) observation that 
in jazz, “To say that a player ‘doesn’t listen’ . . . is a grave insult,” applies 
with no less force to classical quartet performance. Small wonder then that 
Richard Cochrane (2000, 140) concludes that “the practice of improvisation 
in fact exists in all musical performances except those carried out solely by 
machines”; and when George Lewis (2009, 4) claims that “improvisation’s 
ubiquity becomes the modality through which performance is articulated,” 
he intends this to apply not just to music but to social action in general.
In putting forward these arguments I do not claim that Johnson’s distinc-
tions between eye and ear, product and process, or individual and commu-
nity are illusory. They are real and deeply embedded in musical culture, but 
they have been drawn in the wrong place. The crucial distinction lies not 
within the practices of performance, which are aurally mediated and pub-
lic (because you can hear me as well as I can hear myself ), but between the 
practices of performance and the discourses around music that are predi-
cated on the ontology of eye, product, and individual. I can illustrate this by 
going back to the string quartet, which I now declare to be the first page of 
Mozart’s String Quartet No. 14 in G major, K. 387. A traditional musicologi-
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cal description (what is often, and tellingly, referred to as a “reading”) of the 
first ten bars might go something like this:
A two- bar opening phrase moves from the tonic to the supertonic and is 
balanced by another two- bar phrase that returns through the dominant 
to the tonic; this pair of matched two- bar phrases leads in turn to a four- 
bar phrase in which a distinctive motif ascends from the viola through 
the second violin to the first violin. This culminates in a homophonic but 
deceptive cadence on the submediant, which is immediately rectified 
through the addition of a two- bar closing phrase that cadences in the 
tonic, resulting in an extension of the normative 8- bar sentence to 10 bars.
This musicological language is abstract and depersonalized: reference 
is made not to people making music together (the description is of “the 
music,” not a particular performance of it) but to instrumental agencies. 
These are conceived as timeless entities, which is why the whole descrip-
tion is expressed in the present tense. Then there is the “distinctive motif” 
that ascends through the instruments (the ascent is an ocular image): it is 
passed from one instrument to another, rather like handing over the baton 
in a relay race. It is in that sense an object and as such potentially can be 
owned (the fact that it is distinctive means that it could in principle be copy-
righted). And if we ask what this object is made of, the answer will probably 
be “sound structures”—that is, specific configurations of pitch classes and 
rhythms—but since they can be usefully specified only in notational terms, 
this is tantamount to saying that the object is made of text. In any case, the 
object is something that exists independently of performance, with the per-
formance accordingly being reduced to an optional extra or supplement, 
rather like reading a poem out loud.
The strange ontology of musical works draws on long traditions of textu-
ality and Platonic idealism, elaborated through Romantic notions of indi-
vidual creative vision and the correlative concept of art addressed to the 
experiencing subject. It is also linked to the aesthetic ideology of musical 
autonomy, according to which music’s value lies in its transcending of the 
social and its access to a higher plane of being. The New Musicology of the 
1990s was defined by its opposition to this ideology. Susan McClary (1991), 
for example, argued that the canonic wAm repertory embodies hegemonic 
values such as misogyny and racism and does so in a particularly perni-
cious way because the apparent naturalness and self- evidence of musical 
meaning disguises its ideological constructedness. Influenced by Adorno, 
the New Musicologists sought to demonstrate the deep links between music 
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and  social meaning, but they did so through textual analysis, aiming to iden-
tify and decode social articulations composed into the score. In this way 
they retained the depersonalizing discourse of traditional musicology even 
as they redirected it to new ends.
But again, this is not an issue restricted to wAm. Monson (1996, 26) ob-
serves, “In an improvisational situation, it is important to remember that 
there are always musical personalities interacting, not merely instruments 
or pitches or rhythms.” She also complains that the contribution of indi-
viduals has been overemphasized at the expense of the group contexts from 
which improvisation emerges. “The melodic vocabulary of the improvis-
ing jazz soloist,” she writes, “must always be seen as emerging in a com-
plex dialogue between the soloist and the rhythm section” (Monson 2002, 
114). In the same way, Wadada Leo Smith condemns the belief of those he 
witheringly refers to as “‘musical analysts’” that “the solo- line is the cre-
ation of a ‘soloist,’ and that the other improvisers involved are mere ac-
companiment,” adding “this is an invalid evaluation” (Walser 1999, 321). 
Daniel Fischlin (2009, 4) goes as far as to claim, “The individual does not in 
this sense really exist, except as a function of the community out of which 
s/he emerges.” And Monson (1996, 80) extends her attack on the persistent 
misunderstandings of jazz as far as that stronghold of ocular- centricity, the 
musical text. “At the moment of performance,” she says, “jazz improvisa-
tion quite simply has nothing in common with a text (or its musical equiva-
lent, the score).” Almost half a century earlier, Alfred Schutz (1964, 169), 
for whom making music together was a paradigm case of intersubjective 
communication, made precisely the same comment about wAm. He went 
on to claim, “There is no difference in principle between the performance 
of a string quartet and the improvisations at a jam session of accomplished 
jazz players” (177). I maintain that all of Monson’s points apply as much to 
wAm as they do to jazz.
One implication of this is that the distinction between improvised and 
performed music cannot be established on empirical grounds—that is, in 
terms of the analysis of musical material. That, indeed, is the outcome of a 
recent study by Andreas Lehmann and Reinhard Kopiez (2010). Their sub-
jects were quite consistent in rating how far various musical examples were 
“spontaneous/improvised” or “coherent/rehearsed,” but there was no sig-
nificant correlation between these ratings and whether the example in ques-
tion was in fact improvised or precomposed. This fits with Philip Auslander’s 
(2013, 54) argument that “the fact that music is improvised is not accessible 
or verifiable through the act of listening.” He sees improvisation as “a social 
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characteristic of jazz performance rather than an ontological characteris-
tic of the music” (57), an agreement between players and listeners to treat 
the performance as if it is improvised. An expression of this is the elabo-
rate gestural stage play through which both jazz and rock musicians cre-
ate the impression of—or perform—spontaneity. (It is telling that this stage 
play is essentially identical to that through which wAm soloists perform the 
authenticity of their emotional engagement with the music they are play-
ing.) In short, Auslander sees improvisation as constituted through a form 
of social contract, and there are a number of other musicological concepts 
of which the same has been argued. Jeffrey Kallberg (1996, chap. 1) has ap-
plied this approach to genre, which, despite huge efforts, researchers in 
music information retrieval have failed to define satisfactorily in material 
terms (Craft 2008). I have described work identity as a social construction 
only weakly supported by material features (Cook 1999, 203); in this case, it 
is analytic philosophers of music who have wasted their efforts.
In this chapter, however, I pursue the argument in a different direction. In 
traditional musicological thinking (as in music philosophy), the concept of 
the score is thoroughly entangled with the Romantic aesthetic ideology to 
which I have referred. The question I want to address is how we might think 
about scores if, in contrast to the traditional musicological approach, we ap-
proach them as frameworks for social action and interaction.
Western “Art” Music and Social Interaction
When your discipline gets weighed down by sedimented assumptions and 
ideology, it helps to view your problems from the perspective of other disci-
plines. At this point, then, I want to inject two perspectives from art theory 
and material culture. One is Nicolas Bourriaud’s (2002) “relational aesthet-
ics.” Though now arguably suffering from overexposure, it embodies an in-
sight that sets into relief the overwhelming orientation of traditional musi-
cology and aesthetics toward subjective experience: Bourriaud proposes 
that one of the functions of art is to construct social relationships among its 
spectators. While Bourriaud’s purpose is to provide a theoretical basis for 
specific developments in the art of the 1990s, I see this as one of the basic 
functions of music in general.
The second perspective arises out of the Peter B. Lewis Building in Cleve-
land, Ohio, which was designed by Frank Gehry for the Weatherhead School 
of Management and opened in 2002. Gehry views buildings as expressing 
and fostering social relationships. Because learning is a social activity, 
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writes Kim Cameron (who was dean of the Weatherhead School during this 
period), the Peter B. Lewis Building “had to foster lots of chance collisions 
and productive interaction patterns” (Cameron 2003, 90). The same ap-
proach characterized the design and construction process. It is well known, 
as documented by Eric Abrahamson and David H. Freedman (2006, 87–88), 
that no detailed blueprints were issued to contractors. They were expected 
to derive the measurements they needed from a scale model of the build-
ing. This forced them “to work with the Gehry team in the task of translat-
ing the look and feel of the model into a full- scale structure,” expressing 
Gehry’s philosophy that “everyone working on the building should keep 
creating throughout the construction process.” A wide range of visual aids 
was used as means of engaging the many different parties involved in the 
project. Richard Boland and Fred Collopy (2004, 11), both faculty members 
at Weatherhead, refer to the many models they saw as the design devel-
oped; Gehry’s team “work with their hands,” they say, “making models of 
the exterior and interior elements out of paper, metal, plastic, waxed cloth, 
or whatever material gives them both the form and feeling that they are 
seeking.”
Perhaps most telling are the freehand sketches that Gehry produced at an 
early stage of the design process (reproduced in Cameron 2003, 91). These 
calligraphic sketches are so abstract that if you saw them out of context, it 
would probably not occur to you that they represent a building. But when 
you see them that way, the spatial and aesthetic characteristics that they 
embody become aspects of the building. They do not embody significant in-
formational content in the way that, for example, a quantity surveyor might 
define it: it would be absurd to think of the building being costed on such a 
basis. Boland and Collopy (2004, 11) explain that the sketches are “meant 
to be spontaneous and evocative of both form and emotion,” while for 
Cameron (2003, 90) they express “a playful sense of experimentation and 
right- brain thinking.” But the best insight into their function comes from 
Gehry himself: “You have to dream an idea. . . . Then you have to work it 
through the staff in my office. You have to work it through the client, all the 
people and the committee who have things to do with it. . . . There are thou-
sands of people in the end that touch this thing” (quoted in Cameron 2003, 
91). The purpose of these sketches, then, is to facilitate collaborative work, 
setting out a broad visual and affective framework without preempting the 
innumerable concrete decisions that must be negotiated in the course of the 
collaboration. In short, they structure the social relationships that are nec-
essary to bring the project to a successful conclusion.
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Such an interaction of human and material agents would lend itself to 
analysis in terms of Bruno Latour’s Actor- Network Theory (2005), and this 
kind of approach would readily transfer to the analysis of graphic scores in 
music. However, I shall return to Mozart’s K. 387, but now in the context of 
a conference held in the Peter B. Lewis Building shortly after it opened. En-
titled “Managing as Designing,” the conference was conceived around Gehry 
(who attended) and his building, and its aim was to develop a new vocabu-
lary for management on the basis of the concepts and practices of design. 
“Design” was interpreted in a broad sense, and I was invited. My paper was 
titled, “In Praise of Symbolic Poverty,” and it presented conventional musi-
cal notation as a means of designing concerted action. I construed K. 387 
as a performative script that choreographs a series of varied social engage-
ments: it sets out a broad vision of what is to be achieved but at the same 
time, through the radical under- determination that characterizes staff nota-
tion, delegates local decisions to be made on the ground, in real time. It in-
vokes and relies on individuals’ tacit knowledge and creativity, their ability 
both literally and metaphorically to play things by ear. This is the musical 
equivalent of what, in the architectural design process, Gehry (2004, 21) 
refers to as “staying liquid” rather than fixing design decisions at too early a 
stage, and to my surprise this turned out to be the guiding idea of the whole 
conference. In the case of music, it represents not only a more positive but 
also a more realistic alternative to Dean Rowan’s conception of the classical 
score as an exhaustive specification of deliverables mandating fully account-
able implementation, in a kind of musical analog to the iso 9000 family of 
quality management standards. In short, my claim, as Monson (1996, 186) 
says of jazz, is that music has “as one of its central functions the construc-
tion of social context”—an idea that precisely parallels Bourriaud’s rela-
tional aesthetics.
In talking about the string quartet as a model for social interaction in 
music, I have chosen the classical genre that perhaps most closely re-
sembles jazz improvisation. Both embody the same relational values: the 
need to play by ear—to communicate through the public medium of musi-
cal sound—means that everyone is open to everyone else, resulting in an 
ensemble that is egalitarian or, at least, in which hierarchies are dynamic 
and negotiated. Both genres involve the same give and take that character-
izes polite conversation, and it is no accident that the metaphor of conversa-
tion was as deeply embedded in eighteenth- century thinking about chamber 
music as in twentieth- century thinking about jazz. But this is not the only 
form of sociality that is embedded in classical music. If the metaphor of con-
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versation serves to define classical chamber music, then one of its features 
is that each player has something to play that makes sense both in its own 
terms and in relation to what others are playing. This is not only the case 
of Mozart’s string quartets. As a former oboist, I would maintain that it is 
the case of his symphonies, too—but not of Beethoven’s. Seen from the obo-
ists’ desk, a change took place in symphonic writing around the beginning 
of the nineteenth century. From then on, a given textural element might be 
assigned at one moment to one instrument or set of instruments and at the 
next moment to another. The overall sound makes sense for the audience, 
but for the players the individual instrumental parts no longer make the 
kind of sense that they did in Mozart’s symphonies.
The music still makes sense, of course, but it makes sense as heard from 
the conductor’s podium or from the auditorium, not from the oboists’ desk 
or the back row of the violins. And that means that performance becomes 
the expression of a different structure of social relationships from the cham-
ber music model. The rank- and- file players become not so much participants 
in a collective social event as skilled workers employed to perform certain 
predefined services for the benefit of the ticket- buying public. It is at this 
time that the conductor appears, a silent performer who coordinates and 
supervises operations, rather in the manner—to continue with the archi-
tectural analogy—of a project manager, essentially representing the clients’ 
interests, though with due attention to other stakeholders. One such stake-
holder, although normally absent, is the composer, who now becomes not so 
much a musical dramatist, choreographing real- time interactions between 
performers, as a sound designer. In short, a fundamentally different man-
agement structure is in place compared with that in a Mozart symphony 
(which normally would have been led, rather than conducted, by the prin-
cipal violinist). There are new lines of accountability. It is still an insult 
to say that orchestral musicians do not listen, but it is now most crucially 
the conductor whom they are not listening to. And this new conception of 
symphonic performance is retrospectively imposed on eighteenth- century 
repertory conceived in terms of a quite different form of social organiza-
tion. The interesting thing is the extent to which this social dimension of the 
orchestra has been overlooked by the historical performance movement that 
began in the 1970s as a reaction against the one- size- fits- all consensus of the 
postwar performance mainstream and by the century’s end had become a 
mainstream of its own. It is not hard to think of period- style orchestras that 
set great store on the use of authentic instruments and playing techniques—
and then perform Mozart symphonies under a conductor.
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This story is really too easy to tell. I could now go on to locate the emer-
gence of ocular- centricity and the rest in this transition from chamber music 
understood as the collaboration of free individuals to the modern orches-
tra understood as a top- down structure, with management and employees 
having highly segmented roles and responsibilities, almost in the manner of 
Ford- style mass production. (The major constraint on such segmentation—
the fact that everyone had to play together at the same time and place— 
disappeared with the introduction of multitrack recording.) And jazz fits 
into the story as a mode of resistance to the juggernaut of capitalist reifi-
cation and alienation. But such a narrative of cultural and social decline is 
grossly oversimplified and illustrates the temptation to make translations 
between music and society—and back again—in a manner that is far too 
glib and literal. I shall make the point from two different points of view. The 
first is that of management studies, which has built up quite an extensive 
literature on how conductors and orchestras work together. The general as-
sumption has been that the globe- trotting conductor is a prime exemplar of 
charismatic leadership—the kind of leadership that involves a top- down re-
lationship between leader and followers. However, the management consul-
tant Yaakov Atik (1994) carried out extensive interviews with conductors, 
players, and orchestral administrators, from which he concluded that all of 
these parties considered the most effective leadership style to be a transfor-
mational one. This involves “an interactive and dynamic perception of the 
relationship between superior and subordinate” (27), characterized by the 
delegation of local decision making to individual players. One of Atik’s in-
formants, an administrator and former player, spoke of the conductor who 
will “communicate a point about something and from that point on, leave it 
up to the abilities that he knows the players have” and added, “That is true 
leadership” (26).
The point can also be made in musicological terms. To do this, I focus on 
changing practices in the performance of Webern’s music (as described in 
Day 2000, 178–85). The composer’s later music, for example, his Concerto 
Op. 24 (1934), is highly pointillistic in style. Melodic fragments of just one 
or two notes pass from instrument to instrument, often with large regis-
tral leaps or dynamic disjunctions. It was precisely Webern’s later music 
that was valued by the hard- core modernists associated with the Darmstadt 
Ferienkurse in the 1950s, owing to the perceived objectivity of its composi-
tional engineering, but no performing tradition for this music had at that 
time come into being. As a result, when Robert Craft made his pioneering 
recordings of Webern’s complete published works, issued by Columbia in 
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1957, he coached each player individually “until he had learned his part like 
a cipher” (Stravinsky and Craft 1972, 95). In other words, the music was 
performed in just the way Rowan supposes, with each note being slotted 
into place in accordance with the specifications of the score. In terms of 
the social interaction involved here, a parallel might be drawn with a num-
ber of other musical contexts both within and beyond wAm: the opening of 
the final movement of Tchaikovsky’s Sixth Symphony (Pathétique), in which 
alternate notes of the tear- jerking melody are assigned to first and second 
violins, resulting in a peculiar stereophonic effect (but only if first and sec-
ond violins are arranged in the old- fashioned way, to the left and right of the 
stage); change ringing of church bells, where each ringer controls one bell; 
and such non- Western traditions based on the principle of hocketing as the 
Indonesian angklung ensemble or central African horn orchestras.
The narrative of decline might seize on such practices as embodying an 
even clearer version of Ford- style segmentation, the model of an alienated 
society in which the individual worker has no investment in the overall pro-
cess of production. But in reality these performance situations are neither 
socially nor musically dysfunctional. They have merely been misdescribed. 
Writing in the mid- 1970s, by which time his own performances of Webern 
had become much more continuous and even lyrical, Boulez (1976, 79) was 
highly critical of the performances of twenty years earlier on the grounds 
that “the musicians did not seem to understand their roles.” As a conductor, 
he explained the implications of this for rehearsal and performance: “You 
have to discover how an instrumentalist can play an isolated sound in a way 
that links it intelligently with what has gone before and what follows. You 
must make him understand a pointillistic phrasing, not just with his intellect 
but with his physical senses. So long as a player does not realize that when 
he has a note to play it comes to him from another instrument and passes 
from him to yet another, . . . he will . . . produce a note that is ‘stupid,’ di-
vorced from context.” As Timothy Day suggests through the judicious juxta-
position of these and other quotations, Boulez was in effect replicating the 
more general advice offered by the famous modernist conductor Hermann 
Scherchen (1933, 94) in his Handbook of Conducting: “Melodies that are not 
given out by one soloist throughout, but pass, in subdivision, from one in-
strument to another, cannot be correctly performed unless each player sings 
the whole of them as they are played, and contributes his share in accor-
dance with the conception of the whole thus formed.”
As it happens, Scherchen had been in the audience six years earlier when 
the composer Ernst Krenek achieved a musical succès de scandale through 
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the premiere of his Second Symphony. According to his biographer John 
Stewart (1991, 43), Krenek “told the players: ‘Now we are going to play a 
piece which you will not understand one bit. Whoever thinks he has the 
theme please play very loud.’ The players dutifully did so, and the ragged 
performance had a colossal effect that produced an immediate uproar in the 
audience.” Krenek, in other words, created his musical effect through con-
structing a social situation in which the players precisely did not listen to or 
negotiate with one another, resulting in a “vision of terror and catastrophe” 
that “simply overwhelmed” another audience member, the twenty- year- 
old Adorno.2 By contrast, Scherchen’s utopian image of an orchestra whose 
members collectively “sing” the melody of which each plays only a few 
notes dramatizes the nature and extent of the social interaction involved in 
orchestral performance. The first and second violinists in the fourth move-
ment of Tchaikovsky’s Pathétique each “sing” the complete melody, although 
they play only half of it, and the effort to coordinate individual and social 
action, matching collective instrumental sound to individually imagined 
vocalization, arguably results in an effect of concentration, of the forging of 
social community against the odds, that would be hard to create in any other 
manner. (Why else would Tchaikovsky have scored it that way?) The hocket-
ing of change ringing, angklung performance, and African horn orchestras 
can similarly be seen as both fostering and expressing a particular kind 
of social interdependence and cohesion, and in this way what might too 
easily be misinterpreted as an extreme form of segmentation or alienation 
turns out to be more realistically understood as an extreme form of commu-
nality. In essence, what we are talking about is distributed cognition. As Bur-
rows (2004, 2) writes, “Cognition may literally be shared among individu-
als through the mediation of objects, tools, symbols, and signs” (although 
in Scherchen’s case, the mediating element is melody). Tellingly, Burrows 
introduces the idea of distributed cognition in order to explain the “subtle, 
web- like interplay” of social and musical relationships that develops in the 
course of free, collective improvisation—what, in a neat inversion of Jung’s 
terminology, he terms “the collective conscious” (2004).
I conclude from this that the irreducibly social dimension of musical inter-
action extends all the way from free jazz to modernist orchestral music and 
that it is only the lingering effect of idealist aesthetic ideologies, on the one 
hand, and painful racial histories, on the other, that lead us to think other-
wise. But I would pursue the argument one step further. I hope I have decon-
structed the opposition between jazz and wAm as musical practices. Despite 
the obvious differences between jazz improvisation and wAm performance, 
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not to mention the equally striking differences between different genres of 
jazz and wAm, there is a level at which both are socially grounded through 
mutual listening, real- time interaction, and collectivity. But that does not 
explain away the image of wAm presented by Johnson and by Rowan. Given 
wAm’s marginalized role in contemporary culture, it is ironic that it remains 
widely associated with a hegemonic establishment, with institutionalized 
authority in terms of education and validation, and with bureaucratic docu-
mentation. Even if in important ways wAm notations function like Gehry’s 
sketches, the notations look a lot more like the blueprints Gehry did not give 
to his contractors. The contrast with the highly mythologized culture of free 
jazz is palpable. But there is a sense in which this might be seen as one of 
wAm’s strengths. We do not live in the utopian community signified by free 
jazz. We live in an administered world constituted by a hegemonic estab-
lishment, institutionalized authority, and bureaucratic documentation. The 
issue is how we can make this world habitable, how we can personalize and 
take possession of it in the same way that, in the built environment, indi-
viduals “refuse the neat divisions and classifications of the powerful and, 
in doing so, critique the spatialization of domination” (Cresswell 2006, 47, 
paraphrasing Michel de Certeau). At a literal level, personal stereo from the 
Walkman to the iPod has been celebrated as a means of taking possession of 
the cityscape, but at a deeper and more social level, the most characteristic 
transformational potential of classical music may lie in its demonstration 
of how the administered world may be opened up to improvisation, social 
interaction, and creativity. And seen from such a perspective, music does 
not just symbolize social actions and relationships: it enacts them. It is not 
just a metaphor but a metonym.
Second Thoughts
But if that is a conclusion, it is a problematic one for a number of reasons. 
One is that characterizations of music as the expression of an ideal society 
tend to be unrealistic and sentimental. Alan Stanbridge (2008, 8) complains 
about Jacques Attali’s “rather idealized claim that free jazz was a prime 
example of a music that heralded ‘the arrival of new social relations’ . . . 
and offered the possibility of the ‘emergence of a truly new society.’” (Stan-
bridge also casts doubt on Attali’s basic knowledge of jazz.) A related issue 
is the extent to which the enactment of social relationships in performance 
translates into actual relationships between human individuals. I made a 
distinction between the depersonalized agents of traditional musicological 
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descriptions of Mozart quartets and the social interactions that the music 
choreographs. But what do these interactions have to do with the actual re-
lationships between the male second violinist and three female members of 
a student quartet, in which the second violinist was the weakest player but 
felt that, as a man, he should exercise an authority that was musically in-
appropriate (Davidson and Goode 2002)? What this shows is that although 
musicians enact their parts, they do so in the same sense that actors play 
their roles. While theatrical and cinematic diegesis is based on the difference 
between the time that is narrated and the time of narration, musical diegesis 
exists only in real time—but it is still diegesis, and it is as diegesis that it 
enters the realm of the aesthetic. There is, then, a diegetic gap between the 
social enactment I have been talking about and the actual social relation-
ships between the players. How easily this gap is jumped is not easy to say. 
It is the same issue that confronts understanding of the real- world effects of 
videogames and pornography.
Even if we accept the efficacy of music’s directly enacted microsociali-
ties—which represent only the first of Georgina Born’s (2010a, 232) four 
orders of music’s social mediation—we still have the issue of how they 
might be disseminated across society, as Attali’s vision implies. According 
to Gustavo Dudamel, former member and conductor of the Simón Bolívar 
Youth Orchestra, “An orchestra is a little community, but the perfect com-
munity, because you need to listen [to] the other musicians.”3 But what 
makes the Simón Bolívar Youth Orchestra different from other such en-
sembles is that it is the apex of an entire system of orchestral education in 
Venezuela, through which the microsocialities of performance are trans-
lated into broader social action. And, of course, if we consider musical par-
ticipation across all styles and genres rather than merely in relation to wAm, 
the extent of teenage socialization that is grounded on musical performance 
adds up to a significant intervention in the wider social order. There is also 
the issue of how far socialization might be achieved through virtual partici-
pation—that is, through watching or listening to music: when I listen to clas-
sical chamber music I feel I am hearing the sound of social interaction, and 
that is what keeps me listening however well I know the music in a score- 
based, informational sense. In the absence of empirical support, however, 
the idea that listening can in itself constitute a medium of socialization may 
amount to no more than wishful thinking.
And then, how can all this be reconciled with the awkward fact that free 
jazz and classical chamber music—the genres on which I have concentrated, 
and on which other writers about music and social interaction also con-
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centrate—represent niche practices? It is again Stanbridge (2008, 10) who 
makes the argument most pointedly: the “more challenging forms of con-
temporary jazz and improvised music remain resolutely minority tastes,” 
he writes, “which tends to circumscribe rather severely the utopian and 
far- reaching claims made regarding the development of ‘new social rela-
tions’ or ‘the transformation of societies’ based primarily on free jazz or the 
avant- garde.” Perhaps, he concludes, the editors of Critical Studies in Im-
provisation/Études critiques en improvisation should acknowledge “not only 
the positive socio- political potential of improvisatory creative practice, but 
also its social and political limits” (10). But here the problem may be that, 
in stressing the socializing power of musical performance, commentators 
have laid too much emphasis on a few iconic genres in which core values 
of interaction are elaborated into symbolically resonant representations of 
ideal societies. After all, real- time processes of entrainment and imitation 
are widely distributed across the spectrum of the world’s music. As Tal- Chen 
Rabinowitch (2010) explains, entrainment is linked to emotional empathy, 
“which depends first and foremost on the ability to adjust to someone else’s 
inner pace, to shift from one’s own rhythm and be prepared to open up to 
and synchronize with someone else who is in a different emotional state,” 
while imitation “is able to provide us with an experience that is very close 
to the first- person experience, enabling us to recognize and internalize the 
emotional conditions of another.” Rabinowitch’s experimental study, based 
on a battery of empathy measures, showed that children who were taking 
part in a year- long program involving games- based musical participation 
outperformed a control group who participated in similar games but with-
out the music component.
There is increasing evidence that music has evolved as a means of coordi-
nating social interaction and, in particular, managing situations of social 
and emotional uncertainty (Cross 2006). If that is the case, it would explain 
the apparent universality of entrainment as a phenomenon that is equally 
musical and social. To this extent, as with music and film or music and per-
formance, it is not a matter of music and the social, because music is already 
part of the social (as well as the other way round). And that would imply 
that there is a level at which the empirical evaluation of music’s role in so-
cialization becomes impossible, because—unlike in Rabinowitch’s study—
there is no possibility of having a control group. The experiment of creating 
a human society without music has never been attempted.
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Notes
1. Since I wrote this paper in 2010, I have developed certain parts of it in Beyond 
the Score: see Cook 2014, esp. chaps. 7–8.
2. I owe this quotation to Matthew Pritchard, who points out that it conflicts 
with Krenek’s account of the incident (in which the words are attributed to the 
conductor).
3. Verity Sharp, interview with Gustavo Dudamel, The Culture Show, bbc 
Two, June 10, 2008, http://www.bbc.co.uk/cultureshow/videos/2008/06/s5_e2 
_dudamel_extra.
chApter 3
FROM THE AMERICAN CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT TO MALI
Reflections on Social Aesthetics and Improvisation
Ingrid Monson
In my view, social aesthetics concerns delineating relationships among aes-
thetic forms, discourses, positionalities, and social structures. The goal of 
pondering social aesthetics is not to arrive at an overarching theory encom-
passing all possible relationships between the aesthetic and the social but, 
rather, to offer rich interpretations of complexly positioned artistic practices 
that challenge our taken- for- granted understandings of what music and the 
social are. I begin by mapping out the relationships among these things 
in my own work and, hence, from within the intellectual trajectory of my 
training in ethnomusicology and the various interdisciplinary linkages that 
I have encountered either actively or passively in my many years in aca-
demia. The legacy of the literature in ethnomusicology on social aesthetics, 
it seems to me, is curiously omitted from much of the recent literature.1 By 
comparison, the understanding of the social and the aesthetic appearing in 
the so- called relational aesthetics seems superficial (see Bourriaud 2002).
I have published two books that address in different ways the relation-
ship between the musical and the social: Freedom Sounds (2007) and Say-
ing Something (1996). In Freedom Sounds, I was interested in the impact of 
macrosocial events on the microsocial world of jazz and especially the effect 
of large- scale historical events such as the Civil Rights Movement and Black 
Power Movement on aesthetic debates within jazz. More informally, I de-
scribe the book as being about the things everyone fought about in the jazz 
world: race, politics, black nationalism, integration, civil rights, economics, 
activism, and aesthetics. To understand the aesthetic debates under way in 
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jazz—particularly the relationship of jazz to various forms of modernism—
I argued, it was important to recognize that the agonizing debates over race, 
black nationalism, color- blindness, and liberal versus radical understand-
ings of social transformation were basically the same as those taking place 
in the Civil Rights and Black Power movements themselves.
I put forth a three- part theoretical framework to organize my discus-
sion, combining aspects of post- structuralism and practice- theory- oriented 
anthropological social theory.2 I suggested that the framework of discourse, 
practice, and structure might be useful in thinking through the complexi-
ties of very polarized debates. I was interested in what people said; what 
they actually did; and how structural racism, in particular, shaped the pos-
sibilities open to various actors in the musical scene. Since these actors took 
apparently contradictory positions from time to time—at one moment wax-
ing universal about the utopian qualities of the music, and at another, em-
phasizing the specifically African American need for self- determination—a 
crucial dimension of my emphasis on practice had to do with understanding 
that the erection of the essentialist wall between black and white was often 
situational. That is, it was less a matter of ideology than of pragmatically 
situated issues of power and respect. The various discourses, including musi-
cal ones, that people used to justify their positions in various situations pro-
vided a way to get at the very human complexity of the political and musical 
aspirations of various jazz communities.
The burgeoning Civil Rights Movement called out to jazz by demanding 
that artists, especially African American artists, do various things to indi-
cate which side they were on—from refusing to play at segregated theaters 
to playing benefit concerts, participating in demonstrations, and making 
albums and performances speak to black pride and racial and social justice. 
The symbolic importance of music as an arena in which the racial hierarchy 
was inverted—where white musicians struggled to keep up with an African 
American leadership and African Americans felt compelled and inspired to 
stay one step ahead of the game—gave improvised music an especially im-
portant place in the social and musical discourses of the time. Aesthetic de-
bates over what jazz improvisation was and should be, over which version 
of aesthetic modernism jazz should embrace, over which sounds were the 
most political, and over who should play what forms of music and why were 
politicized in the quest for justice, self- determination, and utopian notions 
of communal wholeness. African Americans were not the only people trans-
formed by these debates that took place in both the musical and political 
spheres, as a generation of young liberal and radicalized white Americans 
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also began to question, however incompletely, the politics and aesthetics of 
whiteness at mid- century.
The crucial issue at the center of the historical analysis in Freedom Sounds 
was the insistence that the aesthetic streams contributing to jazz were far 
more mobile and hybrid than the sociological and economic statuses of the 
various demographic groups who played the music. Put another way, the 
musical language of jazz has been far more pluralistic, democratic, and cos-
mopolitan than the racially stratified society that produced it. By develop-
ing the idea of aesthetic agency, I sought to present a picture of musicians as 
actors free to draw on a wide variety of aesthetic traditions, whether or not 
they were historically associated with their home ethnic group. I suggested 
that musicians at mid- century drew on a palette consisting of five broad 
aesthetic streams: (1) the aesthetics of African American vernacular music 
as expressed in jazz, blues, gospel, and rhythm and blues; (2) the aesthet-
ics of American popular song as descended from Tin Pan Alley and musical 
theater; (3) the aesthetics of modern classical music; (4) the aesthetics of 
Africa and its diaspora, especially Afro- Cuban music; and (5) the aesthet-
ics of other non- Western music—most notably, in this time period, that of 
India. Although these aesthetic streams overlap in some respects, there are 
certain musical resources associated with each one. The African American 
stream valorized improvisation; intensity of emotional feeling; the rhyth-
mic feels of swing and the shuffle; harmonic progressions from blues, spiri-
tuals, and hymns; and timbral complexity. From Tin Pan Alley, musicians 
learned about song forms, the use of chromatic harmonic in crafting them, 
and repertory enabling them to cross into the mainstream. From classical 
music, musicians were inspired by form, orchestration, modern methods of 
creating sonorities (such as quartal harmony), and the idea of modern art. 
From the African diaspora came an expanded set of rhythmic feels, such 
as Afro- Cuban clave rhythms and West African asymmetric time patterns. 
From other world music, such as Indian music, came ideas of the expanded 
time frame of improvisation and modal systems beyond those used in the 
West.
Despite the boundary- shattering musical explorations of various artists, 
when they left the bandstand they entered a world that insistently put them 
back into the various social categories they sought to transform. Perhaps 
the greatest difference between black and white musicians in the 1950s, 
I argued, was the fact that white musicians had access to structural white 
privilege, no matter what their individual relationship to the blues and Afri-
can American aesthetics more broadly, while black musicians experienced 
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structural racial discrimination, no matter what their individual relation-
ship to Western modernism and mainstream culture. Aesthetics alone, in 
other words, could not achieve social transformation.
In Saying Something, I addressed the way interactive improvisational 
processes operated at both a musical and an interpersonal level and the 
processes by which they indexed larger social issues, especially race. The 
 direction of analysis accomplished in Freedom Sounds was reversed in Saying 
Something: I moved instead from microsocial to macrosocial. In ensembles 
building emergent musical trajectories through improvisation, I suggested 
that the relationships among sounds were simultaneously relationships 
among people. Consequently, inherently social as well as musical bonds 
were created in improvisational performance. I had in mind acoustic musi-
cal performances of musicians performing in the same place and at the same 
time, something that the vast expansion of digital and electronic capabili-
ties has rendered but a small spectrum of contemporary performance pos-
sibilities.3
In Saying Something, the idea that music and, especially, improvisation 
create social bonds was hardly new at the time I wrote, as a long- standing 
conversation in ethnomusicology about the relationship between the social 
and the musical was well known. I took my point of departure from Steven 
Feld’s article “Sound Structure as Social Structure” (1984), the title itself a 
paraphrasing of Alan Lomax’s “Song Structure and Social Structure” (1962). 
Feld’s article critiqued Lomax’s cantometrics project, which attempted to 
correlate in a rather deterministic fashion sound characteristics with social 
and cultural traits. Like other discussions of improvisational and participa-
tory music in ethnomusicology, Feld’s (1994) analysis of the music of the Ka-
luli in Papua New Guinea associated the classless egalitarian social structure 
of Kaluli society with the participatory, multipart organization of the musi-
cal aesthetic of Kaluli “lift- up- over- sounding.” The ceremonies in which 
music making took place, which had as their principle objective moving the 
audience, especially women, to tears, were not in his opinion arenas for the 
demonstration of power. As Feld wrote, “Soundmaking provides no format 
for the assertion of power, dominance, or personal excellence at the cost of 
others. The recognition of skill in composition and performance is clear, and 
its pragmatic outcome is the weeping of the hosts. Despite all this, competi-
tion is not a major agenda in the ceremonies, and the provocation involved 
is not a manipulation for the sake of power” (393). Although Feld implicitly 
argued for a correlation between egalitarian social structures and participa-
tory musical making, he recognized the limits of mapping supposedly egali-
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tarian social structures onto sound structures. Men, he noted, appropriated 
and controlled the most prestigious expressive resources, generated a social 
focus on themselves and their evocative powers, while the expressive weep-
ing of the women mobilized far less social power. Even in an egalitarian 
 social structure, in other words, Feld recognized the existence of inequalities 
and unequal distribution of prestige. Nevertheless, the tendency to map par-
ticipatory musical experiences onto a utopian ideal of a liberatory equality 
achieved through music remains a persistent discourse surrounding impro-
visational musics of the African diaspora, jazz, and popular music. It seems 
to have been my function in the literature to rain on the parade by insisting 
that, however emotionally satisfying and spiritually transforming improvi-
sational performance can feel, issues of power and prestige persist whether 
they take the form of leader- side person relationships within a band, aes-
thetic respect or lack thereof, gender dynamics, racial dynamics, or some-
thing else drawing a line of inclusion or exclusion. I might also explain my 
position by saying that I do not deny that transcendent social and musical 
connections can be and often are created in performance; nevertheless, a 
great deal in the life of professional and nonprofessional music making falls 
short of this ideal. Once the band leaves the stage, the performers and audi-
ence members return to the everyday world—perhaps nourished, revital-
ized, moved, and inspired but pushed by forces larger than themselves back 
into the various positionalities they occupied before the performance. There 
are limits, in other words, to the social relations that improvisational musi-
cal performance can create.
I find myself much in sympathy with Claire Bishop (2004), who is suspi-
cious of the emancipatory claims made for the collaborative, relational work 
of art which Nicolas Bourriaud argues should be judged by the social rela-
tions that it produces. The open- ended artwork—not framed by or result-
ing in an object, insisting on the participation of its audience, not existing 
without the participation of the audience—may offer something revelatory 
to the art world transcending the “shelter” of art history of the 1960s and 
its values, but to me it reinscribes something utterly ’60s in music: emanci-
patory claims for artistic practices veiling nagging hierarchies, power plays, 
and human fallibility, even in the most sincere. Just what frame is required 
to have everyday experience, such as cooking and eating, turned into re-
lational art, after all? The setting and the audience seem paramount—an 
art gallery populated by the strata of people who circulate through art gal-
leries—and create the frame of artistic significance for what, were it to take 
place in a kitchen in Flatbush where neighbors stop by, is simply an every-
AmericAn ciVil riGhts moVement to mAli 83
day activity. The ability to frame such things as art requires a set of posi-
tionalities that are anything but innocent of power and prestige.
My career- long suspicion of overly emancipatory claims for improvisation 
is informed most directly by the gendered walls of inclusion and exclusion 
that seemed to haunt my experiences as a trumpet player. From my gen-
dered position, for example, I could easily see the hypocrisy of white men 
claiming to be excluded by black players, for few seemed to see an ethi-
cal problem in the exclusion of women. Women somehow deserved exclu-
sion due to our inadequate skill or because having us on the stage with the 
real (male) musicians somehow undercut the mystique of the entire enter-
prise. We were seldom status- enhancing, in other words, even if we played 
well and had good camaraderie with our male colleagues. Although things 
have improved since those days—with the success of amazing players and 
composers such as Ingrid Jensen, Matana Roberts, Geri Allen, and Maria 
Schneider—the complexity of the relationships between participatory musi-
cal forms and the quality of social relations produced by them seems to be 
particularly visible when issues of gender are factored into the rest of the 
social picture. Sherrie Tucker, of course, is the one who has written the most 
eloquently about this subject (see esp. Tucker 2000).
My discomfort with uncritical claims for the creation of new social re-
lations through music has led me to take the position that ensemble im-
provisation is not inherently egalitarian or emancipatory; instead, it offers 
only the potential for such human interaction, necessarily subject to the 
very human and social shortcomings the various individuals bring into the 
circle of sound that frames musical experience. Can that circle of sound 
transform us internally? Of course. Can the internal transformation inspire 
the self- conscious creation of new forms of social organization? Yes. Can 
it just be fun? Yes. Can it eliminate global hierarchies, anomie, economic 
stratification, poverty, racism, and disease? Not by itself. Whatever micro-
social claims we make for musical process as modeling the social relations 
we would like to achieve, in other words, need to be tempered by a larger 
understanding of power and social hierarchy.
My most recent work in Mali with the balafonist Neba Solo illustrates 
an improvisational music that has a different relationship to the discourses 
and values generally assumed in defining aesthetics and social conscious-
ness in improvisational and popular music in the United States and Europe. 
Although many aspects of modernist aesthetics are alive and well in Mali—
the importance of originality and virtuosity and a special place for the art-
ist—there is a far less oppositional stance to society and tradition than has 
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usually be associated with the rebellious stances of figures such as Charles 
Mingus, Max Roach, and Public Enemy. In most musical styles in Mali, tra-
dition is actively invoked to exhort people to live up to the deeds and values 
of their ancestors, even if in practice people fall short.
I should qualify this claim by saying that in the past decade there has 
been noticeable growth in the presence of hip hop, especially in the capital 
city, Bamako, and that many young rappers have taken on the oppositional 
stance, attitude, and styles of American hip hop. They nevertheless operate 
in a popular music scene dominated by the broader aesthetic I am about to 
describe. In 2002, I began doing ethnographic work on Neba Solo (whose 
given name is Souleymane Traoré) from Sikasso, Mali’s second- largest city. 
Mr. Traoré is a Senufo bala (wooden xylophone) virtuoso who is widely 
known in Mali as the balafon (genius of the bala), but he has a relatively 
low international profile. He is fabulously virtuosic as an improviser and a 
composer of complex compositions and arrangements, and his songs’ lyrics 
comment on contemporary social and public health issues, such as vacci-
nation, Aids, female excision, environmental protection, and political cor-
ruption. Traoré views part of his mission as sensitizing people to important 
ethical and political issues of the day, as well as alerting them about what 
they can do to keep themselves healthy. Vaccination, his song urging people 
to get their children vaccinated, was written in 1997 to persuade elders that 
allowing the vaccination of children was important, despite rumors that it 
caused sterility. Since only 30 percent of Malian youth are literate, the ex-
hortations of musicians are an important arena of public health education.
Neba Solo’s composition Yiri is both a homage to trees and a call for en-
vironmental responsibility. The song recounts the richness of the gifts of 
trees, from shea butter to medicine and food, and urges people to honor 
and respect them as living beings and to refrain from burning them in the 
countryside, which will ultimately cause deforestation and desertification.4 
Traoré’s social message is personalized by testifying to all the things that he 
has received as the result of trees, for the bala itself is made of wood. He and 
his band members are especially proud that the Senufo use the wood only of 
trees that have died naturally.
Neba Solo’s music is not traditional in the usual sense of the word. Rather, 
his music represents a professionalization, modernization, and reconfigura-
tion of traditional Senufo bala music. When he was eighteen years old, in 
1987, Solo heard Alpha Blondy’s reggae recording of Jersualem as he walked 
through the streets of Bamako. He was enchanted by the bass line and was 
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inspired to try building a bala with added bass notes when he returned 
home. His father and other Senufo were at first skeptical of the changes he 
wanted to make to the instrument. By Senufo tradition, in order to proceed 
Traoré had to secure his father’s permission. They came to an agreement: he 
would be allowed a period of time in which to develop his ideas and make a 
recording. If the results pleased his father, he would give his blessing to his 
son’s musical direction. He added three bass notes to the traditional seven-
teen keys and experimented with various tunings. First and foremost, he 
wanted to expand the role of the bass line in his music. His new version of 
traditional Senufo musical pieces, with an expanded texture and new tun-
ing, earned the approval of both his father and local audiences.5
The new style reconfigured the musical ensemble. Traoré used two balas 
instead of the traditional three. The accompaniment parts were distributed 
between the two instruments: the treble bala player typically improvises 
melodies with the right hand while playing accompaniment parts with the 
left hand; the bass bala player usually improvises bass lines with the left 
hand and plays accompaniment parts with the right hand. The interplay be-
tween the two balas creates a rich contrapuntal texture between interlock-
ing parts. In performance, Neba Solo (on the bass bala) and his brother Siaka 
Traoré create endlessly rich textures by modulating from one configuration 
of parts to another. This new contemporary sound for the bala modernized 
an instrument that had been dismissed by urban dwellers as a primarily vil-
lage instrument that was not suitable for modern (professionalized urban) 
music. Indeed, to understand the respect with which Solo is now regarded, 
one needs to know that when he first came to Sikasso many dismissed him as 
a player of the fali gala bugula, or donkey ribs. When he and his group were 
scheduled to play on the anniversary of Radio Kene in Sikasso, the station’s 
director, Daouda Mariko, took one look at the balas and bara drums (signs 
of the village) and asked them to leave the stage. They began to play offstage 
and won over both the audience and Mariko, who became one of Neba Solo’s 
principal advocates.6 In this sense, Traoré has become a figure of particular 
pride for the people of Kenedougou who live in the dozens of small villages 
surrounding Sikasso.
The moral exhortations in Malian music sometimes surprise my students, 
many of whom have drawn from Western representations the idea that Afri-
can music is about lack of restraint and bourgeois inhibitions. The work 
ethic expressed in Neba Solo’s song Bɛɛ k’i Bemba (Let’s Strive), has strong 
cross- cultural resonances with the Protestant work ethic but also expresses 
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a kind of patriotism that is consistent with the Malian national motto: One 
People, One Goal, One Faith (Un peuple, un but, une foi; Jama kelen, kunti-
lenna kelen, ŋaniya kelen). Neba Solo is directing his comments not to indi-
vidual ethnic groups, such as the Senufo, Fulbe, Maraka, Bamana, or Dogon, 
but to all of Mali, a place where developing and improving the country is a 
major preoccupation.
nebA solo, Bɛɛ k’i BemBa (let’s striVe)
Se ko ni don ko dugu jɛ le




Bɛɛ k’i jija ka bara kɛ
Bɛɛ k’i jija
Faso denw minw bɛ jamana kɔnɔ
Faso denw mun bɛ jamana kɔ kan
N’aw ye aw kɔfilɛ faso la
Faso nin bɛ diya
An ka dugu bɛ diya
An ka jamana bɛ diya, o ho
O farafin denw
A y’i wuli o
Anw ka bara
Ni anw ma bara kɛ
Fangantanya tɛna b’anw na
N’anw ma bara kɛ
Gɛlɛya jugu tɛna b’anw na
N’anw ma bara kɛ
Kɔngɔ jugu tɛna b’anw na
Bɛɛk’i bemba ka bemba
Bɛɛk’i bemba ka bemba
Se ko ni don ko dugu jɛ le
Bɛɛ k’i jija ka bara kɛ
|  |  |
The time has come for our culture to come to light
Let’s all strive in our work








If you remember the homeland
It will be a better place
Our country will be a better place




If we do not work
Powerlessness will not end
If we do not work
Hard times won’t end
If we do not work
Hunger will not end
Let’s all strive, let’s strive
Let’s all strive, let’s strive
It is time to show our culture
Let’s all strive in our work
In the song Sababu, Solo exhorts people to do good by invoking divine cause, 
or sababu. The religious expression in the text—which advises people not 
to be arrogant, because God can take away what he has given—gives some 
feeling for the pervasiveness of everyday invocation of God in Mali, a coun-
try where 94 percent of the population self- identifies as Muslim. Although 
Muslim spirituality is directly invoked in this piece, the line between Islamic 
and traditional spiritual beliefs is often quite blurry.
nebA solo, SaBaBu
Ka n’i wasɔ fangantan lu la
k’i ele ye waritigi ye duɳaɳa
Ala min ye ele ke waritigi ye
O Ala kelen b’i se k’i kɛ fantan ye
I miiri o la, i kana yada, yada
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Kana i waso ko mogolu la
k’i ele ye ɳemɔgɔba ye
Ala min ye ele ke ɳemɔgɔba ye
O Ala kelen bɛ se ki kɛ ko mɔgɔ ye
I miiri o la, i kana yada yada
Ka n’i waso denwtan nu la
K’i ele ye dentigi ye duniya na
Ala min ye i ele kɛ dentigi o
O Ala kelen bɛ se k’i ke dentanya ye
I miiri o la, i kana yada yada
|  |  |
Do not show off among poor people
about your money in this life
God who made you rich
Can make you poor
Think about that, do not be arrogant
Do not show off
because you are a great leader
God who made you a great leader
Ala can also make you a common person
Think about that, do not be arrogant
Do not boast among those who are childless
because you have children
God who gave you children
Can also make you childless
Think about that, do not be arrogant
Sababu’s exhortations to not be arrogant highlights a very important prin-
ciple of Malian ethics: mɔgɔya, or being a good person. A common Bama-
nankan expression is, “Foyi te mɔgɔya bɔ.” Nothing is better than being a 
good person; even if you do not have money, if you have good relations 
with other people, you are rich.7 Western travelers are often surprised by 
the generosity and hospitality of Malians, despite the crushing poverty and 
lack of infrastructure in the country. There is relatively little petty street 
crime toward Western visitors, despite the tremendous disparity in eco-
nomic status.
Much of Malian music, including the music of jeliya (or the music of the 
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griots), reminds people of the fundamental principles of being a good person 
in Mali, which include greeting people, thanking God, hospitality,  respect, 
and living up to the wisdom of the elders and ancestors. Most songs of po-
litical and social critique point out the ways in which people have failed 
to live up to these traditional principles, which are broadly shared across 
Mali’s multiple ethnic and language groups. A generational split of greater 
intensity is emerging in the world of Bamako hip hop over the mode of ac-
ceptable critique. A standard trope in song lyrics of social critique is to ask 
for forgiveness before criticizing one’s target. Many in the older generations 
find the mode of critique in hip hop to be too disrespectful—that is, lacking 
in the principles of mɔgɔya.
The idea of improvisation as contributing to the making of community 
is certainly a value shared across the cultural divide between Mali and the 
West. So are ideas of being an artist, originality, and the linking of music 
through technology to the broader world. The idea of sonic dissonance and 
avant- garde experimentalism as a sign of social and cultural critique, how-
ever, is pretty foreign. Although there are hierarchies of musical style in 
Mali—with international stars (such as Salif Keita, Oumou Sangare, and 
Toumani Diabate) at the top, followed by the music of the jeliw (griots), 
urbanized popular music, regional traditional stars, and village musicians—
they are marked not so much by musical language as by professionalized 
performance practices and economics. Being popular is a good thing, not a 
sign of lack of seriousness in one’s art. Bamako elites attend performances 
of the most famous stars, often in expensive traditional clothing and jewelry, 
and paying prices that would be prohibitive to most. They hear exhortations 
to live up to their ancestors, often from singers who circulate through the 
crowd, singling them out and reciting the history of their families. While 
there are love songs, and cautionary tales about the trials and tribulations of 
romantic relationships, there is very little sexual explicitness by American 
standards. The public primness of much performance is belied by the never- 
ending gossip about the actual humanly fallible personal lives of various 
performers, but in general the defiance and countercultural assertiveness 
that seem endemic to Western ideas of social engagement through music 
seem mostly to be missing. Artists seem to critique from inside a larger sense 
of tradition rather than in opposition to it.
In thinking about social aesthetics cross- culturally, that is, relationships 
among aesthetic forms, discourses, positionalities, and social structures, it is 
helpful to consider issues of power at all levels of analysis. A series of ques-
tions lead to some conclusions. Who is included/excluded in the musical 
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circle or, conversely, what are the criteria for entrance? What are the ethical 
values developed by musical practice and how are they evaluated by larger 
audiences? Which musical tropes, lyrical themes, and participatory prac-
tices index a performance to larger- scale social and political issues? How do 
social stuctures, geopolitical issues, religion, economics, race, and politics 
affect the music industries in particular locales? Do Western presumptions 
about aesthetics, resistance, and music apply in whole or in part? Analyz-
ing social aesthetics cross- culturally requires thinking broadly and notic-
ing overlaps and resonances in geographically distanced musical practices, 
while cultivating grounded ethnographic and historical research. Such em-
pirical contextualization serves to illuminate compelling differences, raise 
new interpretive questions, and temper the all- too- human tendency to over- 
generalize.
Notes
1. Examples of work on social aesethics in ethnomusicology include Feld 1982, 
1988; Meintjes 2003; Monson 1996; Perlman 1998.
2. Literature that was important to shaping my perspective includes Comaroff 
and Comaroff 1991, 1997; Bourdieu 1977; Foucault 1972; Giddens 1984; Ortner 
1996; Sewell 1992.
3. In the Internet age, what interests me is how the computer has become a 
nonhuman interactant, enabling musical interaction across different times and 
spaces, as well as an instrument that has moved contemporary popular music in 
a direction that is more compositional than improvisational. The nature of the 
social connections and communities forged through such digital mediations, it 
seems to me, is an open question and one that contemporary researchers are 
bound to illuminate in the coming years.
4. In Mali, it is not uncommon to see fires alongside the road in the dry season. 
In some cases, people set fires to chase game from the brush. More problemati-
cally, some people set fires for fun.
5. Interview with Neba Solo and Yacouba Traoré, January 12, 2005, Sikasso, 
Mali.
6. Interview with Neba Solo, February 16, 2006, Sikasso, Mali.
7. Indeed, Charles Bird’s textbook on the Bamanankan language includes a dis-
cussion of this principle in a teaching text: see Bird and Kante 1977. See also 
Skinner 2015, for a comprehensive account of the use of mɔgɔya among artists in 
Bamako.
chApter 4
FROM NETWORK BANDS TO UBIQUITOUS COMPUTING
Rich Gold and the Social Aesthetics of Interactivity
George E. Lewis
Since its inception in the early 1970s, the loosely constituted field of inter-
active computer music has drawn on artificial intelligence (Ai), cybernet-
ics, and socio- musical networks of free improvisation in creating models of 
social aesthetics that include machines as central actors. Interactions with 
these systems in musical performance produce a kind of virtual sociality 
that both draws from and challenges traditional notions of human inter-
activity and sociality. Efforts to imbue interactive systems with values such 
as relative autonomy, integral subjectivity, and computer individualism, and 
with musical uniqueness rather than repeatability, were accompanied by 
an upsurge of bricolage and homegrown elements that were seen as mani-
festing resistance to institutional hegemonies. Musical computers were de-
signed to stake out territory, assert both identities and positions, assess and 
respond to conditions, and maintain relativities of distance—all elements of 
improvisation, in and out of music.
Among a number of interactive artist- theorists, Simon Penny (2016, 402) 
has been particularly perceptive in observing that the advent of real- time 
computational technologies has led to art “objects”—artifacts that “possess 
behavior, ‘make decisions’ and ‘take actions’ based on changes in its context 
in real time.” According to Penny, “This development has led to categori-
cally new kinds of cultural practices” (401), for which aesthetic theory has 
been lacking. Today, according to Penny, these kinds of systems include such 
“new media” forms as “online interactive worlds, augmented and mixed 
reality work, locative media and fully physically embodied interactive in-
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stallation and performance—in single and multiple participant, discrete and 
distributed modalities” (401).
Recent new media histories (see Chandler and Neumark 2005; Salter 
2010) have implicitly challenged the field’s conventional wisdom that traces 
the origins of interactive computer- based art making to the mid- 1980s. 
Around the time that the first voltage- controlled synthesizers were being 
invented by Donald Buchla and Robert Moog, the young composer Joel 
Chadabe (1997, 286) was putting together hybrid analog- digital construc-
tions that generated music autonomously by means of pseudo- random pro-
cesses. By 1977, Chadabe had created one of the earliest computer systems 
for live musical performance. The heart of Chadabe’s cems system was a 
Digital Equipment Corporation pdp- 11 “minicomputer,” which was able to 
both input and transform analog data and control analog hardware. Fre-
quently found in academic music departments, minicomputers were rela-
tively portable in that, unlike the mainframe systems of the period, they 
could be loaded into a van or truck and transported to concert sites.
Chadabe (1997, 291) characterized his devices as the first fruits of a prac-
tice of “interactive composition” in which the instruments “made musical 
decisions, or at least seemed to make musical decisions, as they produced 
sound and as they responded to a performer. These instruments were inter-
active in the sense that performer and instrument were mutually influential. 
The performer was influenced by the music produced by the instrument, 
and the instrument was influenced by the performer’s controls.” Roughly 
coterminous with Chadabe’s work, a number of young composers began 
making interactive computer music using the new eight- bit microcomput-
ers, systems far more portable and less expensive than Chadabe’s. Much of 
the most influential work took place in the San Francisco Bay Area, a center 
for experimental music since the 1950s. Their music and ideas were devel-
oped in itinerant settings among independent researchers, designers, and 
artists in public performance spaces such as the Blind Lemon in Berkeley 
and, most crucially, the Center for Contemporary Music at Mills College, 
which became an important gathering place for new ideas and practices 
around the emerging interactive directions.
The college already possessed a strong reputation for supporting cutting- 
edge music. In the 1930s, the Mills Concert Hall featured performances of 
works by Béla Bartók, Henry Cowell, Igor Stravinsky, and Anton Webern, as 
well as the American premiere of Alban Berg’s Lyric Suite. Around the time 
that Darius Milhaud began his long tenure at Mills in 1940, John Cage was 
teaching music (in the Department of Dance). Harry Partch lived at Mills 
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for two years, between 1951 and 1953, and among the composers who taught 
at Mills over the years were Luciano Berio, Lou Harrison, Pauline Oliveros, 
Morton Subotnick, Iannis Xenakis, Anthony Braxton, Gordon Mumma, 
David Rosenboom, Frederic Rzewski, Larry Polansky, Maryanne Amacher, 
Alvin Curran, and Roscoe Mitchell. Former Mills students represent a great 
diversity of musical directions; among those whose work intersected with 
experimental music were Subotnick, Maggi Payne, Laetitia Sonami, Paul 
DeMarinis, Charles Amirkhanian, Leland Smith, Richard Felciano, Miya 
Masaoka, Steve Reich, Dana Reason, and Frankie Mann.1
In 1966, the San Francisco Tape Center, founded in 1961 by Subotnick and 
Ramon Sender, received a Rockefeller Foundation grant that supported its 
eventual move to Mills, where in due course it became the Center for Con-
temporary Music (ccm), with Oliveros as its first director.2 In 1969, Robert 
Ashley became a co- director of the ccm, and in 1978, his fellow Sonic Arts 
Union founder, David Behrman, joined him.
While the Bay Area has continued to produce what, at this writing, 
amounts to nearly two generations of innovative computer music artists, 
this chapter focuses on the early flowering of the scene, as represented by 
the work of the League of Automatic Music Composers and the artists and 
institutions surrounding it. The earliest version of the League was formed by 
a group of Mills graduates and graduate student composers, including John 
Bischoff, Jim Horton, and Rich Gold, and remained active until 1983 (Cha-
dabe 1997, 296). Other active members of the League included Donald Day, 
Tim Perkis, and Behrman, who became a key early adopter of the kim- 1, 
which he used along with his own “homemade” electronics to produce one 
of the first released recordings of interactive computer music, On the Other 
Ocean (Bischoff 1991).3
After presenting a sense of the developing social aesthetics of that scene—
in particular, its connection with practices of improvisation—I pursue the 
evidence for my contention that the work of Rich Gold (1950–2003), a co- 
founder of the League of Automatic Music Composers, bridges the historical 
lacuna separating practices of interactivity in computer music of the early 
1970s from the development of interactive multimedia in the 1980s. Gold’s 
later work in the corporate sector and at the Xerox Palo Alto Research Cen-
ter (pArc) was influential on new models of gaming and, in particular, the 
early development of ubiquitous computing, a technology that framed re-
lations among people and interactive systems as microcosms of the social. 
Both system design and real- time interactions with the results were marked 
by a utopian politics of interactivity, with an emphasis on establishing non-
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hierarchical, collaborative, and conversational social spaces that were none-
theless indeterminate at the level of structure—aspects of a social aesthetics 
of free improvisation that dates from the mid- 1960s. Through Gold, these 
technologies continue to exhibit the genetic imprint of the social aesthetics 
of early Bay Area interactive music practices.
“Let the Network Play”
This early period produced a number of “interactive” or “computer- driven” 
works and practices, representing a great diversity of approaches to the 
question of what interactivity (then usually called “interaction”) was and 
how it affected viewers, listeners, and audiences. In many cases, works were 
designed precisely to stimulate this kind of reflection, to explore communi-
cation not only between people and machines, but also between people and 
other people. The ideals of this creative community also reflected emerging 
debates and social changes in U.S. society, with particular emphasis on emer-
gent musical phenomena; itinerant rather than institutional activity; social, 
conversational, convivial, and communitarian ethics; and collective, net-
worked, democratic work, expressed in terms of a lack of hierarchy between 
human and non- human roles, as well as between humans and other humans.
Chris Salter (2010, 206) recounts the reminiscences of Joel Ryan and David 
Behrman, who saw the Mills scene as “driven by an anti- authoritarian atti-
tude combined with an experimental atmosphere of tinkering and aesthetic 
curiosity.” Indeed, the developing social aesthetics of this scene embraced 
bricolage and autodidacticism, reflected in preferences (born of economic 
necessity, to be sure) for portable, inexpensive, homegrown, and personal 
systems rather than general- purpose devices, and for an artist- programmer 
model of techno- musical development rather than institutional separation 
of roles.
At many public events, artists from around the community would present 
electronic circuits and software of their own design to audiences and other 
composers (Chandler and Neumark 2005, 378). In this way, the new tech-
nology was also widely viewed as providing possibilities for itinerant so-
cial formations that could challenge institutional authority and power. As 
League members Gold, Horton, and Bischoff (1978, 28) declared, “The ad-
vent of not- very- expensive micro- systems can help free the computer musi-
cian from the pressure to conform to the mores of highly- structured business 
and academic institutions.”
network bAnds to ubiquitous computinG 95
Salter (2010, 206) identifies the Bay Area scene around Mills College 
as “the first known use of cheap, portable computing technology for real- 
time musical performance.” League members, among a number of other 
Bay Area artists, adopted as their computing platform the mos Technology 
kim- 1, one of the first single- board microcomputers. The kim (an acronym 
for “Keyboard Input Module”), which could be had via mail order for as 
little as $250, sported an eight- bit microprocessor running at 1 megahertz, 
an interface and timer chip, an operating system stored in read- only mem-
ory (rom), a hexadecimal led readout, and anywhere from 1,000 to 4,000 
bytes of random- access memory (rAm).
John Bischoff called the League of Automatic Music Composers “the 
world’s first computer network band.”4 From the start, as Bischoff and his 
colleagues declared, they intended to create computer music that valorized 
sociality and performativity, concepts that they mapped onto the signifier 
of the “band”:
Music over the milleniums [sic], traditionally, has involved more than 
one person, either in its composition, in its production or both. In fact, it 
seems to be one of the most social of the artforms. While there has been 
individually produced music as well, computer music, until very recently, 
because of its nature, could only be individual, solitary music. However, 
with the introduction of microprocessors at a reasonable cost, composers 
can now own their own computers, and, operating free from major institu-
tions, true computer bands are possible. While such bands can take many 
forms, network music seems best suited and the most contemporary. (Bi-
schoff et al. 1978, 24–25)
This model of performance presented a new model of liveness that included 
computers as part of the matrix while affirming the central place of the 
human: “To bring into play the full bandwidth of communication there 
seems to be no substitute, for mammals at least, than [sic] the playing of 
music live” (28).
Each of the League’s computers was running a program created by one 
of its composers that was able to produce music without outside interven-
tion—an automatic composition (or improvisation) program—as well as 
taking in data that could affect the behavior of its own system and output-
ting data that could affect the behavior of the other machines.5 Jim Horton’s 
description of a performance by Bischoff, Tim Perkis, and himself in 1980 
encapsulates the characteristic social aesthetic behind the approach:
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The musical system can be thought of as three stations each playing its 
own “sub”- composition which receives and generates information rele-
vant to the real- time improvisation. No one station has an overall score. 
The non- hierarchical structure of the network encourages multiplicity 
of viewpoints and allows separate parts in the system to function in a 
variety of musical modes. This means that the moment- to- moment form 
the music takes is the combined result of the overlapping individual ac-
tivities of the parts with the coordinating influence of the data exchanged 
between the computers.6 (Horton 1999)
League performances were exoskeletal; the composers were often seen pro-
gramming, debugging, and even soldering as the concert proceeded. “En-
vision a table full of electronic circuits, little boxes, computers, all kinds of 
wires and so forth,” Horton told an interviewer. “A typical concert would 
be us at this table, continually fooling around with electronics, changing 
parameters on the programs” (1999).
Particularly transgressive was the League’s penchant for simply sit-
ting back and listening as the computers created the music. League per-
formances often cast the computer in the role of independent composer- 
performer rather than instrumentalist. In 1979, the League set up a biweekly 
series of concerts at the East Bay Center for the Performing Arts. As Bischoff 
recalled, “Every other Sunday afternoon we spent a few hours setting up our 
network of kims at the Finnish Hall in Berkeley and let the network play, 
with tinkering here and there, for an hour or two” (quoted in Chandler and 
Neumark 2005, 378). Often, the composers would leave the stage and join 
the audience as the computers played (380).
As Bischoff remembers, “After a while it seemed more fun to perform 
along with the network, so we began to sit around our large table of gear, 
adjusting parameters on the fly in an attempt to nudge the music this way 
or that” (quoted in Chandler and Neumark 2005, 380–81). However, it is 
important to note that when League members took hands- on improvisative 
roles with their machines, they did so from a collaborative rather than an 
instrumental standpoint, negotiating with their machines rather than fully 
controlling them. “Letting the network play” became a key aspect of its per-
formance practice, and when the humans performed, they became part of 
the network, as well.
Several possible precursors and probable influences on the League and 
other artists in this scene can be identified. First, in terms of processes 
and materials, the work of this scene appears closely related to the open- 
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form music of Christian Wolff, who created compositions for performing 
musicians in which complex structures emerged from the results of sev-
eral interacting decision- making processes rather than the chance opera-
tions for which Cage was noted. Works such as “For 1, 2, or 3 People” (1964) 
require the musicians to perform actions according to, among other things, 
their perceptions of what other musicians are doing, their position in the 
score, and certain overarching rules. The composer provides an environ-
ment in which real- time decision making by performers, and therefore re-
sponsibility for the direction of the music, is paramount.7 The similarity 
of this human- driven performance process to the processes of networked 
exchanges of musical data that we see in the work of the early interactive 
computer musicians is striking. As Bischoff and his colleagues (1978, 28) 
wrote, “An extension of that idea is to write ‘reactive’ compositions which 
can interact with one another as well as with their players.”
Second, in the wake of works such as Cage’s Cartridge Music (1960), work 
on electrically and electronically modified acoustic sound developed into 
a practice of “live electronic music” that differentiated itself in terms of 
approaches to temporality and performativity (and, in many unacknowl-
edged cases, improvisativity) from electronic works whose primary medium 
of presentation was magnetic tape playback. Composers associated with 
Cage, such as Behrman and Gordon Mumma, invented hardware to trans-
form human sounds and gestures musically. Mumma’s series of “cybersonic” 
works, beginning with Medium Size Mograph (1963), were “hardware com-
positions,” pieces for which the “score” would include a circuit diagram.
Mumma’s Hornpipe (1967) for horn and electronics appears particularly 
prescient with respect to what was coming in live computer music:
The acoustical feedback loop which exists between the French Horn, the 
resonant pipes, and the loudspeaker, is part of an electronic feedback sys-
tem which employs amplitude gated frequency translation. As the per-
formance begins the system is balanced. Sound is produced only when 
something in the acoustic- electronic feedback- loop system is unbalanced. 
The initial sounds produced by the French Hornist unbalance parts of the 
system, some of which rebalance themselves and unbalance other parts 
of the system. The performer’s task is to balance and unbalance the right 
thing at the right time, in the proper sequence. (Mumma 1967)
The conception of performance as task in Hornpipe is both dialogic and ex-
ploratory. The performer treats the electronics as a quasi- independent co- 
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performer and can glean the inner state of the electronics only by making a 
sound and ascertaining its effects through listening observation. The music 
results from three factors: the acceptance and performance of the task of 
restoring balance, the real- time adjustments in musical strategy by the per-
former, and the similarly real- time sonic behavior in response to the per-
former’s initiatives.
Following Mikel Dufrenne (1989, 196), the electronics become a quasi- 
subject, an object not simply and totally constituted by a Kantian perceiv-
ing and constituting subject: “But what of a world of the aesthetic object? 
We may speak of this too—if the aesthetic object is a quasi- subject, that is, 
if it is capable of expression. In order to express, the aesthetic object must 
transcend itself toward a signification which is not the explicit significa-
tion attached to representations but a more fundamental signification that 
projects a world.” The performance as whole becomes a form of real- time 
world making, a roughly delineated, reciprocal mediation between the ex-
hibited behavior of human and machine actants.
Third, a number of the early interactive pieces drew on open- form 
compositional procedures, and a number of these composer- performer- 
technologists directly identify Cage as a major influence in terms of pioneer-
ing “an important form of collaborative music, that is of the simultaneous 
playing of compositions” (Bischoff et al. 1978, 28). Thus, the composers ad-
vance an aesthetic of emergence avant la lettre: “Independent simultaneous 
activities viewed as one single activity always bring to mind the idea that 
groups can work wonderfully together without the anxiety of control struc-
tures that supposedly insure success” (27). What also comes to mind is a 
notion of productive freedom rooted in anarchy, and in that regard it comes 
as no surprise that for these composers, “Making music together using ideas 
and structures developed independently without thought of future collabo-
ration now seems a natural musical process due, in large part, to the work 
of John Cage,” himself an avowed anarchist (27).
At the same time, in contrast to Cage’s well- known antipathy to jazz, the 
League’s members express a social aesthetic of voice that would be familiar 
to any jazz musician: “At this stage in the development of the experimen-
tal tradition it is thought well to develop a personal, even idiosyncratic, 
approach to music. To find such an approach is not always easy” (Bischoff 
et al. 1978, 28). We can easily compare this to the Afrological trope of “tell-
ing your own story” (G. E. Lewis 1996, 118–19). A similar affinity with both 
Cageian aesthetics and the Afrological arises as the composers declare, “At 
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each stage in the development of the network the music changed unpredict-
ably. It became clear that it was impossible to tell beforehand where the 
music was going to come from (Bischoff et al. 1978, 28).” Similarly, the saxo-
phonist Steve Lacy observed of his musical practice of improvisation, “You 
have all your years of preparation and all your sensibilities and your pre-
pared means but it is a leap into the unknown” (quoted in Bailey 1992, 57).
“Listening to the combined result,” wrote Bischoff and Chris Brown, a 
computer musician and professor at Mills College, in 2005, “one hears in-
dependent musical processes at work—each station has its distinct musical 
viewpoint—along with the coordination of those processes through a real- 
time choreography of data flow” (quoted in Chandler and Neumark 2005, 
381). This aesthetic valorization of the melding of individual voice with the 
unforeseen undoubtedly stems from the machine- improvised nature of the 
networked music itself. “At times, the computers did indeed seem to have 
minds of their own,” Horton (1999) wrote, “sounding not unlike a group of 
musicians playing off each other, be it free improvisation or an almost uni-
fied consciousness.” Indeed, we can read Horton’s recollections in terms sug-
gested by sociologist of science Andrew Pickering (2010), as an account of 
post- humanist dances of human and nonhuman agency: “Sometimes when 
the system enters a strong interactive mode, its activities may be heard as if 
there is a unified mentality improvising or composing. Because the semantics 
of whether we can ascribe intentional acts to nonliving entities seems to be 
open, we can choose to consider that we have invented a (partially guided) 
musical artificial intelligence” (Horton 1999). With regard to this aspect of 
League ideals, I want to take into account Nicolas Bourriaud’s (2002, 14) 
declaration that “the possibility of a relational art (an art taking as its theo-
retical horizon the realm of human interactions and its social context, rather 
than the assertion of an independent and private symbolic space), points to 
a radical upheaval of the aesthetic, cultural and political goals introduced 
by modern art.” One of these upheavals has to do with Penny’s (1995, 216) 
observation of “a novel art form in which the key aesthetic element is the 
‘behavior’ of the work in response to the viewer.” We do not need to embrace 
Bourriaud’s urban- based origin narrative for the aesthetics of relational art 
to see that the League’s version of interactive computer music making, fol-
lowing Bourriaud, is a kind of work for which quasi- independent behavior 
is key, where “the substrate is formed by intersubjectivity, and which takes 
being- together as a central theme, the ‘encounter’ between beholder and 
picture, and the collective elaboration of meaning” (Bourriaud 2002, 15).8 
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In the particular form of sociality created by the League’s interactive perfor-
mances, a world is constructed in which the hierarchy of agency of humans 
over machines is not at all axiomatic.
Bourriaud does not address technological artmaking directly, but a work 
of relational art, in his view, “may operate like a relational device contain-
ing a certain degree of randomness, or a machine provoking and managing 
individual and group encounters” (30). Relational works propose “moments 
of sociability” and present “objects producing sociability.” Membership in 
the relational world is centered on this primary criterion: “Does this work 
permit me to enter into dialogue? Could I exist, and how, in the space it de-
fines?” (109).
Cybernetics and Ai discourses were important influences on this genera-
tion of computer music artists. Horton’s posthumously published diaries, 
“Unforeseen Music: The Autobiographical Notes of Jim Horton,” composed 
in August 1996, set out a number of elements of an emerging social aesthet-
ics of interactivity that are not only compatible with Bourriaud’s ideas but 
are also strongly inflected by Ai and cybernetics discourses. In one diary 
entry, Horton explicitly cited the cyberneticist Gregory Bateson’s ideas as 
an influence on a performance of 1980:
1. A mind is an aggregate of interacting parts or components.
2. The interaction between parts of mind is triggered by differences 
[sic, difference].
3. Mental processes require collateral energy.
4. In mental processes, the effects of difference are to be regarded as 
transforms (i.e., coded versions) of events which precede them.
5. Mental processes require [sic, Mental process requires] circular (or 
more complex) chains of determination.
6. The description and classification of these processes of transformation 
disclose a hierarchy of logical types immanent in the phenomena. 
(Quoted in Horton 1999)9
A remarkable prefiguring of the work of the Bay Area computer musicians 
appears in the unusual odyssey of the British psychologist and cyberneticist 
Gordon Pask. After conversations with Norbert Wiener, who was lecturing 
on cybernetics at Cambridge, the young Pask was moved to demonstrate 
how a machine could learn. Adapting his electronics expertise to the artistic 
connections he had developed in the theater, between 1953 and 1957 Pask 
developed the Musicolour, a unique device that used the sounds of music 
performance to control theatrical lighting. Signals from a microphone were 
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passed through a set of tuned filters whose output controlled the lights in 
response to the pitch and beat of the music.
Andrew Pickering’s (2010a, 316) account of the Musicolour makes it clear 
that the device operated according to the tenets of cybernetics: “In analogy 
to biological neurons, banks of lights would only be activated if the output 
from the relevant filter exceeded a certain threshold value, and these thresh-
olds varied in time as charges built up on capacitors according to the devel-
opment of the performance and the prior behavior of the machine.”
In an essay about the device, Pask presented his notions of “an aestheti-
cally potent environment”:
a. It must offer sufficient variety to provide the potentially controllable 
variety required by a man (however, it must not swamp him with 
variety—if it did, the environment would be merely unintelligible).
b. It must contain forms that a man can learn to interpret at various 
levels of abstraction.
c. It must provide cues or tacitly stated instructions to guide the learning 
process.
d. It may, in addition, respond to a man, engage him in conversation 
and adapt its characteristics to the prevailing mode of discourse. 
(Pickering 2010a, 322)10
The relationship between subjectivity and agency was prefigured by Musi-
colour, which “staged the encounter of two exceedingly complex systems—
the human performer and the machine—each having its own endogenous 
dynamics but nevertheless capable of consequential performative inter-
action with the other in a dance of agency” (Pickering 2010a, 319). Pickering 
tells us that “the cybernetic brain was not representational but performative 
. . . and its role in performance was adaptation” (6). Thus, again prefiguring 
the questioning of the human- machine distinction, Pickering writes that “a 
Musicolour performance undercut any familiar dualist distinction between 
the human and the nonhuman. The human did not control the performance, 
nor did the machine. . . . A Musicolour performance was thus a joint product 
of a human- machine assemblage” (319).
As Pickering notes, in such an assemblage considerations of power inevi-
tably arise, and the Musicolour’s ontology was remarkably similar to what 
we find a decade later with Mumma and Oliveros, as well as the implicit 
and explicit politics of performance that emerged twenty years later among 
Bay Area interactive computer musicians: “In contrast to the traditional im-
pulse to dominate aesthetic media, the Musicolour machine thematized co-
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operation. . . . The Musicolour performer had to find out what constituted 
a synesthetic relation between sound and light and how to achieve it. We 
could speak here of a search process and the temporal emergence of desire— 
another Heideggerian revealing—rather than of a preconceived goal that 
governs a performance” (Pickering 2010a, 320).
Across the Great Divide: From Network  
Bands to Quotidian Computing
In this chapter I extend my interest in pursuing what the first- generation 
new media theorist Erkki Huhtamo, in the title of a 1999 article, called “an 
archaeology of interactivity.”11 Huhtamo’s archaeology traces the desire for 
a dialogically real- time human- machine relationship across a period from 
the cybernetics talk of the 1950s to the then emerging new media discourse 
of the 1990s. Huhtamo sees this real- time concept as having come to frui-
tion only in the late 1980s—notably, with Jeffrey Shaw’s well- known virtual 
reality piece “The Legible City” (1989–91).12
Part of the reason that early and now canonical new media histories ap-
pear to be unaware of the earlier history of interactivity discussed in this 
chapter may be laid at the door of the computer music community itself. As 
we now see from Horton’s diaries, the early experimenters realized privately 
that their work aimed at projecting new models for the study of meaning 
and sociality. However, as I remarked in an earlier essay, their public tran-
scripts evinced a certain tardiness in coming to terms with the social impli-
cations of their technologies, practices, and aesthetics:
The field of interactive music quickly recapitulated the stance of the 
earlier mainframe- based work in tending to see itself as heir to a tradi-
tion of vanguard Euroclassical music that, after the explosions of 1968, 
had once again retreated from contact with popular culture, political con-
cerns and the social world generally. Unprepared to contextualize their 
issues beyond the frame of pan- European composition, the questions 
they raised would be left to a later generation of interactivity artists and 
theorists whose work became subsumed within the field of “new media.” 
(G. E. Lewis 2007, 109; see also Born 1995)
Well after the early network performances with Bischoff and Horton, League 
co- founder Rich Gold (2008, 27) said, “The Terrain Reader, in all its myriad 
forms, was my primary computer music work and could easily be called 
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my only real work.” The Terrain Reader, which Gold deployed frequently 
in League performances, composed music algorithmically by modeling a 
virtual landscape in software and a virtual hiker that freely traversed the 
terrain. The hiker’s activity would be reflected in the sounds coming from 
the speakers.13 As Gold whimsically put it, the program had “three notable 
qualities: it could produce a wide range of sounds; it could fit within my 
kim- 1; and it had a charming metaphor which made it fun to explain. If I 
were to describe the music it made today I would say it was syntho- bebop, a 
form approximately fifteen years too early” (27).
In distinction to his Bay Area artist colleagues, and at variance with earlier 
League critiques of “highly- structured business and academic institutions,” 
Gold joined the corporate world, working for much of the 1980s as director 
of the Sound and Music Department of the U.S. division of Sega USA, which 
was still well known for its home gaming devices and for the strong pres-
ence of its machines in coin- operated arcades (“In Memory” 2003, 253). By 
that time, Gold had replaced “syntho- bebop” with a new term, “Algorithmic 
Symbolism” (As), which he usually described as a “field”—one for which 
he was the inventor.
Gold presented various explanations of the intent and subject of the field. 
In one formulation, published in 2008, algorithmic symbolism became “a 
form of art where the underlying procedures of generation contain meaning 
that interplays with the surface meaning. The algorithms matter and need to 
be presented as part of the art” (Gold 2008, 30). This formulation describes 
the Terrain Reader rather well and forms the basis for his self- distributed 
Party Planner program, which was featured in a Scientific American article 
published in 1987. In Bourriaud’s terms, the Party Planner is a relational art-
work that combined sophisticated programming with humor and whimsy 
as it sought to advise users as to the best way to foster congenial sociality 
through counsels on social space (Dewdney 1987, 112–15).
Gold’s 1993 description of As encapsulates a post– Party Planner ideal: 
“Algorithmic Symbolism uses various computer programs that seem to have 
a lifelike quality—a charm and humanness—in their ability to make things 
happen that can only occur in the anti- natural world. That pool ball going 
uphill, for example, shows a lot of determination on the pool ball’s part. 
These programs would include chaos, fractals, cellular automata, and neu-
ral nets” (Gold 1993a, 10). Taking a position at Activision, a competing firm, 
Gold, with a collaborator, David Crane, produced a highly successful com-
mercial example of this latter version of As: Little Computer People (lcp), 
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described in one article as “the first fully autonomous, computerized Ai 
game” (“In Memory” 2003, 253). The game, which was released in 1985, ran 
on new, sixteen- bit microprocessor computing platforms, such as the Atari 
st and the Amiga. These machines adopted the now universal wimp- style 
(windows, icons, menus, pointer) graphical user interface, which had been 
popularized earlier in the decade in Apple’s Lisa and Macintosh computers, 
and was itself an outgrowth of a system invented by Alan Kay and his asso-
ciates at pArc in the early 1970s (see Broneck 2002, 207–9).
The activities of the lcp demonstrated the extent to which algorithmic 
symbolism was an outgrowth of the social aesthetics of Bay Area microcom-
puter experimentalism. The screen presented a two- dimensional representa-
tion of a house, with dining room, living room, recreation area, kitchen, and 
other areas visible. The virtual person played the piano, exercised, watched 
television, and performed other quotidian tasks while completely ignoring 
the so- called user, who was often relegated to the status of voyeur—hence, 
the characterization “autonomous.”14
The user manual strongly encouraged anthropomorphization and subjec-
tivization of the lcp, informing new purchasers of the protocols needed to 
encourage him to move into his new home:
The first time you visit your lcp, his house will be empty when it appears 
on the screen. This is because most lcps are quite shy and will not readily 
rush into a new situation. In fact, it may take several minutes before yours 
actually musters the courage to step inside the new home you’re providing 
for him. On the other hand, lcps are also quite loyal. Once he’s moved in, 
you can expect him to be home on subsequent occasions.
When an lcp enters a house for the first time, he will usually inspect the 
new home for anywhere from 5 to 10 minutes. Then he’ll leave to retrieve 
his belongings. Yours will probably return shortly with his suitcase. Most 
lcps also bring their dog. (Polley and Nelson 1986, 3)
There were channels for communication with the little man on the hard 
drive, however, via a set of keyboard commands. Like the Tamagotchi digi-
tal pet of the late 1990s, lcps required care and feeding, including food and 
water for both the lcp and his dog.15 In anticipation of emotional computing 
and the humanoid robots created by Cynthia Breazeal and other research-
ers at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,16 users were also required 
to monitor and tend to the lcp’s “emotional needs” via “mood boosters.” 
To get the user’s attention, the lcp would “knock on the glass of your tV 
or monitor” (Polley and Nelson 1986, 7). Mood boosters included “phone 
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calls” (“unless they are constantly interrupted to the point of irritation”), 
petting (“he must be sitting in his easy chair in the living room”), playing 
card games (including Blackjack and Five Card Draw), and leaving a new lp 
record at the front door for the lcp’s listening pleasure (6). The lcps were 
fine amateur pianists and were often seen reading the newspaper in front of 
the fireplace or playing with their computers.
Users could communicate with the lcp via text, including making re-
quests and suggestions and asking questions. “lcps are especially respon-
sive to good manners,” the manual said, “so remember to incorporate words 
like ‘please’ and ‘thank you’ into your requests” (Polley and Nelson 1986, 7). 
In the end, however, users became aware that “lcps are basically quite inde-
pendent” (4), thus bringing into the picture a mode of machine agency that 
framed the lcp not only as an object invested with agency conceived along 
Latourian lines but also as a quasi- subject (see Latour 2005).
In the terms suggested by Penny, we can theorize the lcp as an artwork 
exhibiting behavior. Moreover, following Bourriaud, we can conceive of the 
lcp as a relational work that proposes and produces dialogue and socia-
bility. Finally, as with the League’s computer network performances, we 
can theorize the lcp’s quasi- independent behavior as an improvisative form 
of machine- human sociality, a social improvisation that constructs a world 
that challenges the hierarchy of humans over machines.
The interaction becomes improvisation when a third term of freedom 
enters the picture: when the lcp’s analysis of the situation mirrors that of 
its “user,” who is no longer a user of software in the traditional sense. Both 
the human and the lcp are responding to conditions and actions that can-
not be wholly foreseen by either, which obliges a recognition by the human 
that in the world of the game, both parties to the improvisation become free 
agents with respect to the position of the other.
Finally, it is important to recognize that this kind of relational artwork 
pursues an improvisation that could potentially take place over very long 
time spans—days, weeks, months—thereby undercutting the notion of im-
provisation as an ephemeral practice bound to the moment. Another way 
to put it is that the improvisation between the human and the lcp expands 
the notion of the moment itself, as well as positing a notion of shared tempo-
rality along the lines suggested by both the sociological phenomenology of 
Alfred Schutz and the music- informed Christian theology of Jeremy Begbie 
(2000, 207; see also Schutz 1964), who maintains, “When I, the improviser, 
come to terms with and engage with another improviser, I come to terms 
with the other’s temporality.” Thus, what is being proposed in this analysis 
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of lcp is not a metaphysics of machine consciousness but a phenomenology 
of freedom as dialogic interaction.
In 1991, Gold took a position at Xerox pArc and became an integral part 
of the development of “ubiquitous computing,” or ubi- comp, working with 
a team that included Marc Weiser, a computer scientist who was then chief 
technologist at pArc and had headed pArc’s Computer Science Labora-
tory. According to an article written by Weiser, Gold, and John Seely Brown 
(1999), the concept of ubiquitous computing dates back to the founding of 
the ubi- comp program at the Computer Science Laboratory in 1988.
In Weiser’s words (1993, 76), “The idea of ubiquitous computing first 
arose from contemplating the place of today’s computer in actual activi-
ties of everyday life.” In the article “This Is Not a Pipe,” Gold complements 
Weiser’s view by troping the surrealist painter René Magritte’s famous 
painting to present a vision of the computational remediation of everyday 
objects such as toys, and indeed, a pipe:
Ubiquitous computing is a new metaphor in which computers are spread 
invisibly throughout the environment, embedded and hiding as it were, 
within the objects of our everyday life. Each of these computers can 
talk with any of the other computers much like chattering animals in a 
living jungle, sometimes exchanging detailed information, sometimes just 
noting who’s around. The everyday objects themselves become a kind of 
ruse: a baby doll (or toy block) might look like a familiar remnant of 
childhood, but It is really only one of a thousand distributed nodes which 
control the functioning of the whole house. Likewise, the baby doll itself 
activates its own mechanisms, behaviors, and charms based partly on the 
comings and goings of its adopted (organic) family, and partly on digital 
discussions with other objects in the house. (Gold 1993b, 72)
Gold ends the article by invoking a vision of the independent decision 
making of embedded systems: “This new augmented reality is perhaps a 
little like the enchanted village in which common objects have magically 
acquired new abilities, a village where toy blocks really do sing and dance 
when I turn out the lights” (Gold 1993b, 72).
By the fall of 1993, Gold had distilled this vision into a set of five fun-
damental characteristics of ubi- comp objects, using as examples computa-
tional analogues to lunchboxes and pipes:
ubi- objects Are sensuous And reActiVe. They feel, see, hear, 
and touch the environment and then respond to it in various ways.
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ubi- objects Are communicAtiVe. They talk a lot among 
themselves, between themselves and other ubi- objects, and between 
themselves and us.
ubi- objects Are tAcitly And inVisibly embedded into dAily 
sociAl liFe.
ubi- objects Are Anti- nAturAl. When an object says “hi” in the 
morning, it is hard not to say “hi” back.
ubi- objects Are eVerywhere. (Gold 1993a, 4–6)
Gold concluded that through computational remediation, everyday objects 
would become “deeply enspirited” (Gold 1993a, 3), an invocation of what I 
have elsewhere called “technology- mediated animism” (G. E. Lewis 2000, 
37).
As Jane McGonigal (2006, 8) notes, “Although Gold never uses the term 
‘performance’ to describe the phenomenon of ubiquitous computing . . . 
[his] vision for ubiquitous computing is fundamentally a vision of distrib-
uted networks of play and performance.” Again, we can trace these networks 
back to the social aesthetics of Bay Area interactive computer music impro-
visations. As the human- computer interaction theorist Paul Dourish (2004) 
notes, Weiser cites the anthropologist of technology Lucy Suchman’s notion 
of “situated actions” as a source for the ubiquitous computing idea. Dourish 
quotes Gregory Abowd’s view that “Situated action emphasizes the improvi-
sational aspects of human behavior and deemphasizes a priori plans that the 
person simply executes. . . . Ubicomp’s efforts informed by a situation action 
also emphasize improvisational behavior and would not require, or antici-
pate, the user to follow a predefined script” (quoted in Dourish 2004, 20).17
The ubi- comp team produced a number of patents for devices that in-
cluded early versions of palmtop and notepad computers. However, for the 
most part, these devices were less compelling than Weiser, Gold, and Brown’s 
(1999, 694) prescient conceptual realization that “ubi- comp created a new 
field of computer science, one that speculated on a physical world richly 
and invisibly interwoven with sensors, actuators, displays, and computa-
tional elements, embedded seamlessly in the everyday objects of our lives 
and connected through a continuous network.” Arguably, both Gold’s early 
work with the League and the creation of lcp presaged this conception of 
quotidian, deeply embedded human- computer interaction. The presence of 
computers in everyday life in the West has become, as Tolmie notes, “unre-
markable” (quoted in Dourish 2004, 29).18 In this sense, the advent of ubi- 
comp objects has also transformed human experience and potential.
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Epilogue
As with ubiquitous computing itself, the social aesthetics of the early inter-
active computer musicians have now become unremarkably embedded in 
the fabric of our everyday encounters with computing devices. As a final ex-
ample, consider the famous world- building game The Sims, whose author, 
Will Wright, was queried about his experience with lcp:
mAx steele: Will, did you ever play “Little Computer People Research 
Project” from Activision, and did it influence you at all?
will wriGht: Yes, a long time ago. I’ve since gotten to know several 
people who were involved with that project, and many of them gave 
valuable feedback on The Sims, especially Rich Gold.19
Gold’s posthumously published The Plenitude (2007) lays out a complex and 
contradictory vision of the connection among computing, commerce, inter-
activity, and everyday life, informed by his leading role in Xerox pArc’s 
ubiquitous computing area and, later, its artist- in- residence program, whose 
vision pursued strong connections between artists and scientists. When Gold 
joined pArc, as the interactivity theorist and designer Anne Balsamo re-
members, the center’s director and chief scientist, John Seely Brown, en-
couraged him to “become a corporate provocateur, cultural mediator, and 
institutional visionary, and to act as a catalyst for creative thinking and prac-
tice” (Balsamo 2011, 57). From this point, Gold’s work developed into a vec-
tor of transmission linking the cybernetics orientation and social aesthetics 
of the early interactive computer musicians with a later vision of interac-
tivity that may one day embrace an understanding of improvisation as a fun-
damental aspect of the human condition.
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4. See the introduction by Bischoff in Horton 1999.
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14. I remember running into Rich, I think in San Francisco. He told me that he 
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15. For a personal account of life with a Tamagotchi, see Turkle 2012, 30–34.
16. For a critique of the project of humanoid robotics, see Suchman 2007.
17. Originally in Abowd et al. 2002.
18. Originally in Tolmie et al. 2002.
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chApter 5
THE SOCIAL AESTHETICS OF SWING IN THE 1940S
Or the Distribution of the Non- Sensible
David Brackett
Back in the early 1990s, I became aware of several series of recordings pro-
duced by the Time Life company that were organized into different cate-
gories of popular music and grouped by year. These series included titles 
such as “Rhythm and Blues,” “Classic Rock,” “Easy Listening,” and “Country 
USA,” as well as the series that was the genesis of this chapter, “Your Hit 
Parade,” with each cd containing twenty- four top hits for the years 1940 to 
1958. The wonderful thing about these cds was what I would call their arbi-
trary quality: little apparent sorting went on in their preparation other than 
finding songs that were popular according to Billboard magazine’s charts 
during a given year and that had a relatively low bar when it came to acquir-
ing the rights for reproduction. The Time Life series thus made few obvious 
nods to the notion of which recordings might be canonical. “These record-
ings were popular and could be included here,” the collections seemed to 
say, and nothing else needed to be added—neither claims of greatness nor 
claims of historical significance.
Such collections give rise to differing perceptions of music history than 
do those based on an individual artist, a record label, or the greatest hits 
of a genre spread out over time, all formats familiar to anyone with even a 
modest claim to being a collector of popular music recordings. The focus on 
a year anticipates turns in historiography toward “annualism” or “annuali-
zation” as a way to construct a history, as opposed to the more common 
approach that covers an epoch, the time span enclosing a famous event or 
a related group of people, artworks, inventions, and so on.1 The impact of 
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these recordings exposed me to a range of recordings to which I would not 
have otherwise chosen to listen and heightened my appreciation of the im-
portance of circulation in the emergence, persistence, and decline of trends, 
cycles, and genres. Topoi for lyrics, instruments, tempos, and even specific 
musical- style features might be shared among a broad array of artists within 
a short period of time, only to disappear suddenly, indicating a large, and 
otherwise undocumented, dialogue between musicians operating in the 
popular sphere. Among the hundreds of tracks in a collection such as Your 
Hit Parade, 1940–1958 lay the canonized as well as the trivialized, hidden 
treasures as well as historical oddities. This chapter is indebted to the latter.
For example, in the volume of Your Hit Parade devoted to the year 1947, 
crooners such as Perry Como and Buddy Clark rubbed shoulders with the 
African American close harmony quartet the Mills Brothers, and throw-
backs to the prewar heyday of the big swing bands coexisted peacefully 
with a plethora of novelty numbers. It was just such a number that began 
the 1947 volume, a song titled “Open the Door, Richard!” recorded by Count 
Basie. My curiosity piqued, I pondered how it could have been that Count 
Basie, the Ur- canonical jazz pianist and bandleader, had topped the charts 
in 1947 with a recording that was clearly based in vaudeville, featuring a 
skit performed in broad African American dialect that evoked nothing so 
much as minstrelsy. The context provided by the other songs on the 1947 
volume of Your Hit Parade gave suggestive hints, the cd producing a kind 
of synchronic snapshot of the popular music field at that moment, a cross- 
section confirmed and amplified via consultation with Billboard and other 
trade publications of the time. In the wake of considering a broad range 
of recordings circulating at roughly the same time, the question arose as 
to how Count Basie’s “Open the Door, Richard!” fit into the popular music 
mainstream of the period. Consultation of earlier volumes of Your Hit Parade 
provided more clues: by thus providing a series of synchronic snapshots, 
these recordings projected a diachronic transformation of the mainstream, 
as well.
One thing that became clear to me in the course of listening to these cds 
was that, although recordings by swing bands were rare in the 1947 volume, 
they were plentiful in the years 1940 to 1942, which was not surprising, as I 
had already been told by countless histories of jazz and popular music that 
those years represented the height of the “big band era.” While no record-
ings by Count Basie appeared in these earlier volumes, one by his canoni-
cal contemporary, Duke Ellington, did, and in general more recordings by 
African Americans appeared in the volumes representing the early 1940s 
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than in those covering the late 1940s.2 The particular juxtaposition of these 
recordings produced a narrative for me in which racial identification, popu-
lar music genres, jazz and popular music historiography, and various axes 
of prestige based on either symbolic or economic capital intertwined and 
intersected in a tangled web.
Indeed, by reproducing the era’s nearly forgotten musical trivialities and 
accidents, the volumes of Your Hit Parade did not so much contradict the 
verities of popular music and jazz historiography as complicate them. If 
popular music histories tend to assert that swing bands died after the war, 
then this seemed to be true, by and large, although a few big bands did man-
age hits, and swing- influenced music was very much alive and well. After 
all, one could say that Count Basie’s band was big, and it definitely had a 
hit. Jazz histories were similarly not wrong so much as overly simple in 
light of the kind of “tasteless” canvassing of public taste performed by Your 
Hit Parade and summaries of popularity charts. These histories may have 
agreed that the big bands died and were superseded by small combos play-
ing bebop, but they ignored the continued activity of bands led by canonical 
figures such as Basie and Ellington, as well as the noncanonical white swing 
bands, such as Stan Kenton’s, that persisted and occasionally even flour-
ished.3 As Scott DeVeaux observed more than twenty years ago, this postwar 
moment in jazz historiography is marked above all by the emphasis on sym-
bolic capital (i.e., the approval of musicians by other musicians and critics) 
and the consequent denigration of economic capital (i.e., the approval by 
the mass public and financial success) and on evaluations of authenticity 
based on race.4 Bebop musicians succeeded in creating a type of music that 
would be evaluated on its artistic merits, not on how it performed in the 
marketplace. The consecration of jazz artists in subsequent historical texts 
(and to some extent in previous jazz histories, though they were far and 
few between) therefore depended on an inversion between artistic merit 
and commercial success, meaning that many jazz historians were suspicious 
about the artistic credentials of artists who were too successful.
It is no small wonder then, that Count Basie’s “Open the Door, Richard!” 
would not figure in such histories. The late 1940s and early 1950s tend to 
be a lacuna in popular music histories anyway, as the mainstream is seen 
as marking time between the efflorescence of the big band era and the ir-
ruption of rock and roll.5 At issue here would seem to be the relationship of 
a category of music called “jazz” as it was understood at the time and sub-
sequently (not quite the same things) to that heterogeneous grouping of 
sounds that produced the mainstream of popular music. If the usual narra-
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tives assert that the instrumental and vocal recordings of the big bands were 
supplanted by crooners singing ballads accompanied by studio orchestras, 
then, to reiterate a point made earlier, my argument is not that this narra-
tive is incorrect but, rather, that it obscures as much as it elucidates. My first 
step toward complicating it is to point out that a succession of genres, such 
as the procession of swing followed by vocal ballads, is rarely a mere suc-
cession of genres. It is, instead, a series of musical styles articulated to iden-
tifications with music: the musical gestures comprising the various styles 
and genres arrive already marked by associations of race, place, class, gen-
der, and so on. Thus, genres are embroiled in a play of power and prestige 
in which social relations and aesthetics intertwine, but in which relations 
among the social, aesthetics, and genre are rarely homologous or direct.6 
The very terms in which I have been discussing African American artists 
such as Count Basie and Duke Ellington in relation to the transformation 
of the popular music mainstream already suggest such an articulation of 
musical style and identification. The position of their recordings in by now 
conventional historical narratives points to the interconnections of style, 
identification, and prestige. This chapter is devoted to tracing the fortunes 
of jazz and swing from the start of the 1940s, beginning with the instrumen-
tal swing number “Tuxedo Junction” (first recorded by the African Ameri-
can bandleader Erskine Hawkins and then covered by the Euro- American 
bandleader Glenn Miller), to the commercial triumph of “Open the Door, 
Richard!” By focusing on the institutional, discursive, and social networks 
out of which these recordings emerged, this tale of two songs will flesh out 
canonical narratives with a “genealogical” account.7
A Dip into the Politics of Aesthetics:  
What’s Improvisation Got to Do with It?
Most scholarly discussions of improvisation are based on an opposition be-
tween composition and improvisation. While unavoidable, the instability 
of such terms and their relation to one another frequently goes unstated. 
In practice few types of music are wholly composed (i.e., preplanned) and 
then reproduced exactly the same way in performance; neither are many 
types of music completely improvised. Even the limit cases of composed 
and improvised music raise difficult issues: electronic, taped, and digital 
composition may have the potential to reproduce pitches, rhythms, timbres, 
and changes in amplitude precisely from one hearing to another, but they 
cannot take into account the effect of differences in performance spaces on 
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the listener, changes in the listener’s state of mind, or the effect of repeated 
hearings of the “same” piece. However, even the most “free” improvisation 
relies on the formal rhetoric of previous free improvisations and other musi-
cal conventions internalized by the musicians; pitch, phrasing, and timbral 
choices are constrained by the limitations of the instrument and the playing 
habits developed by musicians over years of playing, as well as internalized 
ideas about how instruments in free improvisations should sound (one need 
only imagine the impact on a free improvisation of a little bel canto lyricism 
applied to a diatonic or tonal melody with a clear rhythmic pulse to grasp 
this point).8 Central to this chapter is how the concept of improvisation is 
understood in a particular historical situation and how the concept figures 
into distinctions made between different types of music and their social con-
notations. Popular music of the type discussed here has played little role 
in previous studies of musical improvisation, in which the most frequently 
found objects of study can at times resemble those found in the art and jazz 
canons, with their inverted relations of symbolic and economic capital.9
The concept of improvisation played a crucial role in the circulation of 
musical identifications during this period through the prior association of 
improvisation with musical practices and genres that were in turn asso-
ciated with African Americans.10 Here, a musical technique, improvisation, 
forms part of the play of resemblance and difference between musical cate-
gories and group identities. Indeed, something approaching a contemporary 
notion of what sounds and musical practices might be identified as African 
American began to take shape during the early decades of the twentieth cen-
tury, spurred on by the growing importance of commercial sound recording 
and the increasing dominance of what Karl Hagstrom- Miller (2010) has de-
scribed as a “folklore- based” model of cultural authenticity, which aided 
and reinforced each other.11 All of the by now familiar elements were already 
in place in discourse about African American music in the 1920s, including 
a “swinging” rhythmic sense, distinctive vocal and instrumental timbres, a 
particular approach to dissonance and pitch inflection, and, of course, im-
provisation (and its affective correlate, spontaneity)—practices associated 
with genres such as blues, jazz, and gospel. I am not asserting a tight, homo-
logical fit between these musical practices and African American identity as 
such; rather, the connotations of these practices reflect a widely shared be-
lief about an association between musical practices and a group of people. 
Thus, the ways in which concepts such as improvisation and swing were 
understood at the time played a critical role in how distinctions were made 
between different types of music and their attendant social connotations.
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In another, broader sense, this period in popular music history is about 
a struggle over the terms in which debates about popularity would be con-
ducted, with the “work concept” (the song as the unit, measured by sheet 
music sales, radio plugs, and so on) derived from Western art music aes-
thetics representing one pole and the sound recording, offering the nuances 
of performance, representing the other.12 Whereas the song as text empha-
sizes structure and fixed identity, which could then be reproduced either 
on a recording or in amateur performances at home, the recording as text 
inscribes the marks of spontaneity, of individualized, embodied gestures.13 
In this context, improvisation could begin to figure in the construction of 
musical categories only if recordings were considered the main format for 
the measurement of popularity.14 The alignment of the former work con-
cept with institutional power and dominant social groups appears unmis-
takably in music industry discourse, from evaluations of performances and 
recordings to which songs and recordings receive the most attention for 
their apparent popularity. At the same time, an emerging discourse during 
this period, which tentatively recognizes recordings as texts, created a con-
flict with the dominant aesthetic, as formerly unacknowledged audiences—
including African Americans and whites from the southern states and rural 
areas—were strongly associated with types of music affiliated with the sonic 
aesthetic.
This sonic aesthetic, based on the unique qualities of sound associated 
with particular performers and performances, could circulate beyond a 
specific performance space only on mechanically reproducible recordings. 
Sheet music could not begin to communicate subtle timbral differences, 
let alone the micro- rhythmic nuances responsible for different grooves 
(easily felt by dancers but elusive for transcribers) or the pitch inflections 
that spontaneously enliven melodies with otherwise limited pitch content 
(easily hummed along with by well- trained listeners but not amenable to 
even- tempered notation). The circulation of this music, associated with 
“marginal” elements of the population, which had thrived in the 1920s and 
almost disappeared during the early years of the Depression, began a vig-
orous comeback with the launching of the swing era in the mid- 1930s. The 
recording’s gradual usurpation of pride of place from sheet music as the pri-
mary means of musical circulation figured prominently in a debate in the 
public sphere between competing aesthetics and different concepts of the 
musical work.
This particular conjuncture of aesthetics and the social adds an interest-
ing wrinkle to a theory of social aesthetics such as that of Jacques Rancière. 
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His notion of the “distribution of the sensible” connects the unfolding of 
new aesthetic regimes with the modes of perception through which both 
social actions and artistic forms may be understood (Rancière 2004). Thus, 
the very legibility or audibility of a practice or text as “art” is constrained 
by the dominant mode of perception. Rancière divides the history of West-
ern aesthetics into three artistic regimes, the third of which, the “aesthetic 
regime of the arts,” emerged during the nineteenth century and is character-
ized by, among other things, “the equality of represented subjects” and “the 
indifference of style with regard to content” (81). Rancière disputes Walter 
Benjamin’s notion of the democratizing function of mechanical reproduc-
tion by asserting that, prior to the appearance of photography, film, sound 
recording, and other artistic forms characterized by mechanical reproduc-
tion, “equality of represented subjects” had already become “the subject 
matter of art.” Therefore, it is due to this prior shift that “the act of recording 
such a subject matter can be an art” (32; see also Benjamin 1969).
Several difficulties immediately arise when one attempts to analyze popu-
lar music circa 1940 through such a theoretical lens. Rancière’s analyses 
remain resolutely on the level of European (and specifically French) high 
culture. When asked during an interview to respond to the criticism that he 
ignores “the social dynamic of history or the plurality of literary and artistic 
practices,” Rancière (2004, 58–59) admits that he focuses on a rather homo-
geneous group of artists but avers that his ideas about the “aesthetic artistic 
regime” could be expanded to include authors such as Virginia Woolf and 
James Joyce. Note that his expansion still steadfastly avoids the terrain of 
mass culture—that is, it includes Woolf and Joyce but not Richard Wright, 
Raymond Chandler, or Jacqueline Susann. The model proposed by my analy-
sis of 1940s swing, by contrast, implies the simultaneous and competing 
artistic and aesthetic regimes that had been enshrined in music industry 
practice since the 1920s with three main categories: popular/mainstream 
(implying a white, bourgeois audience), race music (implying an  African 
American audience), and old- time/hillbilly music (implying a white, 
middle- and upper- class audience).15 It would also require many semiotic 
moves, analyzing different stages of connotation, to understand how the 
recordings analyzed here might project an “equality of represented subjects” 
(81).16 “Tuxedo Junction” is an instrumental piece (how instrumental music 
might “represent subjects” is surely a complicated affair), and the “lyrics” of 
“Open the Door, Richard!” could only ever represent the “common people,” 
although a version of the song focused on the foibles of European aristoc-
racy would certainly be entertaining. And while mechanical reproduction 
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did not necessarily create these musical practices, such practices could not 
circulate without sound recording (and it could be argued that the practices 
responded to the possibilities opened up by sound recording). These forms, 
by not figuring in Rancière’s schema, therefore would not be legible or au-
dible—hence, my subtitle: the arrangement of texts and genres within the 
popular music field at this time could be understood, pace Rancière, as the 
“distribution of the non- sensible.”
Despite what may seem to be the foregoing dismissal of Rancière, some 
aspects of his theory will help guide what follows. The idea of the “legi-
bility” of an artistic practice and its relationship to power and institutional 
discourses, for example, highlights the way in which notions of copyright, 
the role of technology, and representation/presentation of popularity were 
interrelated. The matrix formed by these notions could be understood as the 
precondition of a popular music genre’s audibility.
Two Stops at “Tuxedo Junction”
This narrative of generic/aesthetic, and thus social, transformation begins 
at the dawn of the 1940s and traces the history of one of the biggest hits 
of the period, “Tuxedo Junction.” The recordings of “Tuxedo Junction” by 
Erskine Hawkins and Glenn Miller exemplify how differences in approaches 
to improvisation and other musical elements were often correlated with the 
social position of the recordings, the fluidity of their circulation, the size of 
their audience, and their access to various modes of dissemination.
The bandleader and trumpeter Erskine Hawkins co- wrote “Tuxedo Junc-
tion” and recorded it with his band in 1939. Hawkins’s band was one of 
the few African American ensembles to be featured regularly on radio 
broadcasts, an advantage accorded by virtue of a long- running engage-
ment at Manhattan’s Savoy Ballroom, which had a wire pickup (i.e., his 
performances were transmitted regularly by radio). This arrangement gave 
Hawkins a forum for self- promotion not quite at the level of the most suc-
cessful white bands, but one that undoubtedly played a role in the unusual 
popularity of this recording and the type of attention it received.
“Tuxedo Junction” is a medium- tempo, riff- based number derived from a 
simplified form of “I’ve Got Rhythm.” The stripped down harmony and tex-
ture, which looks forward to the “jump blues” and rhythm and blues that 
would begin to coalesce as genres in the mid- 1940s, allow for an abundance 
of superimposed riffs and bluesy improvisations, and were joined with 
orchestration touches that both evoked some of the most successful swing 
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bands of the day, such as Miller’s, and recalled the timbres associated with 
the “jungle style” of Duke Ellington’s Cotton Club period of the late 1920s. 
The trumpet and clarinet soloists both get a full thirty- two- bar chorus on 
which to improvise. These solos reveal an awareness of contemporary “hot” 
soloing trends and are supported almost continually by bluesy riffs designed 
to appeal to dancers.17
Any attempt to trace the reception of this recording from music industry 
discourse necessarily runs afoul of an obstacle created by the aforemen-
tioned struggle over what would be the dominant mode of conceptualizing 
popular music: the abstract template of the song, favored by publishers and 
the long- established songwriters employed by them, or the recorded per-
formance, which captured the specific nuances of singers and instrumental-
ists and favored those types of music not supported by the most powerful 
publishers. A song like “Tuxedo Junction” did not emanate from the world 
of established music publishers. Rather, it was developed out of the perfor-
mance practice of certain hot swing bands that could assemble a song out of 
riffs that were part of a common stock of musical figures circulating among 
(primarily African American) swing musicians.
Credited to Hawkins and to the saxophonists Bill Johnson and Julian 
Dash, the song (as composed structure) would not have been promoted by 
the apparatus then dominant in the U.S. music industry, wherein represen-
tatives (“song pluggers”) from music publishing companies attempted to 
persuade bandleaders to record and, most important, to play their songs 
on radio broadcasts. The reliance on non- notable musical elements and the 
creation of the song outside the circuits of Tin Pan Alley rendered “Tuxedo 
Junction” in its first incarnation unattractive to song pluggers. The practice 
of plugging had ramifications in the generation of discourse in the music in-
dustry press, which included the representation of a song’s popularity. The 
number of plays on radio broadcasts was tallied every week, and rankings 
were compiled based on the number of “plugs” a song received. Charts also 
recorded “best- selling sheet music,” and the music industry press focused on 
these measures of popularity. Radio, and especially network radio, which 
drew the largest audiences and counted the most in calculations of popu-
larity, was dominated by live performances of songs rather than recordings, 
and a popular song emanating from one of the major publishers would rou-
tinely be performed by many different artists. All of these factors meant that 
Hawkins’s recording of “Tuxedo Junction” would generate little commen-
tary in the music industry press, which would be incapable of perceiving its 
popularity, or lack thereof.
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Jukeboxes, however, were in the middle of a huge boom when Hawkins 
released “Tuxedo Junction,” accounting for more than 50 percent of all 
recordings sold at the time, according to most estimates.18 A section ap-
peared in Billboard listing recordings that were popular on jukeboxes; this 
section included a page of comments, titled “What the Records Are Doing 
for Me,” sent in by jukebox operators from around the country reporting 
on the records that were attracting nickels. The commentary on jukeboxes, 
however, was in the back of the magazine in the “amusement machines” sec-
tion, well separated from the music section, implying, perhaps, that music 
circulating primarily via the jukebox had not earned the right to be called 
music, as amusing as these recordings might be. (Indeed, the circulation of 
music in this fashion had a status similar to that of the revenue generated by 
pinball and vending machines.) Hawkins’s recording did receive some atten-
tion at the back of the magazine—that is, by the segment of the industry 
interested in jukebox play—and jukebox operators often found that many 
of the people who liked Glenn Miller’s band, the most popular ensemble 
of the period, also liked Hawkins’s. One jukebox operator reported to Bill-
board in the December 30, 1939, issue, “As for bands, Glenn Miller seems to 
grow more and more popular along with Erskine Hawkins, the latter going 
like a house afire in the colored neighborhoods.”19 After a few weeks of 
attention, Hawkins’s recording seemed to sink without a trace in the pages 
of Billboard, only to reappear several weeks later. Although initially mys-
tified, Billboard quickly put two and two together: “Erskine Hawkins, who 
wrote the tune, recorded it some weeks ago and it enjoyed a slight measure 
of phono [i.e., jukebox] popularity. Glenn Miller then picked the song up 
and began to feature it on his radio programs, with the result that requests 
flooded in for him to record it. The Miller version of the number has already 
created such excitement that his disk is practically certain to be another In 
the Mood. Be prepared for a big thing here.”20 Subsequent issues of Billboard 
noted that Hawkins’s recording had experienced a resurgence of interest in 
jukeboxes after the appearance of Miller’s, which became one of Miller’s big-
gest hits, ranking with previous recordings of his, such as “In the Mood” and 
“Chattanooga Choo- Choo.”
It is interesting to speculate on just how, exactly, Miller managed to “pick 
the song up.” Hawkins and Miller shared a pre- Christmas gig at the Savoy 
Ballroom on December 2, 1939, soon after the release of Hawkins’s recording 
and a mere two weeks before the first recognition of the song’s popularity in 
Billboard in the December 16, 1939, issue. It is not wild speculation to imag-
ine that Miller heard the Hawkins band perform it, saw the positive crowd 
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response, and realized that it could be a vehicle for the type of arrangement 
he had just used for “In the Mood,” a massive hit for him.21
Miller considerably rearranges the tune in his recording, using a slower 
tempo and a heavier approach to groove. The most striking difference is 
formal, however: Miller takes the AAbA form of the original and reduces it, 
after an initial presentation of ideas, to the opening melodic gesture which 
is continually interrupted. This results in a transformation of the song into 
one of the most durable mainstream genres of the era: the “novelty” number. 
The continual interruptions function as a commercial “hook” for the song 
that is altogether lacking in Hawkins’s version and seems tailor- made to fit 
Adorno’s scathing critique, published at almost exactly the same time, of the 
use of novel effects to create “pseudo- individualization” in popular songs 
(see Adorno 2002b). Form is significant here because the recording that is 
the more “standardized” (also an Adorno term) on one level—Hawkins’s—is 
actually more poorly adapted to commodification in Adorno’s terms. That is, 
Hawkins’s version features a thirty- two- bar, AAbA form, the sine qua non 
of formal standardization in the popular music of the era, while Miller’s 
form is very irregular. Yet that very irregularity produces the hook gimmick 
that can then recur a maximum number of times. The formal regularity of 
Hawkins’s version provides a backdrop for the improvised solos, which in 
turn produces a kind of moment- to- moment variety lacking in the Miller 
version. Of course, Adorno believed that all jazz improvisations were pre- 
digested, but this seems to be a rather famous instance of how his assump-
tion of an identical reception context for Western art music and the popu-
lar music of the period actually dulls the force of his argument. Adorno 
never analyzed jazz improvisation in any detail; however, within his overall 
focus on composition, Adorno believed that the “hook” would reside in the 
“pseudo- individualized” melody rather than the form. The interruptions of 
Miller’s “Tuxedo Junction” resemble closely those used in “In the Mood” 
(a hit for Miller several months before the release of “Tuxedo Junction”) in 
which the formal interruption was used in two different ways: first, to cut 
off the flow of an improvising soloist; and second, to create suspense during 
the long fadeout at the coda, the device re-created in “Tuxedo Junction.” 
This formal device had thus become a kind of trademark for Miller, not un-
like the way a 1959 Cadillac Eldorado might distinguish itself from a 1959 
Chevrolet Impala by the size and shape of its tail fins.
Yet on another level, one could argue that soloistic improvisation actu-
ally de- standardizes the moment- to- moment experience of the recording. 
While Miller’s formal irregularities must be repeated as closely as possible 
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from one performance to the next, locking the band into endless restagings 
of their recording, the improvised, thirty- two- bar choruses of Hawkins’s 
recording make literal repetition unlikely, as well as not particularly desir-
able from either the listening or the performing standpoint.22 The projec-
tion in Miller’s version of group interaction, and therefore a sense of spon-
taneous social interaction often heard in improvising ensembles, is thereby 
diminished. Sheet music not only had copyright law and a whole apparatus 
for measuring popularity on its side but the idea of the song, or a through- 
arranged song that mimicked the unique form of a through- composed piece 
of art music, was also in line with the aesthetic values enshrined in the West-
ern art music canon and the “work concept.” Heavily arranged versions of 
songs such as Miller’s thus benefited in public discussions of musical aes-
thetics when compared with versions such as Hawkins’s, in which sectional 
form served as a generic frame to facilitate improvisation.
Somewhat contrary to the most entrenched stereotypes about black 
music, rhythm is not one of the most obvious differentiating factors between 
the two recordings of “Tuxedo Junction.” “Swing” music, after all, swung at 
least some of the time, even when played by white bands. Yet one of the most 
general differences lies (conveniently enough from the standpoint of a vol-
ume on improvisation) in the role of improvisation. Once again, this is some-
what tautological in that improvisation was already identified with Afri-
can American musical practices; however, improvisation permeates popular 
race records of the time in a way that transcends common understandings 
of it as soloistic melodic invention.
Thus, improvisation is found not only in solo sections but also in the con-
struction of the song itself, where, as in “Tuxedo Junction,” songs are blues- 
or riff- based and therefore created out of “floating” musical tropes that were 
recombined in an endless variety of ways from song to song. “Composition” 
thus comes about often through a performative, improvisatory approach. 
The vocal melody in most race records of the time is therefore freely varied 
on repetition based on these same blues melodic tropes. Arrangements in 
race records featuring small groups likewise are improvised, as individual 
vocal and instrumental parts are made up by the musicians on the spot in 
an aural/oral process rather than written down. While improvised “solos” 
are often featured in the songs, I would argue that improvisation plays a 
more basic role in the construction of the songs themselves than in big 
band–based swing music, which almost always relies on some sort of writ-
ten arrangement, as well as on a separation of creative roles among com-
poser, arranger, and performer.
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One Door Opens, Another One Closes
While many of the style characteristics that identified the distinctiveness 
of race music—the category of music with which a band such as Hawkins’s 
would have been associated—would remain separate, by and large, until the 
1950s, changes in the status of African American musicians and the grow-
ing presence of musical practices associated with African Americans were 
recognized by the music industry at the time. The following quote from the 
January 2, 1943, issue of Billboard explicitly connects the shift away from 
a minstrel- based paradigm for African American music to the popularity of 
swing:
The biggest break Negro performers received . . . has been the recognition 
of Negroes as first- rate jazz musicians. The craze for swing music suddenly 
put the spotlight on Negro musicians as creative artists and did much 
to live down the typical presentation of Negro entertainers as carefree, 
banjo- plucking cotton pickers continually grinning and shouting jazzy 
spirituals. . . . Negro name band leaders have held their own thru [sic] 
the years because they presented a brand of music whites could not easily 
duplicate. (Denis 1943, 28)
After the war, however, the picture had changed, but in a way that the usual 
narrative of the decline of the swing bands only begins to suggest. The de-
cline of the large swing bands did decrease the amount of improvisation 
found in mainstream recordings, as well as the circulation of musical tropes 
associated with blackness. Rather than a sound woven into the fabric of 
popular music, African American- ness became something that could be per-
formed only literally, by the corporeality of black voices on recordings that 
signaled a revitalization of racialized tropes, including those that resembled 
nothing so much as the trope of the “carefree, banjo-plucking cotton pick-
ers” in the quote. This revitalization was found, in a more general sense, 
in a wide proliferation of novelty recordings during this period, most of 
which invoked the simultaneous desire and disavowal that comes with the 
process of stereotyping; unlike minstrelsy, novelty recordings thus formed 
a genre with the advantage of being adaptable to nonwhite others of all de-
nominations. The words of a tune such as “Managua, Nicaragua” exemplify 
how exotic images of women’s sexuality, travelogues, colonial trade, and 
imperialism all meld together seamlessly to create a novel sense of humor: 
the second verse begins, “Managua, Nicaragua is a heavenly place / you ask 
a señorita for a ‘leetle’ embrace,” while the third begins, “Managua, Nicara-
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gua what a wonderful spot / there’s coffee and bananas and a temperature 
[sic] hot.”
In addition to novelty tunes, medium- to up- tempo swing tunes played 
by big bands still occasionally put in an appearance, although they tended 
to reside solely at the Glenn Miller end of the swing spectrum. More im-
portant, elements of musical style derived from the big band era still domi-
nated the sound of the mainstream, even when performed by studio orches-
tras or by sweet bands such as Freddy Martin’s and Sammy Kaye’s, which 
often featured novelty numbers. Without the interaction of these bands with 
the music of contemporary African American artists, however—either as 
models for recordings or as collaborators—one could argue that the asso-
ciations of swing with African Americans weakened. This also occurred be-
cause African American musical tropes were mutating and becoming asso-
ciated with other genres, such as rhythm and blues, on the one hand, and 
bebop, on the other, or even with some of the country music of the late 1940s 
(such as that recorded by Hank Williams or the Delmore Brothers).
Phillip Ennis (1992, 161–92) writes compellingly about the synchroniza-
tion of media—records, jukeboxes, radio, all based on the recording as the 
most important unit of exchange—necessary for the formation of a black 
popular music field that could achieve visibility within the larger music 
industry and that eventually would create crossovers (again) beyond the 
sphere of the novelty record. With the development of forums such as a 
“race chart” in publications such as Billboard for tracking and producing 
the popularity of recordings among African American consumers, a realm of 
black popular music separate from the mainstream was reinforced. As if the 
tentative mainstream introduction of black musical tropes by swing bands 
and the boogie- woogie craze of the early 1940s constituted an intolerable 
threat, the riffs, grooves, and blues notes of the early 1940s were figured as 
an absence in the remaining vestiges of swing that could only appear some-
where else in the popular music field—that is, in another category with its 
own apparatus for the evaluation of economic capital, such as “race” music 
or rhythm and blues (the music industry name for race music after 1949). 
Black musical tropes after the war thus formed a constitutive outside to a 
mainstream aesthetic in which nonwhite others would now function only 
as novelties.
This is where the curious tale of “Open the Door, Richard!” comes in. One 
of the few recordings by an African American artist (or, more accurately, 
artists) in the years immediately after the war to be heard on network radio, 
it could also be found in record stores and jukeboxes outside black neigh-
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borhoods. A brief account of the song’s tangled history provides a great 
example of a text without an origin.23 Dusty Fletcher, an African Ameri-
can vaudeville comedian, learned a routine in the 1920s from a comedian 
named John Mason, who, in turn, had learned it from another black come-
dian, Bob Russell (who, we presume, learned it from someone else).24 The 
routine describes the plight of a man named Richard who is locked out of 
his apartment in a somewhat inebriated condition. A saxophonist named 
Jack McVea, who was playing primarily on Central Avenue in Los Angeles, 
worked with Fletcher when they both toured with Lionel Hampton’s band 
in the early 1940s. When McVea began touring with his own band up and 
down the West Coast, he featured a version of the skit, to which he added 
a memorable chorus. McVea recorded it in Los Angeles in September 1946, 
and the recording quickly became popular up and down the West Coast. As 
the recording was about to break out into a national hit, the major record 
companies rushed to put out their own versions, as did independents that 
specialized in race records. Fletcher’s two- sided version came out in early 
1947, and the race was on.
In a portent of things to come, even the first discussion of the song in Bill-
board put the versatile potential of the title to good use: a headline reading 
“Open the Door, Richard, and Let All the Lawyers in” (1947, 18) referred to 
a dispute raging between McVea and Fletcher, while the brief review of the 
disc in the same issue instructed jukebox operators to “Open the door to 
the jukes and slip these platters onto the changers.”25 Soon the floodgates 
opened, and radio listeners were treated to versions by (among others) the 
Three Flames, the Pied Pipers, the Charioteers, Louis Jordan, Bill Samuels 
and the Cats ’n Jammer Three, Tosh (One- String Willie) and His Jivesters, 
Walter Brown and Tiny Grimes, the Merry Macs, Big Sid Catlett, the Hot Lips 
Page Orchestra, and Hank Penny, as well as the recording by Count Basie.26
A riot of different versions flooded the market, with Basie scoring the big-
gest hit—the biggest of his career, in fact. Unlike the example of “Tuxedo 
Junction” and countless other instances of “crossover” recordings, “Open 
the Door, Richard!” is an example of a recording by a black artist that was 
covered largely by other black artists (of the fourteen recordings listed 
earlier, at least ten are by African Americans). Deemed a “novelty” by music 
industry publications, and undoubtedly received as such by white bourgeois 
listeners, the song displayed a remarkable ability to adapt to a wide range 
of situations. In addition to becoming a punchline for comics of all stripes, a 
common greeting for door knockers everywhere, and a torment for anyone 
unfortunate enough to have been named Richard in the preceding years, 
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the song was recorded by hillbilly artists and calypso artists and in Yid-
dish, Spanish, Swedish, French, and Hungarian. There is even an anecdote 
with local flavor for residents of Montreal: fans of the local hockey team, 
the Canadiens, serenaded their star, “Rocket” Richard by shouting the re-
frain. Moreover, the many recordings of “Richard” appeared to fit in effort-
lessly with a newfound abundance of novelty recordings that, as I have men-
tioned, relied on stereotypical others for their punchlines.
In the African American community, however, another debate erupted. 
Was “Richard” an embarrassing reminder of minstrelsy, an evocation of 
“Uncle Tom”– like behavior? This view, probably the first to come to mind 
to someone contemplating the song today, was held by many in the Afri-
can American community seeking to gain respectability and distance from 
a history of degrading caricatures. To some younger, more radicalized black 
listeners, however, “Richard” became a call to arms: “In 1947 students from 
Georgia colleges marched to the state capital demanding the resignation of 
segregationist governor Herman Talmadge, carrying banners reading ‘Open 
the Door Herman’” (R. J. Smith 2004, 83). The Los Angeles Sentinel, the 
city’s black newspaper, ran an editorial entitled “Open the Door Richard,” 
which called for “political representation at City Hall” and an end to dis-
criminatory housing practices (83).
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 display both the shift in the relationship between race 
music and mainstream popular music from 1940 to 1947 and how race music 
recordings that “crossed over” to the mainstream charts were required by 
1947 to cite the conventions of the novelty number. Figure 5.2 also shows the 
growing distance between the mainstream and race music, spurred in part 
by the decline of big bands, a forum that had enabled African Americans to 
participate (albeit semi- invisibly) in the realm of instrumental music, and 
the need for crossover tunes to create novelty effects. The new mainstream 
styles, relied, on the one hand, on the centrality of a single vocalist, a de-
velopment that was less hospitable to African Americans because it tended 
to reveal the social identity of the vocalist, who could project an “adult” 
persona endowed with subjectivity, an option that was rarely available to 
African Americans during this period. On the other hand, the rise in novelty 
recordings either used the stereotypes of nonwhite others as the subject of 
the lyrics, thereby discouraging African American participation and identi-
fication, or revived minstrel practices. African American– associated musi-
cal practices, including improvisation in performance and song creation, 
drained out of the mainstream and into the semiautonomous realm of what 
in 1949 was renamed rhythm and blues, a category that grew in  commercial 
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importance after 1945. The focus on solo singers did pay dividends for a 
small number of African American singers, however, as vocalists such as Nat 
“King” Cole and Billy Eckstine gave improbable voice to expressions of true 
love that previously had not had access to a large audience.27
This chapter has been concerned with the large categories used by the U.S. 
music industry and how these categories map certain aspects of musical 
style onto categories of group identification. Such a study runs the risk of 
reification, both of music and of identifications. A focus on musical cate-
gories and genres would seem on its face to reinforce the emphasis in West-
ern philosophical thought on the idea of identity over difference, the priority 
of notions of resemblance, representation, and the same over the recogni-
tion of the singularity of the event and the evanescence of the phantasm.28 
Yet by looking at these categories and genres as historical artifacts, one be-
comes acutely aware of how such groupings of musical events can func-
tion only through the effects of domination in which the difference of both 
musical styles and individual subjects is deemphasized in favor of similarity. 
The similarities that are broadly accepted as pertinent become the conven-
tions of categories as they are consolidated and accepted by the public. In 
the United States in the early and mid- twentieth century, musical categories 
grew out of and contributed to a preoccupation with race, class, and geo-
graphical regions and how they might be articulated to technological devel-
opments and the imperatives of economics. Thus, knowledge about people 
and music participated in the process of finding an efficient model for the 
music industry that would coordinate production and consumption.
The period that forms the focus of this study provides an excellent op-
portunity to analyze what was at stake in the formation and re- formation 
of musical categories. The 1940s began with swing forming an important 
part of mainstream popular music, spreading forms of improvisation and 
groove associated with African Americans among heterogeneous audiences. 
Whether or not swing was a type of jazz was hotly debated among crit-
ics and jazz connoisseurs.29 By 1947, while swing had not completely disap-
peared from the mainstream, what remained deemphasized improvisatory 
practices and had lost much of its association with African Americans. As 
far as the debate over the meaning of jazz went, big band– based swing was 
no longer a factor. Instead, within the realm of mainstream popular music, 
African American- ness appeared as a stereotype grouped with stereotypes 
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of assorted others, while jazz and soloistic improvisation were exiled tempo-
rarily to a newly established, semiautonomous field of black popular music, 
as the “outside” of mainstream popular music acquired greater cohesion due 
to the increased stability of country and rhythm and blues.
Such an examination of terms such as “jazz” and “swing” and their rela-
tionship to race music/rhythm and blues and mainstream popular music has 
the potential to reorganize our sense of jazz history, which since the 1950s 
has favored evolutionary models, excluded music that was overtly commer-
cial, and ascribed greater authenticity (and more value) to music made by 
African Americans. Close attention to a broad range of music that was cir-
culating at the time can also reorganize our sense of popular music history, 
which tends to look at music from 1940 to 1955 for how it anticipates rock 
and roll, but in which the complex interactions among style, category, and 
identity that occurred at the time are often overlooked. Finally, a focus on 
a broad range of music, canonical or not, that approaches an analysis of the 
synchronic complicates our notions of the role played by the shifting alle-
giances between identifications and categories, in which, rather than con-
firming a sense of their stability, we gain a renewed appreciation of their 
fluidity and contingency. Insofar as the categories of the popular music in-
dustry attempt to reify the relationship between the social and the aesthetic 
into a hierarchy that speaks to beliefs about the proper place of different 
types of music, the story told here is also about the transformation of social 
aesthetics in the music that dominated the public sphere of the 1940s in the 
United States.
Notes
1. For more on annualization, see North 2001.
2. Although in a similar series, Hit Parade (produced by the Dynamic recording 
company), dating back to 1938, Basie’s “Jumpin’ at the Woodside” was included 
in the 1938 volume. The number of these compilations has been proliferating at 
an alarming rate, as any search of iTunes will readily confirm.
3. This particular usage of “tasteless” is derived from Brooks 1982.
4. The classic theoretical formulation about the relationship between economic 
and symbolic capital is in Bourdieu 1993; see also DeVeaux 1991. On the exclusion 
of popular figures such as Louis Jordan, see Ake 2002. On the exclusions of gender 
performed by the conventional framing of jazz historiography, see S. Tucker 2000.
5. Although for a recent attempt to address this lacuna, see Zak 2001. For 
broader histories that do not give this era short shrift, see Ennis 1992, Wald 2009.
6. For the most sophisticated model of the different ways in which music and 
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identification may interrelate (and one which considers homology as a possi-
bility), see Born and Hesmondhalgh 2000, secs. 4–5. I expand on Born’s model in 
the context of a discussion of genre in popular music in “Popular Music Genres” 
(2014) and in my introduction to Categorizing Sound: Genre and Twentieth- Century 
Popular Music (2016). For a previous formulation of the relationship between 
genre and identification, see Brackett 2005.
7. The reference to a “genealogical account” invokes the work of Michel Fou-
cault, specifically his essay “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” (1977a). The purpose 
of this invocation is not to contrast simply a “presentist” view of history—a role 
that might be filled by the “canonical narratives” referred to earlier in which a 
cause- and- effect teleology leads from a point of origin to the present to confirm 
contemporary beliefs about a subject—with a “historicist” approach that recon-
stitutes the historical horizon in which events and texts emerge. Rather, such a 
genealogical approach seeks both to analyze the conditions that make it possible 
for an event to occur and, at the same time, not to occlude the current events to 
which an interest in the past is responding, what Foucault called elsewhere a “his-
tory of the present” (Foucault 1979).
8. Again, a concept of Bourdieu’s—this time, that of “habitus”—is helpful for 
understanding how improvisation can be experienced as free yet at the same time 
be constrained and made possible by previously internalized practices that thus 
become a set of naturalized responses. See Bourdieu 1977, 52–65.
9. For examples, see Nettl and Russell 1998, Solis and Nettl 2009.
10. For contemporary music criticism promulgating two contrasting views of 
this subject, see Freedman 1940, 7, 20; Kolodin 1941, 78–82. Both of these articles 
are reprinted in Brackett 2009.
11. Ronald Radano (2003) has examined the emergence of a particular notion of 
African American music that relies on the trope of “hot rhythm.”
12. For more on the work concept in Western art music, see Goehr 1992.
13. A body of scholarly literature exists arguing that the emphasis on the record-
ing as the referential text for a work of popular music after rock and roll displaces 
the emphasis on print textuality favored by the aesthetics of Western art music 
and pre- rock Western popular music. For examples, see Gracyk 1996, Zak 2001. 
While Albin Zak (2010) extends the dichotomy of song as printed artifact versus 
song as recorded/sonic experience back to the late 1940s, the discussion here sug-
gests that this opposition is central to understanding the formation of the popu-
lar music field in the era of mechanical reproduction, with discourse about this 
opposition appearing as early as the 1920s.
14. A reader (particularly one interested in improvisation) may well wonder 
about the role of performances, yet the way in which performances were fac-
tored into the computation of popularity during this period consisted solely of 
noting the number of times which song was played, not who played it or how it was 
played. Tabulations of the number of times a song was played on the radio were 
counted in the category of “song plugs,” a measurement used by music publishers 
to gauge the success of their attempts to popularize their product.
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15. The homologies assumed by these categories functioned partly as an imagi-
nary ideal; the relation of production and consumption to identification were 
considerably more complex.
16. By an “equality of represented subjects” (Rancière 2004, 81), Rancière 
means that authors and painters of the Romantic era could focus just as easily 
on those of lower social status as on the aristocracy. Music only arises in the 
elaboration of his theory during a discussion of modernism, in which “the lan-
guage of twelve sounds” is used as an example of how “each individual art would 
thus assert the pure potential of art by exploring the capabilities of its specific 
medium,” and on the role of nostalgia in the aesthetic regime of the arts, in which 
he adduces “Mendelssohn replaying the St. Matthew Passion” as an example (Ran-
cière 2004, 25–26). Once again, it is difficult to see how these observations might 
apply to examples drawn from commercial art, thus again banishing such art to 
the realm of the non- sensible. Part of my argument, and thus my interest in Ran-
cière, is precisely to analyze how different genres of popular music might present 
or re- present subjects. Popular music genres tend to be associated with one type 
of subject at a time and thus would still have a difficult time “representing” an 
“equality of subjects.”
17. Indeed, the debate about whether swing music was primarily for dancing or 
listening was more significant than we might now currently imagine. Ballroom 
owners disliked the fact that many in attendance clustered around the band-
stand for particular ensembles, standing still and listening rather than dancing. 
Hawkins’s recording of “Tuxedo Junction” could be understood as trying to keep 
both groups of fans involved: listeners, more attuned to the nuances of impro-
visation, and dancers, engaged by the repetition of swinging riffs. For more of 
an argument about the role of non- dancing listeners in the swing era, see Wald 
2009, 123–25. Lewis Erenberg (1998, 58–62) also describes the tension between 
“jitterbugs” and swing fans (and musicians) who preferred to listen attentively.
18. On the popularity of jukeboxes, see Rasmussen 2010.
19. “What the Records Are Doing for Me,” Billboard (December 30, 1939): 150.
20. “Record Buying Guide,” Billboard (February 24, 1940): 72.
21. See “Miller, Hawkins, Cooper Score at Savoy Xmas Eve,” Chicago Defender 
(December 30, 1939): 17.
22. Although, interestingly enough, even in this era musicians were occasion-
ally forced to memorize solos that they had improvised in the studio to avoid dis-
appointing audiences that had come to a performance expecting to hear a record-
ing re- created as exactly as possible. To be sure, this was more often the case with 
bands such as Miller’s, in which solos were often only four or eight measures long, 
as opposed to the thirty- two- bar choruses to be found in the recordings of the 
“hottest” ensembles of the day (Wald 2009, 127).
23. The following draws heavily on R. J. Smith 2004.
24. A video of a 1945 performance of Fletcher performing this skit can be 
viewed at http://archive.org/details/open_the_door_richard (accessed February 
26, 2013).
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25. This legal dispute reflects the uncertain status of non- notatable elements 
with respect to copyright law and refers back to questions around the legibility of 
different sorts of musical texts with respect to the music industry. The sound of a 
recording and the way in which a song was performed were not protected in the 
same way that the notated melodic- harmonic matrix of a song was.
26. The most exhaustive accounting of different versions is at http://www 
.jerryosborne.com/8-1-11.htm, http://www.jerryosborne.com/8-8-11.htm.
27. On Eckstine, see DeVeaux 1997. On African American crooners, see Stephens 
2008.
28. The formulation here is guided by that of Foucault 1977b.
29. On this debate among jazz critics, see Gendron 2002, 121–42; Gennari 2006, 
61–115.
chApter 6
WHAT IS “GREAT BLACK MUSIC”?
The Social Aesthetics of the AACM in Paris
Eric Lewis
In the summer of 1969, members of the Association for the Advancement 
of Creative Musicians (AAcm) recorded a number of albums in Paris. Many 
of the musicians had recently made Paris their home, including Roscoe 
Mitchell, Lester Bowie, Malachi Favors, and Joseph Jarman (known col-
lectively as the Art Ensemble of Chicago, or Aec) and the ensemble of Leo 
Smith, Anthony Braxton, and Leroy Jenkins.1 The recordings, and their asso-
ciated performances, were subjected to intense critical scrutiny by both the 
French press and American and English critics. The many albums issued dur-
ing this period (a large number on the French label Actuel) are often thought 
to represent an artistic high- water mark for the music variously called “the 
new thing,” “avant- garde jazz,” or, as we shall examine, “Great Black Music.” 
It was certainly viewed by critics as being of great social, political, and aes-
thetic interest. George Lewis devotes a chapter in his magisterial A Power 
Stronger than Itself (2008) to the AAcm in Paris, discussing with character-
istic detail and subtlety a wide range of issues related to this period of the 
association’s history and evolution. Building on Lewis’s account, I want to 
explore the aesthetic ramifications of these AAcm members’ varied artis-
tic activities—from the music they performed, the albums they recorded, 
and the interviews and press conferences they gave to the critical reception 
they received and their responses to it—and argue that they consciously en-
gaged in what I will call repeated acts of “aesthetic thickening.” These acts 
discharged both aesthetic and social functions and can therefore be fruit-
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fully seen as the articulation of a particular kind of social aesthetics that is 
deeply rooted in aspects of a more general African diasporic aesthetic and 
the constellation of political and social issues focusing on identity that many 
see as an important function of such art.2 More specifically, these aesthetic 
and social functions are not distinct but require each other for their effect.
Much of the attention the music of the AAcm in Paris received centered 
on a basic question: what “sort” of music were they creating and what is 
its relationship to jazz, on the one hand, and European art music, on the 
other? As we shall see, the members of the AAcm were acutely aware of 
the importance of such genre/ontological judgments. Far from being pas-
sive recipients of categories, genres, meanings, and goals foisted on their 
art and actions by others, the AAcm in Paris turned on its head the poten-
tial ghettoizing of genre categories and used them to widen the aesthetic 
and social interest of their art.3 They accomplished this by destabilizing any 
single genre perspective from which to critique their art and (therefore) 
argued that their art was best seen as multi- generic and thus aesthetically 
thick. As will be discussed more fully later, since membership in a genre par-
tially determines what properties are potentially of aesthetic interest, multi- 
generic works are aesthetically richer than they might otherwise have been.
I begin by describing two particular recorded performances: “Silence” 
(1974), by Smith, Braxton, and Jenkins, and the album Message to Our Folks 
(1969), by the Aec. These performances play with and problematize as-
sorted musical genre categories.4 I then relate this genre play to theorizing 
on the antiessentialist impulse found in much black art and the hypothe-
sis of multiple authentic artistic identities that is seen to follow from this. 
After relating this to aspects of genre theory, I argue that the AAcm in Paris, 
aware of the roles and functions of genres and their associated critical dis-
courses, consciously manipulated these categories and expectations against 
a backdrop of criticism of their art that drew on both modernist and nascent 
postmodernist theory. I tie this together by sketching a theory of aesthetic 
thickness and argue that this is what the AAcm in Paris were undertaking 
and show how this thickening discharges both traditional aesthetic and so-
cial/political functions. Finally, I discuss the expression “Great Black Music” 
as coined by members of the Aec, concluding that it takes on the function of 
a meta- genre, signifying on the notion of genre itself—an act that is simul-
taneously a social and an aesthetic critique of how genres function and the 
politics of genre ownership.
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“Silence,” by Wadada Leo Smith, is a very sparse musical work, with long 
periods of silence punctuated by usually brief interjections of small per-
cussion, reeds, trumpet, violin, harmonica, flute, or accordion.5 A skeletal 
structure is discernible (see table 6.1). The sections that contain sounds, 
viewed as single temporal blocks, become more closely spaced as the piece 
progresses. There is also an increase in the number of instruments that play 
simultaneously and the length of time that they do so, although the pitch 
density is never very great. There is always much “space” in the music and 
little in the way of musical syntax as traditionally conceived. It is unclear 
whether the “environmental” sounds such as footsteps and chair creaks are 
intentional or residue from a less than perfect recording environment. There 
is the regular use of extended techniques, although at no times are these 
foregrounded per se (the playing is controlled throughout and does not draw 
attention to its techniques). The instrumentation also avoids coding as jazz. 
The violin is often played in non- standard ways; the percussion lacks the 
characteristic tones and effects of a trap set; there is a preponderance of 
small percussion instruments; the trumpet is played with highly inflected 
timbre decentering its sound from the jazz world; and a series of reed in-
struments are all played with no sonic gestures toward the jazz idiom. Cer-
tainly, this piece is worlds away from the dynamics, pitch density, rhythmic 
sense, and melodic and harmonic language of what at the time was com-
monly called “free jazz.” It does not sound like how that species of new jazz 
associated with African American political movements of the time was often 
characterized, lacking, most obviously, the propulsive beat, loud dynamics, 
and pitch density.
The Aec recorded its album Message to Our Folks around the same time 
in Paris. The album opens with the piece “Old Time Religion” (itself a tra-
ditional), which here is not a spiritual so much as a sermon. Over a repeat-
ing four- note arco bass riff Joseph Jarman recites a sermon in what sounds 
like an archaic style, with vocal responses from the other band members. 
Soon, long horn tones start to interfere with the spoken sermon, along with 
a tambourine. The call and response continues, with multiple “amens” that 
resolve into the melodically sung line, “Give me that old time religion.” The 
vocals throughout are spoken with odd timbres that suggest post- production 
engineering. The piece rises in intensity with a series of “woops” and half- 
valve trumpet blasts. Then the horns play the emergent melodic line in uni-
son, and the piece dissolves into a series of soft call- and- response lines, end-
ing with a single long tone.
Taken in isolation, and with no contextual information, it would be very 
TABLE 6.1 Structural Outline, “Silence,” Wadada Leo Smith
0:00–0:12 Rough violin bowing near bridge
0:39–1:08 Long alto horn (?) tone, mezzo- piano
1:12–1:14 Brief percussion hits, wood then metal with sustained overtones
1:31–1:35 Muted trumpet note
2:07–2:15 Violin note vibrato, mezzo- piano
2:18–2:31 Very soft chair squeaks? Intentional? Environmental?
3:02 Single short clarinet (?) note, with perhaps ghost images before 
and after, a result of recording process?
3:34 Very faint vocalization?
3:51 Footsteps?
4:04–4:21 Triangle hit > wood block hits > hand muted cymbal? >  
single tenor horn with white noise
5:59–6:09 Baritone horn notes piano, with overblowing > single soft 
percussion hit?
6:18–6:20 Chair noises, very soft?
6:32–6:40 Violin notes, bow percussive taps
6:54–7:02 Forte trumpet riff, held note > dense cluster (more ghost tones)
7:07–7:25 Ascending wood flute / recorder riff with simultaneous small 
percussion taps (first time more than one instrument playing)
7:30–7:33 Brief, soft wood percussion taps
7:45–7:57 Bells with scraped cymbal?
7:57–8:15 Harmonica melodic section
8:25–8:37 Low register trumpet glissandos > chimes with single wood  
flute / recorder tone
8:45 Chair squeak?
8:50–9:45 Accordion notes > high muted trumpet > valve flutter on sax 
with single short note > violin note with horn tongue flutter  
then with forte trumpet riff and tenor horn? Upper harmonics / 
lower growl
9:49–10: 21 Assorted percussion playing together > wood flute?
10: 30–11: 55 Plucked violin with cymbal > cymbals with human voice  
whistle > soprano sax > harmonica with trumpet and wood 
flute? > percussion hit (sense of structure here)
12: 07–12: 47 Cymbals and gongs, wood block, with bass clarinet tone?
12: 52–13: 42 Percussion with recorder wood flute > accordion
13: 44–14: 43 Assorted percussion decreasing tone density to end
Note: > = successive sonic acts. The question marks indicate my lack of confidence 
in my description of the instrument being played. Also, many sounds are discernible 
during this recording that may be “incidental” but that may still be intended as part 
of the listening experience. These details are not particularly important here.
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hard to place this piece with respect to genre, time, or place. “What is it?” 
is the question I often get when I play this piece for listeners without sup-
plying any prior information about it. Its reference to, and embeddedness 
within, African American sacred music is clear, but little else is. It is fol-
lowed by “Dexterity,” a bebop standard written by Charlie Parker. Here the 
Aec seems to call into question one of the founding rules of the AAcm, 
which is to promote original, or creative, music.6 While the founding mem-
bers of the AAcm held a range of opinions about both the desirability and 
interpretation of a prohibition on the performance of standards, this was, 
I believe, the first time an AAcm ensemble had recorded a standard. While 
the performance is full of small idiosyncrasies, it is played fairly straight, 
with Malachi Favors’s walking bass line serving as a backdrop for a series of 
solos. While there are vocal interventions, the musicians are clearly sticking 
rather close to the piece as scored, and the overall structure of their perfor-
mance places it recognizably within the jazz idiom.
Next is “Rock Out,” with Favors moving to fretless electric bass and some-
one playing brief electric guitar riffs, all over a busy percussion track. The 
piece is highly repetitive, with little rhythmic variation and no harmonic 
movement (indeed, for quite a while, apart from the repeating bass riff, no 
real harmonic or melodic material is present at all). At one point, a horn 
enters playing a rhythm- and- blues- style solo, with, however, little interest 
or real commitment; it is more satire than substance. The piece then moves 
to a brief bridge, after which the horn engages in more forceful honking, 
evoking the tradition of Texas tenors. The piece lies somewhere between 
parody and merely boring, as if the Aec are saying that rock music has black 
musical forms as its source but has denuded them of any musical interest. 
A brief guitar- driven section follows, with playing that would not be out of 
context in a punk piece; it, in turn, resolves into a series of distorted tones 
accompanied by car horns, cymbal crashes, and vocal exclamations. At this 
point the piece ends (is rock just noise?).
The final piece on the album, “A Brain for the Seine,” takes up the whole 
B side. It is far more abstract; small instruments abound; and the ensemble 
makes much use of space and silence. This piece occupies a sonic space simi-
lar to that of “Silence.” There are spoken interludes that ask, “Can I please 
have a drink of water?” as if one is begging an aloof French waiter or, per-
haps, a jail guard.7 The piece sits squarely within the precise tradition of 
experimentalism that the members of the Aec and other first- generation 
AAcm members developed. It sounds like the audio track of a performance- 
art piece, which in many senses it is (given the highly performative nature 
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of live Aec concerts). It lacks any rhythmic propulsion, although it occa-
sionally has an implied beat. Sections include accordion, seeming to evoke 
French street musicians, while other sections, with piano and reeds, may re-
mind one of modernist European art music before morphing into sonically 
sui generis ensemble playing. Carefully constructed trumpet and saxophone 
lines often emerge out of near- silence, with a focus on tone color and tim-
bres produced by the use of extended techniques. There is a great variety 
of percussion accompaniment (the Aec was known to travel with more 
than two thousand instruments in total), from bells to assorted idiophones, 
gongs, horns, and cymbals, which collectively were to suggest to critics both 
the jungle and the city, along with many imaginary soundscapes. Near the 
end of the piece a brief melodic line is played in unison, resolving into a 
series of cymbal taps.
“Silence” (and the performances of the Smith- Braxton- Jenkins trio more 
generally) and the music of the Aec as exemplified by the pieces on Mes-
sage to Our Folks confused both French critics and those from the English- 
speaking world precisely because of how the variety of their sonic gestures 
impeded obvious pigeonholing of their music into one genre category or 
another and so problematized discussion of their art from any single given 
critical perspective. It is worth delving into this “confusion” in some detail 
to flesh out the aesthetic strategies employed by the AAcm in Paris related 
to this genre instability. As Stuart Hall (1992, 26) writes, “By definition, 
black popular culture is a contradictory space. It is a sight [sic] of strate-
gic contestation. But it can never be simplified or explained in terms of the 
simple binary oppositions that are still habitually used to map it out.” It is a 
commonplace of postcolonial studies to note and theorize about the (appar-
ently) contradictory elements of African diasporic culture and, in particular, 
to note the careful negotiations and manipulations of these contradictions 
undertaken by black artists. Such contradictions are demonstrated not to be 
“mistakes”—elements that need to be exorcized to create a consistent artis-
tic discourse and practice—but are shown to be the building blocks of cre-
ative artistic practices. Hall goes on to say, “In its expressivity its musicality, 
its orality, in its rich, deep and varied attention to speech, in its inflections 
towards the vernacular and the local, in its rich production of counternarra-
tives, and above all, in its metaphorical use of the musical vocabulary, black 
popular culture has enabled the surfacing, inside the mixed and contradic-
tory modes even of some mainstream popular culture, of elements of a dis-
course that is different—other forms of life, other traditions of represen-
tation” (27). Such hybridity,8 with its element of the contradictory, is itself 
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theorized to be grounded in the affirmation of multiple identities by many 
black artists, itself seen as a product of colonialism, and to operate as a cri-
tique of essentialist racial discourse. A clear statement of this linkage is 
made by bell hooks:
Employing a critique of essentialism allows African- Americans to ac-
knowledge the way in which class mobility has altered collective black ex-
perience so that racism does not necessarily have the same impact on our 
lives. Such a critique allows us to affirm multiple black identities, varied 
black experience. It also challenges colonial imperialist paradigms of 
black identity which represent blackness one- dimensionally in ways that 
reinforce and sustain white supremacy. This discourse created the idea 
of the “primitive” and promoted the notion of an “authentic” experience, 
seeing as “natural” those expressions of black life which conformed to a 
pre- existing pattern or stereotype. . . . Contemporary African- American 
resistance struggle must be rooted in a process of decolonization that 
continually opposes re- inscribing notions of “authentic” black identity. 
. . . When black folks critique essentialism, we are empowered to recog-
nize multiple experiences of black identity that are the lived conditions 
which make diverse cultural productions possible. When this diversity is 
ignored, it is easy to see black folks as falling into two categories: nation-
alist or assimilationist, black- identified or white- identified. Coming to 
terms with the impact of postmodernism for black experience, particu-
larly as it changes our sense of identity, means that we must and can re-
articulate the basis for collective bonding. (hooks 1990, 28–29)
In a telling autobiographical passage from a different essay, hooks (1989, 
11) tells us, “It was listening to black musicians like Duke Ellington, Louis 
Armstrong, and later John Coltrane that impressed upon our consciousness 
a sense of versatility—they played all kinds of music, had multiple voices.” 
While the hybridity of African diasporic art practices, their playful use of 
contradictions, and their multivocality and denial of single authentic iden-
tities is now well established, it is rarely recognized that the enactment of 
these artistic strategies is itself employed as an aesthetic gambit—that the 
aesthetic theory that emerges out of these strategies both serves to critique 
racial and artistic essentialism and uses these contradictions to thicken the 
aesthetic value of such works. What results are not works fractured from 
the perspective of an aesthetics bent on revealing aesthetic value but works 
whose aesthetic worth can be viewed from multiple aesthetic vantage points, 
from assorted critical positions, and employing varied aesthetic discourses.
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What I hope to do is demonstrate that the sort of critique of essentialism 
that hooks discusses is consciously undertaken by the AAcm in Paris and 
that it is an aesthetic strategy that enacts this critique—a most intimate en-
twining of the social and the aesthetic. This can be seen as a way to cash 
out George Lewis’s (2008, 240) claim, concerning the criticism the AAcm 
in Paris received, that “the [black] nationalist strait- jacket that the music of 
the AAcm Paris contingent was being shoehorned into often served to limit 
the ways in which their music might be perceived and contextualized. . . . 
These and other reductivist accounts of their work were strongly resisted by 
AAcm musicians working in Paris.”
The primary terrain on which contrasting critiques, both laudatory and 
negative, of the AAcm in Paris were constructed, and to which the AAcm 
responded (both while in Paris and in earlier and later statements), is that 
of the genre designations appropriate for discussing their music. Criticism 
was not so much directed at individual performances and musical works as 
it concerned the AAcm’s musical practices writ large. What kind of music 
was the AAcm producing, why was the AAcm producing it, and (therefore) 
what critical stance is best suited to come to an understanding of it, were 
the questions asked, and the site of much controversy. Genre theory can 
help us both understand what was (and continues to be) at stake and make 
sense of the AAcm members’ responses to the reception of their music, for 
they understood perfectly the role genre determinations play both at the 
level of general theory and in the precise manner that genre terms were em-
ployed by their critics, offering a critique of them. As hooks (1990, 28) says, 
“Such a critique allows us to affirm multiple black identities, varied black 
experience. It also challenges colonial imperialist paradigms of black iden-
tity which represent blackness one- dimensionally in ways that reinforce and 
sustain white supremacy.”
Genre theorists, particularly those who have focused on music, have 
stressed the role that musical genres play in the mediation of social iden-
tities and investigated the porous (synchronic) and malleable (diachronic) 
nature of genre boundaries. For example, David Brackett (2005, 75) states, 
“The notion of genre speaks to transitory divisions in the musical field that 
correspond in discontinuous and complex ways to a temporally defined so-
cial space. . . . Musical genres participate in the circulation of social conno-
tations that pass between musicians, fans, critics, music- industry magnates 
and employees. That these connotations, these ‘meanings’ are accepted 
as ‘real’ speaks to the phantasmatic nature of identity, that ever- shifting 
sense of self that finds confirmation and reinforcement in quotidian social 
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practices and in a range of discursive formations, both institutional and 
shadowy.” How the “logic of genres” affects aesthetics is nicely summarized 
by Georgina Born (1993b, 215), who writes, “Indeed the wider cultural char-
acter of popular music, as of non- Western music, forces a reconsideration 
of the concept of the aesthetic itself—if, by aesthetic, we understand the 
ways that music- as- culture produces both meaning and pleasure. The point 
is that, in these cultures, since meaning inheres in the social, visual, discur-
sive and technological mediations of music as well as in the musical sound, 
we may consider the aesthetic as subsuming these mediations. From this 
perspective, then, the social, the visual, the discursive and so on are all con-
stitutive of the aesthetic.” The aesthetic properties of music are partially a 
function of the meanings attributed to music, and musical meaning is both 
partially constituted and constrained by genre.9 Here we can begin to see 
the complex intertwining of the social and the aesthetic at the site of genre, 
since genres are as much about identities (and they are, after all, themselves 
a kind of identity, a category of being) as they are about aesthetics. Perhaps 
better yet, no real separation of the two can be made. The AAcm in effect 
combine the antiessentialism of hooks and the social aesthetics of Born in a 
demonstration that they are in effect two sides of the same coin. The meth-
ods for effecting the critique of essentialism are themselves aesthetic gam-
bits, and the music that mediates such critiques is aesthetically richer for 
undertaking such a critique.
In an influential article concerning the role of art category/genre judg-
ments in the formation of aesthetic judgments, Kendall Walton (1970) ex-
plores the manner in which what category we take an art object to be an 
example of establishes fields of aesthetic value and disvalue. Walton argues 
that the category into which we place an art object generates three kinds of 
properties that such an object may or may not manifest, which he calls stan-
dard, variable, and contra- standard. While he does not descend to the level 
of genres within a traditional art form (his account operates at the level of 
art forms themselves, painting, sculpture, and so on), his account strongly 
suggests the appropriateness of so doing. He concludes, “What aesthetic 
properties a work seems to have, what aesthetic effect it has on us, how it 
strikes us aesthetically often depends (in part) on which of its features are 
standard, which variable, and which contra- standard for us” (343). Walton 
goes on to argue that works that can be considered members of more than 
one art kind, or more than one genre, may well have distinct, even contradic-
tory aesthetic properties attributed to them.10 In a passage that, as we shall 
see, can usefully explain some of the response to the AAcm in Paris, Walton, 
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considering the aesthetically relevant property “shocking,” claims, “Shock 
then arises from features that are not just rare or unique, but ones that are 
contra- standard relative to categories in which objects possessing them are 
perceived. . . . What is important is not the rarity of a feature, but its con-
nection with the classification of the work” (354). In this sense, the aesthetic 
properties that the works have are relative to the genre of which we take 
the work to be a member.11 Here we can see the importance of Jacques Der-
rida’s (1980, 59) notion of “participation without belonging” with respect to 
a genre, for the tendency to naturalize and view as objective the aesthetic 
properties, and thus meanings, we find in artworks is actually to a great ex-
tent a product of our genre judgments, as both Derrida and Roland Barthes 
have argued. Again, Born succinctly draws a moral from this:
But the point is that the relation of these extramusical connotations to 
music- as- signifier is cultural, historical, established by convention and in 
social practice. Yet they are experienced as “inherent in” or “immanent to” 
the music by a process of projection of the connotations into the musical 
sound object. It is this process of projection that achieves what Barthes 
calls the “naturalising” effect: the connotations appear to be natural and 
universal where they are cultural and historical. It is, then, the forms of 
talk, text and theory around music—the metaphors and rhetoric explain-
ing and constructing it, whether propounded by composer, theorist or 
critic—that constitute its inherent discursive intertextuality, and that may 
liable to analysis as ideological. (Born 1993b, 222)
As we shall see, the AAcm in Paris consciously fought against such natural-
izing readings of its music on ideological grounds; its members attempted 
to widen the field of connotative projections into their music to avoid the 
situation in which the acceptance of certain connotations led them to ossify 
into essentialisms; in effect, to avoid a connotation becoming a denotation, 
in Derridian terms.
In a passage that he chose not to explore further, Walton recognized the 
aesthetic value, in and of itself, of the various, perhaps even contradictory, 
aesthetic properties a work might manifest due to the multiple genres in 
which it might plausibly be taken to “participate”: “Works may be fascinat-
ing precisely because of shifts between equally permissible ways of perceiv-
ing them. And the enormous richness of some works is due in part to the 
variety of permissible, and worthwhile, ways of perceiving them” (Walton 
1970, 362). If we ignore his prescriptive talk of “permissibility,” what we 
have here is the recognition that what I call aesthetic denseness is itself an 
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aesthetic value; that works located in multiple social fields of art consump-
tion, creation, and criticism, and that thus participate in multiple genres, 
may well be aesthetically richer for this. What is at stake in the genre de-
bates surrounding the music of the AAcm in Paris is not “just” the meaning 
found in the music, the role such music may play in an antiessentialist so-
cial agenda, the place of the association’s art in large art- related discourses 
and therefore history, but also good, “old- fashioned” issues surrounding aes-
thetic value, or how “fascinating” the AAcm’s music may be. As Joseph Jar-
man sarcastically (as we shall see) yet truthfully states, “Yes we hope you 
enjoy our music.”12
I now want to consider some of the writing of the members of the AAcm 
in Paris and the criticism their music received to demonstrate how they 
engaged in collective acts of aesthetic thickening and to demonstrate that 
these acts discharged both aesthetic and social/political functions. In his 
dense book notes (8 pieces), Wadada Leo Smith stresses the importance of 
autonomy in improvisation, which he sees as (among other things) freeing 
the “sound rhythm” elements from the limitations of reactive improvisation 
and from traditional elements of meter, tempo, and rhythm. Autonomy is 
one of the key concepts that the AAcm members in Paris use both to respond 
to their critics and to describe their own music. This makes sense, since they 
are combating both genre judgments about their music made by others and 
related assumptions about what sort of music black so- called jazz musicians 
could, or should, produce. To be autonomous is in this context to be able to 
take control of these issues oneself. This stress on autonomy in improvisa-
tion suggests an emphasis on the autonomy of individuals more generally, 
something African Americans (among others) historically have been denied. 
More precisely, the expression of assorted identities, displayed via varied 
musical constructions, is a robust assertion of both personal and collective 
autonomy. It is the refusal to be typecast or essentialized.
By employing a variety of small instruments, each given equal footing; 
refusing to employ a strong rhythmic pulse; and employing long stretches 
of silence, Smith and the other AAcm members in Paris were rejecting stan-
dard white constructions of black identity, particularly essentialist construc-
tions of black music. The autonomy the music itself manifests is a product 
of Smith’s and his fellow improvisers’ autonomy in deciding what to play 
(and, crucially, when not to play), and, in particular, their conscious deci-
sion not to delimit their choices by genre expectations, themselves created 
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by assumptions concerning what they, as black musicians, should sonically 
produce and how their productions should be categorized.13 Smith himself 
seems to view his music this way: “I, a black man, a creative improviser, 
strive, through my improvisations and as an improviser to pay homage to the 
black, the blackness of my people, and that these creations themselves are 
for all, and the natural laws that are prevailing under these creations are rela-
tive as they are interpreted or perceived by beings of other peoples” (W. L. 
Smith 1973).14 He also writes, “Critics have applied narrow concepts to this 
improvisational music so that they could easily write about and define it and 
dictate what is the essence of black music- creative music. The percussion, 
brasses, strings and any other beaten, plucked or wind blown instruments 
in improvisational music are equal—they are all equal in the creation of 
music” (1973). Smith sees his music as part of a tradition of black music that 
has been (mis)constructed by critics. In other words, while he does view his 
music as speaking to issues of black identity, he is not limited by what many 
see as the characteristics music must have to be coded as black. He wishes to 
be able to construct his own history and future for his music—to express his 
personal autonomy via the creation of autonomous music. His music is to be 
considered part of the history of black music; the construction of a historical 
narrative of such music is at the forefront of what he is trying to accomplish. 
These thoughts are not mere conjecture but were made explicit by Smith 
himself with respect to “Silence” during an interview on the New York radio 
station wckr- Fm on the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of the AAcm:
Well, we wanted to look at music that would give us a chance to express 
exactly who we were. And once you make that particular commitment, you 
have to find out how you’re going to do this. So we decided that we would 
write for instruments, and write for ensembles. We didn’t have to accept the 
history that was given to us before, and we didn’t even have to expect some 
kind of present history or future history. We were able to contemplate the 
real essence of creative music. We were able to come in with projects, for 
example, like “Silence” is a piece that has silence in it, and it came after 
John Cage’s “Silence,” but the philosophical connection of silence in this 
case was to materialize music within the space, and whatever was heard 
in the environment, whereas in the Cage piece there was absolutely no 
music in the space, and the gestures were the moments of the environ-
ment, you see. So creating a piece that seemed that it would look like and 
feel like a piece that came out of Cage’s tradition, in fact, we didn’t have 
that problem, because as I say, we are not bound by what came in the past or 
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this particular ensemble’s history—you know, like a classical ensemble has 
a history that’s specifically European. We didn’t have to worry about that.15
Smith has consistently made claims such as this, and they form the core of 
notes (8 pieces), which explains some of the philosophy behind his composi-
tional methods and contains more general thoughts about what has come to 
be called “creative music.” Smith begins with a “warning to black people” 
to take control of their own history (including the history of their musical 
practices) and to offer their own critiques of their music. This, he claims, 
is tantamount to becoming “self- conscious” (W. L. Smith 1973, 1).16 At the 
level of musical production, this is an argument for prioritizing improvis-
ing, “giving [improvisers] a part in the creation of the music” (13). Crucially, 
Smith builds this desire for autonomy into his music itself: “The concept that 
I employ in my music is to consider each performer as a complete unit with 
each having his or her own center from which each performs independently 
of any other, and with this respect of autonomy the independent center of 
the improvisation is continuously changing depending upon the force cre-
ated by individual centers at any instance [sic] from any of the units. . . . In 
other words, each element is autonomous in its relationship in the impro-
visation” (22). He goes on to state that his compositional methods are cre-
ated “in such a way as to preserve the autonomy of each improviser within 
a group, each group within the orchestra, and each improviser within the 
unit- total” (23).
Smith’s music is an expression of who he is, a self- construction of his 
identity (and the identities of his fellow improvisers). He rejects a view of 
“Silence” as just “Cage on the cheap” while denying that he was bound by 
others’ construction of black music’s history or similar constructions of Euro-
pean art music. By freeing himself from a history that historically has denied 
black artists autonomy, that has created a history and identity forcibly for 
such artists, Smith’s music—the silence Smith employs—speaks. It speaks of 
a new identity; it tells a new history. Silence as employed by Cage was per-
haps a “mere” formal musicological element. Silence as employed by society 
against blacks (and others) was, and still is, a powerful tool of oppression. 
Silence as employed by Smith is both a musical “tool” serving to undermine 
a false construction of black music (as being necessarily rhythm- bound and 
pulse- driven) and a highly creative use of the tools of oppression to express 
musical and personal autonomy. When viewed against a backdrop of both 
Western experimental music and African diasporic music and the political 
issues that Smith foregrounds in his discussion of the piece, “Silence” be-
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comes aesthetically thicker than it would be if one were to examine it from 
any single genre perspective. It is not just that both perspectives are “appro-
priate” but that the piece actually puts them in dialogue with each other, in-
viting you to compare your views about each, their differences and similari-
ties, their distinct yet overlapping histories, and what follows from taking 
them to be mutually exclusive, how this might reveal perhaps often hidden 
prejudices.17
Smith is explicit in his goal of constructing a historical narrative for the 
ensemble’s music by referencing both Cage and the tradition(s) of black 
music. Thus, “Silence” is aesthetically thickened via genre multiplication, a 
multiplication that both problematizes our genre assumptions about black 
music and suggests a political agenda related to autonomy and freedom, 
both social and musical.
We can see how autonomy in “Silence” operates on assorted planes. The 
individual performers are given autonomy to choose what and when to play. 
Silences in particular are hallmarks of this autonomy, since their length, 
placement, and frequency in the piece direct one’s attention toward these 
performers’ decisions not to play. The resultant music, lacking many obvi-
ous hallmarks of traditional musical structure and mimetic content, can 
easily be heard to aspire to the oft- cited goals of autonomous music and to 
invite the associated acousmatic listening. Yet the emphasis on autonomy 
also refers to the politics of autonomy and its closely associated concept, 
freedom, and “Silence” can be viewed as performing—that is, instancing—
what a more egalitarian social reality in which all are free to assert their 
autonomy would be. By using silence—a tool of oppression—to assert au-
tonomy, Smith, Braxton, and Jenkins turn the oppressors’ means of oppress-
ing back on itself. Autonomy is performed as much as it is injected into 
the music. Here what are at one obvious level aesthetic choices (to employ 
silence, to allow performers great autonomy in their sonic choices, to avoid 
melodic and harmonic development) discharge social functions and cri-
tiques (the assertion of alternative histories of black music and a rebuttal to 
essentialist readings of such music), and these social functions themselves 
determine the aesthetic choices that are made. This is a perfectly integrated 
social aesthetics, and if it has elements of a musical- social homologism that 
some find simplistic, I hope to have demonstrated that with the AAcm this 
operates at a high level of sophistication and is well theorized.
This brand of social aesthetics is consistent with assorted “founding” 
documents of the AAcm and comments by its original members. Consider 
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the following statement by two of the founding members Muhal Richard 
Abrams and John Shenoy Jackson (1973, 72): “The AAcm intends to show 
how the disadvantaged and the disenfranchised can come together and de-
termine their own strategies for political and economic freedom, thereby 
determining their own destinies.” This passage echoes their claim that the 
primary concerns of the AAcm are “survival, accountability and achieve-
ment.” The collective responsibility they have in mind concerns the com-
munity of black artists and the wider community these artists represent and 
partially constitute: “In the area of accountability, Black artists should be 
held responsible to their brothers and sisters, who, in turn, should demand 
excellence and give their support to Black endeavors” (73). The notions of 
accountability and self- determination in these passages, which clearly have 
a primary social/political meaning, are, as we have seen, enacted or mod-
eled musically by the AAcm by holding each improviser responsible for his 
own sonic contributions, by allowing the music to perform its own history, 
and by creating, in effect, autonomous music.
These themes are picked up in the following passage:
The AAcm is attempting to precipitate activity geared towards finding a 
solution to the basic contradictions which face Black people in all facets of 
human structures, particularly cultural and economic. There is an inces-
sant demand in Black communities to solve the disparity between partici-
pation and nonparticipation in the social process. Our concerts and work-
shops in the schools and in the community are an effort to expose our 
Black brothers and sisters to creative artists contemporary to their time 
and present to them a factual account of their glorious past as an under-
girding for facing the future. Demonstrating the creation and production 
of art will enhance the cultural and spiritual posture of a people and it 
is our firm belief that artistic appreciation will so enhance cultural and 
spiritual growth that the individual’s participation in the social process 
will be highly accelerated. It is the contention of the AAcm that it is not 
the potential which Black people have which will determine what they do 
but, rather, how they feel about themselves.
Finally, the AAcm intends to show how the disadvantaged and the dis-
enfranchised can come together and determine their own strategies for 
political freedom and economic freedom, thereby determining their own 
destinies. This will not only create a new day for Black artists but for all 
Third World inhabitants; a new day of not only participation but also of 
control. (74)
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Here participation in social processes that might bring about the better-
ment of their community is explicitly tied to participation in the creation of 
art. Artistic growth is almost presented as a prerequisite for social growth or 
change, and self- determination, as a social/political goal, is both practiced 
and modeled artistically. The AAcm, and other likeminded cooperatives of 
black artist- activists, intends both its music/art and its organizational struc-
tures to model a more participatory egalitarian culture. Statements such as 
these by members of the AAcm can easily serve to ground Jacques Ran-
cière’s observation that “it is not a misunderstanding of the existing state 
of affairs that nurtures the submission of the oppressed, but a lack of con-
fidence in their own capacity to transform it” (quoted in Bishop 2006, 83). 
The AAcm’s practices and art serve to instill this transformative capacity in 
the association’s community.
Let us turn our attention to the critical reception of the AAcm in Paris, 
and other comments by AAcm members about their own work, to both flesh 
out the points made earlier and demonstrate the precise manner in which 
genre judgments were implicated in critiques of the group’s music. As dem-
onstrated, the AAcm in Paris used its relationship to genres to assert its 
agency against the danger, which Brackett rightly noted, that particular 
genre judgments fix too rigidly the meaning attributed to the music and 
the appropriate aesthetic to apply to it. For this reason, the members of the 
AAcm in Paris steadfastly refused to talk about their music from any single 
genre perspective, and they constantly problematized attempts at genre 
pigeonholing by employing a variety of tactics, from straightforward asser-
tions of the multi- generic nature of their music through the employment of 
contradictory utterances about their art and the use of multi- generic pas-
tiche in their performances. Many of these tactics and tropes would soon 
become characteristic of postmodern art discourse, and the French critics 
were quick to pick up on the postmodern nature of the AAcm in Paris’s art.
Genre- destabilizing gestures by the AAcm have a long history. Consider, 
for example, the following poems from the liner notes to Joseph Jarman’s 
album Song For (1967) and the albums Reese and the Smooth Ones and Mes-
sage to Our Folks, recorded in Paris in 1969 by the Aec:
sonG For is made of sound and silences from
Musical
Instruments, controlled by seven men; it’s
Music that lasts 131/2 minutes, it’s for itself,
For love, for hate & for the God within
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Us
All—it has no “meaning” outside of itself,
The music.
Then the following “ironic” poem is added:
Yes, we read and write music
And sleep, eat food, have visions, etc. . . .
“just like everyone else.” Yes we are humans.
No, we do not think the whole world is full of evil
Only 3/4 of it. Yes, some of us have wives and children. No, we do not 
work
Enough. Yes we hope
You enjoy our music.
The first poem appears to be a statement asserting that Song For is a work of 
absolute music, “having no meaning outside of itself.” Yet even this claim, 
in keeping with a major strand of modernist art- music theorizing, is im-
mediately problematized by the claim that the music is for love, hate, and 
the God within us—a direct renunciation of the claim that it has no external 
meaning that, in fact, grounds the music in traditional strong emotions and 
religion, akin to claims often made about so- called primitive music when it 
is held in contradistinction to Western art music and its oft- theorized purely 
self- referential character. The second “ironic” poem reads like a series of 
responses to an imaginary interviewer (and picks up on a theme explored 
by the composition “Is Jazz Dead?” found on Congliptious, by the Roscoe 
Mitchell Art Ensemble, which is a parody of an interview of Lester Bowie 
by a jazz critic). Here Jarman is responding to a critic who questions the 
musical credentials of the Aec (“Yes we do read and write music”) and even 
their very humanity. There is the suggestion of a question about whether 
he thinks anyone could actually enjoy their music, and a question about 
his political/ethical take on humanity, itself answered ironically. His re-
sponses foreground the Aec members’ roles as traditional music makers 
(they read and write music), what they have in common with all humans 
(as if this could actually ever be in question), and their desire, almost uni-
versal among all artists, that their work be received well, that it be enjoyed. 
Taken together, these two poems suggest that the Aec members were situ-
ating themselves squarely (if not exclusively) within a tradition of Western 
art- music production and tacitly denying that their music should be read 
through some sort of narrow, perhaps political/racial lens.
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Yet the ironic claim concerning the evil found in the world is picked up in 
other poems by Jarman in the liner notes of the Actuel albums the Aec re-
corded in Paris in 1969:
(excerpt)
reVolt / do not incite to riot—incite to / reVolution
Quietly- calmly (to the point) universal energy black yea
he said / loVe / Observe- poison is what the west would give
us. This message to Our Folks- Seek (love what you are) These songs then 
to offer you your Truth of having what you are GreAt blAck music 
your light, sound & being toGether we free together.
And
(excerpt)
intensiFy the struGGle, seize the time . . .
we joined the mau- mau to cut honkie throats, kill their children and 
claim the
soil—it was a love movement seeking peace.
This poem squarely situates the Aec’s art practices in the radical black poli-
tics of the time—or, perhaps, a (white) reception of these politics. Again, 
ironies abound. While the message does seem to endorse the need for radi-
cal political change and to enjoin blacks to “seize the time,” it also plays into 
the worse (racist) fears of whites by claiming to “enjoy” the murder of white 
children and to view such actions as part of “a love movement.” Of course, 
the ironic nature of this last claim may reflect as much on white fears and 
expectations of the nature of black radical politics as it endorses the need 
for and legitimacy of violent political action. Either way, such statements 
are a far cry from the “music for music’s sake” claims found earlier; thus, 
these poems taken together led to confusion on the part of critics, many of 
whom missed the intended message: that the music of the AAcm could, and 
sometimes did, speak to political issues, but that this was not the only lens 
through which it should be viewed. The music was intended also to stand on 
its own—to be effective examples of pure or absolute music, to yield “tra-
ditional” musical enjoyment. Indeed, as we saw, its autonomous nature, its 
internal musical structure, is (one) way that it discharges its social/political 
function. While certain historical discourses about art music would find a 
fusion of these positions difficult, the AAcm do not endorse the agenda of 
either the absolute music camp or the music as politics (music with propo-
sitional content) camp.
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The multi- generic, mixed- message nature of the performances by the 
AAcm in Paris was not missed by the French critics of the time. The author 
of the program notes for the first Aec performance in Paris, at the Theatre 
Lucernaire on June 12, 1969, states:
It sounds like Xenakis. . . . Wait, there’s Stockhausen, with a beat to boot—
here a pop progression, there we’re a bit bored—Klangfarbenmelodie—
etc. etc. The AAcm does everything. Coming into the Lucernaire, watch 
out for how they’re picking your pockets; you’ll be beaten, robbed, then 
abused, and sent back totally naked and crying for your mother. But cer-
tainly not back home. . . . If you knew how to listen to the AAcm of Chi-
cago, you would become, all at once, a subversive terrorist. You’ll see how 
intoxicating it is to kidnap Boulez, to kill Berio, or to beat up Xenakis. 
(Quoted in and translated by G. E. Lewis 2008, 223)
While it is perhaps appropriate to assume the author of this passage is mani-
festing a humorous tone, he does merge both high- art European methods 
and composers closely identified with absolute music and the radical—in 
fact, violent—tropes associated with black political radicalism and its as-
sociated music’s assumed adversarial stance toward European art music. 
George Lewis confirms both the syncretic nature of the music and the fact 
that the French both noted and responded to it:
Quick changes of mood were the rule, ranging from the reverent to the 
ludic. A quiet, sustained, “spiritual” offered by one musician might be 
rudely interrupted by an ah- ooh- gah horn or a field holler from another. 
A New Orleans– style brass fanfare would quickly be dunked in a roiling 
sea of tuned metal trash cans. An ironically demented fake- bebop theme 
could be cut up into a series of miniatures, punctuated by long silences 
and derisively terminated by a Marx Brothers raspberry. This was defor-
mation of mastery, indeed. No sound was excluded and no tradition was 
sacrosanct, and French audiences and the jazz press quickly fell in love 
with the ruptures and surprises. (G. E. Lewis 2008, 226)
Lewis draws the conclusion that the practices of the AAcm in Paris bore the 
hallmarks of postmodern artistic expression and seemed to be received that 
way by the French: “[Such descriptions by French critics] seem to support 
the notion that the work of the Art Ensemble of Chicago, where visual col-
lage and historical montage combine, could exemplify Derrida’s observation 
that collage/montage is the quintessential postmodern form of expression” 
(2008, 223).
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Such use of collage and montage was recognized by the French press as 
contributing to the aesthetic of the music of the AAcm. The Aec was said 
to “incorporate everything of value, classical, European, Hindu, African, 
seemingly without any prohibition against any kind of process of working 
with sound” (cited by G. E. Lewis 2008, 228). The Aec was not bound to any 
particular genre or culturally grounded methods of sound/music produc-
tion, and while this was clearly viewed by many French critics as both new 
and liberating, it equally destabilized the aesthetic ground from which to 
critique the music.18 As Lewis (2008, 234) comments, “Rather than trying to 
fit in with an existing scene with defined borders of aesthetics, method and 
practice, AAcm musicians in Paris made no attempt to contextualize their 
work solely within the jazz art world. Rather, they took work wherever they 
could, and regularly moved outside the frame of jazz, collaborating with a 
wide range of artists.” The aesthetic thickening that the AAcm created via 
its members’ refusal to present music tethered to one genre or another also 
revealed itself via the choice of “scenes” in which they participated and not 
just the sounds they produced. These “trans- generic” explorations were seen 
by French critics as fitting squarely within the still- being- developed critical 
discourse of postmodernism. As Lewis (236) states, “Moreover, in contrast 
to much post- 1990’s American scholarship, French critiques of the 1970s 
positioned free jazz as a postmodernist, rather than a modernist phenome-
non,” He goes on to quote from Francis Marmande, who in 1971 talked about 
“ruptures” this music created, seeing in it “a certain lexical world that is 
constantly called upon (‘collages,’ ‘mixtures,’ ‘borrowing’ . . .) scrupulous in-
ventories of ‘quotations’ or ‘references’ from which programs for free music 
records or concerts are woven” (236). Here, characteristic tropes of post-
modernism—intertextuality, collage, quotation—are used to characterize 
the music and its aesthetic power.
As we have seen, a key terrain on which the AAcm in Paris fought for con-
trol over the appropriate interpretive context for discussing its art was its 
relation to black politics and broader issues of black identity and, in particu-
lar, the tendency among French critics to, on the one hand, make the linkage 
between radical black politics and the music of the Aec in particular, but on 
the other hand, to go on and assume that this political content revealed the 
primary or privileged position from which to access the AAcm’s music. The 
postmodern tendencies the French were so quick to pick up on were often 
viewed as instrumentally serving the radical black political agenda, which 
those critics also assumed was “behind” the music. They treated “radical 
black music” as a genre term, and when they placed the AAcm in it, they 
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tended to avoid considering alternative aesthetics. Again, the members of 
the AAcm in Paris did not deny the presence of political aspects to their 
practices; they just denied particular interpretations of what the political 
content might be (the refusal to be essentialized with respect to a particular 
political message) and more global attempts to essentialize their music as 
being purely or primarily a means of mediating political messages—that is, 
that it was “just” political music.19
Smith articulates these points nicely. The radical black political agenda 
French critics found in the music was not just a product of the sort of state-
ments AAcm members made in interviews and liner notes (as discussed 
earlier). It was heard via the AAcm’s disassembly (hence, the relation to 
postmodernism) and “attack” on Western art- music conventions and the 
high- energy, often dissonant playing characteristic of (some of ) the music 
of the AAcm. These are forms of sonic homologism: an attack on white Euro-
pean musical conventions is heard as an attack on colonial power and racism, 
while high- energy dissonant music is heard as a violent struggle against such 
oppressive musical rules. As Smith says, “They thought we were going after 
the Western tradition. . . . We challenged that tradition, but it wasn’t our 
only investigation” (quoted in G. E. Lewis 2008, 242). Lewis goes on to quote 
Smith as saying: “From my recollection of interviews and interactions with 
people who were in the media system there, their questions were always lim-
ited to just the black issues, and what the music meant in those terms. Even 
though we would go into these areas of exploration, other ideas, they would 
always try to refocus it. Their idea was designed to present not just an art-
ist, but a black artist in their society” (G. E. Lewis 2008, 242). As Smith says, 
“We were looking at music in a much broader way than a lot of other people 
in the music community at that time” (quoted in G. E. Lewis 2008, 244).
A narrow political reading of the music of the AAcm in Paris served as a 
genre category from which to judge its music. The AAcm members did, of 
course, contribute to the plausibility of such an interpretation. There cer-
tainly was a political element to the music, but how that element was best 
characterized, the fixity of the political stance it took, the relative impor-
tance of it to the musicians’ aesthetic vision, and, crucially the degree to 
which they intended their politics to carve out an exclusive position from 
which to consider their music were all contested by the members of the 
AAcm. Their music was multi- generic and intended to be judged through a 
variety of lens.
Against this backdrop, it is perhaps not surprising that the very day after 
the Aec played a Black Panther benefit in Paris, an event that naturally 
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contributed to the radical political reading of their music, Jarman told the 
audience at another concert, “The critics have called it avant- garde, they’ve 
called it the New Thing . . . but we have only one name for it: ‘Great Black 
Music’” (quoted in G. E. Lewis 2008, 241). This term, “Great Black Music,” 
which was to become a motto of the Aec and, to a lesser degree, the AAcm, 
is offered by Jarman as a genre to describe the music of the Aec of its/his 
own choosing. As such, it evinces a sophisticated understanding of the issues 
at play surrounding the reception of the music of the AAcm and can be seen, 
as I now show, as a perfect genre name, given the assorted commitments of 
the AAcm toward the social and the aesthetic.
The term “Great Black Music” has been received uncritically by many 
people as squarely grounding the music of the AAcm not just in black 
politics but also in (so- called) radical black politics, as if merely mention-
ing blackness is to take a politically radical stance.20 As we have seen, the 
AAcm’s members did occasionally position themselves and their music in 
sympathy with radical black political causes (although they never seem to 
have advocated a narrow reading of black nationalism per se), but “Great 
Black Music,” while suggesting such a political alignment, also denies an 
exclusively narrow reading of the music to the exclusion of other critical 
stances from which to discuss their art. The expression contains three words: 
“Great,” an evaluative term that is deeply and obviously grounded in tradi-
tional aesthetic discourse; “Black,” a racial category; and “Music,” an art- 
kind term that logically functions in many ways like a genre or meta- genre. 
The expression is itself a concatenation of aesthetics, politics, and genres 
and is best read, I claim, as a genre designation intended to include many 
preexisting genre terms and the critical discourses with which they align 
themselves, without prioritizing any of them and thereby taking a particular 
theoretical stance toward genres and their aesthetic function.
The breadth with which Smith claims the AAcm was approaching music 
is intended to be foregrounded in the expression Great Black Music, and it 
includes, of course, musical traditions that code as European and white. 
Great Black Music, in a sense, is an anti- genre genre designation that is in-
tended to deny any particular narrow perspective from which to categorize, 
and thus judge, the music while simultaneously seeming to do just that. It 
is like the “trope of all tropes,” which Henry Lewis Gates Jr. calls the sig-
nifying trope, or an example of Derrida’s claim that there cannot be a text 
that exists outside a genre. Each of the genres this expression implies ( jazz, 
new thing, experimental music, rhythm and blues, blues, African music, and 
so on) is, at times, an appropriate perspective from which to consider the 
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AAcm’s music and the different histories in which each perspective grounds 
the music. The distinct, if overlapping, aesthetics with which each perspec-
tive is in sympathy; the distinct properties of the music that bear aesthetic 
weight; and the distinct political and social narratives and functions each 
music is seen as discharging collectively serve to thicken the music of the 
AAcm aesthetically. This thickening is a result of the multiple aesthetic per-
spectives one should take when considering the music of the AAcm—that is, 
what the AAcm is arguing for and (so) is what the term “Great Black Music” 
is intended to suggest. Yes, the music of the AAcm is critiquing race relations 
and making universalist comments about music and culture and contribut-
ing to ongoing debates about art music and commenting on the received his-
tory of jazz and exploring aspects of black identity. It simply is not doing just 
one of these or any of these at the expense of the others. It is political music, 
and it is music for its own sake. The expression “Great Black Music” can now 
be seen as an exemplary instance of a double- voiced text: on its surface, it 
seems to endorse an essentialist reading of race and cultural artifacts closely 
identified with race, but its very point, on further analysis, is to warn one to 
avoid essentialist readings of black music (and thus of blackness in general). 
The essence of blackness is, in effect, to lack an essence, to resist essential-
ist constructions, and to enact blackness artistically is to repel essentialism.
Notes
1. While in Paris, Don Moye, who was already based there, joined the Aec. 
There were also musicians from abroad who had gravitated to Paris and engaged 
in collaborations with the extended jazz community there.
2. One sense in which this can be seen as a form of social aesthetics is the de-
gree to which the aesthetic thickening requires more than just the production 
of certain sounds to take place. It is the combination of the AAcm members’ as-
sorted activities related to their music—from the sounds they played to the album 
titles they chose and the interviews they gave—that brings about this thickening. 
This account therefore is at odds with what is sometimes called “sonicism” as 
advocated by philosophers of music such as Julian Dodd (2007), and, in a related 
sense, Roger Scruton (1997).
3. Cf. Brackett 2005, 77: “The spectral protest of musicians hover before me, 
complaining that an emphasis on genre, and hence (to some extent) on structure, 
robs them of agency. . . . Moreover, when one posits a momentary relationship 
between a musical field of genres and different positions in social space, one is 
confronted with the instability of social identities, which, like genres, are subject 
to constant redefinition and which also become meaningful within a field of re-
lationships at a particular moment.” I argue that the AAcm in Paris used genres 
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and their characteristic instability to assert its agency. In this sense, the AAcm was 
a predecessor to Living Color, as described by Will Straw (1991, 384; emphasis 
added): “What these logics invite, however, is a reading of the politics of popular 
music that locates the crucial site of these politics neither in the transgressive or 
oppositional quality of musical practices and their consumption, nor uniformly 
within the modes of operation of the international music industries. The impor-
tant processes . . . are those through which particular social differences (most 
notably those of gender and race) are articulated within the building of audiences 
around particular coalitions of musical form. These processes are not inevitably 
positive or disruptive of existing social divisions, nor are they shaped to any signifi-
cant extent by solitary, willful acts of realignment. (Attempts to transform them into 
the bases of artistic strategy have generally failed, one notable recent exception being 
that of the group Living Colour).” For a useful, if at times obscure, account of the 
function of genres in “creating worlds” and determining actions, see Frow 2006.
4. Anthony Braxton, Leroy Jenkins, and Leo Smith, Silence, Freedom Records 
278.128, 1974; Art Ensemble of Chicago, Message to Our Folks, byG Records 
529.328, Actuel 28, 1969. All listening was done with original vinyl, while timings 
were generated from digital copies.
5. This piece is usually said to have been recorded in Paris on July 18, 1969, as 
indicated by the record jacket. In private correspondence, Wadada Leo Smith in-
forms me that it was in fact recorded in Chicago just before Anthony Braxton left 
for Paris in the early summer of 1969.
6. On the vexing question of defining “original” and “creative” music for the 
AAcm at the birth of the organization, see G. E. Lewis 2008, 98–103.
7. One may well think that the use of the voice and actually spoken sentences 
distances this piece from “Silence” insofar as this piece makes use of mimetic ma-
terial and semantics in a way that the purely abstract “Silence” does not.
8. Hall (1992, 27) himself goes on to make the linkage with hybridity.
9. It is commonplace to state that genres establish criteria of both truth and 
meaning.
10. See Walton (1970, 347–48) for his discussion of what he calls “Guernicas” 
versus “Guernica.” Walton’s account can be profitably read alongside Jacques 
Derrida’s “The Law of Genre” (1980), written ten years later. A story for another 
day would be to locate where these two very different thinkers part company. 
Their disagreements focus, I think, on the unfortunate fact that Walton in the end 
wants to graft a theory of true versus false aesthetic judgments on his theory of 
art categories (a notion that is anathema to Derrida), and while he is sensitive to 
the changing nature of our genre judgments, he perhaps assumes that it is easier 
to tease out what these are than is actually the case. In effect he recognizes the 
importance of considering sociological “facts” but takes such facts to be neater 
than they often are. For an account of how the “sociological facts” may as often 
confuse as clarify our genre judgments, see Born 1993b.
11. I use the language of genre membership not as a commitment to a particular 
ontology of genres (that, say, they are types of which individual works are tokens) 
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but simply to foreground their classificatory aspect. Others, such as Flew, prefer 
to talk of works “performing” genres, but this notion also comes with heavy theo-
retical baggage.
12. Quoted in liner notes for Joseph Jarman, Song For, Delmark Records Ds- 410, 
1967, by J. B. Figi, which are dated June 4, 1967.
13. In this sense, Smith’s sense of autonomy in music is crucially different from 
that commonly employed in modernist art- music discourse, where musical au-
tonomy is not linked to the autonomy of the composers’ intentions but is some-
how free- floating, wholly internal to the music itself. Smith is concerned most 
fundamentally with performed autonomy.
14. Excerpts from notes (8 pieces), including these passages, are available at 
http://music.calarts.edu/~wls/pages/philos.html.
15. Interview with Wadada Leo Smith and George Lewis, wckr- Fm, New York, 
September 12, 1995, http://www.jazzhouse.org/library/?read=panken18.
16. The original is not paginated. The page numbers cited here are my creation.
17. That genre assumptions about black music may rest on prejudices follows 
directly from the history of race- driven music categories and, in particular, the 
characteristics of a “pure” form of jazz as being associated with various flavors 
of primitivism.
18. Similar claims were made by other AAcm in Paris members, as found in an 
interview conducted by Daniel Caux in October 1969. Leo Smith claims that his 
goal is to employ “all forms of music . . . everything and anything is valuable,” 
while Jarman adds, “We play the blues, we play jazz, rock, Spanish music, gypsy, 
African, classical music, contemporary European music, vodum. . . . Everything 
that you’ll want . . . because finally, it’s music that we play: we create sounds, 
period” (quoted in Caux 1969).
19. Again, French critics seemed to pick up on the fact that the political and 
the aesthetic are not at odds with each other in the music of the AAcm. In a clas-
sic and groundbreaking study, Phillipe Carles and Jean- Louis Comolli state that 
“with free jazz, one is witness to a real political positioning of the music, through 
the convergence of directly militant concerns, and their influence, also direct, on 
the very conception of the music and on its aesthetic explorations” (Carles and 
Comolli 1971, 71, quoted in and translated by G. E. Lewis 2008, 236). While one 
may object to aspects of Carles and Comilli’s precise account of the relation of 
“militant” political concerns to the AAcm, they seem spot on in recognizing that 
political concerns, when they surface, need not come at the expense of aesthetics 
but may help give it form.
20. Recall that the genre “race records” was not abolished by Billboard maga-
zine until 1949. It was replaced with “rhythm and blues” until within a month 
of Jarman’s creation of the term “Great Black Music,” when the genre became 
“soul.” In a certain sense, “Great Black Music” functioned to broaden the already 
widely accepted genre term “soul”; however, “soul” was imposed from the out-
side, by the white record industry, and no longer transparently admitted, for 
better or for worse, the racial connotations of the genre.
chApter 7
KENNETH GOLDSMITH AND  
UNCREATIVE IMPROVISATION
Darren Wershler
To be unoriginal with the minimum of alteration is  
sometimes more distinguished than to be original with  
the maximum of alteration.
—T. S. Eliot (minimally altered)
Is there such a thing as uncreative improvisation? If so, how would it oper-
ate in the second decade of the twenty- first century, when creativity and 
improvisation are as likely—or more likely—to be invoked in the business 
world than in the context of contemporary art? The “uncreative” and “con-
ceptual” practice of Kenneth Goldsmith, with all of its attendant impurities, 
provides one possible model.1
Much of Goldsmith’s oeuvre, which involves labor- intensive acts of tex-
tual appropriation on a large scale, bears a counterintuitive relationship to 
the sorts of extemporaneous production that characterize improvisation. 
However, Goldsmith’s fifteen- year stint as a dj for the free- form New Jersey 
radio station wFmu (from mid- 1995 to mid- 2010) offers some possibilities 
for a reconsideration of how improvisation works in a contemporary con-
text. Goldsmith’s show, which went under a variety of monikers, including 
“Unpopular Music with Kenny G,” “Anal Magic with Kenny G,” “The Kenny G 
show with Kenny G,” “Kenny G’s Hour of Pain,” and “Intelligent Design with 
Kenny G,” managed to bridge the gap between improvisation and constraint 
without resolving the difference in one direction or the other.
In The Philosophy of Improvisation, Gary Peters (2009, 52) argues that 
“free- improvisation is more about power than it is about freedom.” As he 
pushes and pulls against self- imposed limitations, what Goldsmith’s un-
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creative improvisations embody is the struggle between control and au-
tonomy—in other words, what Michel Foucault (1982, 780) dubbed “power 
relations.” Further, Goldsmith’s uncreative improvisation provides an im-
portant contrast to the ways in which the discourse of contemporary busi-
ness uses terms such as “improvisation,” “innovation,” and “creativity.” For 
corporate gurus such as Richard Florida, these terms are always produc-
tive—that is, they are a means to make something efficient and commodifi-
able. Goldsmith, however, is a much more complex beast. Like Andy Warhol 
and Jeff Koons, Goldsmith knows the techniques of the business world well 
and cheerfully incorporates them into his repertoire. At the same time, his 
work gestures back toward decades of difficult, uncomfortable, constrained 
art and, ultimately, to the freedom that allows for it. However, Goldsmith’s 
astonishing popularity indicates that he clearly and obviously profits from 
his work and does not occupy anything like the oppositional positions of 
the historical left. In sum, Goldsmith’s uncreative improvisation is charac-
terized by its impurity.
As Craig Dworkin (2007, 34) has noted elsewhere, Goldsmith’s ongoing 
personal project, which he has successively dubbed “nutritionless writing,” 
“uncreative writing,” and “conceptual writing,” falls squarely into a century- 
old tradition of technologized, high- volume appropriation. Goldsmith’s 
methodology proceeds by identifying a neglected (because mundane, or, 
in Goldsmith’s terms, “boring”) repository of cultural discourse, such as an 
average edition of the New York Times, or the artist and album names from 
his extensive lp collection (6799),2 or all of the traffic reports on a New York 
radio station that appear at ten- minute intervals over a twenty- four- hour 
period (Traffic). He then transcribes the contents of that repository meticu-
lously, sorts and reconfigures the resulting digital manuscript as a book, 
and attaches his name to it. In this context, even Goldsmith’s curation of 
the decade- old Ubuweb, the world’s largest digital archive of avant- garde 
sound recordings, concrete poetry, video, outsider art, and related critical 
materials, is perhaps his most significant work and arguably part of the prac-
tice of uncreative improvisation. (Damon Krukowski [2008] explicitly com-
pares Ubuweb’s ongoing operation to Goldsmith’s dj practice at wFmu.) 
Although such projects have been common in the art world for decades, they 
are relatively rare in what Charles Bernstein (1986, 246) famously refers to 
as “official verse culture.”
The concept of improvisation does not appear very often in Goldsmith’s 
critical writing or in the discourse of contemporary conceptual writing in 
general. In Goldsmith and Craig Dworkin’s 593- page Against Expression 
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(2011), the term appears only twice and never in the editorial sections of the 
book.3 In Uncreative Writing (2011b), Goldsmith’s major statement of poet-
ics to date, it appears three times (and I address two of them). The first is 
a comparison of Ezra Pound’s and Walter Benjamin’s methods of literary 
appropriation: “Pound’s is a more intuitive and improvisatory method of 
weaving textual fragments into a unified whole. Often- times it takes a great 
deal of Pound’s intervening—finessing, massaging, and editing those found 
words—to make them all fit together just so. Benjamin’s approach is more 
preordained: the machine that makes the work is set up in advance, and it’s 
just a matter of filling up those categories with the right words, in the order 
in which they’re found, for the work to be successful” (Goldsmith 2011b, 
loc. 2014).
The Benjamin text that Goldsmith has in mind is Passagen- Werk (translated 
as The Arcades Project [Benjamin 1999]), an enormous, cross- referenced 
shuffle text that had no fixed form until its posthumous publication as a vol-
ume with a fixed spine. Goldsmith (2011b, loc. 2008) asserts that “it’s im-
possible to determine Benjamin’s exact methodology” for authorship of this 
work, as he left no set of instructions to follow. Goldsmith also cites Susan 
Buck- Morss’s observation that although Passagen- Werk has no necessary 
narrative structure, it does in fact have a conceptual structure, presenting 
confusion without collapsing into a confused presentation (loc. 2008). Gold-
smith’s decision to base the structure of Capital, his major work- in- progress, 
on Passagen- Werk suggests that while it may be impossible to follow the let-
ter of Benjamin’s methodology, improvising in his spirit may be an option. 
Marjorie Perloff ’s paper (and subsequent book) “Unoriginal Genius: Walter 
Benjamin’s Arcades as Paradigm for the New Poetics” provides critical sup-
port for this position, arguing that Passagen- Werk is “paradigmatic for our 
own poetics,” with Goldsmith as its exemplar (Perloff 2008, 251). Just as 
the flaneur improvises a path through the rigid confusion of urban space, 
Benjamin and Goldsmith demonstrate that it is possible to repeat something 
to make a difference.
What form would this sort of practice take? In Uncreative Writing, Gold-
smith (2011b, loc. 2284) invokes Sol LeWitt’s notion of art based on the 
recipe: “Like shopping for ingredients and cooking a meal, he says that all 
the decisions for making an artwork should be made beforehand and that 
the actual execution of the work is merely a matter of duty, an action that 
shouldn’t require too much thought, improvisation, or even genuine feel-
ing.” One name for this approach (which Goldsmith implies cannot expunge 
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improvisation entirely) is “scored improvisation,” a term that appears in 
some of Goldsmith’s early music criticism and provides his longest state-
ment on improvisation to date (Goldsmith 1999, 180). In “Near the Edge 
and Off the Page” (1999), what interests Goldsmith is the practice of com-
mingling/composed scores and improvised works. The exemplars of this ap-
proach, Goldsmith argues, are Pierre Boulez and John Cage, but he also pro-
vides a laundry list of other musicians who blur these boundaries, including 
John Zorn, Mauricio Kagel, Butch Morris, Iancu Dumitrescu, and Takehisa 
Kosugi. The transgressions are bidirectional; Goldsmith happily reports, for 
example, that some of the guitarist Jim O’Rourke’s work with Kosugi on 
John Cage scores “would certainly have upset Cage.” For Goldsmith, the 
result of these experiments is “win- win,” producing “flexible and sponta-
neous” structures that hold composition and improvisation in tension with-
out resolving that tension in one direction or another (180).
But is this improvisation, really? Theorist practitioners have argued that 
the distinction between scored composition and improvisation is blurrier 
than we commonly imagine. In the essay “Towards an Ethics of Improvisa-
tion,” the composer Cornelius Cardew (whom Goldsmith has long hosted 
in pirated form on Ubuweb), implies that it is. He writes that “scores like 
those of LaMonte Young (for example ‘Draw a straight line and follow it’) 
could in their inflexibility take you outside yourself, stretch you to an ex-
tent that could not occur spontaneously” (Cardew 1971, xviii). Conversely, 
as Marcus Boon (2010, 228), a dj, university professor, and Goldsmith col-
league and collaborator, points out, many improvisers are not all that free 
in their approach: “Faced with a field of total, open possibility, many im-
provisers repeat a certain set of gestures that are ‘free’ but as predictable 
as the idiomatic forms they seek to move away from. In other words, they 
copy themselves, or they copy a way of relating to other musicians. This 
is not necessarily bad, since it can result in new idioms, protocols, forms 
of beauty and pleasure (what Simon Reynolds identifies as the pleasure of 
‘cheesiness’). Or not: there are no guarantees.” Just as structure can lead to 
unprecedented occurrences, “total openness” in practice often means a reli-
ance on “common sense,” “gut feelings,” or some other set of unexamined 
and clichéd forms.
There is also a philosophical justification for considering Goldsmith’s 
work within the realm of improvisation. Peters argues for a consideration 
of improvisation that is quite distinct from discourses that invoke the cre-
ativity and innovation of the performer:
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Instead of situating freedom in a future yet to be attained, the discussion 
follows Immanuel Kant in tracing the origin of freedom to the prior play 
of the cognitive faculties, a sense common to all (sensus communis) and 
one that the artwork helps us remember. This strategy is crucial because 
it allows for a rethinking of freedom in terms of memory rather than hope 
while also introducing into the past a freedom that, once remembered, 
must be preserved in the artwork. In other words, the prioritization of the 
past is able to be conceived in conservationist rather than conservative 
terms: the conservation of freedom understood as the infinite opening of 
the artwork. (Peters 2009, 2)
Here freedom is a state that exists not because of but prior to the creation 
of the structured work, which calls forth memories of that freedom in the 
minds of the audience. To support his position, Peters also cites Keith John-
stone’s Impro, which uses the same allusion: “The improvisor has to be like 
a man walking backwards. He sees where he has been, but he pays no at-
tention to the future. His story can take him anywhere, but he must still 
‘balance’ it, and give it shape, by remembering incidents that have been 
shelved and reincorporating them” (Johnstone 1979, 116). Once again, the 
spirit of Walter Benjamin has been invoked; for Peters, the improviser is like 
Benjamin’s Angel of History, blown ceaselessly backward into the future 
while watching history accumulate in his wake.
Likewise, Goldsmith continually researches the archive of avant- garde 
practice for performative recipes to pair with texts he has plucked from some 
forgotten corner of the wreckage of history. As Boon (2010, 140–41) points 
out, Goldsmith’s interventions are minor, because limiting himself to making 
small changes allows him to maintain his claim to be conceptual, uncreative, 
and scripted. For Goldsmith, the act of carefully selecting and preparing 
something for a procedure (however idiosyncratic) is a means to remem-
ber that the “givens” of history could have been, and can still be, otherwise.
One outcome that we might reasonably expect from such a model of im-
provisation is the death and subsequent disappearance of the modernist au-
thor as genius, whose acts of bricolage and appropriation succeed precisely 
because of a refined sensibility. However, this is one place where Goldsmith 
differs from the more radical improvisers that inspired him. John Cage, for 
example, eschews the notion of taste along with his attempts to break free 
of the sovereign subject position:
What I have never appreciated in improvisation is the return to memory 
or to taste: the return of things that have been learned or to which one has 
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become accustomed—sometimes consciously, deliberately, sometimes in-
sidiously. Phrases thought to be original are only articulations heard a 
long time ago. In improvisation, when you think you are following your 
own direction, most of the time you are following someone else’s line. At 
the most, that is not what bothers me so much as the desire for unique-
ness that appears in the act of improvising. Once you realize the number 
of obstacles and of more or less deliberate references that the improviser 
is struggling with, you can only smile at the claim to originality. (Koste-
lanetz 1988, 229)
By way of contrast, here is Goldsmith (2011b, loc. 2508): “Sorting and fil-
tering—moving information—has become a site of cultural capital. Filter-
ing is taste. And good taste rules the day.” In the same volume, Goldsmith’s 
references to the taste of his heroes Benjamin and Warhol both merit the 
adjective “exquisite” (locs. 2009, 2508). Where Cage wants to purge taste, 
Goldsmith hangs on to it, tightly. Regardless of whatever else he is doing, 
Goldsmith is almost always building his reputation as an artist in the pro-
cess.
In this as in many other respects, Goldsmith is a residual modernist. As 
Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 6) described, although most modern methods 
for creating openness and multiplicity succeed in one aspect, a unity of 
totalization often reaffirms itself at a different level—in this case, the reifi-
cation of the author as iconoclastic but tasteful genius. (Krukowski [2008] 
refers to this as Goldsmith’s “Stein- like self- admiration.”) In “My Career in 
Poetry,” Goldsmith explains the logic behind the “famous suit[s]” (Gold-
smith 2011a, 8) he wore for his readings at the White House for President 
Barack Obama and the First Lady. Although “John Stewart speculated that 
it was improvised at the last minute, quipping that the afternoon before 
I went onstage I glanced at the wall and asked, ‘Hey, does that wallpaper 
come off?’” both the paisley suit that Goldsmith wore for the evening per-
formance and the pastel suit that he wore during the day were “designed by 
the avant- garde designer Thom Browne under his Brooks Brothers’ owned 
Black Fleece label” (2011a, 6). Call it sartorial scored improvisation, if you 
like. In any event, it epitomizes Goldsmith’s signature ability to make care-
ful planning evoke spontaneity—and increase the value of his personal 
brand at the same time.
This seems like an appropriate spot to suggest that the “creative” business 
theory of Richard Florida and the “uncreative” work of Kenneth Goldsmith 
are reflections of each other. They are strikingly similar but ultimately op-
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posed attempts to address the same basic situation: the cultural economy of 
late capital. As bAVo (Gideon Boie and Matthias Pauwels) argue, the sort 
of instrumentalized creativity that has been part of U.S. business since the 
1950s is a major component of contemporary business: “When creativity 
is affirmed as an autonomous value that needs to be nurtured and main-
tained, it stands in a direct instrumental relation to the current regime. The 
acquisition of poetic freedom by creative agents is achieved through the 
agent’s voluntary acceptance of the inscription of creativity in the economic 
process, where it gets put into service as something that cannot be estab-
lished by capital alone” (bAVo 2007, 163). In a networked milieu, as busi-
ness claims creativity for itself, turning its factories into playgrounds, art 
makes a corresponding detour into the boring and the uncreative, turning 
its playgrounds into factories. Creativity is the imaginary surplus that con-
temporary business uses to remain “business as usual,” wallpapering over 
the traumas of barely contained global fiscal meltdowns and looming cli-
mate change.
As texts such as Florida’s bestselling The Rise of the Creative Class (2012) 
and Hal Niedzviecki’s Hello, I’m Special (2004) demonstrate, the invocation 
of creativity is deeply imbricated into contemporary neoliberal ideology 
and ontology: “the creative ethos pervades everything from our workplace 
culture to our values and communities, reshaping the way we see ourselves 
as economic and social actors and molds the core of our very identities” 
(Florida 2012, loc. 525). For Florida, creativity is the new normal, a para-
doxical regime of individuality, self- expression, and openness to difference 
(2012, loc. 486) that somehow includes “heretofore excluded groups of ec-
centrics and nonconformists” (loc. 438). This cheerfully contradictory con-
tention corresponds closely with Slavoj Žižek’s description of today’s pre-
dominant mental state as a sense of not being fully in the clutches of the 
dominant power structure. Everywhere we see opportunities for play and 
creativity (Žižek 1997, 77), although such moments are precisely when we 
are most fully in ideology’s grasp (Žižek 1989, 49). As Alan Liu (2004, 375) 
points out, the link that the Romantics once forged between creativity and 
critique is now badly broken, “no matter how functional creativity may be 
at the lower levels of ideology.”
The signature characteristic of the neoliberal formulation of improvisa-
tion and creativity is that it is always useful (Florida 2012, loc. 424 pas-
sim). In Florida’s writing, creativity is important because it is the machine 
that synthesizes nebulously defined “knowledge” and “information” into a 
thoroughly instrumentalized “innovation,” which can be anything (and the 
kenneth Goldsmith And uncreAtiVe improVisAtion 167
range here is breathtaking in its narrowness) from “a new technological arti-
fact or a new business model or method” (loc. 736). In “Struggling with the 
Creative Class,” Jamie Peck provides the following incisive critique:
Rather than “civilizing” urban economic development by “bringing in cul-
ture,” creativity strategies do the opposite: they commodify the arts and 
cultural resources, even social tolerance itself, suturing them as putative 
economic assets to evolving regimes of urban competition. They enlist 
to this redoubled competitive effort some of the few remaining pools of 
untapped resources; they enroll previously- marginalized actors for this 
effort, enabling the formation of new governance structures and local po-
litical channels; they constitute new objects of governance and new stakes 
in interurban competition; and they enable the script of urban compe-
tivity [sic] to be performed—quite literally—in novel and often eye- 
catching ways. (Peck 2005, 763)
Florida (2012, loc. 859), for example, is ready and willing to put even poets, 
musicians, and artists to work in his caring sweatshops, willfully forgetting 
that creativity ever bore a strong relation to waste, excess, profligacy, and 
expenditure.
As Thomas Frank’s The Conquest of Cool (1997) carefully and convincingly 
documents, the entry of creativity into the discourse of business is not a re-
cent phenomenon; it spread into the larger business community through the 
advertising agencies of Madison Avenue between 1946 and 1966 (the Mad 
Men moment), preceding the appearance of the 1960s counterculture. By 
1969, when the highly influential exhibition “Live in Your Head: When Atti-
tudes Become Form: Works– Concepts– Processes– Situations– Information” 
was staged by Harald Szeemann at the Bern Kunsthalle (March 22– April 
27, 1969) and the Institute of Contemporary Arts in London (September 
28– October 27, 1969), John Murphy could confidently write the following 
on behalf of the show’s patron, the Philip Morris tobacco company:
We at Philip Morris feel it is appropriate that we participate in bringing 
these works to the attention of the public, for there is a key element in this 
“new art” which has its counterpart in the business world. That element 
is innovation—without which it would be impossible for progress to be 
made in any segment of society. Just as the artist endeavors to improve 
his interpretation and conceptions through innovation, the commercial 
entity strives to improve its end product or service through experimenta-
tion with new methods and materials. Our constant search for a new and 
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better way in which to perform and produce is akin to the questionings of 
the artists whose works are represented here. (Murphy 1999, 126)
The ease with which the discourse of business absorbed the art world’s 
notions of creativity explains in part why “When Attitudes Become Form” 
became so central to contemporary practice, Catherine Spencer writes in 
her review of the 2013 re- creation of the show: “As well as introducing the 
ideas of process art and the concept exhibition, ‘When Attitudes Become 
Form’ ushered in a new era of overt corporate art sponsorship. You don’t 
need to look much further for an object lesson of money and power uniting 
to write histories, and select archives for preservation.”4
During the same period that business began to appropriate the discourses 
of conceptual art and improvisation to describe its own modes of creativity, 
European and North American neo- avant- garde art movements (especially 
Fluxus, pop, and figures such as Jackson Mac Low and John Cage) were 
making a reciprocal shift into a variety of investigations of the boring and 
the mundane, including the discourse and methods of business itself. Gold-
smith’s forays in this tradition are worth considering for several reasons. 
Just as Warhol incorporated practices from his early days of advertising dis-
play and window dressing into his later career and Jeff Koons worked on 
Wall Street as a commodities broker, Goldsmith, since the late 1990s, has 
drawn on the discourses and techniques of business—particularly infor-
mation technology and advertising (although this is seldom, if ever, com-
mented on by his critics).
During the dotcom boom at the turn of the millennium, Goldsmith was 
working as a creative director for an early New York Internet design firm 
called Methodfive Inc. Methodfive was an archetypal dotcom success story: 
founded in 1996 by a twenty- three- year- old University of Pennsylvania drop-
out named Adeo Ressi, who had already sold a previous Internet startup, the 
Greenwich Village firm boasted customers such as the New York Times Com-
pany and Fox Networks. In January 2000, one month before it was sold to 
Xceed Inc. for $75 million in cash and stock, Methodfive employed seventy- 
five to eighty people.5 One of the few surviving online artifacts relating to 
Goldsmith from this period is an entry from the online newsletter Courtney 
Pulitzer’s Cyber Scene, dated Monday, April 21, 1997. In it, Pulitzer recaps 
Goldsmith’s talk “Ramping Up without Dumbing Down: Lessons Learned 
from Methodfive’s Own Site Redesign,” delivered on the same date at the 
After- 5 Web Forum at the offices of NickandPaul in the Chelsea Market. 
As the following excerpt demonstrates, Goldsmith (who in a business con-
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text usually identified himself as “Ken” to immediately distinguish by mode 
of address on the phone his business contacts from art- world people, who 
knew him as “Kenneth,” and friends who called him “Kenny,” and thus shift 
into the proper persona)6 was adept at the business argot of the moment:
As the client, ensure that you understand the components and ramifica-
tions of what’s outlined in the spec before submitting it to the designers or 
to others involved in your Web initiative, such as the content producers or 
programmers. All involved parties, especially the designers, should then 
follow this document to the letter. Using an extranet to post thoughts, 
comments and feedback regarding the site’s development and for de-
signers to post their work helps with communication and meeting ex-
pectations. Allow your designers to be experimental and innovative dur-
ing the first stages of design to get creative juices flowing. Then assign 
a “cranky monkey” who helps the designers integrate their imaginative 
and inventive designs into a site that’s practical, functional and buildable. 
While keeping in mind the new technologies that will be able to repackage 
and distribute information in a new and innovative way, be aware of who 
your audience is and their level of technology. Analysis on who your user 
is and what the level of technology they’ll be using to access your site is 
also important. Designing for a lower- end browser and keeping plug- ins 
to a bare minimum to ensure that the site can be accessed by the greatest 
amount of people possible is one way to ensure your users are accessing 
your site with ease.7
At the same that he was working for Methodfive, Goldsmith was coding the 
first pages for Ubuweb, which had launched six months earlier in 1997. In a 
recent e- mail, he remarked that the Methodfive talk “is the UbuWeb charter 
statement.”8 Hewing to Methodfive’s principles so closely is, in part, what 
has kept this ancient site in good operating condition for more than a decade 
with minimal alterations to the underlying code.
Second, Goldsmith (2011b, 258) works explicitly with the categories that 
the business world’s championing of improvisatory creativity exclude (e.g., 
the uncreative and the boring) to reveal the current bankruptcy of the popu-
lar usage of terms such as “creative” and “spontaneous.” He alludes indi-
rectly to Florida’s arguments, writing, “Having worked in advertising for 
many years as a ‘creative director,’ I can tell you that, despite what cultural 
pundits might say, creativity—as it’s been defined by our culture with its 
endless parade of formulaic novels, memoirs and films—is the thing to flee 
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from, not only as a member of the ‘creative class,’ but also as a member of 
the ‘artistic class.’” Intriguingly, both Florida and Goldsmith cite Warhol as 
a major inspiration for their conceptual moves (see Florida 2012; Goldsmith 
2011b).9 However, there are not two perspectives here but a perspective and 
what eludes it: Goldsmith’s work shows, as if in relief, the gaps in the edifice 
of Florida’s approach.
Like Goldsmith, Peter Stallybrass (2007, 1584) has suggested that digi-
tal media, and database technology in particular, offer a way out of the 
regime of originality, creativity, and proprietary authorship. He argues that 
originality “produces as its inevitable double the specter of plagiarism, a 
specter rooted in the fear that we might have more to learn from others than 
from ourselves.” As an alternative to the Romantic legacy of waiting around 
for inspiration to strike, Stallybrass offers instead a program of organizing, 
annotating, and imitating that is strikingly similar to the self- written job de-
scription that Goldsmith provides in “Being Boring,” a major statement of 
his poetics: “I’ve transformed from a writer into an information manager, 
adept at the skills of replicating, organizing, mirroring, archiving, hoard-
ing, storing, reprinting, bootlegging, plundering, and transferring.”10 Such 
an approach is what Charles Bernstein (1986, 164) has dubbed a “strategy of 
tactics.” In opposition to strategy proper, which manifests all of the assur-
ances of the powerful, a strategy of tactics would be a way to combine the 
hodgepodge of poetic techniques so that they form “a complementarity of 
critiques,” which is then projected onto the social in the manner of negative 
dialectics, as a transgression against tradition. Goldsmith’s notion of scored 
improvisation is part of a strategy of tactics—neither one thing nor the other 
but a compromise formation that holds the two approaches in an unresolved 
tension. This approach is driven by the ethic of impurity that Goldsmith pro-
fesses to adore. And, as Boon asks rhetorically in the unedited transcript of 
his interview with Goldsmith for Bomb, “Your radio practice also kind of 
flaunts that impurity, right?”11
Uncreative improvisation is most evident in the least discussed aspect of 
Goldsmith’s practice: his three- hour dj shifts for the free- form radio station 
wFmu (90.1 Fm in the Hudson Valley, Lower Catskills, western New Jersey, 
and eastern Pennsylvania and 91.1 Fm in Jersey City; see also http://wfmu 
.org). Originally the radio station of Upsala College in East Orange, New Jer-
sey, wFmu is often credited with coining the term “free- form” (Post 1993, 
108) and is the longest- operating station of its type in the United States. 
The content on virtually every radio station in existence—music, commer-
cials, and public service announcements—is dictated by a playlist created 
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and maintained by the station’s program director. Steve Post (1993, 107) as-
serts that “playlists have nearly always been standard operating procedure 
at almost all radio stations.” Free- form stations such as wFmu, which grant 
total autonomy to their disc jockeys provided that they adhere to Federal 
Communications Commission (Fcc) regulations, such as the need for sta-
tion identification and restrictions on foul language,12 are the exception to 
this rule (wFmu is almost entirely listener- supported, which frees its pro-
gramming from the need to make a profit or the demands of advertisers). As 
a result, as Jaime Wolf described in an article for the New York Times Maga-
zine from 1999, which briefly mentions a younger Goldsmith under his nom 
de radio “Kenny G,” the djs of wFmu have long been arbiters of taste in 
American music.
What a dj actually does is synthesize tradition and innovation in a man-
ner that is similar to the notion of scripted improvisation. Siva Vaidhyana-
than (2001, 125, 219) surveys the work of a range of cultural theorists (in-
cluding Gena Dagel Caponi, Brenda Dixon Gottschild, Paul Gilroy, Gerhard 
Kubik, and Stephen Tracy), all of whom contribute to a tracing of the dj’s 
logic back through the practices of delta blues musicians to West African 
aesthetics. Vaidhyanathan distils his survey down to a neat little bouillon 
cube of theorization: a dj’s practice, he writes, demonstrates simultaneous 
“individual ‘stylization’ and mastery of a canon.”
It has become a commonplace to invoke the dj as the paradigmatic 
creative figure in contemporary culture. Paul Miller (2004, 57; a.k.a. dj 
Spooky That Subliminal Kid) claims that “dj- ing is writing, writing is dj- 
ing.” Nicolas Bourriaud and Lev Manovich go a step further. For Bourriaud 
(2005, 47), “The remixer has become more important than the instrumen-
talist”; likewise, for Manovich (2001, 134–35), the practice of the selection 
and combination of preexisting elements from the archive is the wellspring 
of new cultural forms. What remains uninterrogated in this formulation is 
a deeply modernist investment in the worth of the new. Manovich, for ex-
ample, sees novelty, creativity, and even “true art” as the inherently valu-
able results of the dj’s inspired manipulations. It would be more accurate, 
and more theoretically useful, to conceive of djs not as the “new” creators, 
but as the embodiment of an impure aesthetic of uncreative improvisation.
Goldsmith’s work as a dj occasionally has been commented on but has 
not been explored in any detail, although Christian Bök (2002, 69) argues 
that it is Goldsmith’s print practice that emulates his radio work and not 
the reverse. The fact that Goldsmith was broadcasting recordings of report-
age on the explosion of the space shuttle Challenger, the assassination of 
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John F. Kennedy, and the attacks of September 11, 2001, before they were 
transcribed for his book Seven American Deaths and Disasters supports such 
a claim.13 The reciprocal is also true: Goldsmith notes in an e- mail inter-
view with Ben Baumes (2005), “I’m always plundering and poaching my 
own writings for my own show.” Such activities, whether the provenance 
of information managers and laptop djs rather than creative directors and 
freestyle jazz musicians, are about working rather than thinking. Running a 
free- form radio show in the manner that Goldsmith did is arguably more 
rather than less work for the dj than usual. Goldsmith added additional, un-
necessary constraints to the various chores involved in programming a radio 
show, revealing the impression of a spontaneous creative dj as a romantic 
fantasy. On occasion, such constraints have been literal as well as figura-
tive, as in Goldsmith’s three- hour- long on- air performance on September 24, 
2003, with the wFmu dj and multimedia collage artist Vicki Bennett (a.k.a. 
People Like Us). During the performance, the two djs were literally bound 
to each other and gagged in the control room. Every fifteen minutes a rope 
was loosened, and the two occasionally broke free to change the program-
ming, only to be captured and rebound by guards in the booth.14 Mic breaks 
consisted largely of the sounds of the ongoing struggle.
What is noteworthy is that, given almost total freedom, Goldsmith’s at-
tention to the formal qualities of radio itself is the source of the disrup-
tive quality of his on- air work. In the Baumes interview, Goldsmith says, 
“I’m interested in pulling back the curtain on radio, making visible what is 
always hidden. When I first started on wFmu, [the station manager] Ken 
Freedman requested that I speak more like a person and less like a dj, ‘Put 
a few ums and uhs into your mic breaks.’ It was an eye- opener for me” 
(Baumes 2005). The hours and hours of digitized online playlists and audio 
streams from Goldsmith’s radio show indicate that the lesson went deep. 
There are entire hours in which Goldsmith’s broadcasts consisted of noth-
ing but farts (September 16, 2010), screams (July 29, 2010), laughter (July 
15, 2010), and silence (July 1, 2010, July 22, 2010).15 All imply the too bodily 
existence of the disc jockey, suddenly present to the extent that he overrides 
any ostensible “content” for his show. At one point, Goldsmith had dubbed 
his on- air practice as “annoyism”; Jason Kaufman (2007, 81) argues that a 
central aim of annoyism is not simply to air “bad” art but “to call into ques-
tion the very standards by which we make such judgements.”
The name of Goldsmith’s website, Ubu.com, points directly to the theo-
retical and aesthetic context for Goldsmith’s approach: the writing of Alfred 
Jarry (1996), particularly the parts concerning his crass, loud, barbaric anti-
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hero Père Ubu (of the play Ubu Roi and its sequels), and the imaginary sci-
ence of ’pataphysics (The Exploits and Opinions of Dr. Faustroll, Pataphysi-
cian, and various short essays). Conceived as a fin de siècle schoolboy’s 
response to the bewildering explosion of scientific discourses into the popu-
lar, Jarry’s ’pataphysics is a principle of functional equivalence, in which 
any given theory is treated as being as valid as any other. In Jarry’s (1996, 
21) deliberately obtuse definition, ’pataphysics “symbolically attributes 
the properties of objects, described by their virtuality, to the lineaments.” 
As Bök (2002, 32) summarizes it, ’pataphysics deliberately prioritizes the 
superficialities of the imaginary over the substance of the thing. Whereas 
science produces facts to arrive at generalities, ’pataphysics concerns “the 
laws governing exceptions” (Jarry 1996, 30–31). Not so much a form of par-
ody as a kind of parallax, ’pataphysics frequently involves minimal or no 
alterations to its object, relying instead on its ability to create a subtle shift 
in the perspective in its audience. According to Bök, ’pataphysics operates 
in three modalities: anomalos (“the repressed part of the rule which ensures 
that the rule does not work,” usually manifesting itself as a sort of excessive 
surprise [Bök 2002, 38]); clinamen (a minimal swerve akin to the détourn-
ment [43]); and syzygy (“the neglected part of a pair which ensures that 
such a pair is neither united nor parted for more than an instant” [41]). All 
of these modalities are relevant to Goldsmith’s work as a dj, so I am going 
to talk briefly about each of them in turn.
To the extent that there is anything unusual about how Goldsmith pre-
sented particular tracks on his show, it could be described in terms of the 
anomalos: a difference in the degree to which free- form djs are willing to 
examine the limits of their alleged freedom. Even among the iconoclastic, 
taste- making djs on wFmu, Goldsmith was an anomaly. Ken Freedman told 
Ben Baumes (2005) that “before [Goldsmith] came along, I felt that Fmu 
had explored all there was to explore in terms of experimental approaches to 
radio.” On a station where djs are ostensibly permitted to do anything dur-
ing their shows, though, Goldsmith had the distinction of being suspended 
on several occasions for violating rules that were not so much nonexistent as 
unspoken. One infraction involved rebroadcasting material from other sta-
tions, but the majority of Goldsmith’s suspensions involved obscene content. 
In his comments on the back of a bootleg cd titled 64 Minutes of Anal Magic, 
Goldsmith wrote, “I’ve been suspended many times on wFmu for playing 
the kind of music included on this disc. In fact, just a few months ago, I was 
thrown off the air for 3 weeks for playing track #9, ‘Sexual Pleasures Film 
Documentary Series Reel #2,’ which is the soundtrack to a stag film from 
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the 1950s. . . . In selecting the cuts, I’ve stayed away from standard erotica 
or straight porn. Instead, I’ve opted for cuts that are more psychological, 
more musical, more racist, more twisted.”16 The best known of Goldsmith’s 
suspensions occurred after his show on Wednesday, December 15, 2004,17 
for, in Freedman’s words, breaking station policy (not Fcc policy) against 
“descriptions or depictions of sexual or excretory matter, anatomy or be-
havior from 5 A.m. to 11 p.m.” Freedman had asked Goldsmith to change 
the show’s name from “Anal Magic” due to this policy; during the show on 
December 15, “Goldsmith solicited new names from listeners. . . . Though 
Goldsmith refused to read many of the suggested titles on the air due to 
their content, the show still contained numerous references to sexual and 
excretory anatomy and behavior, prompting the suspension. The thread on 
the wFmu message board regarding this incident has also been removed.”18 
Freedman was also quite clear, though, that this act of censorship was in the 
interest of protecting the station’s license during a period of overweening 
Fcc scrutiny, saying, “I disagree with the Fcc’s approach, with its guide-
lines, and with its enforcement. . . . I really respect Kenny G and his show, 
but this is something I have to do to protect the station in the face of the 
Fcc’s ongoing crackdown.”19
Clinamen was the Roman philosopher Lucretius’s term for the Greek phi-
losopher Epicurus’s postulate that a borderline- imperceptible, minimal 
swerve in the motion of atoms makes it possible for an event to occur in the 
universe. An artist executes a clinamen by making a minimal swerve in re-
lation to the works of their precursors or some other cultural object (Bloom 
1973, 14). Works based on the principle of clinamen often begin as identical 
copies of such objects and depart from resemblance by such subtle degrees 
that their audiences are stunned to realize that at some point they have 
entered what Jarry (1996, 30–31) described as a universe “that perhaps one 
should envision—in place of the traditional one.” The spiral that always ap-
pears on the belly of Père Ubu was the symbol that Jarry used to represent 
the clinamen. In the universe next door to this one, it might be the groove 
on a long- playing record.
To return to the opening sentence I stole from Eliot and repurposed, un-
original improvisation is all about the clinamen. Boon (2010, 140–41), a 
longtime friend and collaborator of Goldsmith’s, writes the following: “Gold-
smith’s most successful works as a writer/artist/poet are those in which any 
embellishments of the original material are minor. . . . Goldsmith reveals 
the deception while carefully concealing his own originality, which con-
sists in small but essential decisions as to format, scale, name, and medium. 
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When the composer Morton Feldman told Karlheinz Stockhausen that his 
secret lay in never manipulating the sounds, Stockhausen shrewdly replied, 
‘Not even a little bit?’” So for a radio dj, what sort of minimal interven-
tion constitutes a clinamen? Subtle variations, such as temporal shifts, are 
a good place to start. On his first show after the inauguration of President 
Obama (November 15, 2008), for example, Goldsmith played Parliament’s 
“Chocolate City”—a five- minute- and- thirty- seven- second track from 1975 
that imagines the possibility of a black president—for a solid three hours.20 
On other occasions, he has used software to extend the length of spoken 
recordings while leaving individual words audible, as in the case of a show 
where he extended the hour- long finale of Friends to the full three hours of 
his time slot (June 12, 2004).21 Goldsmith’s most extreme versions of the 
practice of temporal shifting involved digitally condensing his playlists to 
radical degrees, playing 180 songs in three hours on October 20, 2004, and 
360 songs in three hours on October 27, 2004.22
Another of Goldsmith’s ongoing practices as a dj, “kenny g sings theory,” 
offers another point for thinking through the structure of the clinamen.23 
In each of these pieces, Goldsmith pairs a digital karaoke audio file with 
the work of a particular cultural theorist and sings the theoretical text as 
the lyrics. In karaoke, as in conventional djing, competence is a mixture of 
fidelity to traditional form and improvisation, which always departs slightly 
from tradition. Unlike djing, however, in karaoke the emphasis falls on the 
affective force of the performance, which has more to do with a ritual af-
firmation of belonging to the community of singer- listeners in the karaoke 
space, a process that inevitably involves attempts to expand that commu-
nity, than it does with musical competence—hence, the form of the spiral. 
Goldsmith’s on- air karaoke raises a number of questions, not only because 
of the ambiguity of his affect and the attenuated feedback from the remote 
radio audience, but also because the potential object of fidelity for his per-
formance is double: is it about the music or the theory? As incongruous as 
they may seem, there is often an associative logic to Goldsmith’s theory- 
karaoke pieces. For example, “Kenneth Goldsmith Sings Jean Baudrillard” 
pairs the Disneyland section of Baudrillard’s America, which concerns the 
structure of the simulacra, with the theme from Claude Lelouch’s Vivre pour 
Vivre (1967), a film that is deeply concerned with themes of self- deception 
and the substitution of a series of phantasmatic objects of desire.
Johan Fornäs (1994) observes that karaoke exemplifies one of the 
commonplaces of post- structural theory and cultural studies: “Theoreticians 
like Wolfgang Iser, Stanley Fish, Julia Kristeva, Roland Barthes, Paul Ricoeur 
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or Stuart Hall have long maintained that all cultural texts leave openings for 
the individual and collective creation of meaning.” By taking theorists liter-
ally and plugging their descriptions of the creation of cultural meaning into 
the epitome of cultural objects that permit such a process, Goldsmith finds 
a way to be faithful and depart from orthodoxy simultaneously. The serious-
ness of the theory is undercut precisely because Goldsmith follows its spirit 
rather than its letter, betraying it while repeating it verbatim.
A syzygy is a temporary conjunction or yoking together of entities that 
otherwise occupy different spaces and trajectories. The ’pataphysical ver-
sion might include Goldsmith pretending to be another dj on his own sta-
tion. Two such pieces are exemplary: “Poem for Ken Freedman” (station 
manager of wFmu) and “Poem for Irwin Chusid” (the dj whose show pre-
ceded Goldsmith’s time slot and the author of Songs in the Key of Z: The Curi-
ous Universe of Outsider Music). On at least three separate occasions, Gold-
smith transcribed every detail of Freedman’s and Chusid’s mic breaks—their 
on- air patter from between recordings, down to the ums and ahs—and re-
cited them verbatim as his own mic breaks. The effect was heightened be-
cause Goldsmith’s voice and Chusid’s are very similar. In a rare interview 
about his work as a dj, Goldsmith notes that in another case he and Chusid 
switched time slots and simply pretended that each was the other (Baumes 
2005).
When Goldsmith is involved, “pretending to be the other dj” is already 
complex, because his on- air persona has always been not “Kenneth Gold-
smith” but “kenny g” (all lower case). The potential for confusion with 
Kenneth Gorelick, the saxophonist also known as Kenny G (capital K and 
capital G), is immediately obvious. In a Google search for “Kenny G” (at 
least, my Google search for Kenny G; search engines are no longer agnos-
tic about who uses them)—the top eleven results all refer to Gorelick. But 
the twelfth still points to “kenny g’s homepage” at wFmu.org; the eighth, 
to “kenny g’s homepage”; and the thirteenth, to his playlists and archives.24 
What has happened since 1995 as a result of this confusion has a certain 
wince- producing predictability: fans who believe they have found the secret 
Gorelick home page inundate Goldsmith’s wFmu e- mail address with fan 
mail, and lowercase kenny g reads the messages on the air.25
In the summer of 2007, at a church in Amherst, Massachusetts, Goldsmith 
began a reading as he often does—with a selection of the Kenny G letters. 
After the reading, he was approached by a young man in the audience who 
extended his hand and said, “Kenny G. May I introduce myself? I’m Jon 
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Zorn” (without the h). To be precise, this was Jonathan Zorn the composer, 
sound artist, and performer from Middletown, Connecticut, not John Zorn, 
the composer, sound artist, and performer from New York.26 The result of 
this meeting (not unlike the Comte de Lautréamont’s chance encounter of an 
umbrella and a sewing machine on an operating table [Lautréamont 1994, 
193]) was an album called Kenny G Meets John Zorn, on which the h- less 
Jon Zorn developed an interactive digital music system to accompany the 
lowercase kenny g’s reading of letters addressed to the uppercase Kenny G. 
What manifests itself in this project is the possibility of subverting the grip 
that the fantasies of celebrity culture hold for us by overidentifying with 
them, revealing the absurdities and inconsistencies of those fantasies in the 
 process.
As Bernstein’s notion of a strategy of tactics suggests through the invo-
cation of negative dialectics, the question that uncreative improvisation 
raises is this: can we fix the problems created by the discourse of corporate 
creativity by adding uncreativity to the mix? This is also the precise mo-
ment that Goldsmith’s larger ethos of impurity and uncreativity encounters 
its own limit. The irony is dialectical. If Goldsmith at one point escaped 
from Florida’s creative class of highly paid new media ad executives into the 
realms of poetry, art, and the academy, his success in being uncreative has 
propelled him straight back into what Florida (2012, 858) calls the “Super- 
Creative Core” of contemporary culture, limiting his ongoing efficacy in 
staging the very problem that his work foregrounds. Goldsmith recognizes 
that there are few spaces in “hypercapitalism” that allow for the appearance 
of the valueless and that others who experimented with boredom and un-
creativity found either mixed or too much success.27 But there is a very real 
risk that the fate of uncreativity may be, in Alan Liu’s (2004, 375) terms, to 
“simply be lumped together with ‘cool’ by the dominant corporate, media, 
and other institutions of society as part of the undifferentiated bread and 
circuses of contemporary ‘entertainment.’” Žižek (2008, 155–56) has com-
mented repeatedly on the ability of capitalism to undermine “all particu-
lar lifeworlds, cultures, and traditions” and enlist them to its cause, so why 
not uncreativity, as well? It is all too possible to imagine the advent of the 
first “uncreative director” of corporate advertising, if such a person has not 
already appeared.
A decade ago, Goldsmith wrote, “When I reach 40, I hope to have cleansed 
myself of all creativity.”28 The ambiguity around whether Goldsmith’s ac-
claim as an uncreative dj or uncreative writer is due to succeeding or failing 
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in this aspiration is beside the point, as Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak pointed 
out more than thirty years ago:
We are the disc jockeys of an advanced technocracy. The discs are not 
“records” of the old- fashioned kind, but productions of the most recent 
technology. The trends in taste and the economic factors that govern them 
are also products of the most complex interrelations among myriad fac-
tors such as foreign relations, the world market, the conduct of adver-
tisement supported by and supporting the first two items, and so on. To 
speak of the mode of production and constitution of the radio station 
complicates matters further. Within this intricately determined and multi-
form situation, the disc jockey and his audience think, indeed are made 
to think, that they are free to play. This illusion of freedom allows us to 
protect the brutal ironies of technocracy by suggesting either that the 
system nourishes the humanist’s freedom of spirit, or that “technology,” 
that vague evil, is something the humanist must transform by inculcating 
humanistic “values,” or by drawing generalized philosophical analogies 
from the latest spatio- temporal discoveries of the magical realms of “pure 
science.” (Spivak 1979, 209)
What matters is how a system that presents us with such a false choice 
marginalizes us all. Goldsmith’s (2011a) recent turn toward institutional cri-
tique suggests that he is attempting to take the political form that his work 
implies and actually fill it with politics. Having the history of institutional 
critique already at hand as an example of what does and does not work, he 
asks: “So what happens when the institutional critique is so easily absorbed 
by the institution, that it moves from a ‘critique of institutions to an institu-
tion of critique?’ We’ve seen this already in the art world where performa-
tive acts of institutional critique are regularly commissioned by the institu-
tions themselves” (2011a). Goldsmith speculates that it might be possible to 
proceed by “at once fondly caressing these institutions, while at the same 
time driving a stake into their backs. To imagine it in any other way would 
be insulting” (2011a). With no way around the “conceptual, political, and 
institutional complexities of parapoetic practice,” the only way to proceed 
is to point out the deadlock between creativity and work rather than try to 
resolve it (2011a). The next question is whether the throngs of newly profes-
sionalized “uncreative writers” and djs can use such practices to shift cul-
ture away from this impasse.
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In mid- January 1956, Billy Strayhorn flew to Los Angeles from New York 
to begin a collaborative recording project with the pop singer Rosemary 
Clooney. Although Clooney was an experienced band singer, having re-
corded with Harry James and Benny Goodman, her stardom was most 
closely associated in the pop imagination with a string of hits she cut in the 
early 1950s for Columbia Records—most notably, the Mitch Miller ethnic 
novelty songs “Come On- a My House” and “Mambo Italiano”—as well as 
for her featured role alongside Bing Crosby and Danny Kaye in Paramount’s 
Technicolor blockbuster White Christmas.1 The collaboration with Clooney 
would be the first of its kind for both Strayhorn and the Ellington Orchestra: 
not only did it mark Duke Ellington’s first collaboration with a singer for a 
full- length lp, but for the first time in his seventeen- year relationship with 
Ellington, Strayhorn was offered creative autonomy on a major recording 
project, one that (also among the first) daringly paired a star white female 
pop singer with an African American jazz orchestra. Even with a band as 
prestigious as the Ellington outfit, this pairing must have raised a few red 
flags for executives at Columbia—or, at least, it would seem so, to judge 
by the evidence of the cover art for the resulting lp, Blue Rose. Images of 
Ellington and Clooney appear on the cover in a split visual space that juxta-
poses, collage- like, a large filmic image of Ellington with a much smaller 
photographic image of Clooney. In the background, placed directly under 
the title “Blue Rose: Rosemary Clooney and Duke Ellington and His Orches-
tra,” a grainy smoke- filled, black- and- white image of Ellington’s face ap-
pears as if being projected onto a movie screen. He smiles gently, his eyes 
cast downward toward a brightly colored, pasted- on photographic head shot 
of Clooney floating in the foreground; she, in turn, innocently gazes out-
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ward toward an unseen camera, seemingly unaware of the celluloid Elling-
ton looming behind her. This stylized separation of Ellington and Clooney in 
the visual field delineates, however satirically, racial and sexual boundaries 
through a technologically mediated, safe distance.
Yet the design of the lp cover, with its contrast of Clooney’s “in- color” 
head against the “black- and- white” Ellington, also referenced the real- life 
“virtual” conditions involved in recording the lp—just one of a set of the 
unusual conditions surrounding Strayhorn and Clooney’s working relation-
ship. At the time, Clooney was pregnant with her second child and was suf-
fering from extreme nausea and vomiting, a situation that precluded her 
from traveling from Los Angeles to New York to record the session.2 On top 
of this challenge, the two collaborators had to work under a very tight dead-
line. As the story goes, the producer Irving Townsend initially pitched the 
idea for Blue Rose to Ellington and Strayhorn on January 12 during the open-
Fig. 8.1 Blue Rose (1956), LP Cover.
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ing night of the Ellington Orchestra’s engagement at Café Society Uptown. 
At the end of their initial discussion, “Strayhorn, Townsend, and Ellington 
had agreed on a basic approach to the album: whatever Clooney and Stray-
horn wanted to do” (Hajdu 1996, 148). However, “whatever [they] wanted 
to do” was set to begin on January 23—and in New York, not Los Angeles. 
Townsend overcame this obstacle by making use of the then relatively novel 
(at least for jazz) technology of multitrack recording; Strayhorn would fly to 
New York to direct the session for the instrumental tracks, then travel to Los 
Angeles to record the vocal overdubbing with Clooney. Originally, Ellington 
and Strayhorn wanted to title the lp Inter- Continental to highlight the bi-
coastal recording process, but that concept was nixed by Columbia in favor 
of the more pop- friendly title Blue Rose.
With Townsend’s plan in place, Strayhorn, armed with records, manu-
script paper, and pen, arrived at Clooney’s home on Roxbury Drive, in 
Beverly Hills, where he stayed for more than a week in her older child’s bed-
room doing double duty as caregiver and musical collaborator (often simul-
taneously). Clooney’s husband, the director, actor, and singer José Ferrer, 
was abroad working on a film project. In David Hajdu’s biography of Stray-
horn, Clooney recalled the ensuing mix of musical, personal, and domestic 
intimacy:
He made me breakfast in bed. We didn’t know each other at all before 
that, and we became incredibly close immediately. I was having a very dif-
ficult pregnancy. I was really suffering and he got me through it. I’d say, 
“Oh God, I’m going to throw up again,” and he would say, “Okay, now. It’s 
okay,” and he would take care of me. He said “Don’t get up, honey,” and 
he’d make me crackers and milk. I felt a bit better one day, and he baked 
me an apple pie. He cared about that baby. He cared about the fact that I 
couldn’t afford to get tired, and he watched out for me. I would just stay 
in bed and talk about things. Most of the time, we didn’t even talk much 
about music. We did work on the music, it was like I was working with my 
best friend. I wanted to do my best for him, and I would do anything he 
wanted. . . . I was never associated with a man who was so completely un-
threatening and uncontrolling and so completely in charge. (Hajdu 1996, 
147, 149)3
While Clooney’s memory conveys her genuine affection and respect for 
Strayhorn, it is difficult to ignore the troubling histories of race, gender, 
sexuality, and power that haunt her story of Strayhorn as trusted domestic 
caregiver. That this tale of a white woman served by a caring and “unthreat-
186 bArG
ening” black man takes place in a Hollywood mansion only underscores 
the close proximity of Clooney’s narrative to the racialized and sexualized 
legacies of the subservient black domestic worker in popular culture (see, 
e.g., Bogle 2001; DuCille 1997, 10–32; Guerrero 1993). In this context, the 
way Clooney narrates her memory of Strayhorn’s actions as domestic care-
giver, coupled with her characterization of Strayhorn’s non- normative mas-
culinity, hails Strayhorn’s black queer body according to the scripts of his-
torical white affection for gendered asexualized black service.4
Yet as a description of her working relationship with her collaborator, par-
ticularly as it marks socio- musical practices and effects of empathy, support, 
and nurturing, Clooney’s memory aligns strongly with a broadly held per-
ception of Strayhorn as collaborator—one pervades the retrospective com-
ments of many other singers (and instrumentalists) with whom he worked. 
Lena Horne, Strayhorn’s lifelong friend and self- described “soulmate,” re-
membered him as a “perfect mixture of man and woman,” “very strong,” 
and “at the same time very sensitive and gentle” (Hajdu 1996, 96). When 
Horne first met Strayhorn, he was “sent” by Ellington to “keep her com-
pany”: “Duke could be very possessive with women . . . so he arranged for 
Billy to be my chaperone. He assumed that Billy was safe, which I guess he 
was in the way that Duke saw me, which was as a sex object” (94–95). Horne 
credited her work with Strayhorn around this time as a formative experi-
ence in her musical training, helping her to discover her own voice: “Billy 
rehearsed me. He stretched me vocally. Very subtly. . . . He knew what songs 
were right for me. He knew my personality better than I did . . . and he wrote 
arrangements that had my feeling in the music” (94–95).
I want to highlight the gendered and racialized terrain of these remem-
brances not only for the paths of musical meaning to which it directs us, 
but also for how they might align with what the film scholar Matthew Tink-
com (2002) has called in a rather different, but not unrelated, context the 
“queer labor” of gay male artists working behind the scenes in the U.S. film 
industry. In Tinkcom’s work, this group includes auteur directors, songwrit-
ers, arrangers, art directors, and choreographers. Clooney’s and Horne’s de-
scriptions of Strayhorn’s practices as a collaborator are a case in point inso-
far as they resonate with the title phrase of Tinkcom’s book, Working Like 
a Homosexual (2002). Tinkcom borrows this phrase from an observation 
made by Lela Simone, a rehearsal pianist and vocal coach who worked with 
Vincente Minnelli and the legendary Arthur Freed Unit at Metro- Goldwyn- 
Mayer (mGm) in the 1940s– 1950s. Recalling Minnelli’s working persona in 
an interview in 1990, Simone explained, “Vincente was not a man who was 
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a dictator. He tried to do it in a soft and nice way. He worked in let’s say . . . 
I don’t know whether you will understand what I say . . . he worked like a 
homosexual” (quoted in Tinkcom 2002, 38).5 Tinkcom argues that Simone’s 
statement “encourages us to theorize the possibility of a capitalist enterprise 
accommodating marginalized sex/gender subjects because their labor could 
enhance a product’s appeal through its differentiated style” (36–37).
Working behind the scenes in the Ellington organization, Strayhorn simi-
larly cultivated a “differentiated style,” but under conditions of creative ano-
nymity irreducibly bound to his identity as a black queer subject. As a musi-
cian friend quoted in Hajdu’s (1996, 79) biography put it, “Billy could have 
pursued a career on his own—he had the talent . . . but he’d have had to be 
less than honest about his sexual orientation. Or he could work behind the 
scenes for Duke and be open about being gay.” While previous critics—most 
notably, Hajdu (1999, 189–96)—have claimed a generalized gay sensibility 
for Strayhorn, little attention has been given to historicizing this sensibility 
by considering it in relation to the particular social and material conditions 
under which Strayhorn worked. This article explores the “queer position” 
under which Strayhorn labored in relation to his collaboration with singers 
and to his aesthetic practices as a vocal arranger. My intention here is not 
to reify Strayhorn as an exceptional black gay subject in the world of mid- 
century jazz (or, accordingly, to reproduce an undifferentiated homo- hetero 
binary) but to describe and analyze specific instances of queer affiliation, 
affect, and identifications surrounding Strayhorn’s work as an arranger and 
ask how such instances mark, enact, or embody a sociality of arranging. 
Strayhorn’s vocal arranging oeuvre is extensive and varied, stretching from 
his hip, swinging charts for Ivie Anderson in the late 1930s and early 1940s 
to lush, ethereal backings for Ella Fitzgerald in the late 1950s. I focus closely 
on two recordings from this body of work that provide useful snapshots of 
contrasting working conditions and historical moments. Specifically, I first 
consider the collaboration between Strayhorn and Clooney on the lp Blue 
Rose and then trace a range of queer historical and aesthetic paths surround-
ing Strayhorn’s celebrated arrangement of the pop tune “Flamingo” in 1940.
As a prelude, however, I want to consider briefly how my focus on arrang-
ing in jazz addresses the broad theme of this volume: social aesthetics and 
improvisation. Questions abound. What socialities are involved in the aes-
thetic practices of arranging? Does arranging facilitate or dictate sonic dia-
logue and interaction? How do vectors of identity such as race, gender, and 
sexuality shape the relationships between the arranger and the musicians 
with whom she works, and how might such relationships come to bear on 
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the final musical assemblage? While I am not going to explicitly theorize 
these questions (much less provide definitive answers), I want to make a 
few preliminary observations. First, the category of arranging in jazz raises 
some of the same issues as that of improvisation insofar as it troubles nor-
mative distinctions between composing and arranging and their hierarchi-
cal aesthetic and legal status with respect to authorship and ownership. Yet 
as discursively constructed categories, notions of composition, arranging, 
and improvisation are grounded in historically and culturally contingent 
roles and practices; here I would argue that when it is talked about at all 
by jazz scholars and critics, arranging (and the image of the arranger) in 
jazz often appears as the “scripted” other in relation to improvisation. This 
was not always the case. Just to give one rather obscure example, in his in-
fluential article analyzing the effect of the American Federation of Musi-
cians’ recording ban on the development of bebop in 1942, Scott DeVeaux 
(1988) notes the threat that arrangers for “jazz oriented swing bands” posed 
to music publishers because of the interdependence of arranging practices 
and improvisation. DeVeaux (135) quotes one publisher’s complaint: “Who 
can count on them for just one straight melody chorus to plant the refrain 
with those who might want to buy the song, if they could only tell what the 
tune was like—what with their way of going haywire after the first eight 
bars?” This leads me to my second point: the interdependence of arrang-
ing and improvisation in the practices of arranging in “jazz oriented swing 
bands.” Here arrangers craft variegated sonic contexts (backings, formal 
design) that frame and facilitate improvising voices and in some cases may 
be said to crucially shape the conditions or scripts through which improvi-
satory performance takes place. With the Ellington Orchestra, this process 
was famously instigated through narrative acts, or “telling stories.” A favor-
ite metaphor of jazz musicians, “telling stories” explicitly attaches to instru-
mental music what Samuel A. Floyd (1991) has called a “semantic value,” 
whereby individual musicians deploy communicative modes that give ex-
pression to and critically comment on a range of attitudes, feelings, and cul-
tural values.6 Part painter, part dramatist, Ellington blended, juxtaposed, 
and stitched together the collaborative “sound identities” and contributions 
of his soloists.7
Whether through narrative or other texts or contexts, arranging involves 
weaving together or “composing” in time and space the formal dimensions 
of a song or musical material and specific bodies, voices, or sonic person-
alities, itself a process that fundamentally depends on collaboration and 
interaction, although one typically worked out prior to the moment of per-
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formance or recording.8 We would do better here to follow Eileen South-
ern’s prescient use of the label “composer- arranger.” As Jeffrey Magee has 
argued, this hyphenated, hybridizing category not only usefully indexes the 
dynamic creative continuum in jazz among the practices of composing, ar-
ranging, and improvisation; it also eschews the value- laden (and juridically 
enforced) distinctions between composition and arranging (Southern 1997, 
392, quoted in Magee 1999, 62–63).9 One could, of course, point to any num-
ber of compositional and improvisational practices that similarly blur the 
lines between composition and arranging, such as graphic scores or struc-
tured improvisations/conductions, both of which often function very simi-
larly to arrangements. A third and critical point to make about my approach 
to linking the social and aesthetic in arranging: arrangers and arrangements 
in jazz function in the background, behind the scenes (whether on or off the 
bandstand), and I am interested especially in how these two senses of ar-
ranging—the social and the aesthetic—emerge in the sociality of arranging.
Grievin’
After Strayhorn arrived at Clooney’s home, the two collaborators set to work 
selecting their songs for the lp and, when time and health permitted, re-
hearsing the arrangements at the piano, which, presumably, Strayhorn had 
worked out with the singer over that same week (Hajdu 1999, 147). In addi-
tion to haunting versions of Ellington classics such as “Sophisticated Lady” 
and “I Got It Bad (And That Ain’t Good)” and a newly composed Elling-
ton original, the eponymous “Blue Rose” (an instrumental with vocals), the 
lp included two original Strayhorn songs from 1939, “Grievin’” and “I’m 
Checkin’ Out, Goom- Bye,” along with one Strayhorn instrumental, signifi-
cantly a full- band arrangement (of film noir– like proportions) of his great 
ballad for the alto saxophonist Johnny Hodges, “Passion Flower.” As Clooney 
explained it, “Having ‘Passion Flower’ on there was sort of a wink, an inside 
thing to those in the know that this was basically Billy’s record” (149).10
The tracks for Blue Rose were cut in four sessions. The instrumental tracks 
were recorded in New York on January 23 and 27, and the vocal overdubs 
were recorded in Los Angeles on February 8 and 11. Of the new arrange-
ments of Strayhorn’s two songs, Clooney’s version of the blues- based bal-
lad “Grievin’” stands out. Notably, the manuscript for the vocal arrange-
ment—the first and only recording of the song with Strayhorn’s lyric—bears 
a dedication under the title, “For Rosemary Clooney,” and Strayhorn made 
extensive alternations to the 1939 instrumental arrangement that included 
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a newly composed introduction.11 Strayhorn’s new introduction immedi-
ately announces the ballad’s orchestrally lush stylistic updating in relation 
to the expressive and formal lexicon of the blues. Harry Carney (baritone 
sax) states the A- strain of the melody in a slow swing tempo backed by a 
dissonant- charged, dark plunger mute “wha- wha” chordal texture that un-
folds over a truncated blues chorus. A particularly interesting feature of 
the melody is how Strayhorn maps the conventional two- bar symmetrical 
phrase structure onto a series of rhythmic displacements, which begin on 
the upbeat to the first full bar with a three- note pattern (two eighths fol-
lowed by a dotted- half note), rising upward from C- sharp to D to F. In mea-
sures 1–4, the pattern expands melodically with pendular leaps covering a 
ninth from F to G before descending downward through the tonic triad via 
an eighth- note triplet figure that leads to A- flat on the downbeat at mea-
sure 4. The triplet figure reverses in measure 5 (B- flat to C to D), landing 
on F, where the melody lingers for the final two measures over an E- flat 
minor/major seventh (functioning as the dominant), before cadencing in 
B- flat with the “grieving’” figure, a bluesy half- note pendular leap.
With her signature warm and sensuous yet light sound, Clooney delivers 
the lyric in a stylish and rhythmically subtle yet straightforward manner, 
backed for the first two vocal choruses (AA) by riff figures that respond in 
rhythmic unison (example 8.1).
These riff figures are derived from rhythmic and melodic features de-
scribed earlier (e.g., repeating triplet pattern, pendular contour, blue notes) 
and appear throughout the arrangement in various guises (example 8.2). By 
far the most dramatic incarnation occurs in the third vocal chorus after the 
bridge: the texture thickens, with reeds and brass playing the riff figure in 
unison behind Clooney as she pleads, “Every day, every night, how I pray 
that you’ll treat me right.” The emotional tension spills into the next bar as 
the riff figures give way to a trombone trio playing a half- note chromatic 
step for Clooney’s climactic ultimatum: “You will regret and you’ll cry some, 
If I die from grievin’,” a moment that itself suddenly morphs into an expres-
sive, improvisatory rupture in the form of a particularly memorable (and 
perfectly timed) wailing, coloratura trumpet solo by Cat Anderson. While 
truly astounding, the full force of Anderson’s blowing on this chorus de-
pends, nevertheless, on the sonic backing that frames—or, more accurately, 
propels—him.
Directly after Clooney intones the grievin’ figure at the cadence, the full 
band lurches upward in unison through a syncopated, chromatically in-
flected two- bar climb, a kind of sonic launching pad for Anderson. As the 
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trumpet part takes off, the reeds and brass choir continue in the upper reg-
ister, but now in an extravagant call- and- response pattern punctuated by a 
chromatically rising and rousing full- throated rhythmic ostinato based on a 
variation of the riff figure (a tied- quarter- note triplet ostinato that we first 
hear sung in the B- section of the melody). With Anderson’s trumpet climb-
ing further into the stratosphere for the final jaw- dropping measures of his 
solo, the backing instrumental choir intones fragments from the first half of 
the melody.
The collective dramatic force of Anderson’s chorus is so startling that we 
might conclude that it actually overwhelms Clooney, as if stealing her emo-
tional spotlight through an affect of improvisatory combustion. But such an 
interpretation would be possible only if we ignore the larger expressive and 
musical arch of the arrangement. Here Anderson’s solo functions theatri-
cally, amplifying—quite literally—the feeling that Clooney authorizes in the 


















































































































































































Ex. 8.1 Strayhorn, “Grievin’,” mm. 9–16.
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transference might also be heard as a kind of phallic excess beyond the 
racialized and gendered proprieties of Clooney’s vocal persona. Formally, 
Strayhorn weaves Anderson’s solo chorus into a quasi- through- composed 
architecture that unfolds the latter part of the arrangement and leads the 
modulation, moving the song as if through sheer propulsion, from B- flat to 
D- flat.12
Taken as a whole, the foregoing discussion of form, style, and sonic affect 
in Strayhorn’s vocal arrangement for “Grievin’” suggests how the practices 
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Ex. 8.2 Strayhorn, “Grievin’,” mm. 27–34.
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of composers/arrangers, singers, and players collaboratively refashion from 
within the formal and affective layers of a song. Strayhorn conceived the 
process of arranging as a kind of co- text: “You really need to write some-
thing you think fits his sound and is your sound, too—a combination of what 
you do and what he does” (quoted in Dance 1970, 30). Strayhorn’s notion of 
sonic fit implies that tailoring an arrangement around the technical abilities 
and stylistic persona of a singer (or soloist) creates a comfortable space for 
a performer to discover or imagine “her space” within the music—in other 
words, a fit that facilitates rather than dictates and thus helps to facilitate 
effective improvisations. From this perspective, it is possible to hear Stray-
horn’s elaborate, blues- tinged arrangement as enabling a sonic space for 
Clooney to fashion a new vocal persona, one that she understood as help-
ing her to break free from the limiting racial and sexual codes of the 1950s 
novelty song (an argument that can, of course, also be extended to most, if 
not all, of the other arrangements on the lp). Indeed, in her autobiography 
Girl Singer, Clooney (1999, 154) associated the experience of collaborating 
on Blue Rose with artistic self- discovery and empowerment. Her comments 
on the subject arose in the context of recalling a memorable evening she 
spent with Billie Holiday just a few months after the Strayhorn- Ellington 
session: “Billie said it wasn’t work to do a song she could feel—the only kind 
of song she would do—and I felt ‘Blue Rose’ and all the songs on that album 
in a way I could never feel ‘Come On[- a my House].’ I wasn’t in a position 
to change my material, and had I been, I might not have had the confidence 
to do it. Now I did.”13
In terms of vocal persona, Clooney’s sound on Blue Rose aligns with the 
hipper, jazz- influenced mainstream white big band singers of the day such as 
Peggy Lee and Frank Sinatra. Yet as I noted earlier, Clooney had already cut 
few sides in the early 1950s (including a Columbia disc with Frank Sinatra) 
in which we can also hear this stylistic orientation (and in fact some critical 
assessments of these sides compared Clooney to Ella Fitzgerald).14 Beyond 
these larger stylistic references and associations, however, I am interested 
in what it meant for Clooney to “do a song she could feel” in relation to the 
specific working conditions and set of constraints surrounding her collabo-
ration with Strayhorn. The sociality of the arranging process on Blue Rose 
required forms of intimacy improvised within both domestic/private and 
public/professional spaces and across lines of gender, race, and class. How, 
then, might we connect such forms of improvised intimacy to the collabo-
rators’ personal engagement with the affective registers of specific song ar-
rangements?
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To return again to the example of the blues ballad “Grievin’,” for Clooney 
the choice of this song may have been guided by her ability to “feel” the 
song (a choice itself guided by Strayhorn’s sense that the song would fit her 
well). The lyric “I” expresses pain of a lover dealing with an unfaithful and 
callous partner, a theme that animates another song on the lp, Strayhorn’s 
poignant, slow- tempo, dissonant- tinged arrangement of Ellington’s “I Got It 
Bad (And That Ain’t Good).” Although generic with respect to the thematic 
conventions of pop/jazz ballads (and blues), both songs would have had a 
particular personal resonance for Clooney and thus could have provided a 
vehicle for her to address difficult personal feelings surrounding her life cir-
cumstances. During this period, Clooney (1999, 131) struggled to maintain 
the heteronormative image of, in her words, “the perfect Fifties Wife” in the 
face of her husband’s flagrant philandering (which began shortly after their 
honeymoon) and intimidating temper tantrums—all while she paid the bills 
and worked tirelessly to support their rapidly growing family.15 Her preg-
nancy during the Blue Rose collaboration led to the second of five children 
born between 1955 and 1960 (all of whom she was left to support after she 
and Ferrer first split up in 1961).16
As noted earlier, Blue Rose also signaled a new direction in Strayhorn’s 
career with respect to his partnership with Ellington. Handing Strayhorn 
the creative reins for the project amounted to a kind of peace offering from 
Ellington following several years of estrangement between the composing 
partners. Strayhorn’s decision to separate from Ellington was precipitated 
by frustration over his uncredited creative labor and “accumulations of 
grievances, from copyright issues to artistic conflicts,” a situation Clooney 
seems to have been aware of, given her comment about the inclusion of “Pas-
sion Flower” as a covert tactic to mark Strayhorn’s largely uncredited public 
authorship (van de Leur 2002, 115; see also Hajdu 1996, 113–14). In fact, just 
a few days before Strayhorn met Ellington and Townsend at Café Society Up-
town to discuss the project, he went to the club with a small group of friends 
to celebrate his homecoming to New York after a liberating extended trip to 
Paris. While in Paris, Strayhorn visited his former longtime partner, the pia-
nist Aaron Bridgers, and spent many evenings at the vibrant, gay- friendly 
jazz bar the Mars Club, where Bridgers worked as the staff pianist and where 
Strayhorn was treated as a celebrity by the city’s expatriate gay cabaret sub-
culture. Returning home to New York from Paris meant leaving behind the 
transforming cultural energy, communal support, and warm admiration he 
found in the City of Lights for professional uncertainty and reckoning. Stray-
horn’s difficult feelings about his return can be gleaned from Hajdu’s (1996, 
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145) account of his homecoming party at Café Society Uptown. With a group 
of friends, including his soon- to- be boyfriend Francis Goldberg, Strayhorn 
“bought a few rounds in salute to Bridgers, and charmed the group with 
droll descriptions of the Mars Club.”17 At one point, he noticed a bill plas-
tered on the wall advertising the upcoming Ellington engagement of Janu-
ary 12. As narrated by a musician friend, Strayhorn responded sardonically, 
“ ‘Well, I’ll have to come to see Duke Ellington—and hear all those Billy 
Strayhorn songs,’ after which he looked around the tiny little club . . . puffed 
on a cigarette and quipped ‘If there’s room for them’” (145).
In recounting these stories, I do not mean to suggest that we can unprob-
lematically impute (auto)biographical meaning into the music or claim a 
reified homology between the social and musical. Nor am I simply pointing 
to the generalized affective power of songs to sonically embody or project 
personal feelings and fantasies—although I do believe that is always a 
potential function of songs. What I am arguing is that such specific every-
day life circumstances and contexts acted as a constellation of social “texts” 
(among others) that framed their collaboration and, as such, played a role, 
however ineffable, in the selection of songs and in shaping the arranging 
process, specifically along paths of cross- gender projection and identifica-
tion. Sometimes these paths emerged through creative directorial advice 
given during the vocal overdubbing.18 When Clooney was recording Stray-
horn’s other original number, a charmingly “retro” arrangement of the up- 
tempo swinger “I’m Checkin’ Out, Goom- Bye,” she recalled Strayhorn’s di-
rection for realizing the lyrics, with its lighthearted yet pointed message to 
a deceptive lover, this way: “He told me not to do it angry. He said, ‘Just be-
cause you’re leaving the other person, it doesn’t mean you’re angry. You’re 
in charge. You’re leaving, because you’re the strong one. You might even 
come back. Who knows?’” (Hajdu 1996, 148).19 But what does this gendered 
improvisatory field of intimacy and identification have to do with the larger 
set of queer issues that I raised at the outset? It is to this question that we 
now turn.
Flamingo(s)
The musical transformation of “Grievin’” from its original 1939 instru-
mental incarnation to Clooney’s 1956 vocal version is not only a story of 
formal and stylistic change. It also indexes to some extent the evolution 
of Strayhorn and Ellington’s working relationship. While Strayhorn wrote 
the tune, it is Ellington who is credited for the larger part of the 1939 ar-
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rangement, an effective but largely conventional swing- band arrangement. 
As Walter van de Leur (2002, 32) points out in his groundbreaking book 
on Strayhorn’s music, during Strayhorn’s first two years with the organi-
zation his creative partnership with Ellington tended toward a division of 
musical labor in which Ellington worked out the instrumental sections and 
Strayhorn worked out the vocal sections. However, this situation changed 
rapidly. In 1941, Strayhorn co- composed and arranged many of the songs for 
the celebrated black Popular Front “revusical” Jump for Joy. And by 1942, he 
was responsible for all of the vocal arranging and was supervising a roster of 
singers that included Ivie Anderson (who had been with the orchestra since 
the early 1930s), Herb Jeffries, Kay Davis, Marie Ellington, and Joya Sher-
rill (Hajdu 1996, 97).20
To the extent that Strayhorn’s work during this period revolved around 
creating arrangements to showcase singers for the legendary Blanton- 
Webster band, his work as a vocal arranger—and that of the singers with 
whom he collaborated—were viewed largely as “commercial work,” a de-
valued category under which the contributions of women in jazz (especially 
singers) historically have been marginalized (see, e.g., Pellegrinelli 2008, 
31–47).21 At once central to the orchestra’s commercial appeal yet operating 
at the margins, Strayhorn negotiated a similar but in no way identical gen-
dered field of power as that which structured the position of many of the 
singers with whom he collaborated.
Notably, Strayhorn’s vocal arrangements during this period were rarely 
recorded, and only a few made it into the Ellington book. One that did stick, 
and in a big way, was Strayhorn’s 1940 arrangement of the Ted Grouya– 
Edmund Anderson pop song “Flamingo” for the baritone crooner Herb Jef-
fries.22 “Flamingo” was a hit for Ellington in 1941 and a career- making song 
for Jeffries, who in an oft- cited remark proclaimed, “That’s the bird that 
brought me. Most people come to this planet by stork; I came by Flamingo, 
and Duke Ellington delivered me.”23 Strayhorn recalled, “I think what really 
clinched the vocal chores for me was when Herb Jeffries came with the band 
[in 1939]. He was singing in a high tenor range, and I asked him whether 
he liked singing up there. He said he didn’t, so I wrote some things for him 
that pulled his voice down to the natural baritone he became after ‘Fla-
mingo’” (quoted in Tucker 1993, 500). As in the case of his collaboration 
with Clooney, these comments convey the ways in which Strayhorn’s ar-
rangement for Jeffries facilitated a space for him to refashion a vocal per-
sona, one he understood as more natural, conveying a more authentic self. 
“That’s the kind of thing he did with the singers in the band,” Jeffries re-
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membered. “He’d work very, very closely with you, and he sensed what your 
strengths were. Then he picked songs and did arrangements to bring out the 
best in you” (Hajdu 1996, 97). As with Clooney, Jeffries’s comments index 
a social aesthetics for arranging in which the scripts of musical and per-
sonal identification work in tandem. Strayhorn’s collaborations with Lena 
Horne, which I discussed briefly at the outset, can also be considered in this 
light. Strayhorn coached, accompanied, and arranged for her, “applying,” in 
Hajdu’s words, “his gift for musical empathy to the artist he loved so” (96).
Of all the vocalists on the Ellington roster in the early 1940s, Strayhorn 
felt a special affinity for Jeffries who, like Strayhorn, was an avowed Franco-
phile. The two friends enjoyed conversing in French, particularly in public 
spaces in which such displays of sophistication could speak back to and 
trouble U.S. racist culture and stereotypes, “There was a tremendous amount 
of discrimination,” Jeffries said, “and you could show a certain amount of 
sophistication by the mere fact that you could speak a language that the next 
white person couldn’t. Strayhorn and I both felt this showed you weren’t 
that lowly person, that Amos ’n’ Andy character that everybody thought you 
were” (Hajdu 1996, 73–74).24
The registral placement and reorientation of Jeffries’s voice in Strayhorn’s 
arrangement of “Flamingo” also performs “a certain amount of sophisti-
cation,” one that can be fully grasped only by hearing how Jeffries’s voice 
interacts and fits in with the musical context that surrounds it—that is, by 
considering the aesthetics of the arrangement as a whole. As van de Leur 
(2002, 38–43) brilliantly describes in his analysis of “Flamingo,” Strayhorn’s 
arrangement extends considerably and transforms the original pop song 
through the addition of new material in the form of elaborate introductory, 
transitional, and modulatory sections).25 These additions and revisions ex-
emplify Strayhorn’s innovative approach to pop tune arrangements in which 
“carefully worked out introductions, transitions, and codas” are used as 
“structuring elements to secure the internal logic of an orchestration” (67). 
Indeed, my discussion of Strayhorn’s arrangement of “Grievin’” pointed to 
these types of “structuring elements” but also emphasized the role of af-
fect and style—both of which are crucial elements at play in Strayhorn’s ar-
rangement of “Flamingo.” The introduction for “Flamingo” is a case in point 
(example 8.3). Strayhorn’s newly composed introduction supplies a sonic 
modernist orchestral gloss on the essential generic topos of the song: Latin- 
tinged, tropical exotica in the “dreamy” romantic mode. A solo trombone 
intones the “flamingo” call, a three- note figure encompassing an octave leap 
upward and minor third down, echoed languidly by the trumpet.
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In the next few bars, a chromatically moving theatrical “curtain- rising” 
passage is answered by a jarringly dissonant, swift series of parallel mov-
ing saxophone chords. These chords outline notes that are sounded in the 
closing gesture that directly follows, a repeated, tonally ambiguous low reg-
ister brass chord (Fmi over D or dominant tritone substitution). As van de 
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Ex. 8.3 Strayhorn, “Flamingo” (1941), Introduction, mm. 1–8.
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Leur (2002, 38) observes, the closing dissonant passages and the “flamingo” 
call heard in the initial bars serve an expository function: the intervallic de-
sign and rhythmic profile of the “flamingo” call form “one of the arrange-
ment’s unifiers” while the complex dissonance foreshadows the “tonally 
ambiguity Strayhorn explores in the arrangement.”
Along with Strayhorn’s sophisticated harmonic palette, his penchant for 
creating intricate introductory, bridging, and modulatory design in arrange-
ments has typically been read as a sign of his French- accented modernist 
classicism. “The rich modern harmonies of the introduction,” writes Mark 
Tucker, “betray the taste of someone who admitted a fondness for Ravel 
and Debussy.”26 Along similar lines, van de Leur (2002, 42; see also Hajdu 
1996, 86–87) credits the song’s arrangement specifically with bringing a 
new classicism to the Ellington sound, one that departed radically from the 
conventions of vocal arranging of the time. As he writes, the “liquidity of its 
casura- less arrangement, its structuring elements, the sophisticated modu-
lations and integrated introductory, transitory and closing sections . . . make 
‘Flamingo’ unique in the jazz writing of its time.” Van de Leur’s insights 
echo Ellington himself, who proclaimed the arrangement “a turning point in 
vocal background orchestration, a renaissance in elaborate ornamentation 
for the accompaniment of singers” (quoted in Nicholson 1999, 226).
I would like to extend these comments about Strayhorn’s signature classi-
cism in a queer direction, first along a path suggested by Tinkcom’s model of 
“queer style enhancements.” As mentioned earlier, Tinkcom (2002, 36–37) 
argues that the opulent and glamorous camp stylizations of Arthur Freed 
Unit production numbers for the classic mGm film musicals (what he calls 
“camp encodings”) constituted an “extra- added labor” on the film’s nar-
rative texts that indexed the “emerging presence of queer metropolitan 
subcultures in shaping mass taste and aesthetic sensibilities.” In doing so, 
Tinkcom rethinks the visual and sonic stylistic markers of camp—artifice, 
excess, and performance—from the perspective of production. Camp thus 
functions for Tinkcom as both a form of queer labor and as affect/style, a 
coupling of social and aesthetic modes that shows “how queer subjectivity 
emerges within the dynamics of capitalist cultural production for audiences 
that extend well beyond queer male subcultures” (36–37). Insofar as Stray-
horn’s creative labor as a vocal arranger was in fact the arena in which he 
would most explicitly have been required to negotiate his ideas and sensi-
bility with the popular song as commodity, Tinkcom’s theory has special 
pertinence. However, questions arise in applying Tinkcom’s model of the 
Arthur Freed Unit’s camp sensibility to the differently located affective 
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world of Strayhorn’s “style enhancements” in an arrangement such as “Fla-
mingo.” Put another way, are the lavish camp stylizations (or “encodings”) 
created by a privileged group of gay white male artists working for big- 
budget Hollywood musicals a relevant point of comparison for hearing—
queerly or otherwise—Strayhorn’s African American jazz- based classicism? 
Yes and no. Certainly there was a considerable amount of traffic (and cul-
tural resonance) between New York– based entertainment (e.g., Broadway 
and Harlem revues) and Hollywood staff composers and arrangers, but this 
traffic gravitated toward de facto white- only routes.27
Nevertheless, an argument can be made for a camp hearing—or, perhaps, 
a queerly signifyn’ one—of Strayhorn’s sophisticated, elaborate orchestral 
gloss on the popular song’s clichéd romantic tropical tropes. In the A- strain 
of the vocal chorus, this comes through the lilting melody, the beguine- like 
beat in the staccato brass accompaniment, and the modal sound created by 
major- minor mixture. Also notable here is the affect of Strayhorn’s stylized 
orchestral additions, such as the opening “flamingo” trombone call passage 
with its dramatically held half- diminished seventh sax chord on the down-
beat and exaggerated trumpet echo, and an almost over- the- top moment 
of word painting that occurs in the opening bars of the bridge—also in the 
form of an echo that references the melodic contour of the opening echo. 
As Jeffries croons through an octave leap the first two words of the line, 
“The wind (sings a song to you as you go),” the saxophone section sounds 
an undulating “wind” motive that sweeps rapidly upward, lingers for a half- 
measure, then languidly drops back down (see example 8.4). Another styl-
ized highlight comes through the ethereal, erotic, yet restrained affect of 
Jeffries’s vocalizing during the arrangement’s most formally breathtaking 
addition: an elaborate thirty- bar transition section that moves through a 
series of complex modulations derived from the source song’s material (van 
de Leur 2002, 39). This part of the arrangement, which does not appear in 
Strayhorn’s written arrangement, arose spontaneously during the record-
ing session when Strayhorn directed the singer to improvise: “Do that ‘Oh, 
oh’ in there, and do that modulation down through it” (39). Even Lawrence 
Brown’s trombone solo receives a sensuous vocal embroidery as Jeffries 
interjects the “flamingo” call in the middle of his chorus, as if whispering in 
the ear of the listener.
Taken together, the song’s sophisticated harmonic design, complex archi-
tecture, programmatic simulations, dreamy “Oh, oh” vocal stylizations, and 
exotic signifiers would seem to resonate with some of the sonic idioms of 























































































































































































































































































































































Ex. 8.4 Strayhorn, “Flamingo” (1941), Bridge, mm. 17–24.
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tion numbers, as well as the ways in which such stylistic discourse served 
the demands of the Hollywood fantasy industry.28 Yet a theory of camp from 
the perspective of production such as Tinkcom’s always depends on the 
potentially problematic claim of ironic intent and, as Lloyd Whitesell has 
recently argued, “Stylistic extravagance does not need to be ironic to count 
as queer.”29 I want to put aside the question of camp affect for the moment 
to pursue a different story of queer affiliation between film musical produc-
tion number and Strayhorn’s arrangement of “Flamingo,” one that places the 
arrangement on the stage of a minor Hollywood studio.
This story begins on January 3, 1941, the day the Ellington Orchestra 
kicked off a West Coast tour with a seven- week gig at the Casa Mañana ball-
room. Thus also began Strayhorn’s extended encounter with white and black 
Hollywood from 1941 to 1942. “He got into the whole exotic trip of the West 
Coast,” Jeffries remembered. “It was a kind of mecca to us—all the glam-
our. . . . Strayhorn bought into all that” (quoted in Hajdu 1996, 93; see also 
Bogle 2005, 213–24, 246–50). Adding a crucial personal depth to his Holly-
wood adventure was the close companionship of Lena Horne, who herself 
was famously “discovered” during this period by the arranger Roger Edens. 
In fact, according to Horne, Strayhorn encountered Edens at Horne’s home 
in 1942 around the time that Horne was cast in her first big starring role in 
the Vincente Minnelli/Arthur Freed Unit black- cast musical Cabin in the Sky 
(which is also significant for featuring the Ellington Orchestra).30 While the 
artistic culmination of Strayhorn’s “glamour” year came earlier, in the sum-
mer of 1941, through his work on Jump for Joy, sometime during the last two 
months of that year Strayhorn’s arrangement of “Flamingo” was given filmic 
realization as one of five Ellington “soundies” produced by the Hollywood 
company rcm, which was then managed primarily by the songwriter Sam 
Coslow (of Cotton Club fame).
A short- lived phenomenon of the early 1940s, soundies were three- minute 
low- budget performance films made for coin- operated automated viewing 
machines—or “visual jukeboxes”—primarily under the trade name Pano-
rams. Film production companies such as rcm marketed soundies in reels 
that contained eight different film segments, which together formed a 
Soundies Miniature Revue. Customers paid ten cents per soundie but had no 
choice as to which of the eight possible segments—or part of the revue—
they would see. Like jukeboxes, Panorams operated in entertainment spaces 
such as bars and amusement parlors and could be found in the lobbies of 
upscale hotels and theaters.31
Klaus Stratemann’s (1992, 180–85) detailed commentary on the Ellington 
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soundies, all of which were directed by Josef Berne, categorizes “Flamingo” 
as the “exotic dance number” in Soundies Miniature Revue No. 1049 (seventh 
position), sandwiched between two patriotic numbers (the reel also fea-
tured Ellington’s “Bli- Blip” from Jump for Joy, with Marie Bryant and Paul 
White). The “exotic dancing” is delivered by Janet Collins and Talley Beatty 
in two quasi- narrative dance sequences set in a generic Afro- Caribbean 
“tropical” mise- en- scène. This secondary footage is intercut with Jeffries 
and the Ellington Orchestra performing “Flamingo” on a studio- constructed 
“nightclub” stage. Stratemann, along with virtually every other source on 
this soundie, identifies Collins and Beatty as “two members from Katherine 
Dunham’s famous black dance troupe” (180–85).32 Although Janet Collins, 
who a decade later would become the first African American prima balle-
rina to be hired into the corps of the New York Metropolitan Opera ballet, 
probably was not dancing for Dunham at the time the soundie was filmed, 
she had performed in her company for a brief period that year. Talley Beatty, 
however, was a principal dancer with Dunham and one of a number of gay 
male members of her troupe, which included Dunham’s frequent on- stage 
partner Archie Savage, who was also associated with the queer interracial 
social circle around Carl Van Vechten (Manning 2004, 157).
According to the dance historian Susan Manning (2004, 157; by way of 
George Chauncey), the Dunham Dance Company was a center for gay life 
in Harlem during the 1940s and 1950s. Gordon Heath, a black gay actor, 
for example, characterized Dunham’s productions as “the highest prancing 
camp in the business.” Manning argues that Dunham’s particular amalgam 
of techniques from classical ballet and modern dance with Black Atlantic 
vernacular and Africanist dance forms “presented legibly queer images for 
gay spectators” (157). She develops her argument with reference to the type 
of images and movements featured in Dunham’s early 1940s breakthrough 
program Tropics and Le Jazz “Hot,” which premiered at the Windsor The-
ater in New York to critical and popular acclaim. The middle section of the 
work, “Tropics” (subtitled “Shore Excursions” and set in Martinique), fea-
tured Dunham dancing in her celebrated “Woman with Cigar” role. One 
critic described the scenario this way: “[Dunham] meets dockhand and flirts 
with him and his companions” (quoted in Manning 2004, 145).33 The dock-
hand in question was danced by Archie Savage. Through their association 
with Dunham’s troupe during this period and through, as I describe later, 
the influence of Dunham’s work (as shown in aspects of dance technique, 
the scenario, and costuming), Beatty’s and Collins’s work in the soundie’s 
dance sequences links up to this queerly inflected choreographic discourse 
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of stylistic and stylized fusion.34 On this point, my reading of the soundie 
as a scene of collaboration brings together bodies, sounds, and movements 
that make legible a historical network of black gay cultural production and 
artists’ affiliation.35
Yet a queer reading of the dance sequences is perhaps most convincingly 
secured through its placement in and interaction with Strayhorn’s arrange-
ment. Indeed, the larger visual, choreographic, and sonic assemblage in the 
soundie, as well as details of editing work, actually heighten the arrange-
ment’s registers of stylistic extravagance and classicisms discussed earlier. 
For example, in the second vocal chorus we see a series of striking close- ups 
of Jeffries and Ellington, initiated through a frontal close- up of Jeffries as 
he croons the “flamingo” call. The camera then cuts quickly to a close- up of 
Ellington: he smiles, eyes sparkling, gazing admiringly at Jeffries. Our gaze 
replaces Ellington’s as the camera cuts back to Jeffries for the line, “For it’s 
you I rely on, and a love that is true”; the dramatic visual frontality of this 
image coupled with Jeffries’s suave crooning and handsome, urbane visage, 
gives a special charge to this part of the arrangement, amplifying the aura 
of sophistication and exotic- romantic fantasy.
At the bridge, the camera crosscuts from its close- up on Jeffries to Collins. 
She is clad in an ornate, ruffle- laden Caribbean dress and bandana and is 
balancing a large tray of fruit with one hand. On the plain white backdrop 
behind her we see a somewhat menacing shadow of a giant flamingo. In 
sync with Jeffries’s octave leap on the words “the wind,” Collins arches her 
back and sweeps her arm melodramatically over her head, heightening the 
already theatrical affect of the wind motive. The camera pulls back to re-
veal a tiny and bare patch of “beach” on which we see Beatty dressed as a 
native “sailor” or dockhand replete with head wrap, a striped shirt with a 
pattern of circular cut- outs, and loosely cropped white pants. In the dance 
sequence that ensues, the longer and more substantial of the two, Collins 
and Beatty perform an erotic barefoot pas de deux. The first part of the 
sequence lasts from the bridge through the intricate “Oh, Oh” modulatory/
transition section: in it they dance slowly around each other, with undulat-
ing, swaying hip movements and other choreographic gestures associated 
with Afro- Caribbean and African American vernacular and theater dance. 
At one point, Collins lifts the billowy, sheer white “picnic” cloth off the 
ground and wraps it seductively around her body as she writhes and undu-
lates around in a kind of brief Salome- esque veil dance.
For the trombone solo, the choreography shifts stylistic gears, and the 
two dancers present an extended ballet sequence. Beatty executes a series of 
Fig. 8.2 Still from “Flamingo,” 1941, Ellington gazes at Jeffries.
Fig. 8.3 Still from “Flamingo,” 1941, Jeffries, frontal close- up.
Fig. 8.5 Still from “Flamingo,” 1941, Collins & Beatty pas de deux.
Fig. 8.4 Still from “Flamingo,” 1941, Collins & Beatty pas de deux.
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quick turns (chaînés) around Collins punctuated by delicate jumps (sissone) 
and leg extensions, while Collins continues her undulating hip movements. 
The two dancers then perform variation- like exchanges of turns, jumps, and 
leg extensions such as attitude and arabesque. As the trombone solo moves 
toward the cadence, Collins and Beatty slowly drop to their knees, arching 
their torsos back to the ground in to an extreme limbo position. This ends 
the sequence, and the camera crosscuts back to the performance just as 
Johnny Hodges stands to take his solo.
Conclusion: Blue Rose (Again)
The director’s choice to showcase Hodges’s solo visually in the “Flamingo” 
soundie is of particular significance to my project for several reasons. First, 
it points to a crucial difference between mainstream Hollywood arranging 
practices and those of African American swing bands: the centrality of solo 
improvisation. Second, along with Strayhorn’s songs, the string of ballads 
he wrote for Hodges throughout his career stand out as his most intimate, 
intense, and certainly most sensuous lyrical statements. The close collabo-
rative relationship between Hodges and Strayhorn was established almost 
immediately after Ellington hired Strayhorn in 1939. That spring he com-
posed the gorgeous ballads “Day Dream” and “Passion Flower,” as well as 
“A Flower Is a Lovesome Thing.” Interestingly, Strayhorn and Hodges left 
the Ellington organization for roughly the period in the early 1950s; Blue 
Rose would mark the return of both artists to the Ellington fold, announced 
with stylized abandon in Strayhorn’s dramatic, noir- tinged new arrange-
ment of “Passion Flower” (followed some seven months later by the extraor-
dinary recording of “Ballad for Very Sad and Very Tired Lotus Eaters”). The 
queer affective registers I have explored with respect to “Flamingo” have 
something in common with Strayhorn’s ballads for Hodges, which similarly 
bear titles and call forth sounds that evoke the sensate world (and pleasures 
therein) of exotic objects and the utopian spaces of dreams and fantasy.36
In this context, I would like to close by considering again the title of the 
Strayhorn- Ellington- Clooney lp Blue Rose. I would argue that it also radiates 
toward this queer affective register, although in a way that—like Strayhorn’s 
“differentiated style” itself—accommodates the intended commercial ap-
peal of the title, with its play on Rose(mary), “blues,” and associations of the 
blue rose flower with ideas of feminine elegance and mystery.37 But as a de-
sired or sought- after yet unattainable natural object, the blue rose also holds 
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an intriguing symbolic history as a figure for fantasy and the impossible.38 
Here it bears pointing out a symptomatic tension between the absenting of 
Strayhorn from the lp’s cover image, and thus from the public face of the 
collaborative project, and his sonic presence behind this (the) scene(s). My 
reading of Strayhorn’s arranging for Clooney (and for Jeffries) suggests ways 
in which such a simultaneous absenting and presence can be productively 
linked to his “queer position” in the Ellington Orchestra and to his arrang-
ing practices. Strayhorn’s sexual identity required that he work behind the 
scenes, a space from which his voice facilitated spaces and created contexts 
for other voices to be heard, to discover new vocal personas and new ways 
of sounding and being. As I have shown, these contexts and spaces merged 
the personal and musical across scripts of race, gender, and sexuality. To be 
sure, a critical element in the art of arranging revolves around cultivating 
skills of musical sensitivity and empathy in collaborative music making. Yet 
for Strayhorn, as with any number of gay male artists working behind the 
scenes, this talent for sonic empathy in collaborative efforts was profoundly 
shaped by and through his dissident sexual identity.
Notes
An earlier version of this article appeared as Lisa Barg, “Working Behind the 
Scenes: Gender, Sexuality and Collaboration in the Vocal Arrangements of Billy 
Strayhorn,” Women and Music 18 (2014): 24–47.
1. Clooney also starred in another Paramount musical, the Western parody 
Red Garters (1954), with Guy Mitchell and Jack Carson. For a recent discussion 
of Mitch Miller’s critical role in popular music during the 1950s, see Zak 2010, 
43–75.
2. Both Irving Townsend and David Hajdu state that Clooney was pregnant 
with her fourth child; however, her fourth child, Monsita Ferrer, was born in 
1958, nearly two years after Blue Rose was released. Her second child, Maria Fer-
rer, was born in 1956: see Hajdu 1996, 147; Irving Townsend, liner notes to Rose-
mary Clooney and Duke Ellington and His Orchestra, Blue Rose, compact disc, 
Sony b00000jbdV, 1999.
3. As a parting memento of their time together and to thank him for his caregiv-
ing, Clooney presented Strayhorn with a Cartier watch with the ironic inscription 
“To Svengali” (Hajdu 1996, 149).
4. I am using the word “non- normative” here to signal how dominant percep-
tions of Strayhorn’s black masculinity align with what Roderick Ferguson calls 
the racialized logic of “nonheteronormativity”—that is, the tangle of pathologiz-
ing histories and discourses of difference ascribed to African American cultural 
formations broadly and, more particularly, to internal variations of black queer 
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masculinity within these discourses/histories. See R. A. Ferguson 2004, 13; see 
also Harper 1996; Somerville 2000.
5. In her autobiography, Lena Horne characterized the lyricist and producer 
Arthur Freed and arranger Roger Edens (whom she credits with “discovering” her 
in 1942) as “men of a certain sensitivity. . . . As long as I worked with them I was 
treated with great decency and respect” (Horne and Schickel 1986, 135).
6. Extending the work of Floyd, who situates “telling stories” within African 
American cultural memory and practice, George Lewis (1996, 91–122) identfies 
“telling stories” as a key component of “Afrologicial” improvisation.
7. For Ellington’s statements on the importance of “telling stories,” see, e.g., 
Ellington 1972, 97. For a recent discussion of the “literary imperitive” in Elling-
ton’s narrative imagination see Edwards 2004, 326–56.
8. This model shows interesting parallels with the productive interdependence 
of scripts and improvisation in theater rehearsals and productions as explored by 
Zoë Svendsen in her contribution to this volume. For a discussion of the practrices 
and sociality of (mostly) small group jazz arranging, see Berliner 1994.
9. As Magee (1999, 62–63) further notes, Southern’s discussion also extends the 
category of “composer” to include the solo improviser.
10. And, indeed, only insiders would know that “Grievin’” and “I’m Checkin’ 
Out, Goom- Bye” came from Strayhorn’s pen, as these two songs are credited only 
to Ellington on the original release, a perception emphasized in Townsend, liner 
notes. (Townsend identifies the songs as Ellington originals.)
11. The manuscript is housed in the Duke Ellington Collections, Archives Center, 
National Museum of American History, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, DC.
12. Cootie Williams’s trumpet solo in the original 1939 recordings does not 
modulate.
13. Following the birth of her daughter Maria in the summer of 1956, Clooney 
officially registered Billie Holiday as Maria’s godmother. Interestingly, Clooney 
(1999, 153) refers to the song “Blue Rose” in her autobiography as “a new number 
Billy [Strayhorn] wrote especially for me.”
14. See, e.g., Will Friedwald’s (1996, 415) discussion of Clooney during this 
period in which he argues that Clooney’s greatest affinity is with “the great male 
icons of the jazz- and- pop mainstream: Sinatra, Bennett and, most of all Crosby.”
15. “I wanted to be married, to have babies. Mrs. José Ferrer wanted to sit by 
his side and listen to him talk, even though Rosemary Clooney was paying the 
bills” (Clooney 1999, 131).
16. Clooney (1999, 186) offered the following account by a reporter of the di-
vorce court drama: “Weeping uncontrollably on the witness stand, singer Rose-
mary Clooney, thirty- three, today accused her husband, actor José Ferrer, forty- 
nine, who fathered her five children, of ‘having affairs with other women since 
the beginning our marriage’ and ‘violent acts of temper.’”
17. Hajdu (1996, 145) quotes here an unidentified “black gay musician familiar 
with the Paris scene” who likened Strayhorn at the Mars Club in Paris to “a minia-
ture, black Noel Coward.”
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18. The mediating role of multitrack technology in Strayhorn and Clooney’s col-
laboration in the recording studio is also at issue but is beyond the scope of the 
present study. For an account of the recording studio as a intermundane space of 
“deadness” in which human, nonhuman, and other entities collaborate, see Stan-
yek and Piekut 2010, 14–38.
19. In her autobiography, Clooney (1999, 153) also recalls how Strayhorn helped 
her overcome extreme nerves around the overdubbing sessions in Los Angeles: “ ‘I 
want you to imagine you’re living in New York and you’ve got a really hot date 
and you’re ready to go,’ Billy said to me through his big square glasses. ‘You’re 
a beautiful woman, looking into the mirror and combing your hair, and there’s 
Duke Ellington and there’s no band. The radio is playing the record, and you just 
sing along with the orchestra, and we overhear it.” See also a similar account in 
Hajdu 1996, 148.
20. While Strayhorn and Kay Davis were good friends, he wrote little for her 
due to her role as Ellington’s vocalese specialist.
21. It is also worth mentioning here that, as van de Leur (2002, 63) reminds us, 
in taking on work that Ellington neither had time for nor interest in, Strayorn’s 
creative labor made it possible for Ellington “to realize his goals”—namely, ones 
that we now identify with the extraordinary pieces he composed for (and with) 
the legendary Blanton- Webster band of this era.
22. According to Hajdu (1996, 86), the tune was “discovered by Ellington’s 
friend, Edmund Anderson, a businessman, who added the lyrics.” Jeffries, how-
ever, claimed the song was given to him by the composer Grouya himself, a little- 
known figure then working in the music publishing division of mGm, in hope 
that it would get a hearing from Ellington. As he narrates it, Jeffries put the song 
on his dressing- room table, where Strayhorn later discovered it and, within ear-
shot of Ellington, began playing the song at the piano. Ellington liked what he 
heard and instructed, “Whatever you’re playing, make a chart of it.” Jeffries also 
claimed that Grouya contacted him after “Flamingo” was charting to complain 
that his words had been altered, thus suggesting he had a hand in writing the 
lyrics: Herb Jeffries, “ ‘Bronze Buckaroo’ Is Still Singing at Age 82,” interview by 
Don Freeman, San Diego Union- Tribune, December 13, 1993; see also Nicholson 
1999, 226.
23. “Herb Jeffries,” August 15, 2002, www.herbjeffries.com. The Ellington 
Orchestra recorded “Flamingo” on December 28, 1940, at Victor Studios in Chi-
cago, a date that marked the end of a grueling year of cross- country travel, play-
ing mostly one- nighters.
24. Along with that of his white gay American counterparts, Strayhorn’s Franco-
philia functioned as a sign of queer affiliation. In remembering his attraction to 
Strayhorn, for example, Aaron Bridgers explained, “We had the same favorite mu-
sicians, especially Tatum and Teddy Wilson. And we both loved the French clas-
sical composers. I had always had a love for all things French, and I discovered 
that Billy did too” (Hajdu 1996, 66). In a different but not unrelated context, the 
black gay poet, novelist, and literary critic Melvin Dixon (2000, 84–109) recalled 
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of his Francophile- oriented college education in the early 1970s, “Most men who 
studied French were gay; so there was a connection there, and my best friends 
were Francophiles, and I guess, it was a way to establish one’s sophistication and 
sissyhood and all that.” On queer Francophilia and Euro- modernist composers, 
see Hubbs 2004.
25. The following discussion of “Flamingo” is indebted to van de Leur’s (2002) 
insights. As he specifies, the new material adds nearly a third to the model.
26. Mark Tucker, “Duke Ellington 1940–42,” liner notes to The Blanton- Webster 
Band, rcA Bluebird, 1986.
27. On this point, while Tinkcom (2002) does clearly acknowledge white racial 
privilege in his analysis of the camp aesthetics of mGm, Vincente Minnelli, and 
the Arthur Freed Unit, he does not fully explore how this racialized environment 
might figure into his analyses of camp, gender, and sexuality. For a historically 
nuanced discussion of racism in the Arthur Freed Unit, see the account of the ar-
ranger Phil Moore’s struggles at mGm during this period in Bogle (2005, 224–32). 
For an excellent history of the practices and cultural meanings associated with 
the symphonic jazz arranging tradition, see Howland 2009.
28. A particularly resonant example from the classic mGm film musical archive 
here would be Leo Arnaud and Connie Salinger’s arrangement for Tony Martin’s 
crooning of Nacio Herb Brown’s “You Stepped Out of Dream,” the “dream num-
ber” choreographed by Busby Berkeley in the hit backstage musical Ziegfield Girl 
(1941), with the starring triumvirate Lana Turner, Judy Garland, and Hedy Lamar. 
The film was released in April, just as “Flamingo” was charting.
29. Lloyd Whitesell, “Musical Glamour and Queer Aesthetics at mGm,” work-
ing paper, n.d. As an alternative to camp, Whitesell develops a theory of glamor 
as a distinctly queer aesthetic mode through a focus on the Freed Unit arrangers 
Roger Edens and Conrad Salinger and outlines a valuable typology for analyzing 
representations of glamor based on “the blending of four qualities: 1) sensuous-
ness, 2) sophistication, 3) elevation, and 4) restraint.” I am grateful to Professor 
Whitesell for sharing this work with me.
30. This meeting is implied in the following quote in Horne’s autobiography: 
“Strayhorn was often in California and we were very, very close. Roger Edens fre-
quently dropped over in the evenings usually with a couple of people from M- G- M 
music department” (Horne and Schickel 1986, 157). For critical accounts of Elling-
ton’s role in Cabin in the Sky, see, e.g., Gabbard 1996, Knight 2002.
31. The initials stand for its three founders: James Roosevelt, Sam Coslow, 
and Gordon Mills. The screen in the Panoram machine measured twenty- two by 
twenty- five inches and was placed at eye level encased in seven- foot- high, art 
deco- style walnut cabinets. (The speakers, which used rcA sound reproduction 
technology, were placed below the ground- glass screen, and the movies them-
selves were back- projected off two mirrors.) Daniel Egen (2010, 348) has esti-
mated that at the “height of popularity, there were approximately 4,500 Pano-
rams operating commercially.”
32. The set for “Flamingo” was also used in several of the other Ellington 
212 bArG
soundies—for example, “Hot Chocolate (Cottontail).” Moreover, Collins and 
Beatty appeared in two other soundies that featured black theater dance num-
bers taken from (or based on) contemporaneous Dunham productions. See also 
Willard 1999, 405–6.
33. Manning (2004, 157–58) specifically argues here for a reading of Dunham’s 
“Woman with Cigar” in terms of queer eroticism.
34. It is highly unlikely that Dunham had a direct hand in the choreography. 
While she was on the West Coast during this time, having just finished a cross- 
country tour of Cabin in the Sky (in fact, Ellington is reported to have attended a 
performance of the Los Angeles run in November), the fees that would have been 
incurred for both the Ellington Orchestra and Dunham were almost certainly be-
yond the limited budgets of soundie productions, and in any case, the sequences 
themselves were not substantial enough to require her participation or presence. 
The choreography may have come out of a nightclub act that Collins and Beatty 
toured during the early 1940s (they billed themsevles as “Rea and Rico DeGard” 
to pass as Latino). Also in evidence here is the influence of Lester Horton’s tech-
nique on Collins’s dancing (she trained in modern dance with Horton). I am grate-
ful to Susan Manning (private communication, July 11, 2011) for sharing this and 
other insights with me.
35. Indeed, just after the war, Strayhorn and Beatty would meet again at the 
black gay salon gatherings held in the home of Dorcas and Frank Neal; these en-
counters led to several postwar collaborations (including Beatty’s staring role as 
Carribee Joe in the Ellington- Strayhorn A Drum Is a Woman, broadcast on cbs 
in 1959).
36. The historical affiliations of these qualities with a gay sensibility were not 
lost on Strayhorn’s posthumous critics, who, however, explicitly construed this 
sensibility in homophobic terms as a kind of dangerous, perverse feminized ex-
cess vis- à- vis Ellington. I examine these issues in more detail in Barg 2013.
37. The title may also have evoked associations with another blue flower pop 
song from the period, “Blue Gardenia,” which was the title song for Fritz Lang’s 
1953 film noir (arranged by Nelson Riddle and sung in the film by Nat King Cole). 
The song was also recorded by Dinah Washington in 1956 for her critically ac-
claimed lp The Swingin’ Miss “D” (arranged by Quincy Jones).
38. To give one mid- century example, in Tennesse Williams’s The Glass Menag-
erie (which debuted on stage in 1944 and was made into an mGm film in 1950), 
the blue rose symbolizes the various forms of “difference” embodied in the misfit 
character Laura Wingfield; they include her retreat into a fantasy world of small 
glass animals and popular songs; her disability; and her extreme fragility, shyness, 
and inability to conform to heteropatriarichal social expectations.
chApter 9
WHAT’S LOVE GOT TO DO WITH IT?
Creating Art, Creating Community, 
Creating a Better World
Tracey Nicholls
What’s love got to do with social aesthetics? With improvisation? And with 
otherness? One way to think about aesthetics in relation to the social world 
is through consideration of the extent to which one’s membership in com-
munity—that is, one’s social identity—shapes one’s approach to art making 
and art appreciation. Conversely, we might consider how one’s relationship 
to art shapes one’s social identity. These kinds of questions are shaping the 
emergent discourses in relational aesthetics, founded and labeled by the 
French art critic Nicolas Bourriaud, and social aesthetics, exemplified by 
the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu’s (1984) critical rebuttal of Kantian 
aesthetics on the grounds that “taste” is not a universal trait that identifies a 
single standard of artistic merit but is instead indexed to one’s class position. 
Similar ways of looking at oneself and at others are also examined in bell 
hooks’s Art on My Mind: Visual Politics (1995a), a book that is not typically 
considered part of these discourses, despite its treatment of these questions 
from a perspective that is fundamentally compatible with the concerns of 
social aesthetics.
Art on My Mind, hooks’s approach to art making and art appreciation, is 
worth investigating in any discussion of aesthetics that implicates issues of 
identity and otherness, in part because of the slippage between the identity 
hooks claims for herself and the identity attributed to her by others. In the 
book’s first chapter, hooks identifies herself both as a member of a working- 
class African American community and as an artist and art critic who is 
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deeply committed to the project of expanding the art world to include the 
voices and perspectives of marginalized others. But the fierce commitment 
to art that permeates the book is not widely acknowledged as “the public 
face” of bell hooks. The reviewer Brian Wallis (1995) notes in his assessment 
of Art on My Mind that hooks is not widely acknowledged as an art critic, 
even though she has woven aesthetic judgments and considerations into 
much of her writing.1 Because she is typically taken to be commenting on 
sociopolitical matters of race, decolonization, and liberation, her attention 
to aesthetics is overlooked, and as a result, an identity she wishes to claim 
for herself disappears. This eliding of her self- image—be it accidental slip-
page or deliberate erasure—makes hooks an interestingly subaltern voice on 
matters of art and culture and figures prominently in the questions of domi-
nation and decolonization that I raise later in this chapter.
On my way to those questions, and by way of explaining why I think 
hooks is being seriously misrepresented by those who cast her as someone 
whose social philosophy has nothing to say about aesthetics, I want to ex-
plore the view of art making and art appreciation that she develops in Art 
on My Mind and draw connections to the “ethic of love” that she develops 
in other writings. The view of art making that emerges from this book is, in 
many respects, a valorization of improvisatory practices. It is, to be sure, a 
mostly implicit valorization, as she devotes little attention to the art form 
most closely associated with improvisation: music. No doubt, this lack of 
attention to music and the other performing arts is the result of her con-
cern in Art on My Mind with the plastic arts, in particular—as the subtitle 
unambiguously telegraphs—the visual arts. Certainly, hooks does analyze 
the social significance of African American music making in other works. 
Notably, in Talking Back: Thinking Feminist, Thinking Black, hooks (1989, 11) 
attributes to “black musicians like Duke Ellington, Louis Armstrong, and 
later John Coltrane” the imparted awareness that it is possible to speak with 
multiple voices. They “impressed upon our consciousness a sense of versa-
tility,” she observes, “[through playing] all kinds of music.” But even in Art 
on My Mind, with all of its focus on arts not normally enumerated in dis-
cussions of improvising, there is an insistence on perspectives and practices 
that I argue are consistent with the theorization of improvisation as a social 
practice. The convergence between her notion of art as a populist concern 
and improvisation as a site of theorizing social relations lies in attitudes of 
openness toward contingent inspiration and in the possibilities of political 
resistance that both reveal.
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Everyday Art Making, Popular Empowerment, and Improvisation
As a way into her discussion of the visual politics of art, hooks recalls that 
what drew her to painting in her youth was its formal properties, the ab-
stract independence from social concerns that warrants the claim that “art 
has no race or gender” (hooks 1995a, xi). This is admittedly an odd way to 
start a book on “the place of art in black life, connections between the social 
construction of black identity, the impact of race and class, and the pres-
ence in black life of an inarticulate but ever- present visual aesthetic gov-
erning our relationship to images, to the process of image- making” (57). 
Her claim about the artwork’s independence, in this context, can, I think, 
only be motivated by a desire to open up our ideas about who can be a pro-
ducer of art. Understanding social aesthetics as a concept that occupies the 
space in which the aesthetic and the political overlap, I argue in this sec-
tion that hooks’s attention to the beauty of everyday objects and crafts—her 
“aesthetics of the ordinary”—is a basic component of her project of making 
space within aesthetic discourse for the artistic practices and preferences 
of people who are not legitimized within an institutional theory of art and 
art making.
Thinking about art and its place—or lack of place—in black communities, 
however, hooks (1995a, 3–4) speculates that the problem runs much deeper 
than under- representation of black artists in galleries. “Most black folks,” 
she contends, “do not believe that the presence of art in our lives is essen-
tial to our collective well- being” (3). This attitude has historical roots, she 
claims, “with respect to black political life, in black liberation struggles—
whether early protests against white supremacy and racism during slavery 
and Reconstruction, during the civil rights movement, or during the more 
recent black power movements—the production of art and the creation of 
a politics of the visual that would not only affirm artists but also see the de-
velopment of an aesthetics of viewing as central to claiming subjectivity 
have been consistently devalued” (3).2 Although she grew up passionately 
interested in art, this attitude was considered odd by many of her family 
members, she recalls. It was, therefore, an amazing experience for her when 
she visited the museums and galleries of Paris and found so much African 
art in them. “It occurred to me then,” she writes, “that if one could make a 
people lose touch with their capacity to create, lose sight of their will and 
their power to make art, then the work of subjugation, of colonization, is 
complete” (xv).
It is worth noting here that the problem hooks is identifying is fairly 
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medium- specific, at least insofar as what she is implicitly excluding; the in-
difference to art that she attributes to African American communities is an 
indifference to visual arts, not music. As I think will become clearer in the 
discussion that follows, she is particularly concerned with visual arts, and 
not music, because of the role representations of African Americans play in 
the development of self- image—a point true of people generally, of course, 
but it is the decolonization of African Americans that motivates hooks’s 
analysis. She does not make an explicit distinction between visual art and 
music as different types of art forms, but I think we might see both her con-
cern with representation and her relative silence on the topic of music (in 
this book, at least) as implicitly committing her to a taxonomy that sorts 
visual arts as representational and musical arts as expressive. Alternatively, 
this inattention to music may flow from a practical consideration concern-
ing suppression of art forms: it is harder to stop a colonized people from 
singing than it is to stop them from painting; to paint requires materials to 
which economically deprived people may not have access, and to paint pro-
duces objects that may be destroyed.3 To restore the sense that visual art 
really matters, “For more black folks to identify with art,” hooks (1995a, 4) 
writes, “we must shift conventional ways of thinking about the function 
of art. There must be a revolution in the way we see, the way we look [to] 
stimulate collective awareness that the creation and public sharing of art is 
essential to any practice of freedom.”
This collective awareness, which she thinks can be stimulated by pro-
moting art making within the community—notably, through a strong and 
wide- reaching commitment to art programs in public schools—should aim 
to elicit popular participation, to instill the idea that, theoretically, anyone 
can be a maker of art. In part, this awareness can be nurtured through atten-
tion to the aesthetic values and practices that are still, or already, present in 
everyday life. This is the compelling point of Art on My Mind: hooks wants 
to highlight the extent to which African American communities have con-
sistently maintained aesthetic visions, values, and practices, even as mem-
bers of these communities might be tempted to dismiss “capital- A art” as 
an activity meaningless to and disconnected from their lives. It is in Afri-
can American communities, hooks (1995a, 19) argues, that we see “a con-
cern with the soul . . . that black people have consistently highlighted and 
shared with mainstream white culture. The aesthetic vision of ‘soul music’ 
was precisely one in which a need to care for the soul was foregrounded.” 
Concern with the soul, which she sees as being “situated within the context 
of everyday life,” is a common element she identifies in the work of many 
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of the particular artists she writes about in Art on My Mind (20, 24, 49). We 
see her touching on issues in social aesthetics, for instance, when she writes 
about the work of installation and photography artist Felix Gonzalez- Torres, 
whose work stresses “the moment of experience, of human interaction,”—
that is, sociality, relationality—and insists that “elegance and ecstasy are 
to be found in daily life, in our habits of being, in the ways we regard one 
another and the world around us” (49).4 hooks describes Gonzalez- Torres’s 
work as one might describe improvised musical performances; it “welcomes 
our presence, our participation . . . , [which] is made more manifest by the 
spaces left vacant in the work that leave room for us” (50).
She links the work and the vision of these professional artists—Gonzalez- 
Torres, Alison Saar, Jean- Michel Basquiat, among others—to the aesthetic 
lessons she learned as a child in rural Kentucky: the extent to which sim-
plicity and utility could reveal aesthetic qualities of otherwise overlooked 
objects. She remembers her community as having had “a shared belief in the 
idea that beautiful things . . . were necessary for the spirit. The more down-
trodden and unfortunate the circumstances, the more ‘beauty’ was needed 
to uplift, to offer a vision of hope, to transform” (hooks 1995a, 120). This 
recognition of a need for beauty in one’s life ranged across classes, and the 
need could be filled in diverse ways. For her parents and many of the other 
adults she knew as a child, the need for beauty was satisfied in “objects that 
could be considered luxurious, that were expensive and difficult to own,” 
but there were also people like her grandparents who opposed materialism 
and sought beauty “in a world that was not subject to monetary exchange” 
(120). Quoting Alice Walker’s reminiscence of her mother’s flower garden 
in her essay “In Search of Our Mothers’ Gardens,” hooks describes this non- 
materialistic everyday attention to aesthetics that she learned most compre-
hensively from her grandmother as “a legacy of respect . . . for all that illu-
minates and cherishes life” (120; 2009, 121).
This quiet, respectful, everyday aesthetic is one that hooks associates ex-
plicitly with a democratization of art, achieved through popular participa-
tion. Democratization, to the extent that it exists, has been accomplished 
through art media to which ordinary people have access, such as photog-
raphy. This medium is significant, hooks tells us, because “the history of 
black liberation movements in the United States could be characterized as 
a struggle over images as much as it has also been a struggle for rights, for 
equal access. . . . Cameras gave to black folks, irrespective of class, a means 
by which we could participate fully in the production of images. Hence it is 
essential that any theoretical discussion of the relationship of black life to 
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the visual, to art making, make photography central. Access and mass ap-
peal have historically made photography a powerful location for the con-
struction of an oppositional black aesthetic” (hooks 1995a, 57). “Had the 
camera been there when slavery ended,” she writes—by which she means, 
of course, had it been available to African Americans5—“it could have pro-
vided images that would have helped folks searching for lost kin and loved 
ones. . . . Half a century later . . . black folks . . . became passionately ob-
sessed with the camera . . . because it offered a way to contain memories, to 
overcome loss, to keep history” (60). Because it gave ordinary black people 
a way to preserve the histories of their families and communities, and be-
cause it gave them a way to resist and oppose the racist misrepresentations 
of them that circulated in the white- dominated world outside their seg-
regated communities, the “camera became in black life a political instru-
ment,” says hooks (60). The resulting walls of family photos that were on 
display in all of the houses of hooks’s childhood “were essential to the pro-
cess of decolonization,” she asserts. “To enter black homes in my childhood 
was to enter a world that valued the visual, that asserted our collective will 
to participate in a noninstitutionalized curatorial process” (61).
Popular participation in the production of art offered the opportunity for 
more than political resistance, however important that may have been. The 
accepted practice of building one’s own house democratized architecture 
and encouraged improvisatory strategies such as contingent expansion in 
response to immediate needs rather than preplanning. Another process both 
artistic and practical that allows us to read improvisation onto it is the quilt 
making at which hooks’s grandmother excelled and through which she ar-
ticulated her own vernacular aesthetic. Women who exercise their creativity 
by sewing these necessary household items draw inspiration for their artis-
tic production out of materials that are contingently there—for instance, re-
using scraps of fabric from old clothes to make “crazy quilts” (hooks 2009, 
158). hooks acknowledges Cynthia Redick’s thesis that these “folk art” ob-
jects originated as a late- nineteenth- century fad among privileged white 
“ladies of leisure” but argues instead that crazy quilts more likely developed 
out of the creativity of black slave women who, from time to time, were per-
mitted to keep the fabric scraps that otherwise would have been discarded 
after they finished making more conventionally designed quilts for their 
so- called owners (158).6 Now one might perhaps think that house making 
and quilt making ought not to be considered arts; that they are, if anything, 
crafts. But hooks is arguing deliberately for an expansive notion of the artis-
tic. These two activities count for her, because they accommodate a link be-
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tween aesthetic attention to everyday objects and popular empowerment. 
“The spirit of self- reliance and self- determination that was aroused and is 
aroused by quiltmaking, by this fusion of the practical with the artistic, stirs 
the imagination in ways that almost always lead to emotional awareness and 
emotional growth,” hooks (167) argues, and “that spirit of self- reliance often 
creates the social context that made survival possible.”
Although hooks does not address improvisation in any great detail in Art 
on My Mind, her discussions of salvage art, folk arts, and popular art prac-
tices do suggest fruitful links between popular empowerment and impro-
visation. Her actual mention of improvised art making appears only in her 
analysis of Basquiat’s graffiti- inspired paintings. One of the aspects of his 
project hooks (1995a, 42) wants to valorize is his celebration of the cre-
ativity and innovation of black jazz musicians: “the avant- garde dimensions 
of the music that affirm fusion, mixing, improvisation.”7 Beyond this fairly 
tangential observation, however, hooks offers some tantalizing hints as to 
how her aesthetic views incorporate or cohere with improvisatory attitudes 
toward art making. Her view of the artistic process, for instance, is that 
“even moments of premeditation are disrupted by the unexpected” (26). 
And her claim that “the very nature of artistic practice is rooted in a phi-
losophy of risk” is, in my view, an improvisatory way of understanding art 
making (83). Further, when she says that “to truly champion artistic free-
dom we must be committed to creating and sustaining an aesthetic culture 
where diverse artistic practices, standpoints, identities, and locations are 
nurtured, find support, affirmation, and regard,” hooks, without explicitly 
recognizing it as such, is calling for an improvisatory culture (139).
I want to make clear here that I am not intending to essentialize African 
American identity through attribution of an “inherent” style of art making. 
Neither hooks’s identification of an African American aesthetic nor the im-
provisatory orientation I am drawing out of her view is dependent on the 
notion of a particular essence.8 Instead, both are best seen as a response 
to colonization. Improvisation historically has functioned as a resistance 
to power of the kind that hooks endorses, one that attends to contingency, 
empowers its participants, and responds to the community within which it 
is performed. It has the capacity to manifest an inclusive aesthetic vision 
consistent with the ethic of love and the political philosophy of liberation 
that hooks is ultimately committed to as postcolonization social goals. The 
call for diversity, inclusivity, and participation that we see in politically re-
sistant improvised music supports a link between the aesthetic value judg-
ments we make and those that are typically labeled “ethical” or “political” 
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and draws on postcolonial/anticolonial assertions of the prima facie value 
of every voice. hooks seems to be echoing the work of improvisation theo-
rists—I have in mind here, in particular, Ingrid Monson’s Saying Something 
(1996)—when she tells us, “Art constitutes one of the rare locations where 
acts of transcendence can take place and have a wide- ranging transforma-
tive impact” (hooks 1995a, 8).
Inclusive Aesthetics and an Ethic of Love
For hooks (1995a, 138), the relation between an aesthetic that includes and 
transforms and a politics that liberates is necessary and inextricable. “In a 
democratic society,” she contends, “art should be the location where every-
one can witness the joy, pleasure and power that emerges when there is free-
dom of expression.” “Art [is] the practice of freedom” and, in its capacity 
for representation, is “a means by which the self is constructed and made 
visible” (144, 163).
She sees representation as the function through which art is revealed as 
political, but, as I noted earlier in my discussion of her attention to the artis-
tic status of crafts, she is deliberately defining the concept of art as broadly 
as possible. Representation as politics is not a limiting of artistic possibili-
ties as in, for instance, Soviet realism; instead, it is a wide- ranging appre-
ciation of the connections between objects and the communities in which 
they take on their meaning. So, for instance, her grandmother’s quilts were 
representational, not in the sense that they were what hooks (2000, 15) calls 
“story quilts,” but because her grandmother could and did pull them out to 
recount tales of family history, pointing to a piece of cotton in a quilt and 
recalling its first life as a dress hooks’s mother had once worn. This is social 
aesthetics in its attention to the way who we are and how we live influences 
the kind of art we make. And that is the point hooks (1995a, 57) insists on in 
her analysis of visual politics: “All colonized and subjugated people who, by 
way of resistance, create an oppositional subculture within the framework 
of domination recognize that the field of representation . . . is a site of on-
going struggle.” The problem of representation that hooks (1992, 1) identi-
fies as particularly pressing for African American communities is the preva-
lence of images that reinscribe white supremacy and internalized racism, a 
problem that is particularly acute in mass media. “For black people,” notes 
hooks, “the pain of learning that we cannot control our images, how we see 
ourselves [and] how we are seen [by others] is so intense that it rends us. . . . 
Often it leaves us ravaged by repressed rage, feeling weary, dispirited, and 
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sometimes just plain old brokenhearted” (3–4). This, too, is social aesthet-
ics, how the kind of art we live with influences who we are. And if hooks’s 
contention that African American communities do not care—or do not care 
enough—about visual art is correct, perhaps we have here a partial expla-
nation: people on constant guard against racist imagery may be easily worn 
down by visual politics and can, as a result, be discouraged from producing 
(or sharing) images of their own. The confluence of racist representations 
in the media and an oppositional subculture can lead to a lively contesta-
tion—an image war, if you like—or it can lead to a passive withdrawal. The 
path hooks endorses is, of course, contestation. Art matters, for her, because 
it offers a sense of agency (hooks 2009, 132).
Liberation and healing can happen, though, only if image making is taken 
up as a central political project in which communities examine “both the 
kind of images we produce and the way we critically write and talk about 
images” (hooks 1992, 4). But, hooks (1995a, 32) cautions, “Willingness to 
critically engage art by black folks in all its profundity is still very difficult in 
a culture of domination where people do not learn to look beneath the sur-
face.” The starting point she suggests for cultural liberation is the aesthetic 
education she received, an introduction to aesthetics that “is more than a 
philosophy or theory of art and beauty; it is a way of inhabiting space, a par-
ticular location, a way of looking and becoming” (hooks 2009, 122). By this, 
she means to underscore the enduring point she makes across many of her 
books about culture and community (see hooks 1992, 1995a, 2000, 2009): 
aesthetic appreciation ought to be understood as part of our daily lives, 
something we learn through experience of, and with, the people and places 
we love. A connection to art and beauty in our lives is a crucial human need, 
hooks says, and it is fulfilled in the same way that all other human needs are: 
in community with others. It is these particular locations and ways of look-
ing that are rooted in the everyday she foregrounds in the critical discus-
sions of particular artists that are interspersed among the theoretical essays 
of Art on My Mind (hooks 1995a). In Basquiat’s work, she celebrates what 
she sees as decolonizing impulses that mark African American art making, 
explaining that “a dual critique is occurring [in his work]. First, the critique 
of Western imperialism, and, then, the critique of the way in which imperi-
alism makes itself heard, the way it is reproduced in culture and art. This 
image is ugly and grotesque. That is exactly how it should be. For what Bas-
quiat unmasks is the ugliness of those traditions. He takes the Eurocentric 
valuation of the great and beautiful and demands that we acknowledge the 
brutal reality it masks” (hooks 1995a, 38).
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The analysis of Basquiat draws our attention to the ugliness of art and the 
art world, whereas much of hooks’s “cultural” writing stresses the other side 
of the coin, the “aesthetics of the everyday” that I sketched in the previous 
section. The connection, as I see it, lies in her observation, quoted earlier 
in her recollection of discovering African art in Paris museums, that sepa-
rating people from the artistic traditions of their communities is a tactic of 
colonization and marginalization (hooks 1995a, xv). Basquiat’s attention to 
the ugly highlights the alienation that results from this tactic, and hooks’s 
attention to relearning an appreciation for beauty and creativity through 
everyday engagement with the people and places one loves highlights the 
empowering solution of developing solidarity through aesthetics. There is 
also, she thinks, a decolonizing function in the work of Gonzalez- Torres that 
is similar to the one she identifies in Basquiat. Gonzalez- Torres speaks to 
her of the need to reject philosophical notions that perpetuate oppression—
specifically, the distinction between a public sphere and a private one that 
feminist theory takes up as the condition of possibility for domestic abuse, 
between the collective and the individual9—so that we can “open ourselves 
to the possibility of communion and community” (53). Art criticism that 
attends to location—of the artist, of the audience—enables “a . . . critical 
culture where we can discuss the issue of blackness in ways that confront 
not only the legacy of subjugation but also radical traditions of resistance, 
as well as the newly invented self, the decolonized subject” (93).
Even “learning to see and appreciate the presence of beauty is an act of 
resistance in a culture of domination that recognizes the production of a 
pervasive feeling of lack, both material and spiritual, as a useful colonizing 
strategy,” says hooks (1995a, 124). But charging that the progressive left has 
been too preoccupied with material needs and benchmarks, she also ob-
serves, “Without love, our efforts to liberate ourselves and our world com-
munity from oppression and exploitation are doomed” (hooks 1994, 243). 
While resistance to politically oppressive structures such as colonization is 
important, developing an appreciation for both beauty and love serves to re-
mind us that we must attend to the spiritual aspect of human life and human 
communities. The art to which hooks wants to draw our attention is not just 
concerned with philosophical critiques of material deprivation. At its most 
potent, art draws us into a mind- set in which we come to respect and value 
all of our fellow human beings, through our experience of valuing those 
whose creative abilities move us.
She attributes the inspiration for her ethic of love to Martin Luther King 
Jr.—whose commitment to nonviolence, solidarity, and the notion of “be-
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loved community” is drawn from his Christian belief in love for all human 
beings as fellow children of God—and cites his belief that we find the high-
est good through love, that it is love “that unlocks the door to the meaning of 
ultimate reality” (hooks 1994, 244). “It is in choosing love,” she argues, “and 
beginning with love as the ethical foundation for politics, that we are best 
positioned to transform society in ways that enhance the collective good 
[and in c]hoosing love we also choose to live in community. . . . The mo-
ment we choose to love, we begin to move against domination, against op-
pression,” she continues; “the moment we choose to love we begin to move 
towards freedom, to act in ways that liberate ourselves and others. That 
action is the testimony of love as the practice of freedom” (247–48, 250). 
hooks does not endorse the explicit commitment to Christianity that drives 
King’s theorizing of love and the ideal he speaks of as “the beloved commu-
nity,” but she does share his robust view of what love is. In his Nobel Peace 
Prize acceptance speech, King explains that his call for “an all- embracing . . . 
love” is not the “oft misunderstood and misinterpreted concept so readily 
dismissed by the Nietzsches of the world as a weak and cowardly force, . . . 
not . . . some sentimental and weak response which is little more than emo-
tional bosh.” By way of explaining what he means by love, King quotes the 
British historian Arnold Toynbee: “Love is the ultimate force that makes for 
the saving choice of life and good against the damning choice of death and 
evil.” King asserts, and hooks agrees, that “love is the key to the solution of 
the problems of the world.”10
hooks (1995b, 263) does not take up King’s call for love and for a “beloved 
community” uncritically, however. In another move that we might want to 
see as reminiscent of improvisatory strategies, she takes up his concept and 
revises it to meet the needs of a different context. She notes that his vision 
of “a beloved community [is one in which] race would be transcended, for-
gotten, where no one would see skin color.” This, says hooks (263), is what 
makes King’s ideal “a flawed vision. The flaw, however, was not the imag-
ining of a beloved community; it was the insistence that such a community 
could exist only if we erased and forgot racial difference.” A disregard of dif-
ference, expressed in King’s dream of a world in which his children would 
be judged by their character rather than their skin color,11 makes much more 
sense in the context of a movement to integrate white and black America 
than it does today, in a more multicultural world where the fissures and 
divisions among communities are visible to all—not just those who are mar-
ginalized as a result of their “difference.” Today, the doctrine of racial color- 
blindness is the target of harsh criticism by hooks, who insists on both an 
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aesthetic and a politics in which the other is not homogenized. She charges, 
“The notion that differences of skin color, class background, and cultural 
heritage must be erased for justice and equality to prevail is a brand of popu-
lar false consciousness that helps keep racist thinking and action intact” 
(265).12 In her view, “Beloved community is not formed by the eradication of 
difference but by its affirmation, by each of us claiming the identities and 
cultural legacies that shape who we are and how we live in the world” (265).
Even as hooks recognizes the color- blindness of King’s vision of com-
munity as flawed, however, she fails to identify the blind spot in her own 
thinking: her idealization of community. This, too, represents a point of con-
vergence between her theorizing of the aesthetic and the political and the 
theorizing we find in improvisation studies. Indeed, one might go as far as 
to argue that the problem in both cases is a failure to theorize community 
at all; instead, it is just uncritically accepted as an affirmative and nurturing 
condition of possibility for social change.13 Untheorized belief that “com-
munity,” and our immersion in it, is a panacea fails to acknowledge the ex-
periences some people have had—in musical ensembles, in religious con-
gregations—of their membership in community as repressive of creativity 
and hostile to independent thought or self- expression. This need to critically 
theorize the possibilities and limitations of community is, I think, all the 
more pressing, all the more important for improvisation studies and rela-
tional aesthetics scholars to attend to, precisely because there are compel-
ling responses available to counter this criticism.
We who think of community as a crucial factor in human flourishing do 
ourselves no favors by ignoring or dodging such criticisms. Instead, I think 
we should face this ambiguous capacity of community head- on, in much the 
same way that the western Canadian political philosopher Roger Epp does in 
We Are All Treaty People: Prairie Essays (2008). Epp’s project is to articulate 
a political philosophy that has at its heart the values and social experiences 
of rural farmers and residents of small- town farming communities. This, 
he argues, is a necessary opposition to mainstream political theory, which 
begins with, and from, urban centers. He writes about having grown up in 
small towns—the kinds of communities most often thought of as the para-
digm of stultifying repression—and frankly acknowledges that the members 
of these communities can limit one’s opportunities for personal and eco-
nomic growth and for self- expression through, for instance, prejudice and 
assumptions drawn from community gossip about one’s family. However, 
he also insists on the generative possibilities of the deeply personal knowl-
edge small- town residents have of one another, a knowledge that strikes 
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those of us from urban environments as invasive and limiting. Epp wants us 
to take notice of the subtle and ongoing ways that intimate knowledge of 
one another can function as support and encouragement and ways that the 
judgments small- town residents make of one another can inspire commit-
ments to personal and social transformation.14 In addition, this knowledge 
base gives us access to our own histories and insight into the range of inter-
pretations that others may place on those histories. Communities, in other 
words, can grind us down, but they also ground us. We need not be naïve to 
see them as valuable.
In a similar vein, hooks (1995b, 264) insists, “We cannot surrender that 
longing [for beloved community]—if we do we will never see an end to 
racism.” Returning to the importance of the everyday, and emphasizing the 
individual engagement that is sometimes used to distinguish ethics from 
politics, she argues that we can see the plausibility and the potential of 
King’s “beloved community” in “the small circles of love we have man-
aged to form in our individual lives” (264). Our own lives can “represent 
a concrete realistic reminder that beloved community is not a dream,” that 
it can be achieved through strategies of antiracist education and critical 
consciousness raising (264). “Our devout commitment to building diverse 
communities is central,” hooks tells us, “like all beloved communities we af-
firm our differences. It is this generous spirit of affirmation that gives us 
the courage to challenge one another, to work through misunderstandings, 
especially those that have to do with race and racism. In a beloved commu-
nity solidarity and trust are grounded in profound commitment to a shared 
vision. Those of us who are always anti- racist long for a world in which 
everyone can form a beloved community where borders can be crossed and 
cultural hybridity celebrated” (272).
Reading (into/onto) the Marginalized Other
Having laid out the framework that situates hooks’s commitment to an aes-
thetics of the everyday and an ethics of love, I want now to return to the 
question of how she is represented by commentators on her work. This is 
a question that I think has a much wider relevance than simply how we 
see hooks; it is, I would argue, a valuable illustration of how otherness has 
been treated in mainstream attention to both aesthetics and politics. Distor-
tions of hooks’s work, and therefore her identity, are interestingly similar to 
misrepresentations of Frantz Fanon’s theorizing of decolonization and John 
Coltrane’s “free jazz” experiments. What I want to interrogate in this sec-
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tion is the extent to which these falsifications are a function of a systematic 
devaluing of political- philosophical and aesthetic contributions by people 
of color. How are they silenced or deflected? And what is it that their con-
tributions threaten?
I spoke at the outset of this chapter of Wallis’s observation that hooks 
usually is not recognized as a legitimate voice in the art world, despite her 
sustained attention to art making and the aesthetic contexts in which repre-
sentations of dominant and marginalized cultural objects are situated, and 
notwithstanding her own declared sense of herself as an artist and art critic. 
Where hooks’s contributions to aesthetic discourses have been ignored, her 
contributions to social and political philosophy have been quite blatantly 
misrepresented. In making these observations, I have in mind responses to 
hooks I have encountered in casual conversations with friends and in teach-
ing her work in classrooms that are predominantly populated by privileged 
white students. hooks is perceived by some of her readers as angry, anti- 
male, anti- white, and inexplicably, unjustifiably aggressive in her demands 
for change. Lest one think that this is a defect unique to the circles in which 
I travel, hooks’s own essays recount ways her work has been twisted by 
interlocutors. She discusses, for example, an interview that she gave to Es-
quire magazine on the topic of how attitudes toward sex supposedly distin-
guish the militant “old feminist” of the 1970s from the cooler, more overtly 
sexual “new feminist” of the 1990s (hooks 1994, 73–81).15 hooks contends 
that her views were blatantly misstated and edited to make her sound as if 
she was conforming to the stereotype of the oversexed black woman, even 
as the interviewer also shaded her comments about the feminist movement 
of the 1970s to reinforce the popular view of it as man- hating. “It has always 
served the interest of the patriarchal status quo for men to represent the 
feminist woman as antisex and antimale,” she notes, and it has always been 
acceptable to appropriate the words of black women to add the appearance 
of racial inclusivity to mainstream discourse, even as the contributions of 
black women to racial and sexual equality movements are ignored (75, 78).
Regardless of whether her words are being ignored or being twisted, the 
common theme of these re- presentations of bell hooks is their failure to ac-
knowledge the humanism that consistently permeates her work. She speaks 
and writes inclusively of African American culture in ways that affirm the 
value of both the middle- class aspirations of her parents and siblings and 
the working- class values of her grandparents, but—despite the charges of 
careless readers—she does not engage in bitterness, special pleading, or race 
baiting. She writes from a racial perspective she realizes she needs to defend 
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against racist devaluations and a gender perspective she defends against 
sexist devaluations, but neither defense is mounted at the expense of those 
who are not African American or not women. The obvious goal of her de-
fenses is to assert the humanity of the marginalized group, its belonging in 
the “beloved community.” In this, her work and responses to it are eerily 
similar to Fanon’s position in discourses on decolonization and postcolo-
nial reorganization. In the opening chapter of his major work, The Wretched 
of the Earth, Fanon (1963, 30–33, 42–43, 73–74) analyzes the violence he 
claims is inherent in colonial relations. This analysis reveals the ways in 
which the violence settler governments impose on native populations pro-
duces a circuit that channels that violence through native communities and 
internalizes it, such that members of these communities attack one another 
rather than those who rule the colonies. There is “no possible coming to 
terms,” Fanon (48) declares. “[Colonization] is violence in its natural state, 
and it will only yield when confronted with greater violence.” The point of 
this analysis is to argue for the liberation from enslavement and exploitation 
of all human beings and “to set afoot a new man” who will live in a new, de-
colonized world (255). This, too, is a strong and persistent humanism, but all 
too frequently the Fanon who appears in academic discussions of colonial-
ism is a ruthless, simplistic advocate of bloody violence, despite the obvious 
connection of this analysis of violence to the larger context of his assertion 
of the moral value of all human beings.16 In both cases—hooks and Fanon—a 
positive program of human liberation is disregarded, and largely tangential 
or highly contextual comments are foregrounded, with the result that the 
very arguments these thinkers are putting forth are inverted. In this way, 
their critiques of status quo politics can be dismissed as radical and danger-
ous nonsense.
It may seem odd to include Coltrane in this group and to thereby suggest 
that African American musical practices are disregarded. But reflect for a 
moment on the popular misrepresentation of Coltrane’s “free jazz” musical 
experimentations and consider whether there is a similarity to the devaluing 
through distortion that is imposed on hooks and Fanon. Most notable, in this 
regard, is the critical attention given to his collaboration with Eric Dolphy in 
the early 1960s, described by Down Beat’s editor John Tynan as “a horrify-
ing demonstration of what appears to be a growing anti- jazz trend” (quoted 
in DeMicheal 1998, 110). Of Tynan and the critics who subsequently jumped 
on the “anti- jazz” bandwagon, Coltrane remarked, “They made it appear 
that we didn’t even know the first thing about music—the first thing. And 
there we were really trying to push things off” (quoted in Kofsky 1970, 242). 
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Speaking of the contemporary art world, but making a point that I think ap-
plies to the entire history of African American arts and music in the twen-
tieth century (and quite possibly to that of earlier eras), hooks (1995a, 58) 
observes, “Commodification of blackness creates a market context wherein 
conventional, even stereotypical, modes of representing blackness may re-
ceive the greatest reward [and] images that would subvert the status quo 
are harder to produce.”17 This is a perennial problem in the jazz world: con-
ventional representations of black jazz musicians constrained and mystified 
the efforts of many who sought to expand and explore the boundaries of the 
genre, Coltrane among them. The limitations of standard set lengths and the 
commercialization of nightclubs focused on profits derived from their “two 
drink minimum” were such a straightjacket for Coltrane that his later years 
were characterized by a reluctance to perform in clubs and a search for 
alternative venues, such as community centers (Kofsky 1970, 418–20). Per-
haps the most toxic stereotype facing jazz musicians, though, is the primi-
tivization of genius that explains the artists’ talents as if they are intuitive 
conduits of a “spirit of music” rather than acknowledging them as skilled 
and, in many cases, highly trained creators.18
So what is achieved through these blatant acts of revisionism? One of the 
things that hooks, Fanon, and Coltrane have in common is their opposition 
to mainstream thought, and as hooks has noted, challenges to (including 
subversion of ) the status quo are always at risk of being suppressed in favor 
of more orthodox views. “The fierce willingness to repudiate domination in 
a holistic manner is the starting point for progressive cultural revolution,” 
hooks (1994, 6) tells us. In a number of her essays, hooks makes a crucial 
distinction between revolution, a complete transformation of a system, and 
reform movements that make local adjustments that may ameliorate bur-
dens that fall on some people but leave the overall framework of “the sys-
tem” largely unchanged (see, e.g., hooks 1994, 73–81, 2008, 36–40). So my 
answer to the question of what their contributions threaten is, simply: the 
status quo. And what revisionism achieves in these cases is a discrediting of 
these voices, these claims to represent a point of view that society must take 
seriously if we are to progress. In discrediting voices such as hooks, Fanon, 
and Coltrane, the dominant culture can attempt to remain as it is.
Conclusion: What’s Art Got to Do with Decolonization?
Of course, the dominant culture’s dream that it can maintain itself un-
changed is just that: a dream. Visions of how things might be are available 
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to revolutionaries, as well. hooks (1995a, 123) tells us that “rather than sur-
rendering our passion for the beautiful . . . we need to envision ways those 
passions can be fulfilled that do not reinforce the structures of domination 
we seek to change.” We need to make of art “a place where boundaries can 
be transgressed, where visionary insights can be revealed within the con-
text of the everyday, the familiar, the mundane” (138). Or, to put the point in 
language more consistent with the discourse of social aesthetics, we need to 
improvise a diverse and multicultural world—united by love (political soli-
darity), not an imposed, coercive homogenization—through an aesthetic of 
otherness. This is where the insights of social aesthetics can help us: draw-
ing attention to the ways our art shapes us and the ways we shape our art 
requires us to consider closely who we are—the differences that distinguish 
us from each other and the common projects that can bring us together. It 
requires us to cross borders, to share ideas and strategies for change, and 
to build a world that has input from, and space for, us all. In hooks’s view, 
“To claim border crossing, the mixing of high and low, cultural hybridity, 
as the deepest expression of a desired cultural practice within multicul-
tural democracy means that we must dare to envision ways such freedom 
of movement can be experienced by everyone” (hooks 1994, 5; emphasis 
added). And “to live in anti- racist society we must collectively renew our 
commitment to a democratic vision of racial justice and equality. Pursuing 
that vision [means] we create a culture where beloved community [charac-
terized by solidarity and meaningful coalition] flourishes and is sustained” 
(hooks 1995b, 271). For that, we most desperately need “an aesthetic sensi-
bility that is redemptive,” that sustains us even as it transforms us (hooks 
1995a, 121).
Notes
1. Wallis (1995) identifies hooks’s Yearning: Race, Gender, and Cultural Poli-
tics (1990) as the more theoretical “companion volume” to this examination of 
aesthetic representation and judgment. However, aesthetic concerns also mark 
hooks’s Black Looks: Race and Representation (1992) and Outlaw Culture: Resist-
ing Representations (1994), as well as the much more recent Belonging: A Culture 
of Place (2009).
2. There is perhaps a partial explanation for this phenomenon that we can find 
in writing that hooks has done elsewhere. In an essay on psychological effects 
of racism titled “Healing Our Wounds: Liberatory Mental Health Care,” she im-
plies that failure to empower communities at the grassroots level may be par-
ticularly pronounced in African American communities due to the influence of 
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“racial uplift” strategies such as W.E.B. Du Bois’s notion of “the talented tenth” 
(hooks 1995b, 133–45). “Passionately devoted to the political goal of racial uplift, 
[nineteenth- century and early twentieth- century black critical thinkers] high-
lighted the achievement of exceptional individuals [and] did not talk about the 
psychological casualties” (133). This suggests that the subjectivity of successful 
elites may historically have been celebrated to the exclusion of the majority of 
members of the communities that produced these “exceptional individuals.”
3. I am grateful to Eric Lewis for this point.
4. The coherence of this language with the discourse of relational aesthetics 
suggests hooks as a precursor to that discourse. However, it is important to see 
that hooks continues to use the language of traditional aesthetics—“elegance,” 
for instance—and does not distance herself from the aesthetic to take note of the 
social and political aspects of art, as some contend the more postmodern strands 
of relational aesthetics do.
5. Because the camera was there, of course, busy producing Matthew Brady’s 
iconic photographs of Civil War soldiers. It was simply—as a novel technology 
deployed by elite segments of the dominant class to provide solemn mementos 
of their history—unavailable to serve African American projects of family reuni-
fication.
6. Although hooks discusses quilt making as a solitary pursuit, focusing on her 
grandmother’s single- handed production of household necessities through which 
she developed her artistic talent, there is also current research that stresses the 
collective production by African American women of quilts. This is yet another 
link to improvisatory practices.
7. She notes that “he felt a strong sense of affinity with jazz artists in the shared 
will to push against the boundaries of conventional (white) artistic tastes” and 
his celebration of this affinity made it possible for him to imagine himself as part 
of a thriving black artistic community (hooks 1995a, 42).
8. Of the debate about essence and identity, hooks (1995a, 11) observes, “When 
the ground is shaking under one’s feet, fundamentalist identity politics can offer 
a sense of stability. The tragedy is that it deflects attention from those forms of 
struggle that might have a more constructive, transformative impact,” like de-
colonization.
9. The “public sphere- private sphere” distinction has been criticized as op-
pressive (or, at least, potentially oppressive) from a feminist perspective on the 
grounds that women and children are vulnerable to abuse by husbands and 
fathers in a system that conceives of families as “private” and under the exclu-
sive, undisputed control of the male head of household. See, e.g., Engels 1972, 
MacKinnon 1983, Okin 1999. This view of the family as a private domain in which 
the man is the undisputed sovereign effectively removes the other members of 
the household from the types of protection that the state might claim to offer to 
citizens in the public sphere—for example, protection from coercion by a stronger 
or more powerful fellow citizen. The “sovereignty” accorded to men through de-
ployment of this distinction is analogous to the status given to the leader of a 
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nation- state in the jurisprudential theory of John Austin’s “command theory” 
of law (Austin 1996) and the political theory of Thomas Hobbes (2007) and Max 
Weber (1946). In all of these accounts, the leader stands in for and assumes the 
power to dictate the will of the collective, which supersedes the will of the indi-
vidual, thereby producing the classical philosophical tension between the citi-
zen/individual and society.
10. Martin Luther King Jr., “The Quest for Peace and Justice,” Nobel lecture, Uni-
versity of Oslo, Norway, December 11, 1964, http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes 
/peace/laureates/1964/king- lecture.html.
11. Martin Luther King Jr., “I Have a Dream,” Lincoln Memorial, Washington, 
DC, August 28, 1963, www.afn.org/~dks/history/dream.
12. Her point here—that the claim of a human community that is “beyond 
color” or post- racial actually perpetuates the very phenomenon it presents itself 
as having transcended (for instance, by marking as deviant all those who are 
not similarly willing to drop allegiance to racial identity)—is remarkably similar 
to Pierre Bourdieu’s rebuttal of Kantian aesthetics. Kant claims that “taste,” the 
judgment of beautiful and sublime objects made in a position of “disinterested 
interest,” is universal, a thesis Bourdieu rebuts through the presentation of em-
pirical data on a variety of aesthetic judgments indexed to the class identities of 
the judgers. Kant’s assertion that taste is universal acts to delegitimize as judgers 
those who do not make “the right” judgments and, as Bourdieu (1984) shows, cul-
tural acceptance of a universal notion of taste results in a retreat from judgment 
by groups already socially marginalized.
13. I am grateful to Georgina Born for raising this point in response to my pre-
sentation of an earlier version of this chapter at the Improvisation and Social Aes-
thetics conference held at McGill University, March 2010.
14. The kind of intimate knowledge of a person that Epp (2008) has in mind is 
the small community’s knowledge of one’s family members that one may not have 
oneself: their memories of the musical ability shown by a never known uncle who 
died in a long- ago war or their awareness of the alcoholism that caused a grand-
parent’s inexplicable behavior. The community’s transmission to an individual of 
these observations can be inspiring or cautionary and can help one form concep-
tions of life’s possibilities that would be much less available to one raised in the 
studied anonymity of more urban areas.
15. Bizarrely, this interviewer talked to her as someone who could describe 
anthropologically the “old feminist” movement (in which she participated) and 
simultaneously as someone who embodied the attitudes of the sexually free “new 
feminist.”
16. For more detailed discussions of how Fanon’s analysis of violence is mis-
read, see Carastathis 2010, Gratton 2010, Nicholls 2010.
17. In an interview on hip hop, hooks discusses the phenomenon of gangsta rap 
as “upscale primitivism” marketed to white kids and notes that rap artists are 
simultaneously pushed by two contradictory forces: the demand that they present 
themselves as killers, pimps, “playahs,” and conspicuous consumers of luxury 
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products (champagne, cars, jewelry) and the demand that they conform to popu-
lar notions of what it means to be a good role model: see bell hooks, “bell hooks 
on Video: Cultural Criticism and Transformation,” Racialicious blog, 2007, www 
.racialicious.com/2007/06/19/bell- hooks- on- hip- hop. hooks glosses this irre-
solvable tension as a demand we make of rap artists that they be more moral than 
any other artists. Note, in the context of her comment about the need to conform 
to conventional stereotypes in order to succeed, that similar analyses of the nar-
rowing of hip hop—which began as radical grassroots resistance to the corporati-
zation, gentrification, and destruction of public spaces of urban communities—to 
gangsta rap are offered in Byron Hurt, dir., Hip Hop: Beyond Beats and Rhymes, 
God Bless the Child Productions, 2006; Rose 1994.
18. This view of the jazz musician as unthinking conduit of music, primitive 
and therefore capable of channeling emotionally powerful music without being 
able to analyze musical genius (the role of the jazz critic, of course), is pervasive 
in jazz histories. See the histories traced by Kofsky (1970)—notably, the critic’s 
contempt and disrespect for the musicians—in the first chapters of this book; 
by Jones (1963), particularly in the chapters dealing with the emergence of the 
blues from the Deep South; by Heble (2000), especially in his analysis of Theodor 
Adorno’s cultural framework; and by Porter (2002).
chApter 10
IMPROVISATION IN NEW WAVE CINEMA
Beneath the Myth, the Social
Marion Froger, Translated by Will Straw
In the introduction to his study Godard au travail (Godard at Work), Alain 
Bergala (2006) draws our attention to the myth of improvisation that took 
shape in the 1960s around the filmmaking of Jean- Luc Godard. Godard 
maintained this myth through postures designed to enhance his image as a 
creator. He loved to speak of his constant improvisation, whether it involved 
dialogue that he would dream up the night before shooting and suggest to 
actors on the set—using earphones—or happened at the level of mise- en- 
scène itself, as when he waited until bodies and scenery were in front of him 
before deciding how the actors and the camera would move. This posture 
resonated with the idea he had forged of his creative practice. As Bergala 
(2006, 154) makes clear, “Godard proclaimed a cinema of the found against 
a cinema based on the execution of a programmed script.”1
This conception of improvisation cannot help but resonate with that em-
braced by jazz musicians of the 1950s, as described by Howard Saul Becker 
(1963). The musicians Becker studied divided themselves into two groups: 
on the one hand, there were those players who belonged to dance bands 
and devoted themselves to pleasing audiences drawn to familiar melodies 
and rhythms; on the other hand, there were the improvisers or “true” mu-
sicians, recognized by their peers but unable to live off their art because 
the “straights”—the customers at the “joints”—had no taste for that kind 
of playing. In cinema, the appearance of the Nouvelle Vague (New Wave), 
with its new shooting methods, its liberated stories that no longer followed 
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strictly linear narratives, and its editing techniques that broke with those of 
classical continuity, generated the same line of division—between the “im-
provisers,” led by Godard, and the others, who belonged to a profession and 
entertainment industry from which they made their living. The emergence 
of this line, which divided the filmmaking community over the question of 
improvisation, is what interests us here.
It is important that the link we want to establish, between cinema and 
jazz, not be misunderstood; our intention is not to somehow compare the 
various “arts of improvisation” or to collapse one community into another, 
for example, the French film world of the early 1960s into the American 
jazz scene of the 1950s. Rather, we want to try to understand the processes 
of community formation that played themselves out around the question of 
improvisation. If we treat each of these as a medium, in fact, we see that jazz 
and cinema cannot share the same relationship to improvisation, for one key 
reason: while musical improvisation takes shape within performance, the 
direction of a film involves making a finished product that cannot claim to 
offer viewers the live experience of an improvisation. In technical terms, im-
provisation is the act by which one simultaneously composes and executes 
a musical piece at one and the same time or simultaneously composes and 
utters dialogue. This happens either because circumstances require that it 
happen or because it is presumed it will produce a superior effect, unless it 
is, simply, the rule of the creative game that one has adopted. Such a defi-
nition of improvisation emphasizes the simultaneity of the time of inven-
tion, execution, and audience reception. However, this simultaneity is not 
possible in the case of cinema, where the time of projection is always de-
ferred relative to that of shooting and editing. To be sure, the cinema can 
record performances that may be improvised—those of actors who invent 
their lines and of the filmmakers who follow these actors and react the best 
they can to what is happening.2 However, setting aside the fact that these 
circumstances are extremely rare, at least in the case of fiction film, impro-
visation in what is filmed, or in the act of filming itself, is very difficult to 
detect in the viewing of a film. In the first place, there is no single, unique 
form of representation that would signal its character as improvisation at 
the moment in which it takes place, through its difference from a written 
text or prior performance with which the public would be familiar. And even 
when one has filmed improvised action, the arrangement of images and 
sounds in the act of editing—which uses and mixes various kinds of visual 
and sound recording as needed—effaces the sense of a performance taking 
place in front of the camera in favor of the after- the- fact construction of a 
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story’s spatiotemporal continuity. Moreover, a scene may occasionally ap-
pear improvised even if it has been meticulously prepared in advance. In 
other words, the status of improvisatory elements is obscured by the me-
diatic apparatus that strives for transparency. One is never sure whether 
there has been improvisation (we know it only through the more or less 
reliable testimony of the director or crew). Improvisation, we might say, is 
that ethereal and elusive something in the image in which one wants to be-
lieve. Depending on the case, it is capable of eliciting admiration, repulsion, 
and even indignation. It is precisely these affective responses of viewers to 
improvisation, which have little to do with the actual presence of improvi-
sation in cinema, that will concern us here.
In the early 1960s, improvisation invaded films and the discourses about 
them. Directors embraced or rejected it. In the films of Godard and his co-
hort, critics looked for traces of the influence of Jean Rouch, a master of 
improvisation (in front of the camera and behind it) who was seen as the 
“guru” of the Nouvelle Vague (cf. Gauthier 2002, 70–75). In discourses on 
cinema, improvisation took on a level of importance that was not justified 
by the actual practices of the young filmmakers of the movement. In fact, 
improvisation was rarely practiced, but it nevertheless crystallized many of 
the breaks with which the movement was credited: a break with traditional 
methods of shooting and a rupture with the consensual, literary realism 
that the former masters of French cinema used to bring the “truth of life” 
into their films. One of the most common explanations of this phenomenon 
was aesthetic in character: improvisation was seen as bound up with the 
emergence of cinema verité, which shattered the boundaries betweeen fic-
tion and documentary and which inspired the directors of the New Wave. 
Cinema verité had been introduced by Jean Rouch in his film Moi un noir 
(1958). It involved filming documentary images—which required improvi-
sation on the part of the cameraman, who had to adapt to an event as it was 
unfolding—and then “fictionalizing” them through editing and commen-
tary. The resulting contrast with those fiction films characterized by pol-
ished writing, acting, and shooting was sufficiently engaging that it set in 
place a “style” for makers of fiction films that evoked the in- the- moment and 
improvised character of documentary filming.
This style was generated by methods of working that were highly unusual 
in the film world. They involved the use of amateur actors and of exterior 
shooting, sometimes with hidden cameras. The temporalities of invention 
and execution were often collapsed into the moment of filming itself. The 
new generation of filmmakers set out to make its name on the basis of this 
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distinctiveness. It must be noted, however, that these methods were prac-
ticed in only a very few films and that the “style” that resulted was limited—
in the case of Godard, in particular—by an editing practice that left nothing 
to chance. The resulting films were closer to the model of a carefully con-
structed artifact than to that of a performance.
One of the key ideas of the critic and theorist André Bazin, to the effect 
that cinema was the art of revealing the real, served to enhance the appeal of 
improvisation. In his account, the cinematic image bears an ontological re-
lationship to the event—by definition unique—that unfolds before the cam-
era. Beyond sets and acting, what the camera captures, quite definitively, is 
the improvisation of life itself; the cinema conserves the form of change of 
something that happens only once. Out of these claims about the essence 
of cinema, the filmmakers of the Nouvelle Vague derived the imperative to 
break with false studio sets, showy acting, and finely chiselled dialogue.3 
This led to the idea of leaving room for improvisation while shooting, an 
idea in line with the notion of cinema capturing the improvisation of life 
itself. However, improvisation would have to remain invisible so it would 
not break what film theorists have called the “effect of the real” of the cine-
matic image.4 This effect of the real is the lot of any shot in film, since it is 
produced by visual and sonic analogies that obscure the medium and point 
directly to things heard and seen out of camera range. This effect of the real 
reinforces the reality effect produced by a fictional universe. While it does 
not completely fool the viewer, it nevertheless gives the impression that a 
film’s characters really exist. To notice improvisation would undermine this 
effect, since it would draw our attention to the real performances, those 
of the acteurs and the filmmakers, and thus rupture the analogic illusion by 
forcing the viewer to notice the ways in which the analogy has been fabricated. 
Arguably, this explains the commercial failure of François Truffaut’s second 
film, Tirez sur le pianiste (1960), which was characterized by improvisation 
much more than was his first film, Les 400 coups (1959), which was an unex-
pected success.5 The impression of spontaneity and freshness that ensured 
the success of 400 coups owed nothing to a practice of improvisation—which 
was limited to two or three asides by Jean- Pierre Léaud—or to the percep-
tion of improvisation.6 When improvisation is noticed, it interrupts our im-
mersion in the world of the film; the film is then seen to be “sloppy” and 
judged a failure, and audiences react negatively, as was the case with Tirez 
sur le pianiste. This is what Godard understood so well. Conveying the im-
pression that he improvised was part of a larger strategy designed to under-
mine the narrative and logical conventions of verisimilutude, transpar-
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ency, and naturalism (which Truffaut had no intention of abandoning, and 
which his audience had not asked him to give up), even if, in reality, Godard 
scarcely improvised at all.
If improvisation—rare in any case—did not have the desired effect when 
used, why was it so important for those active in the field of cinema in the 
1960s? What was it that, crystalized within improvisation, proved so inter-
esting both to the cinema’s young rebels and to established professionals? 
The first thing that might be said here is that “improvisation,” before be-
coming a technical issue (involving the practice of filmmaking itself ) or an 
ontological one (having to do with the very definition of cinematic art7) 
emerged as an issue on the social terrain of work itself. To improvise is to 
act without preparation, either because one already possesses the neces-
sary skills to do so or, on the contrary, because one’s incompetence requires 
that one improvise. In the 1960s, the question of improvisation was posed 
in these terms as much as in relation to the cinema as an art form. Indeed, 
it was as a result of the confusion between these two perspectives that l’af-
faire of Jean Aurel and Roger Vadim unfolded. The controversy received 
a great deal of attention in the press, partly because of the involvement 
of Brigitte Bardot and partly because of what might be called its “tribal” 
character. The Nouvelle Vague had torn itself apart in public in response 
to the accusation of slander launched by Vadim against Truffaut, who had 
attacked Vadim in an inflammatory article published on December 22, 1960, 
in the weekly magazine France Observateur. Truffaut wrote that Vadim had 
maneuvered to take the place of Jean Aurel, the contractual screenwriter 
and nominal director of La bride sur le cou (Please, Not Now! in the United 
States), a film starring Bardot. The actress, who also produced the film, was 
alarmed by Aurel’s lack of preparation—this was his first film—and turned 
for help to Vadim, who moved from simple technical consultant on the film 
to becoming its director mere days after his arrival on the set. Truffaut then 
came to the defense of Aurel, who felt he had been pushed aside and ac-
cused Vadim of disloyalty. Why did Truffaut defend Aurel? He did so in part 
because he saw Aurel as a young filmmaker much like himself. Truffaut’s 
intervention, which won the highly publicized support of Godard before 
and during the trial,8 amounted to declaring something along the lines that 
he and Godard, too, had been beginners; they, too, had had supervisors and 
“technical consultants” (with the difference being that, unlike Vadim, they 
respected their work); and they, too, had delilberately chosen not to script 
everything in advance and looked for ideas that would guide their direct-
ing in the act of filming itself. This “improvisation,” which was really no 
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such thing, was part of their profession. As filmmakers, they had the right 
to choose their methods of working, and no producer could break a (moral) 
contract on the grounds that they made use of such methods.
Nevertheless, Truffaut lost at trial as the court recognized Aurel’s lack 
of preparation, which caused delays and resulted in retakes, and his low 
level of involvement in the writing of the script and direction once Vadim 
arrived on the set.9 It is worth noting that the film’s technicians supported 
Vadim against Aurel in a letter published in Le Figaro on January 14, 1961. 
It should also be pointed out that, in French cinema at the time, the culture 
of labor was ouvrière (“workerish”) and artisanal, marked by a level of care 
for work well done and respect for the director but limited by some distrust 
of the innovations of intellectuals who seemed to overstep the boundaries 
of their roles.
This episode allows us to highlight what, in the discourse of both sides 
concerning improvisation, touches on the social value of “work.” Here, the 
issue of improvisation itself changes character. Let us return to Godard’s 
posturing in this context and consider the ways in which posing as an im-
proviser might be seen as a denial of the social value of work. In the 1950s, 
the French cinema was a world dominated by artisans, whose enshrined 
values were work well done, technical perfectionism, and mastery acquired 
through experience. In contrast, the filmmakers of the Nouvelle Vague came 
from the world of criticism, in which they had made their names fighting 
for the recognition of cinema as an art form. As a result, they sought to im-
pose a different sense of the value of work in the cinematic field: one that 
set the artist against the artisan. Following this logic, we might see young 
rebels as bringing an artistic sense of work into a milieu that would not ac-
knowledge it. There were, in fact, artists working in the world of film, many 
of them already recognized as such at the beginning of the 1960s. However, 
they were master figures and included, in particular, Henri- Georges Clou-
zot, whose name would be invoked during the Aurel- Vadim trial.10 Like the 
directors of the Nouvelle Vague, Clouzot challenged the professional culture 
of the filmmaking world while he was making L’Enfer (1964), a film he was 
forced to abandon afer several months of tests and weeks of filming, even 
though his status as a “genius director” had given him an unlimited budget 
and absolute freedom on the project.11 Clouzot was not an improviser, how-
ever; he was something like its very opposite: an “experimenter.” The great-
est obstacle to the completion of his films was that they were overprepared.
However, Godard’s improvisatory poses are not simply those of a new-
comer seeking to transform a cinema dominated by a culture of artisanal 
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work and to impose himself as an artist or intellectual.12 His poses were re-
ceived differently in the film world of the period. They were seen, in moral 
terms, as proof of off- handedness, flippancy, confirmation that Godard was 
content to make “little films” on the fly, as it were, such as Bande à part, Une 
femme est une femme, and Made in USA, which annoyed half of the critics and 
delighted the other half. In the case of Une femme est une femme, Godard’s 
improvisation was interpreted in two ways, each of which expressed the af-
finities (or lack thereof ) felt toward him. Michel Capdenac (1961) wrote in 
Lettres françaises about a “cinema which clearly does not take itself seriously 
and which, with its flippant tone of never- ending improvisation, will say 
anything at all, no matter how perfectly futile, like a hawker who invents, 
in proclaiming them, the bountiful qualities of his merchandise, but with 
such brashness, brilliance, talent and, for once, a kind of secret tenderness.”
By not taking himself so seriously, Godard showed “tenderness,” modesty, 
and generosity, according to his most enthusiastic supporters. They focused 
on the sociability that they saw as one of his key virtues. Conversely, his im-
provisation would be read by others as proof that he did not take his audi-
ence seriously, that he had no qualms about leaving them feeling excluded 
and humiliated: “The prince of little tricks, Godard piles up the corny jokes 
to kill time, like a clock ticking off the minutes. . . . The result is a film that, 
most of the time, seems to have been conceived solely to amuse its director 
while it was being made: we, the audience, feel embarassed, left out” (our 
emphasis).13
These polarized responses recall an imaginary scene of interaction that 
the work of Erving Goffman may help us to interpret. Goffman (1967, 6) has 
shown how, in direct interaction, each person follows a line of behavior de-
signed to avoid losing face and to ensure that the other not lose it, either. 
He describes those lapses or lulls in which an unease between the part-
ners develops—when one of them is embarrassed or feeling left out, as in 
the second of the reviews just quoted—and has recourse to a “reportory of 
face- saving practices” that aim to neutralize this embarrasment to stop the 
interaction—this minimal sociability—from floundering (14). Inasmuch as 
the viewing of a film may be seen as an indirect form of interaction, the im-
provisatory gestures of Godard may be seen as provocations in this sense. 
In Interaction Ritual (1967), Goffman draws our attention to the threat of 
offense that runs through every interaction, noting that a significant part of 
every interaction is devoted to ignoring or warding off that which is offen-
sive by cutting it short, disarming it, or offering a riposte. The price to be 
paid when the offense is too strong is a breakdown of the relationship. Goff-
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man insists on the fact that the percepton of an offense presupposes a pub-
lic witness possessing norms and values of which both the offended per-
son and the person committing the offense are aware. It is very much in 
relation to the values of this “public” that the defense or condemnation of 
Godard organizes itself, being concerned fundamentally and precisely with 
the respect to be shown toward a filmmaker on the basis of how much he is 
judged to show the same respect toward others. The first of the reviewers 
quoted earlier uses the occasion to express his complicity with Godard and 
avoid the rupture that so much flippancy on Godard’s part might have en-
gendered; the second denounces what is insulting in Godard’s indifference 
toward others (i.e., toward those viewers whom he ignores to have his own 
fun) (Goffman 1959, 47). An imaginary scene takes place in which a film 
replaces the Goffmanian face-work of a partner, leaving the viewer feel-
ing either at ease or wronged, like an accomplice or a victim. However, this 
viewer, now represented by the author of a published review, endorses his 
chosen posture, for all his readers, and from this flows a moral tone that 
either offers a protest in the name of a general civility or supports the film-
maker, justifying his behavior in the name of a new sociability that arrives in 
a roundabout way but nonetheless founds a new communality. In the latter 
case, Godard’s “flippant tone” and “never- ending improvisation,” to borrow 
Capdenac’s words, are in the service of that “secret tenderness” that ani-
mates new partners and players ready to demonstrate their solidarity and 
complicity on the social scene.
Why did the impression of improvisation—left or perceived—carry such 
importance? Perhaps it is because, at the time, it was bound up with the 
signs of respect people showed one another in their various social activities. 
Let us return to Clouzot, a master whose genius was said to express itself in 
his hard work. On November 4, 1960, Le Canard Enchaîné noted about La 
vérité (1960): “a scenario whose architecture is a model of ingenuity and pre-
cision, a staging that leaves nothing to chance, performances directed with a 
master’s hand, . . . consummate understanding of story, [a] constant concern 
for perfection, [and] a solid grasp of the audience’s tastes.”
For the journalist, this valorization of work went hand in hand with a 
denunciation of the “skewed, unreasonable, worthless youth” represented 
so well by Bardot’s character, but the article included an ironic reference, 
typical of the newspaper’s satirical tone, to the laborious character of “the 
director’s efforts.” We see here, in fact, evidence of a certain ambivalence 
toward the value of work of a sort misisng from another review, published in 
the conservative Carrefour: “Working like an ox, leaving nothing to chance, 
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Clouzot not only demonstrates a rare sense of professional responsibility but 
shows, as well, that he is modest.”14
Through one’s work, then, one signals to the others the respect one has for 
them and reassures them of one’s sociability. Moral accents of this kind are 
not rare in the debate surrounding improvisation. Critics of the period who 
denounced improvisation in the Nouvelle Vague were looking for evidence 
of work, which they took as proof of morality. Work is the fruit of labor and 
an essential part of the respect one owes to the person who has performed 
it; conversely, the person who has produced the work shows respect for the 
others by giving to them the best that she can produce. The quality of work 
is one of the major signs through which respect is expressed, and, through 
it work enters into the circuit of the gift, in which the merit of everyone is 
recognized in the fruits of their work. Indeed, critics of the time interpreted 
films as, in effect, gifts offered to audiences. Worthless films could signify 
only the contempt in which their authors held the audiences for which the 
films were destined. While improvisation was ultimately nothing more than 
a working method that produced superior works, the partisans of the Nou-
velle Vague were obliged to struggle against the impression of disrespect 
provoked by Godard’s up- front flippancy. Associated with carelessness, im-
provisation was, in fact, a synonym for imposture, the equivalent of an in-
sult for those at whom it was directed and, ultimately, toward the larger 
community interpellated by a film. It should be remembered that, at the 
beginning of the 1960s, improvisation was not simply a Godardian posture 
but a collective rallying cry. Ultimately, at the time of the Truffaut- Vadim 
affair, the foot soldiers of the Nouvelle Vague might well have said, “We are 
all ‘improvisers.’”
Improvisation was a declarative act: for auteurs, to be seen to improvise or 
not was part of their enunciative strategies, reinforced by punchy pronounce-
ments. For film viewers, improvisation, above and beyond the impression 
made by any particular stylistic gesture, carried a moral sense that called on 
their social rather than their aesthetic sensitivities. In a sense, their social 
sensitivity expressed itself in the perception of improvisation.
What impulse was contained within the call to improvise? More than 
anything else, for the young rebels of Cahiers du Cinéma, this call was a 
means of acceding to the role of director. These rebels had not been formally 
trained in school, had not served apprenticeships—and so, in a sense, they 
improvised their status as filmmakers and did so collectively, most notably 
through the making of shorts such as Le coup du berger (Jacques Rivette, 
dir., 1956). Improvisation revealed the collective to itself. By improvising 
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themselves as filmmakers, they were obliged to function as a tribe, in a net-
work outside professional circuits. Improvisation, then, through its liber-
ating function, was the founding act of their “community.” The first films 
of the Nouvelle Vague were marked by solidarity, expressed through brief 
appearances by directors in one another’s films, through the borrowing of 
actors, through references by one film to another (as Godard did on so many 
occasions in Une femme est une femme). One after another, their films made 
reference to this founding act and maintained a semiotics of solidarity and 
liberty (e.g., through the transgression of aesthetic and dramatic rules) that 
guaranteed, for those who recognized it, a sense of community.
Creative improvisation also belongs to an ideal of successful social inter-
action. Cinema, after all, involves a collective mode of production that pro-
duces a sense of collectivity through interaction. The creative dimension of 
improvisation appears to guarantee the formation of an ideal community; it 
points in the direction of utopia. Within it, a model of sociality crystallizes 
that sets aside rivalry among egos and builds on promises of relationality. 
One must be able to improvise together to belong to a group that is taking 
shape outside the usual rules of the field. In 1961, Agnes Varda (1994) had 
Godard and Anna Karina shoot a silent film to be included as a film within 
her film Cléo de 5 à 7. She describes the shoot as symbolizing, for her, “La 
Nouvelle Vague as we experienced it, with imagination in charge and friend-
ship in action.”
“This dynamic of deviance,” to borrow a term from Becker (1963, 192), is 
of the same order as that produced by traditional communities. It, too, will 
end up establishing rules and generating exclusions: “We see that people 
who engage in acts conventionally thought deviant are not motivated by 
mysterious, unknowable forces. They do what they do for much the same 
reasons that justify more ordinary activities.”
Very quickly, these people came to defend themselves against the frivo-
lous and incompetent imitators who usurped those signs of lightness, spon-
taneity, and complicity among filmmakers, technicians, and performers that 
characterized the “true family” of the Nouvelle Vague. In La Nouvelle Vague, 
Antoine de Baecque repeats Claude Chabrol’s comments describing his “dis-
trust towards the crowd of anonymous first- time filmmakers” getting ready 
to make their first films. Chabrol was even more outspoken on the subject in 
L’Express: “Let us be under no illusions. There is an underside to the current 
success of the Nouvelle Vague: the fact that certain people, who are incred-
ible charlatans, will be able to direct films” (quoted in de Baecque 2009, 
72). In private, Truffaut also deplored the fact that certain films had been 
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branded Nouvelle Vague, films that “quickly gathered together all those 
things considered reproachable in young filmmakers, their amateurism, 
their banality, their incomprehensible and eccentric characters” (quoted in 
de Baecque 2009, 102). In a long interview in the October 22, 1961, issue of 
Nouvel Observateur, however, he expanded on the moral rather than aes-
thetic problem that lay behind this rejection, emphasizing the refined moral 
values of “his” tribe: “The deliberate lightness of these films often comes 
across, sometimes wrongly and sometimes with good reason, as frivolity. 
Confusion arises because the qualities of this new cinema—its grace, light-
ness, modesty, elegance and speed—go hand- in- hand with its faults—its fri-
volity, obliviousness and naivété” (quoted in de Baecque 2009, 103).
Why did these improvisers bother the professionals of cinema to such an 
extent? What contextual knowledge is needed to help us understand the 
opposition between two political models of the “communal?”15 In 1958, the 
communist unions in the film world mobilized against a reform of govern-
ment policies that would have brought stronger political control over film. 
In their eyes, the new agreement—meant to bring the film industry in line 
with the rules of the European common market—threatened the tradition of 
quality in French cinema that had been rooted in a sense of craft, which was 
seen as opposed to the industrial standardization characteristic of Holly-
wood cinema. There were also worries about employment in the field, with 
France falling behind a German industry now swollen with American money 
invested in the film sector. There was no place for questions about impro-
visation, which found themselves edged out in the opposition between an 
industrial, capitalist rationalization of filmmaking labour and an artisanal 
practice. The artisans of cinema had no desire to sacrifice their self- respect, 
rooted in a sense of craft, to the dictates of an industry suspected of want-
ing to make films the way one makes canned food.16 When the first films 
of the Nouvelle Vague were released, the professional milieu, along with a 
significant faction of the communist- leaning critics, did not support them. 
The fact that the directors had become filmmakers by staking claims to im-
provisation was seen as irritating by those writing in the columns of union 
newspapers. Laurent Marie (2005, 146) explains, “Through a series of edito-
rials and articles whose main targets were the methods and amateurism of 
these new filmmakers, the editors, including several of the old guard (Max 
Douy, Jean Dréville) of the union newspaper Technicien du spectacle, accused 
the young filmmakers of undermining the professional rules then in effect. 
Many people felt threatened by these first- time filmmakers [who had] no re-
spect for common practices.” Admittedly, Truffaut had fired the first shot in 
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his articles, regularly going after screenwriters and directors, as well as the 
producers who hired them, and all those who lay claim to the French quality 
that gave them distinction. Nevertheless, the improvisation embraced by the 
directors of the Nouvelle Vague had to do with something more profound 
than their simple corporatist self- interest. The young rebels (Godard, Truf-
faut, Chabrol, Rivette, Rohmer, Malle) who demonstrated their contempt 
for simple technique had found the means to make films in part through 
family money, through personal relationships, or by working within closed 
communities. In this respect, improvisation was on the front lines of a class 
conflict. The professional unions set two social models against each other: 
on the one hand, that of a social advancement that necessitated connections 
with bourgeois circles and built its members’ reputation in opposition to the 
values of professionalism to produce a community of amateurs and new-
comers; and on the other hand, a society of craftspeople in which it was nec-
essary to pay one’s dues to get ahead and be recognized by the collectivity. 
In the latter model, it was the profession that gave individuals a social value 
based on their competence. In this case, it was craft that was to be defended 
and craft that was felt to be under attack by improvisers who used exterior 
locations, stripped- down crews, and amateur actors.
We can see here how improvisation, from the perspective of those op-
posing it, was perceived as a lack of (or an attack on) the respect to which 
people felt they were entitled. This question of respect would emerge regu-
larly during a period of social unrest marked by heightened tensions among 
different groups, classes, and generations. To improvise was also a sin of 
youth that could be pardoned more or less easily depending on the context. 
Those who had fought in the Second World War worried about a younger 
generation, seduced by materialism, that seemed to be on the rise in the 
early 1960s. Indeed, some of the older generation accused young people 
of being immoral and uncivil “monsters” (Fournier 1958). This worrisome 
youth was the focus of two hotly debated and compared films of the late 
1950s, Les tricheurs, directed by Marcel Carné (the most respected craftsman 
in French cinema), and Les cousins, the second film by the young prodigy 
Chabrol. The denunciation in both films of the incivility of selfish, disre-
spectful youth masked a deeper anxiety about the social, and thus about 
the future of a society that judged social relationships on the basis of a re-
spect whose meaning was precisely what the heroes of these films seemed 
to have lost.
The upheaval in morals engendered by modernity fed this alarm. Tradi-
tional civility, which reassured members of a group of their common desire 
improVisAtion in new wAVe cinemA 245
to live together, no longer existed; the modes of socialization surrounding 
new dances and new appetites for consumption frightened the elderly, as 
in the scene from Adieu Philippine in which a friend of the young heroine’s 
father refuses to dance a cha- cha- cha with her, saying, “You are a marvel-
lous teacher, but I prefer more tender dances, and I consider these brutal 
dances the perfect expression of the heartlessness at the heart of today’s 
youth.” It was nevertheless people like him who sent the youth of this period 
to Algeria, from which they returned with horrific memories, and it was 
precisely to “save” her friend from such a departure that the young woman 
attempted to seduce the older man. However, Adieu Philippine, filmed in 
1960, was not released until 1962. By then, the war was over, even if its 
shadow hung over the future of several of the film’s characters. And the in-
consequential love story was ultimately reassuring, as was the profile of the 
main characters, modest workers with sensible leisure activities who were 
far from the characters of Les tricheurs or Les cousins. Youth rediscovered 
the qualities of freshness and spontaneity that made it possible to find value 
in the improvisation offered up without fanfare by the filmmaker, a young 
person who improvised to escape the codes and conventions for represent-
ing youth on the screen:
The truth of character. For the first time in French cinema, here is a young 
man, he might be from public housing, or a Renault plant, or a boy’s gang. 
He isn’t an actor. In real life, he works in a bank. He came to cinema by 
accident. He doesn’t speak dialogue written to please. He says what he 
wants to say, he improvises as in cinéma- vérité. He speaks with his own 
words, in his own tone. If Mr. Delon played this role, with dialogue by 
Michel Audiard in a film by Henri Verneuil, we’d find it delicious. In this 
case, because it’s real and truthful, people protest. However, it’s the truth 
that’s making them cry out. Or, rather, it’s crying out the truth. (Collet 
1963)
In order for spontaneity to have a positive value, however, it is necessary 
that it appear in a context in which the older codes of interaction have be-
come heavy and unworkable. As long as these codes are still in force, spon-
taneity is perceived as a false mode of interaction, a threat. In Goffman’s 
terms, it is a source of unease. The valorization of spontaneity as a means of 
reviving the social bond presumes that this bond is threatened by encrusted 
conventions. In 1962, at the moment of Adieu Philippine’s release, these con-
ventions were doubly exhausted—both sociologically and dramaturgically.
The recognition of improvisation, then, produced a greater sense of 
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truth—or, conversely, of falsity, as when improvisation in one film rendered 
false the scenes of interaction written and filmed for another—in the films 
of Jacques Rozier. However, a threshold had been crossed. One soon passed 
from the impression of spontaneity to the sharing of intimacy, at that mo-
ment in which the truth of interaction threatened to become a psychodrama 
unfolding in front of the camera, at that point at which one asked actors to 
invest, in their performance, feelings, and emotions that they really felt at 
the moment of shooting. This is what Jean Rouch had asked of his actors 
in La pyramide humaine (1961). Those actors were, in fact, adolescents in 
their first year of high school in Abidjan. Rouch laid out for them the initial 
situation: a new student, white and just arrived from the homeland, sets out 
to break down the barriers between whites and blacks. These barriers, ac-
cording to Rouch, were real for the students, and the film allowed them to 
effectively overcome them. He claimed that the emotional relationships that 
produced this result, and that one sees develop in the film, really transpired 
and that his role was essentially that of exploiting the situation to dramatic 
ends, relying mostly on scenes that were improvised.
From the viewer’s perspective, this kind of improvisation places one in 
a relationship of intimacy one is not always ready to occupy or that one 
has not really desired. Viewers do not leave their social sensitivities in the 
cloakroom when they enter the viewing room. Film viewers are not voyeurs 
looking to see what they are forbidden to see. They are watching a spectacle 
legitimized by the conventions of theater (or cinema), of which the most im-
portant is this: that what confronts them is the intimacy of the characters, 
not that of the actors. When actors bare themselves, the viewer is surprised, 
even embarassed. Goffman reminds us that the spectacle of intimacy un-
folds only within the frame of a very specific kind of theatrical experience: 
that of a theater in which actors and spectators play at being intimate with-
out really being so. In real life, we are called on to manage the modesty of 
others, to protect their intimacy. In theater or cinema, tact is not required 
when we are dealing with characters. What happens when the character is 
the actor laying herself or himself bare, when she or he is no longer acting 
but living the situation as a person—when the performed interaction be-
comes, on the contrary, an instrument by which the performer reveals her 
or his intimate being? Writing about La pyramide humaine, Georges Sadoul 
suggests:
The truth—and [Rouch] tells us this—is that the game imagined for the 
film became reality. Love and rivalry were born in the course of the film, 
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leading on occasion to little dramas. . . . We would have prefered to see 
these episodes of truth rather than those others which sometimes smell of 
fiction . . . [but] if we can imagine super electronic cameras using thermo-
plastic film that made it technically possible to record romantic or social 
conflicts unknown to their protagonists, we can be sure that the very hon-
est Jean Rouch would prevent himself from pushing his quest quite that 
far. To show human intimacy on the screen is, in fact, obscene—not in a 
pornographic but in an etymological sense. The intimacy of the heart can-
not be staged, shown naked in public.17
Since Rouch’s time, however, it is not only that filmmakers no longer prevent 
themselves from pushing their quest quite so far—even though they deny 
this—and not only that viewers may or may not be duped (as when they 
perceive real relational games as scripted interaction) but that these view-
ers, without the filmmaker’s complicity, may see something hidden from 
everyone else (from filmmakers and actors) when they suspect, beneath the 
performance and outside its control, an independent interaction revealed 
in an improvisation that the viewers believe they have detected. Suddenly, 
the intimate relationship among actors, or between actors and crew, be-
comes clear to the viewer, who then “loses” the characters. If the viewer 
is embarassed, Goffman tells us, it is because he or she is pulled between 
two postures: on the one hand, that of a viewer who has paid to applaud a 
spectacle, and on the other, that of an observer who is present, much to his 
or her surprise, at a real interaction between people. The ordinary viewer 
“sympathetically and vicariously participates in the unreal world generated 
by the dramatic interplay of the scripted characters. He gives himself over. 
He is raised (or lowered) to the cultural level of the playwright’s charac-
ters and themes, appreciating allusions for which he doesn’t quite have the 
background, marital adjustments for which he doesn’t quite have the stom-
ach, varieties of lifestyle for which he is not quite ready, and repartee that 
gives to speaking a role he could not quite accept for it were he to find such 
finery in the real world” (Goffman 1986, 130). The onlooker is confronted 
with a scene of real interaction—people who are very much interacting 
under the guise of producing a performance. Two outcomes are possible: 
either the onlooker, excluded from an interaction that is taking place be-
tween actors and no longer between characters, feels out of place, even em-
barassed for having been an unexpected witness, or bound to the actors in 
a real or imaginary way, the onlooker’s sharing of intimacy may reinforce a 
sentiment of complicity with them. In the latter case, the onlooker will share 
248 FroGer
with these actors—or take pleasure in the belief that he or she is sharing—
an emotional experience that strengthens the sense of communal belonging. 
With reference to the important role played by the perception of improvisa-
tion in the critical texts defending the Nouvelle Vague, we can now under-
stand those texts as expressing a sense of closeness to those who belonged to 
this movement. To detect improvisation in the performance of an actor or in 
the approach of a director is also to attain an intimacy with this person—an 
intimacy that the game of roles and masks, in theater as in life, usually hides 
and blocks. It is to live, with that person, a moment of intimacy that is able 
to feed our imaginary attachment to them.
My analysis of the debates over improvisation that accompanied the rise 
of the Nouvelle Vague has shown the close ties between that movement and 
the social dynamics of their era. The social sensitivities of the French in the 
early 1960s were, at least in part, bound up with those particular artistic 
and aesthetic orientations that characterized the Nouvelle Vague. The social 
experience of the French was characterized by systems of values that were 
inherited, defended, or rejected by conventions and customs that regulated 
relationships and constrained them, by methods of work that enforced or 
complicated collaboration, and by frameworks of experience that protected 
reticence and modesty. For film audiences entering into the imaginary scene 
of interaction among spectators, actors, and directors, the ambivalences of a 
desire for intimacy were maintained, determined by the level of proximity 
people felt or wanted to feel with one another. The question of improvisa-
tion enables us to go to the heart of those social dynamics—of inclusion and 
exclusion, defiance and trust, promise and frustration, openness and vul-
nerability—that were engendered by the uneasy attention of people toward 
one another, toward those with whom they had to deal in the performance 
of everyday life.
Notes
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1. In Bergala’s book, we find the note that Godard sent to his American pro-
ducer, Joseph A. Levin, to justify the lack of shot breakdowns in a scene from his 
scenario for Le mépris: “This sequence will last about 20–30 minutes. It is diffi-
cult for me to recount exactly and chronologically what will happen” (quoted in 
Bergala 2006, 149). However, the structure of the scene, both dramatically and 
aesthetically, was thought out in precise terms; bits of dialogue were written; 
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and, most important, the characters’ states of mind were identified. It was up to 
Godard to find the space and rhythm with which he would orchestrate the ex-
change of looks and bodily relatonships that translated this to film.
2. Raoul Coutard, the Nouvelle Vague cameraman hired by Georges de Beaure-
gard for À bout de souffle (1959), often told the story of how Godard would treat 
filming as a kind of reportage, with cameras on the shoulder and natural light, 
which presumed if not an element of improvisation, at least a sense of profes-
sional risk, since it required that he give up such guarantees of photographic 
quality as the tripod, which minimized the camera’s incidental movements and 
directional errors, as well as the ability to control light through the use of lamps. 
The reception of these films would comment more on this “amateurishness” than 
on their improvisatory qualities.
3. For Jean Douchet (1998, 255), all of the ruptures enacted by the Nouvelle 
Vague were rooted in a concern for truthfulness aimed at preserving the impro-
vised character of life itself: “What interested the Nouvelle Vague was no longer 
the story contained in the script, but, on the basis of this script, the encounter be-
tween a unique story and the truth of life itself. The true story told by a film rose 
out of this duel between fiction and reporting. Editing, as a result, was subservi-
ent to the unpredictable and the random. lt was no longer about organizing shots 
in a pre- established, determined sequence, but about organizing the breaks, gaps 
and ruptures in sound and image which were provoked by an event and which in-
truded, in a surprising and even disruptive fashion, into camera range.”
4. “The effect of the real designates the fact that, on the basis of a sufficiently 
strong reality effect, the viewer arrives at a judgement as to the existence of the 
representational figures and assigns them a referent in the real” (Aumont and 
Marie 2007, 65). The idea is that the reality effect, which may be obtained through 
the use of those conventions acceptable to realistic representation, will be re-
inforced by an effect of the real carried by the analogic character of the image.
5. Tirez sur le pianiste (1960) was Truffaut’s biggest failure. It was photographed 
by Coutard and influenced by Godard’s techniques, which, in turn, were inspired 
by Rouch’s methods of filming.
6. In 1959, Truffaut stated in the magazine Arts, “Where the seasoned director 
shoots fifteen takes, we shoot two or three. This stimulates the actors, who have 
to take the plunge. . . . I believe strongly in chance and in the strokes of luck that 
happen during filming. Things move on a set. Filming outside shakes things up 
even more. And that allows us to be on the lookout for these kinds of accidents. 
Parfois d’improviser” (quoted in de Baecque 2009, 82).
7. Cf. André Bazin (1967, 14–15): “Viewed in this perspective, the cinema is ob-
jectivity in time. The film is no longer content to preserve the object, enshrouded 
as it were in an instant, as the bodies of insects are preserved intact, out of the 
distant past, in amber. The film delivers baroque art from its convulsive catalepsy. 
Now, for the first time, the image of things is likewise the image of their duration, 
change mummified as it were.”
8. “Twenty- seven filmmakers, including Jean Cocteau, Claude Chabrol, Jean 
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Delannoy, Julien Duvivier, George Franju, Jean- Luc Godard, Alex Joffe, Pierre 
Kast, Jean- Pierre Melville, Louis Malle, Alain Resnais, Jacques Tati and François 
Truffaut have just signed a joint protest following the replacement of Jean Aurel 
by Roger Vadim. . . . In their protest, the 27 directors declare that Roger Vadim’s 
attitude toward Jean Aurel went against the spirit of collegial brotherhood. They 
argue that one cannot replace the director of a film already underway without his 
consent, and that no argument invoking force majeure can replace the consent 
of the ousted director” (“De nombreux réalisateurs prennent Parti dans l’affaire 
Aurel- Vadim,” notice in Le monde, January 14–15, 1961). The trial took place in 
1962. Several of the filmakers who signed the petition were called on to testify, 
including Jean- Luc Godard.
9. As noted in the report of the public hearing of March 27, 1962, “Given that 
[Jean Aurel] has only himself to blame if the sequences directed by the co- 
directors were not entirely faithful to his original scenario, since, at the moment 
that the camera began filming he had only produced a third of the shot break-
downs and had not yet found the conclusion to his story; given that, faced with 
work scarcely begun, and under pressure as a result of the financial demands in-
herent in the making of any film, Roger Vadim and Claude Brûlé were obliged to 
devise the various sequences of a film whose author had not, in contravention of 
standard practice and in violation of his obligations, completed the shot break-
downs before filming, said circumstances explaining why Vadim, called upon to 
oversee the project, had to play a more important role and recreate the unfinished 
scenario.” The tribunal of the Grande Instance du Département de la Seine recog-
nized Vadim’s good faith and found Truffaut guilty of defamation.
10. The press commented on one detail of the hearing involving Bardot’s depo-
sition in the trial: while she offered, as proof of Aurel’s incompetence, the fact 
that he had forced her to redo some of the scenes shot on the first day, Truffaut 
felt compelled to reply that “Clouzot also made Mademoiselle Bardot do retakes 
of scenes already shot for La vérité.” Lifting her blond hair, which was held by 
a black headband, Bardot furiously answered, “I don’t accept the comparison. 
When Mr. Clouzot reshot scenes, those scenes were already good, and this great 
director had prepared his shot breakdowns many weeks ahead of time” (Le Berry 
Républicain, January 30, 1962).
11. On this subject, see Serge Bromberg and Ruxandra Medrea, dir: L’enfer 
d’Henri George Clouzot, documentary, 2009.
12. This is the analysis offered by Esquenazi (2004) in Godard et la société 
française des années 1960.
13. “Un Godard audacieux prisonnier d’un Godard collégien,” L’Express, Sep-
tember 14, 1961, Cinémathèque Française, on- site press clippings database. http://
www.cinematheque.fr/bibliotheque.html. Italics added for emphasis.
14. Carrefour, November 9, 1960.
15. Max Weber (1978, 40) defines “communal” relationships in terms of the sub-
jective sense of belonging.
16. It is interesting to note at this point that filmmaking professionals refused 
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to invoke improvisation to justify the basic creative dimensions of their work. 
in his study of “dance” musicians, Becker noted that those musicians who con-
sidered themselves craftsmen refused improvisation—which would have seen 
them barred from their professional milieu—but nevertheless sought to distin-
guish themselves from the simple sheet readers of dance orchestras. Their sense 
of craft allowed them to maintain their self- respect while giving them a sense of 
social inclusion that jazz improvisation would have made impossible.
17. Georges Sadoul, “La chronique de George Sadoul,” Lettres françaises, April 
27, 1961, Cinémathèque Française, on- site press clippings database. http://www 
.cinematheque.fr/bibliotheque.html.
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chApter 11
SOCIAL AESTHETICS AND 
TRANSCULTURAL IMPROVISATION
Wayde Compton and the 
Performance of Black Time
Winfried Siemerling
The presence and coexistence of deconstructive and antiessentialist im-
pulses, exemplified by postmodern artistic practices, within contestatory 
strategies of reconstructed identity formation is a recurrent issue in post-
colonial and critical race theory. I am interested here in the improvisational 
crossroads where different transcultural and migrant resources meet. Trans-
posed into new contexts and often fragmented, how can sounds and signs 
fitted to the original circumstances of their making yield a new, socially me-
diated and historically rooted aesthetics elsewhere? After a brief introduc-
tory consideration of the contingencies that come with the displacement of 
diasporic sounds facilitated by recording technologies, I look at the work 
of Wayde Compton, a black British Columbian artist who makes context- 
specific use of musical improvisation and hip hop as a model for textual 
production and turntablism- mediated performance. In works such as 49th 
Parallel Psalm (1999) and Performance Bond (2004), Compton relies on hip 
hop turning into transformative textual “lit hop” to articulate historical 
conditions, border crossings, and possible futures of black British Colum-
bian diasporic subjectivity and performance.1 But how does he achieve this 
effect by means of compositional techniques that in many cases seem to dis-
perse cultural specificity? The very processes of sampling and postmodern 
citation that drive Compton’s artistic practice, after all, have also been ac-
cused of betraying historical depth and the social relatedness of signs that 
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undergo substantial transformation in improvisational performance and 
 redeployment.
Improvisation, Sound Writing Technologies,  
and the Displacements of Diasporic Sound
Improvisation often proves to be an effective practice in the contact zones of 
diasporic and transnational cultures. Transcultural improvisation can adapt 
and appropriate existing archives, materials, and techniques and combine 
them through inventive sampling to produce new effects and solutions in a 
present defined by local circumstance. While such “dis- location” of erstwhile 
differently used ingredients is arguably the hallmark of invention generally, 
the increasing recirculation of entire entities and sequences of artistically or 
otherwise produced artifacts has also been considered a defining feature of 
postmodern intertextual and often parodic rearticulation of earlier materi-
als (see, e.g., Hutcheon 1988). Employing a term from audiovisual culture 
in this respect, the cultural theorist and curator Nicolas Bourriaud (2005) 
speaks of “postproduction”—the manipulation of previously recorded ma-
terial—as an increasingly relevant form of artistic practice.2
But to what extent do disc jockeying and other intertextually resourced 
forms of performance and improvisation convey or “eradicate” the earlier 
contexts of their presumably “raw” materials in this process of “dis- location” 
and recontextualization? Do they leave the social dimension connected 
to these contexts entirely behind? Do they elide, re- cognize, sublate, as-
similate, or otherwise mediate them? And how does this question relate to 
the status of “the social” not only of the resources, but of the performance 
itself?3 With reference to George Lewis’s distinction between Afrological 
and Eurological perspectives on improvisation,4 for instance, the musician 
and theorist Jesse Stewart (2010, 339) calls for more scholarship that brings 
into view “the culturally specific aspects of Afrological engagements with 
postmodernism.” Stewart posits an “Afro- postmodernism” that “denotes the 
kind of fragmentation, plurality, and intertextuality normally associated 
with postmodernism, but locates these processes with the cultural matrix of 
the African diaspora wherein they often function in unique ways” (340). In 
particular, he suggests, they operate here “as strategies of identity formation 
that remember and honor the cultural past, while at the same time working 
to construct visions of a better future” (340–41). Stewart’s reflections are 
particularly interesting here since they are made specifically with reference 
to DJing and turntablism and thus concern intertextual or intersonic prac-
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tices of mixing and transforming mechanically transcribed “written sound” 
that often migrates across cultures and locations.
The availability of mechanical sound transcription with Edison’s inven-
tion of the phonograph in 1877 contributed to the later dissemination and 
migration of blues, jazz, and, eventually, hip hop sounds. This development 
intensified dramatically, first with new transmission technologies from 
electromagnetic radiotelegraphy to television, and eventually again with 
digitization and its attendant possibilities of dissemination. In the words 
of Georgina Born (2005, 25), “If music notation and recording were the 
means by which musical ideas, and then sounds, became spatially mobile— 
released, or alienated, from both place and co- presence—then digital media 
have accelerated those processes.” Mechanical sound writing thus opened 
the way for a secondary orality that was increasingly freed not only from 
limits of time and space, but also from communities based on face- to- face 
contact, a necessary local condition of oral cultures that distinguished them 
from print cultures (see Anderson 1983). The media following Edison’s in-
vention facilitated what Paul Gilroy (1993, 8) calls “translocal solidarities” 
that rely on mediated nodes of exchange or appropriation of past- produced 
resources and thus unsettle the time flows and circulation patterns of “tra-
ditional” rooted cultures. The channels of conveyance and circulation sig-
nified by the agrarian metaphors of “root” and “culture” are opened to the 
chance of trades in other traditions.
These openings, however, can seem a mixed blessing. George Lipsitz 
(1994, 4) suggests that, “like other forms of contemporary mass communi-
cation, popular music simultaneously undermines and reinforces our sense 
of place. Music that originally emerged from concrete historical experiences 
in places with clearly identifiable geographic boundaries now circulates as 
an interchangeable commodity marketed to consumers all over the globe.” 
Yet while “consumption” may connote a certain passivity and absence of 
agency, it can also suggest a highly strategic and active practice of everyday 
life. This is also the case in certain styles and practices of musical consump-
tion. Gilroy (1993, 105) thus argues that through performance in “black dias-
pora styles . . . the basic units of commercial consumption in which music 
is fast frozen and sold have been systematically subverted by the practice of 
racial politics.” As he points out, such consumption as performance turns ob-
ject into event. With reference to Michel de Certeau, Gilroy calls for “an en-
hanced understanding of ‘consumption’ that can illuminate its inner work-
ings and the relationships between rootedness and displacement, locality 
and dissemination that lend them vitality in this countercultural setting” 
258 siemerlinG
(105). Indeed, for de Certeau (1988, xii– xiii) consumption channels agency 
“through its ways of using the products imposed by the dominant economic 
order.” Of course, Bourriaud (2005, 13) highlights “a scrambling of bound-
aries between consumption and production” that is typical for postmod-
ernism and notes that, “in our daily lives, the gap that separates production 
and consumption narrows each day” (33). But what interests de Certeau 
more specifically are “the tactics of consumption, the ingenious ways in 
which the weak make use of the strong” (de Certeau 1988, xvii, quoted in 
Gilroy 1993, 103).
Gilroy sees such tactics of consumption at work in the “montage” strate-
gies that musical innovators such as Kool dj Herc (a.k.a. Clive Campbell) 
operated by cutting and mixing available record tracks to produce what be-
came hip hop. Such montage, however, and the transcultural and transna-
tional migrations of hip hop and its commercialization, draw attention also 
to the relationships between what Gilroy (1993, 105) calls “rootedness and 
displacement, locality and dissemination.” Commercialization is certainly 
part and parcel of a nonetheless socially and historically specific aesthetics 
of hip hop. As the sociologist Herman Gray puts it:
Hip Hop is a commercial form fashioned from a specific confluence of so-
cial, cultural, and historical articulations that brought together different 
subjects, traditions, and narratives, recombining them so that they spoke 
to the specific local circumstances out of which they were fashioned. At the 
same time, as a popular commercial form, Hip Hop travels widely—across 
different social, geographic, media, and discursive spaces— adapting as it 
is adapted, recombining as it is itself recombined, to speak to local and 
specific conditions at the same time as it continues to signal identification 
and belonging to a global imagined community. (Gray 2003, 205)
Hip Hop in the Boondocks?
Wayde Compton is a black writer from Vancouver who often performs his 
poetry together with turntablists or improvising musicians and has done 
much to unearth the black British Columbian archive.5 His use of hip hop as 
literary metaphor and performance practice to channel black British Colum-
bian voices is a case in point. Compton has emphasized hip hop as one of 
the factors intervening in his usage of forms of black englishes: “For black 
writers in North America, these conditions constitute a new relationship to 
the old and treasured orality of our collective memory. While writers like 
sociAl Aesthetics And trAnsculturAl improVisAtion 259
Langston Hughes and Amiri Baraka looked to blues and jazz as their sources 
for memory and form in both poetry and prose (blues and jazz were received 
as much live as they were from recordings), black writers today have hip 
hop as their musical concomitant, their living extension of orality” (Comp-
ton 2003b). Compton is aware that hip hop, like any form and medium, 
comes with its own historical and cultural weight and logic. The relationship 
“between rootedness and displacement” evoked by Gilroy and Gray is one of 
Compton’s concerns when he reflects on the mediated nature of this orality 
in hip hop, and the mediation of place that determines some of the mean-
ings of consuming, and performing, hip hop in British Columbia: “Ironically, 
it is a type of music that is never quite completely live, but is plugged into a 
vast media machine that extends into every home and every ear individually 
more than communally. In the small culturally isolated black communities 
of western Canada, this individualization is exacerbated” (Compton 2003b). 
In Performance Bond, he thus speaks of “hip hop / in the boondocks, / the 
relief package / drop zone. I echo New York back / like a code cracker. / 
Reality hacker” (Compton 2004, 108). Yet he will also claim (via Chuck D), 
“Hip Hop is black Canada’s cnn [sic]. / Talk stops for no border cop” (102).
While Compton reflects critically on the mediated, transcultural, and 
potentially colonizing effects of hip hop “in the boondocks,” he effectively 
consumes and practices hip hop in de Certeau’s sense and in keeping with 
the claims to the style’s adaptability to local circumstance. Compton em-
ploys hip hop as literary structural metaphor and practiced improvisational 
form. The result is a border- crossing and intermedial social and historical 
aesthetics that adapts a number of historical and symbolic “tracks” to make 
them answer to the needs of a black British Columbian here and now.
History as Present: Legba’s Technological Tidalectics
Compton’s remixing of borders and histories for local consumption is coded 
under the sign of Legba, the Voodoo trickster at the crossroads who controls 
traffic between humanity and the loa who preside here indeed over numer-
ous other crossroads. Compton’s text crosses the borders not only between 
the written and the spoken (black) word, music, and various other modes of 
conveyance, but also between the present and the past. Consider the open-






to drums splayed for you. does rum
conduct electricity? drop a dram
on the ground to be grounded,
to be landed,
so we can dig the sound
of the switches and the channels.
Shango flows into the amp.
the tubes warm up.
the filaments erupt.
go fourth and multiply,
go north and fly
to each cardinal point,
and us just
the forth generation from slavery. (Compton 1999, 12)
The book opens under the sign of the “mc,” here the first in a “cast” that 
is introduced in the first section and that includes, among others, Sam, the 
Voodoo loa of Baron Samedi; J. D., the initials of James Douglas, the first 
governor of British Columbia; and, at the end, dj, the disc jockey as modern- 
day griot, Papa Labas or Legba at the crossroads.
The opening doubled invocation of a “conductor” replays and mixes musi-
cal and electronic references with historical tracks that point here to the 
legacies of slavery, black disenfranchisement, and diaspora. The “conduc-
tor” as Underground Railroad guide across borders and to freedom of op-
pression takes on multiple references and overtones, first in musical terms as 
a kind of orchestral dj, and then in electronic terms as a channeling device.
These doublings of the first line are replayed and complicated by the line 
break, with its remix of the word “overture.” In terms of doubled content, 
the break signals historical pastness (e.g., of the Underground Railroad and 
the following history of black British Columbia) together with, or as a form 
of, a new beginning, as “over” becomes “overture”: musical and historical 
opening, but also “overture” as “proposal,” a meaning that also links the past 
of “over” to future possibilities.
The line break links also with some of Compton’s acknowledged inspira-
tions—for instance, Black Mountain– influenced Vancouver tish poetics6 
along with Edward Kamau Brathwaite’s poetic trilogy The Arrivants (see 
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Compton 2003a, 492–97) and his concept of “tidalectis,” with its emphasis 
on repetition. In the introduction to his anthology Bluesprint, Compton de-
scribes the larger emphasis on repetition in tidalectics as
an Africanist model for thinking about history. . . . In contrast to Hegel’s 
dialectics . . . tidalectics describes a way of seeing history as a palimpsest, 
where generations overlap generations, and eras wash over eras like a 
tide on a stretch of beach. . . . Repetition, whether in the form of ances-
tor worship or the poem- histories of the griot, informs black ontologies 
more than does the Europeanist drive for perpetual innovation, with its 
concomitant disavowals of the past. In a European framework, the past 
is something to be gotten over, something to be improved upon; in tida-
lectics, we do not improve upon the past, but are ourselves versions of the 
past. (Compton 2001, 17)
Commenting again on Brathwaite’s tidalectics in a discussion of the con-
nection between poetry and hip hop turntablism, Compton applies similar 
ideas of repetition and variation to small- scale decisions of utterance and 
rearticulation in black and electronic orality (here especially through remix-
ing): “I think he means that each person, each beat, each stage of culture is a 
version of the last one, and is not a progressive disjuncture. If this is the case, 
then the orality of temporally and spatially removed Africa can also be this 
new electronic orality. The idea is not to break, or even to preserve, but to re-
peat; and to celebrate repetition, knowing that you will mis- duplicate—and 
that the mis- duplications are the closest achievable thing to an actual you” 
(Compton 2003b). This sense of connection and repetition also plays out, 
on a smaller scale, in the sound repetitions and connections that modulate 
meanings and overlays as “mc” continues its remixing of historical tracks, 
personal identity, electronic circuitry, and Voodoo mythologies. From the 
narrator’s dance we come to drums, associated with the Voodoo loa Shango, 
and then—guided again by the sound pattern—to a dram of rum, often asso-
ciated with Baron Samedi, the loa of death but also of sex and resurrection 
(and the subject of the following poem). The poem first inquires about rum 
as a “conductor” in its various senses (material, spiritual, historical), then 
recommends a small sacrifice of it—or feeding of the loa—“to be grounded / 
to be landed” as immigrant in this enabling tidalectic mixing of Voodoo my-
thology, black history, and electronics. This circuitry continues as Shango, 
the loa associated with thunder and hence the African resistance to enslave-
ment, as well as with drums and music, dance and art, is amplified by the 
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old- school heat- radiating conducting technology of tubes and filaments. The 
remix, here, is clearly part of a historical and social aesthetics, replaying 
and mis- duplicating in the next lines Noah’s post- deluge command “go forth 
and multiply”—also urban slang for “get lost”—as the misspelling doubled 
double “go fourth and multiply” to signify finally the direct connection (“go 
north . . . and us / just the forth generation from slavery”) between the 
speaker’s here and now with slavery- fleeing earlier generations of the black 
diaspora moving north into Canada.
At the Border of History and the Present:  
Legba’s Turntables, James Douglas, and the dj
The enabling figure of Legba is omnipresent in Compton’s improvisational 
tidalectics. As Voodoo trickster at the crossroads, he is here also the gate-
keeper at the border. He appears later in “mc” and then again in two poems 
connected as inverted doubles by their titles, “jd” and “dj.” The first title 
evokes James Douglas, the mixed- race first governor of British Columbia, 
who invited a founding group of blacks from San Francisco to cross the bor-
der into his province in 1858. The inversion of his initials as the title of a 
poem a few pages later, “dj,” relates him to the manipulator of tracks and 
hip hop. The time- crossing remix of the two signals, or what Compton calls 
“the temporal conflation of past, present and future (synchronic narrative)” 
that he associates with Voodoo syncretism (Compton 2003a, 484), channels 
again a historical and social aesthetics through tidalectic Voodoo poetics 
and electronic media. Compton’s James Douglas, apostrophized as “our own 
quadroon Moses,” is a Legba at the crossroads:
you held the keys
like a lesser Legba—laughing, shuffling passports,
passing
in your black and white
archival stance. (Compton 1999, 18)
Chains of alliteration and assonance tidalectically replay and remix here 
again sounds that lead from a “lesser Legba” to “laughing” and “shuffling” 
(and thus, card playing and chance), and from “passports” to James Doug-
las’s own “passing” and mixed race. This “black and white” is then remixed 
as the signifier of print and of the vagaries of historiography and the writ-
ten archive.
The later, doubling poem “dj” calls on “Papa Labas / [to] open the doors / 
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straddle the roles,” after invoking the dj as the conductor at the crossroads 
of contemporary narratives, secondary orality, and knowledge:




holds in his collection the keys to corporeal
wisdom
this body of texts
these twelve- inch tables of counterclockwiseness. . .
more singles in the crates than scrolls in the ancient library
of Alexandria. (Compton 1999, 25)
Compton’s 49th Parallel Psalm closes with the section “Hear,” a counterpart 
in the present to the earlier “Their” and equally predicated on the oral. The 
very last poem is “49th Parallel Psalm,” which invokes again the dj with 
two “parallel” circles inserted after the line, “living on the weals of steal” 
(see figure 11.1). Concrete poetry here remixes the wheels of steel—or turn-
tables—themselves as the conjunction of time and chance, with a dj Legba 
controlling the crossfader between the two “reinventing wheels.”
The clock of the right circle is doubled by a wheel of an American roulette 
on the left (which, in contrast to the single- zero French wheel, uses both 0 
and 00 for the bank, increasing its statistical advantage). Compton makes 
Fig. 11.1 Reprinted from 49th Parallel Psalm by Wayde Compton (Arsenal Pulp Press, 1999) with 
permission of the publisher.
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a few substitutions: number 1, the sign of beginning, has been replaced by 
two numbers 11: a doubled double. One of these takes up the place of the 
numbers 1 and 13, with the latter thus also missing, as is its inversion, 31. 
Note that in roulette, the croupier or dealer spins the wheel and the ball in 
opposite directions, like the dj when scratching the “twelve- inch tables of 
counterclockwiseness” (Compton 1999, 25).
Turntablism thus becomes the sign and medium of the dj Legba and of 
tidalectics: two circles doubling, mixing time at the crossroads between past 
and present, turning horizontal progression and dialectics into vertical repe-
tition and counter- clockwiseness. The remixing of the tracks of history and 
time thus envision the past as accessible resource of the present, suggesting 
agency and another chance.
Vèvè
Compton includes a performance of turntablism and mcing on a cd that 
is part of Performance Bond. Significantly titled “The Reinventing Wheel,” 
it offers examples of a secondary orality as remix of history, opening up 
to crossroads of past and future at the faultlines and interstices of its re-
iteration.7 As one line states, “The rupture is the inscription, the brokenness 
the tradition” (Compton 2004,103). The corresponding printed section pre-
cedes directly the section “Rune” on Vancouver’s former black neighbor-
hood, Hogan’s Alley, which was erased by urban planning and a road via-
duct around 1970. One of the first poems here, “Vèvè,” articulates in other 
ways the interventionist tidalectics of “The Reinventing Wheel.”
“Vèvè” is the sign in Voodoo that invokes Legba as the master of the cross-
roads, and the poem with this title is followed, toward the end of Perfor-
mance Bond, by further historical remixes and border crossings. We find 
here, for instance, a photo essay that reenvisions doors under the signs of 
a reinvented black community, such as a “Coloured Benevolent Society,” a 
Muslim temple, a black newspaper, and the “Pacific Negro Working Men’s 
Association.” Another remix supplements oral histories with black Vancou-
ver residents, originally recorded by Daphne Marlatt and Carole Itter (1979) 
and reprinted in Compton’s Bluesprint, with two further oral testimonies 
attributed to a fictive volume, Portals: East Vancouver Oral Histories (1972).8 
These invocations are thus prefaced by Compton’s “Vèvè” itself, a dialogue 
that takes place on a bench “beside the Georgia Viaduct,” the former site of 
Hogan’s Alley. Two characters whose names reference modes of recording 
and conveyance, Digital and Analogue, discuss Brathwaite’s poem equally 
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entitled “Vèvè,” and his evocation of Legba at the end of The Arrivants. 
Brathwaite here evokes Legba’s sign as the ground of writing, albeit a bro-
ken one.9
When Analogue uses his trail mix snack food to pour a version of Legba’s 
“Vèvè” on the broken ground of Hogan’s Alley, it is eaten up by pigeons, an 
evanescence that prompts Digital to inquire about more permanent materi-
als such as ink. A coyote—another incarnation of the trickster— walking 
by unnoticed (Compton 2004, 120), however, signals the efficacy of the 
Vèvè, despite its subsequent erasure. Analogue later suggests that “maybe 
an ephemeral language that can drift away in the wind or be eaten by birds 
would be able to say things we can’t think of” (121). The writing of the Vèvè 
is ephemeral, a performance and evocation in real time, yet the vanishing 
result of this writing performance—if the passing coyote is any indication—
has the power to invoke Legba. Analogue remarks, “It’s more than language, 
it’s sorcery or worship. It’s a portal between worlds,” adding later, “I don’t 
think it’s quite right to call it writing. I think what Brathwaite means is that 
it’s the beginning of writing or the urge to make a new kind of language, one 
unique to the New World” (118–19).
It is no coincidence that Brathwaite’s poem appears at the very end of a 
trilogy, in a section called “Beginning,” just as Compton’s “Vèvè” comes in 
the last section as preface to his remixed “portals” of Hogan’s Alley. This 
Vèvè is thus a preface at the end that invokes Legba to grant the remix of 
history, passage at the border, and conveyance to the loa. The performance 
of writing the sign—and Compton’s section title can be seen as both de-
scriptive and performative—is a conjuring that invokes a new language with 
transforming powers, crossing borders from a past that elides black histories 
into a new history and future mediated by acts of tidalectic writing.
While the signs and materials of this performance and social aesthet-
ics belong to diasporic archives and displacements—Voodoo, Caribbean 
(Bajan) exilic writing, hip hop—they are adopted and adapted here to speak 
to the (re- )rooting of a dispersed local history and culture. The history and 
culture of black British Columbia is tidalectically re/cognized by Compton’s 
lit- hop portals. Compton’s texts and performances not only cross geographi-
cal borders of the African diaspora but also reconfigure possibilities of mem-
ory that include black diasporic experience and the remixing of history and 
storytelling with the performative power of invocations.
Compton’s sampling of resources is in many respects improvisational, but 
at the same time it follows certain scripts that are not indeterminate with 
respect to their social contexts. The terms “transcultural” and “hybrid” have 
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to be used with a certain caution, in this respect, to speak of the encounters 
in historical and geographical “contact zones” orchestrated in 49th Paral-
lel Psalm and Performance Bond. The term “transculturation,” originally de-
veloped by the Cuban sociologist and ethnomusicologist Fernando Ortiz in 
the study of Cuban culture, was used by Mary Louise Pratt in its entry into 
Anglophone literary studies in 1992 to denote critical selection and appro-
priation by subaltern social actors in the “contact zone” for contestatory 
or survival purposes. (The term also entered other literary fields, as well 
as psychology, health care, and management studies.) In many of its sub-
sequent migratory incarnations, however, the term has tended to signify a 
kind of hybridity that often elides cultural specificity.
But Compton’s improvisation and consumption of hip hop are circum-
scribed by socially identifiable tactics that offer an aesthetic that, I would 
argue, remains dialogic—or what he calls tidalectic—rather than dialectic. 
The performative moment of the circulation of the signs and relocation of 
archives and contexts—the moment of transcultural encounter facilitated 
by sound- writing technologies—does not efface their singular particulari-
ties. Compton’s choices at the crossfader that connect his resources are im-
provisational, perhaps not so much in the real time of a sound performance 
as in their decisions, which are often led by the sound qualities of the sig-
nifier in the real time of writing and composition. These moments of im-
provisation bind the signs together, however, to make their social particu-
larity more striking, not to subsume them under the hybrid logic of their 
 circulation.
Notes
1. Compton also recuperates black British Columbian writing in his anthology 
Bluesprint (2001) and records oral history as a member of the Hogan’s Alley 
Memorial Project, which is dedicated to preserving the memory of a black neigh-
borhood in Vancouver that was erased by urban planning.
2. For Bourriaud (2005, 29), “emblematic figures” in this context are not only 
the dj but also the programmer, producers of the “emergence of a new cultural 
configuration” that seems to answer to the demands of Guy Debord’s situation-
ist “Methods of Detournement” (1981; originally published in 1956). Debord de-
manded that the “literary and artistic heritage of humanity should be used for 
partisan propaganda purposes. . . . Any elements, no matter where they are taken 
from, can serve in making new combinations” (quoted in Bourriaud 2005, 29).
3. In this respect, Bourriaud’s Postproduction (2005) rearticulates aspects of a 
postmodern aesthetics that emphasizes the active role of the audience and inter-
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action to the point of blurring the line of producing and consuming art. Yet the 
“cultural” itself is marginalized here to the extent of its disappearance: any aes-
thetics of the transcultural one might find here seems socially fairly indetermi-
nate. While his aesthetics of the “encounter” puts a premium on sociability, the 
social dimensions mediated in this “contact zone” (to use Pratt’s phrase from 
1991) point mainly in the direction of de- scripting and defamiliarization.
4. Lewis (1996) critiques John Cage’s elision of jazz in his statements about ex-
perimental music, which emphasize spontaneity, uniqueness, indeterminacy, and 
“chance operations” but at the same time dismiss jazz. Jazz improvisation, how-
ever—and certainly the bebop innovators who changed U.S. music a few years 
before Cage made his comments about jazz—can lay claim to the central notions 
adduced by Cage. As part of his critique, Lewis (1996) also makes it clear that for 
“African- American improvisers . . . sonic symbolism is often constructed with a 
view toward social instrumentality as well as form.” Any elision of social speci-
ficity thus would radically underdetermine such forms of improvisation. Or, as 
Walter Muyumba (2009, 18) puts it, “Studying how musicians communicate in 
jazz performance is a way of developing a more cultural music theory and a more 
musical culture theory.”
5. For an example of a performance by Wayde Compton (with Nick Storring), 
see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4MuUirGB2Oo. Compton’s collections of 
poetry are 49th Parallel Psalm (1999) and Performance Bond (2004). He has edited 
the groundbreaking anthology Bluesprint (2001) and further commented on this 
corpus and his own work in After Canaan (2010).
6. The tish poets—identified with the Vancouver tish poetry newsletter 
launched in 1961—include Geroge Bowering, Frank Davey, Daphne Marlatt, and 
Fred Wah. Their influences include the Black Mountain poets Robert Creely, 
Robertt Duncan, and Charles Olsen.
7. See also the sound sample in Compton, “The Reinventing Wheel,” http://
www.horizonzero.ca/flashsite/issue8/issue8.html?lang=en&section=compton.
8. Incidentally, 1972 is Compton’s year of birth.
9. “So on this ground, / write; / within the sound / of this white limestone 
vèvè, . . . / talk / of the empty roads, / vessels of your head, / claypots, shards, 
ruins. . . . / the Word becomes / again a god and walks among us / look, here 
are his rags, / here is his crutch and his satchel / of dreams; here is his hoe and 




Contact Improvisation, Mobile Performances,  
and Dancing through Twitter
Susan Kozel
“Devices of existence” are the mechanisms, movements, and media of life 
(Bourriaud 2002, 103). The expression is borrowed from Nicolas Bourriaud’s 
writing on relational aesthetics, but in this chapter on dance improvisation 
and social aesthetics, the word “device” takes on several meanings that ex-
tend beyond Bourriaud. It is used as both a noun and a verb: improvisation 
is frequently a tool for devising a performance; the literal and metaphorical 
devices of life become either content or context within dance; and our media 
devices (mobile phones, computers) become vehicles for the presentation 
or creation of movement. Bourriaud acts as a starting point for these re-
flections, but his formulation of relationality is not necessarily social; nor 
is it particularly embodied. Jacques Rancière’s (2009a) writing on aesthet-
ics takes us further along the path toward a sensory approach to social aes-
thetics, and finally, the play of improvisation and intercorporeality in two 
unconventional dance events is addressed by a reading of Jacques Derrida’s 
(2005) role for the anesthetic within the aesthetic, the insensible within the 
sensible. Rancière’s framing of aesthetics as a reconfiguration of forms of 
perception combined with Derrida’s thoughts on the anesthetic yield a way 
to account for the less immediate, less celebrated qualities of social aesthetic 
experience, such as anticipation, delay, and uncertainty, as well as the disin-
tegration and reconstruction of memory.
Two dance events will be considered: Small Acts (2010) by the choreog-
rapher Ben Wright, performed at the Skånes Dansteater in Malmö, Swe-
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den, and the IntuiTweet project (2009–2010) by Mia Keinänen, Susan Kozel, 
and Leena Rouhiainen occurring in the networked digital space of Twitter 
and Short Message Texting (sms). My perspective on these improvisations 
comes from different phenomenological positions: with Small Acts I was a 
member of the audience, and with IntuiTweet I was one of the dance artists.1 
Small Acts, a dance performance with multiple choreographic layers, gener-
ates reflections on the transformation of relations between performer and 
audience, distributing and recombining the dance so that those who watch 
also contribute their own improvised movements to it. IntuiTweet used Twit-
ter as the media/medium for improvisational exchanges and asked whether 
bodily intuition could exist within social networking. This project yielded 
unexpected insight into the variations of touch across distance, making it an 
unusual example of contact improvisation: the contact between dancers was 
palpable but asynchronous and dislocated. Dancers were not located in the 
same place or time, and movement was mediated not just by technology but 
by words. Motion was transferred through text messages.
This chapter enacts three theoretical shifts. The first is to consider so-
cial aesthetics not through improvisation in general, but through contact 
improvisation in dance. The second is to refigure contact improvisation— 
frequently viewed in terms of a somewhat athletic practice of leaps, sup-
ports, inversions, and falls—into a practice based on touch: touch between 
audience members and performers and touch between dancers through mo-
bile technologies. The third shift is to see touch according to a phenomeno-
logical experience of contact; as something that is ceaselessly interrupted. 
Contact implicitly becomes “con- tact,” with a hiatus in the middle of it that 
makes a dynamic slippage integral to the sense of touch (Derrida 2005, 229). 
These shifts will provide an opening for relational aesthetics to be applied 
to dance events and expand the notion of contact improvisation so that it 
might be useful for other art forms. Further, the improvisation practices 
illuminated in the two dance events can be seen as models for social inter-
action in a more general sense, the creation or re- creation of bonds between 
people giving rise to “new modes of confrontation or participation” (Ran-
cière 2009a, 21).
The Intimate Bedlam of Small Acts
Small Acts was a performance that invited audience members to travel 
through all areas of the Skånes Dansteatre building in the Western Harbor 
district of Malmö to discover the movement of the dancers.2 The mobility 
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and the improvisation of this piece will be read through the actions not of 
the dancers but of the audience members. The notion of audience generally 
applied to theater and dance events implies containment and singularity (we 
refer to “an” audience, and it tends to be planted in numbered seats facing 
forward) that are not appropriate to the mobile, fluctuating group of people 
who visited Small Acts. This dance event did not occur in a theatrical space 
as much as it transformed the working parts of a theater into an array of 
public spaces; as such, we were less like audience members than like mem-
bers of the public. With the assistance of maps, we journeyed through the 
innards of the building. We walked the backstage corridors, crowded into 
the workshops and wardrobe, ventured into rehearsal studios, and noticed 
small meeting rooms silently waiting to be animated by bodies. The only 
space we skirted was the black box theater itself; it remained quiet and dark.
We peered over others’ shoulders to see dancers performing steps that 
navigated qualities between the lightness of studio movement and the 
weight of street movement. The dancers wore a jumbled array of outdoor 
clothing and shoes, exuding a sense of delight at being part of the intimate 
bedlam of dancing around and among 250 peripatetic members of the pub-
lic. Rooms and passages of opaque plastic, illuminated by fluorescent bar 
lights along the floor, were built within rehearsal studios and workshops. 
These structures became important filtering devices as both dancers and 
public entered and exited like fluid pouring into and out of containers. The 
category of relational art is not applied as readily to dance as to other prac-
tices that stem from the visual and sculptural domains, but the dynamic and 
ephemeral qualities of dance, when combined with experimentation in con-
ventions of viewing and use of space such as that which occurred with this 
piece, invite aesthetic formulations of relationality. Small Acts constructed 
“undecided situations” for the audience members, producing “a displace-
ment of perception, a passage from status of spectator to that of actor, and 
a reconfiguration of places” (Rancière 2009a, 23–24).
Frequently it was impossible to find a place inside these crowded little 
rooms, and the movement had to be witnessed from outside. Watching the 
silhouettes of people and listening to their shuffling and breathing, it was 
possible to infer or imagine what might be happening inside the rooms. 
The process of finding the dance became a bit of a scavenger hunt: follow-
ing other audience members, pursuing a dancer who dashed from one loca-
tion to another down corridors or up stairs, or deciding to walk against the 
flow along a seemingly deserted hallway. This was a highly social event not 
just because of the feeling of being in a slightly chaotic and crowded pub-
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lic space while trying to view a performance, but because the rhythm of the 
experience was measured differently from more formal choreography. The 
improvisation of the dancers seemed to occur in between choreographic 
sequences and was shaped by members of the public simply by virtue of our 
being present and obstructing the paths of the dancers in our attempts to 
see what was happening. On a subtler level, the rhythm of the improvisation 
was affected by attempts on the part of the public to anticipate where the 
movement might go next. It is possible to say that anticipation is one of the 
modes of improvisation—in this case, anticipation on the part of the audi-
ence members, not just the performers. The state of anticipation is ambigu-
ous. It cannot be pinned to specific senses but is powerfully affective and is 
crucial for dance improvisation. It is like an inhalation of breath, a moment 
of suspension that is not beyond the senses but is not tied explicitly to them, 
either. It is an enhanced state of receptivity, a breathing space where antici-
pation opens onto imagination and is tinged with memory.
Up to a point, Bourriaud’s (2002, 18) formulation of relational aesthetics 
is helpful in understanding the improvisation of the audience members in 
Small Acts—for example, relational art “is a state of encounter” rather than 
an object as such. With Small Acts, it is clear that my movements through 
the rooms and corridors, in concert with that of other members of the public 
and the dancers, were the very fabric of the aesthetic experience. This piece 
came to being through public interaction—or improvisation—between the 
dancers and the public. The choreography was not a pattern of movement 
that could exist on its own; without those who participated as audience 
members it would not exist. Bourriaud continues to shed light on the ex-
perience, for it is true that the scope of the piece was more than just an en-
counter among people. It encompassed human interactions and a particu-
lar social context rather than a private symbolic space (14). The cultural 
symbolic space of the theater was inverted so that the public spaces within 
the theater building became private or closed off, and the normally private 
spaces were opened to performance. Yet if we read him more closely, it is 
evident that Bourriaud’s focus remains largely with the art object: it may 
be rendered transitive, dynamic, dialogic, open- ended, and multiple, but 
relationality remains a structural response to an artistic ancien régime of 
generating static and contained artwork. “Transitivity,” he writes, “is as old 
as the hills. It is a tangible property of the artwork. Without it, the work is 
nothing other than a dead object, crushed by contemplation” (26). Transi-
tivity is the “formal disorder which is inherent to dialogue” mapped onto an 
object. Even his evocative explanation of form as “a lasting encounter” or 
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a “principle of dynamic agglutination” takes its perspective from the object 
rather than squarely from the social, let alone from the corporeal (19–21). 
For him, art invents new relations “to the body” or “to the ‘mysteries’ of 
life and death,” as if art and body were objects juxtaposed, rather than art’s 
being inseparable from the experience of bodies (92).
Obviously, this is a phenomenologist’s critique of Bourriaud: I cannot help 
but experience the world through my body. And it is equally a dancer’s cri-
tique: my knowledge is corporeal, and there can be no real distinction be-
tween the sensible and the intelligible, even though they may coexist un-
evenly. Still, it is not desirable to dismiss Bourriaud too quickly, for he excels 
at the poetic encapsulation, if not at its elaboration. When he writes, “By cre-
ating and staging devices of existence including working methods and ways 
of being, instead of concrete objects which hitherto bounded the realm of 
art, the artists use time as a material” (Bourriaud 2002, 103), he provides a 
rough outline of a dynamic aesthetic ontology. Without heading off on too 
much of a tangent at this point, it is important to point out that the approach 
to aesthetics in this chapter is ontological, accessed by means of a variation 
on phenomenology. This is to say that these reflections are not concerned 
with formal structures of the work or its meaning as much as they reveal the 
dynamic ebb and flow of states of encounter of all the participants, where 
everyone is, in some sense, a performer. This dynamic ontology is brought 
to life by experimental work such as Small Acts and IntuiTweet.
Small Acts invited shifts in perception regarding what was expected from 
a dance and who was defined as a dancer. This experience was as much 
about glimpses of dance, and traces of dance, as it was about actually see-
ing dance in a standard performative mode, where sight lines are clear and 
movement is constructed to face forward toward a bank of seats. I arrived 
at a room just as the audience and dancers left, and for a moment felt I 
was mis- timing my choices of where to go and whom to follow. The action 
seemed to be eluding me. I turned the corner of a plastic- walled room just 
as the last person had scurried out of it in search of further dance, and my 
internal narratives and expectations washed over me. I am not doing this 
properly, I thought. I am missing something in another room. Which room? 
I did not know. The dance over there might be more interesting than the 
non- dance here. I experienced a strange numbness because I did not know 
how to respond to what I was sensing; then a sudden, unexpected shift in 
perception made the heat and residual vibrations of movement evident. I 
began to sense the space: dance happened here a moment ago. It was pal-
pable, and I found myself imagining what I had just missed. In this moment 
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my aesthetic experience coincided with Rancière’s (2009a, 14) reformula-
tion of aesthetics as a way to identify art when the border between art and 
not art is increasingly challenged and, more important, as a “redistribution 
of the relations between the forms of sensory experience.” In other words, 
dance that embraces what might be called “non- dance” is art both because 
of its experiments with aesthetic convention and because of the impact it 
has on the performers and audience: it scrambles our sensory perception.3 
What seems at first like chaos or one’s expectations being cruelly thwarted 
(“Why can I never really see what the dancers are doing?”) are actually 
alternative orderings of senses and meaning. “Aesthetics,” he writes, “is the 
thought of the new disorder” (13). Small Acts offered a glimpse into this dis-
order: experience of the dancers was mediated by my having to navigate 
cramped spaces and unexpected breaks in movement (dancers leaving the 
space); further, concrete sense perception (what I actually saw) collided 
with memory and imagination (what I thought I saw, what I might see). I 
did not see the dance directly, but I heard it; I sensed it kinesthetically; I an-
ticipated, recalled, or imagined it, all while it was happening. Further, this 
“new disorder” of relational aesthetics is not a solitary experience. The ways 
we navigated, perceived, anticipated, and recollected a performance were 
reconfigured across multiple bodies.
Finding myself in a room recently vacated by the Small Acts dancers and 
by the cohort of audience members who had managed to squeeze in, the de-
cision became one of staying where I was, in this room still resonating with 
movement, or going somewhere else to find more dance. The dance outside 
the room became increasingly compelling because I did not know where or 
what it was or which combination of dancers might reconfigure. The deci-
sion to stay where I was and to absorb the no- longer- there- yet- still- palpable 
dance was a crucial moment, because the dance was very much present, but 
differently. In the space, like a ripple on my skin, I remembered the move-
ment I had just seen and reconstructed what I had just missed with both 
my memory and my imagination. I was already inventing the story of the 
dance that had just happened. In this way, I contributed to the aesthetic con-
struction in which I was participating. The many disappearances of dance 
I experienced with Small Acts, either because the choreography dissolved 
around me and dancers left the space one by one or because I chose to aban-
don a room with ongoing dance, were like breaks in the moments of contact, 
fissures in the immediacy of the experience.
A subtler interpretation of the roles played by anticipation and recollec-
tion in this sort of distributed performance is based on the acknowledgment 
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that one is always missing some part of the dance, that one has an awareness 
of what is not present. There is an absence of dance within the dance, and 
the sense of confusion or numbness I encountered before a burst of new sen-
sation can be illuminated (or, some might say, rendered more confusing) by 
considering Derrida’s role for the “anesthetic” within aesthetic experience.4 
Derrida (2005, 229) presents a phenomenological point of view, which is 
to say that he attempts to understand contact not just abstractly but based 
on an actual moment of contact or the lived experience of touch. What is 
revealed is that contact is suspended in the middle of the moment of con-
tact; thus, an “anesthetic interruption” is embedded in the experience of 
contact.5 This explains why he prefers to split the word “contact” with a 
hyphen, making it “con- tact.” He writes that it is impossible to have contact 
and a sense (or understanding) of contact at the same time, but that we con-
stantly slide between the two; taken from the perspective of improvisation, 
it is possible to say that moments of “non- contact” that confuse the senses 
and seem to be outside the fluidity of aesthetic experience are all part of the 
experience of contact.
The ripples of touch, of contact and losing contact, are rhythmic because 
they occur in syncopation. They occur across intervals. “Such haptical (or 
aesthetic in general) différence, which is interruption, interposition, detour 
of the between in the middle of contact, could analogically open onto what 
[Jean- Luc] Nancy calls a ‘syncope’ or what [Jean] Chrétien terms interval, 
the ‘intervallic character of touch itself ’” (Derrida 2005, 229). This rhyth-
mic alternation between touch and not touching, contact and losing contact, 
resonates with Rancière’s assertion that aesthetics is the reconfiguration of 
the relations among forms of sensory experience. When senses are reconfig-
ured, they slip in and out of familiar patterns. Derrida goes on to say that 
there is a necessity of “insensibility within sensibility,” as if the absence of 
sense is essential to sense. This addresses a basic but important motivation 
for aesthetic innovation—and, indeed, improvisation—which is that if we 
want to escape rigid habits that control what we see and how we move, 
we need to be interrupted by difference. That which is different can at first 
seem to be anesthetic, or nothing (229). The anesthetic or the insensible is 
not a deadening or an absence of sense—or, at least, not for long. It can be 
construed as that which is outside immediate experience, on its margins in 
the form of memory, anticipation, or confusion. Or it can be that which is 
simply not yet understood or comprehended, such as new artistic practices.
A duet between the dancers Graham Adey and Sam Denton took place in a 
small patch of a large studio on a layer of shredded black plastic that looked 
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like feathers or ashes. I found myself gratefully absorbing the movement of 
other bodies; receiving the movement felt like being stroked. Not just how 
I perceived art but how I received it became relevant. By this point in the 
performance, I had shifted to a far more expansive and receptive mode, less 
goal- directed. Perception is so frequently construed as outwardly focused 
and evaluative, while reception involves the permission to let something 
in or to be lured into it. There is a difference between being drawn into a 
movement exchange or being kept at a remove from the internal workings 
of a choreography and left to admire from the outside. It must be said that 
there is nothing wrong with the aesthetics of virtuosity and externality, and 
at times this is exactly what we desire from an artistic event, but Small Acts 
fostered a version of social aesthetics that is valuable for being inclusive, 
for stimulating thought and community. As an aesthetic experience it pro-
vided a moment of living in the world differently and, perhaps, with more 
openness and delight. The suggestion that watching dance can be like being 
stroked or absorbing the movement of another into the fabric of one’s being 
implies that as a member of the audience I was not just in an improvisatory 
relationship with the performers (whereby they moved and I moved) but 
that the improvisation was based on contact. Touch, as metaphor and con-
crete experience, was the aesthetic foundation of this experience.
This is a good point to transition to a discussion of IntuiTweet, which was 
in part about offering one’s movement to another so that it could be em-
bodied and owned by someone else before being released again. These two 
projects are variations on a theme of con- tact.
The Distributed Improvisation of IntuiTweet
IntuiTweet (2009–2010) occurs at a point of overlap between social aes-
thetics and social media. It was an experiment in improvisation initiated 
by three dancer-researchers (Mia Keinänen, Leena Rouhiainen, and me) in 
which we filtered moments of movement intuition through the medium of 
Twitter, the immensely popular social networking platform, so that they 
could be exchanged and transformed.6 Before describing the details of the 
project, it is helpful to locate it in a broader cultural and intellectual context. 
IntuiTweet is part of a particular trend within digitally mediated aesthetics: 
artistic projects that transform modes of presentation and perception. Im-
plied by such a transformation is “a break with the hierarchical order that 
determined which subjects and forms of expression were deemed worthy of 
inclusion in the domain of a given art” (Rancière 2009a, 10). At stake, Ran-
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cière elaborates, is not just art but also “the ways in which our world is given 
to perceiving itself” and the way “powers that be assert their legitimacy” 
(15). This is what he refers to as the regime of art: a broad compilation of 
politics, intelligibility, and sensibility.
The hierarchical order, to use Rancière’s expression, did not manifest 
itself as hesitation on the part of dancers or the art world to embrace tech-
nology. Significant numbers of dancers, choreographers, programmers, and 
funding bodies in many countries create and support collaborative inter-
disciplinary work using a range of digital technologies. Twitter has been 
famously lambasted for being superficial, trivial, and, despite its undisputed 
place as a widespread social phenomenon, an enabler of people’s basest de-
sires. It is regularly used as a trope in other cultural forms, such as journal-
ism and television programming (from comedy to drama), to indicate dumb-
ing down and sacrificing integrity.7 Oddly, a strong current determining 
what was legitimate or acceptable behavior came not from the art world but 
from the attitudes, codes, and conventions surrounding the use of Twitter 
in general. The mechanisms for conformity emerging from within the Twit-
ter community itself constrained its creative range as much as externally 
imposed attitudes. In effect, the hierarchical order came from within. De-
spite its crowd- sourced, decentralized, and do- it- yourself principles, there 
is a form of Twitter etiquette that dominates (for better and for worse) its 
use. According to several Twitter etiquette sites, Twitter should continue to 
be about answering the simple question, “What are you doing?” or, in its 
current version, “What’s happening?”8 As one article states, “All tweets are 
prompted by the question ‘What are you doing?’ Many people don’t answer 
the question, and others are religious about it. Does it irritate people if you 
don’t answer the question? Sometimes. Should those people take a deep 
breath? Possibly.”9 Of course, social networking needs to be insulated as 
much as possible from insulting, threatening, and abusive behavior, but 
other, softer directives for appropriate conduct coincide with Rancière’s 
concern over hierarchical orders that define expression and how a commu-
nity perceives itself.10 The shift initiated by IntuiTweet was to use Twitter not 
just to report what we were doing but also to explore what we were sensing 
or intuiting and how we were moving. This expressive mode exists in a gray 
zone, for Twitter etiquette tends to steer its users away from tweeting their 
personal states: “Your weirdly honest confession terrifies me” and “Don’t 
just post about you, you, you. Not only is this directly against what Twitter is 
all about, it will get you ignored quickly.”11 Tweets are supposed to be about 
what you are doing, but only within a narrow band of acceptable actions and 
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emotions; also, a lot of “re- tweeting” is expected. Further, there have been 
instances of vocal segments of the Twitter community being particularly 
condemnatory of women posting about their bodies. There were loud ob-
jections to the blogger Meghan McCain posting of a photo that revealed her 
cleavage (“Fellow Tweeters bullied her for showing off her bust line”12), and 
other direct and politically controversial articulations of women’s bodily ex-
periences, which would have been acceptable in other media, were loudly 
condemned. In 2009, Penelope Trunk was “excoriated” for tweeting about 
having a miscarriage while sitting in a business meeting,13 and a year later, 
Angie Johnson was lambasted for chronicling how an abortion felt physi-
cally and emotionally.14 While the content of Trunk’s and Johnson’s tweets 
is more explicit and politically sensitive than the tweets we exchanged, both 
women’s use of social networking coincides with the phenomenological ap-
proach adopted by IntuiTweet. Collectively, these body tweets exist on a 
spectrum of corporeal reflection, from visceral and intimate to kinesthetic 
and poetic. It can be argued that, by taking a phenomenological turn and 
using Twitter to express and exchange what we were sensing or intuiting 
and how we were moving, at any given moment we were actually answer-
ing a combination of the core Twitter questions, “What is happening?” and 
“What are you doing?”
So what, exactly, was IntuiTweet? It took place in specifically deter-
mined improvisation periods, usually between seven and ten days. There 
were a limited number of primary participants (Keinänen, Rouhiainen, and 
me, plus up to three invited guests) and an unlimited number of followers 
through Twitter. With the exception of one improvisation, when we were 
together in Helsinki, the improvisations occurred across several countries 
and time zones (Russia, Finland, Norway, Denmark, France, and the United 
States). Our instructions were simple: we were tasked with noticing mo-
ments of movement sensation or movement intuition throughout our day, 
no matter where we found ourselves. No one really knows exactly what 
movement intuition is; this task was to contribute to exploring and under-
standing it. We translated what we noticed into a tweet of no more than 140 
characters and sent it to the others using Twitter’s sms function.15 When a 
tweet was received as a text message, the instructions were to improvise the 
movement we received, but how or when we improvised was open. We could 
immediately respond as though we had received an actual movement im-
pulse—and it frequently felt like this—or we could hold on to the moment 
of movement and improvise a response later in the day or the next day, once 
we were in a different place. The other alternative was to improvise subtly, 
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through imagination or by means of somatic response. In other words, we 
could enact a shift in body state rather than a repositioning of our limbs 
in time and space. Once this response was generated, we recoded it into 
a tweet and sent it off once again to join the flurry of movement messages 
between us. This was a crucial part of the improvisation and created an on-
going movement dialogue between us. A rolling, asynchronous ebb and flow 
of dynamic and kinesthetic exchanges was created by converging dance im-
provisation and social networking.
The instructions were quite playful and game- like. For this reason, the 
project falls into the domain of rule- based dance improvisation at the same 
time that it satisfies Bourriaud’s (2002, 103) criteria for relational art in that 
“the production of gestures wins out over the production of material things,” 
emphasizing “the production of movement over categories.” In contempo-
rary dance history, the approaches of Yvonne Rainer and Trisha Brown, from 
Judson Church in the 1960s and 1970s, come to mind; there, dancers were 
asked to eschew technique and perform tasks such as moving awkward bed 
mattresses, walking, standing or speaking, and moving in repeated loops 
(Banes 1987). Dancers were also combined with non- dancers in happening- 
style events that were radical because the accepted constructions of both 
the dance and the dancer were questioned. Contact improvisation, which 
emerged out of the same era, involved sensing shifts of weight in oneself and 
others and reacting to the received impulses by listening to how one’s body 
responded, then letting the movement ripple outward to influence the other 
bodies in the space. If we call attention to the game- like structure of Intui-
Tweet, there is a distinct convergence with the ever expanding fields of game 
studies and game design, as well as with experiments in locative media that 
frequently use mobile phones’ global positioning system (Gps) functions for 
participants to search for or create narratives. Further related cultural phe-
nomena are the open- ended art practices of artists such as Miranda July that 
invite participants to follow instructions to create quirky objects or liminal 
experiences.16
Rancière’s (2009a, 22) argument that relational aesthetics are character-
ized by “displacement and despecification of instruments, materials and 
apparatuses” is particularly applicable to IntuiTweet because both functions 
were enhanced. We de- specified the moment of improvisation into words 
spread across countries and time zones, and we displaced bodies from a 
dance studio. Additional de- specifications of dance once it is situated within 
the context of social networking are the liberating of this art form from 
young and virtuosic bodies, from the traditional evaluative gaze of the audi-
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ence, and from the economic structures for production and presentation. 
This political and aesthetic inclusivity is characteristic of the contact impro-
visation ethos: “Contact Improvisation is an open- ended exploration of the 
kinesthetic possibilities of bodies moving through contact. Sometimes wild 
and athletic, sometimes quiet and meditative, it is a form open to all bodies 
and enquiring minds.”17 The moment of receiving a tweet, sent as sms and 
announced by the usual brief phone vibration or chirp, was surprisingly kin-
esthetic. It felt like a touch, a stroke, or a nudge—effectively, the insertion 
of another’s corporeal experience into my daily life. Despite being displaced 
from usual improvisatory contexts (the theater, the studio, or even public 
spaces) and displaced from the other dancing bodies, these messages trig-
gered a range of powerful responses, revealing that networked touch is like 
the “tact beyond the possible” that Derrida identifies in Nancy’s writing on 
the corpus. How is it possible that our mobile media devices can facilitate 
such “stroking, striking, thinking, weighing” across a distributed corpus of 
bodies (Derrida 2005, 66)?
Walking along a path after having emerged from a Boston underground 
station, I received a tweet from Leena, who was in Oslo: “Fluids passing 
through my legs, a sense of weight filling wide space, finally. I know I made 
the right decision.” This caused me to experience blurred central vision and 
to have a strong peripheral focus. The impact was quick and involuntary to 
the extent that I did not craft a response but let myself shift into a responsive 
state, as one does when doing contact improvisation. The public path was 
relatively deserted, so I let myself inject a moment of dance into my more 
pedestrian movement, and I swerved sideways for a few steps, directly into 
some bushes. It was like a moment of escape. I sent the following tweet in 
response after my micro- improvisation: “Fluid legs made me want to walk 
sideways or at least to waver no more straight lines. Soft peripheral focus 
makes me a bad pedestrian.” The exchange continued after an interval of a 
few minutes: “Bad pedestrian made go on all fours and crawl which I hap-
pily did in the comfort of my kitchen.” I received this message while I was 
driving and, as if I was in the midst of an actual contact improvisation, I had 
a strong desire to fall on all fours myself. For obvious reasons, I could not 
physically react, but I was able to nurture a somatic response. I kept this 
sensation alive during the short drive home, and when I entered my house 
ten minutes later, I dropped to the floor in my kitchen to continue the im-
provisation. This ability to let movement responses become latent and then 
to release them was an unexpected result of the IntuiTweet method. The 
ebbs and flows of movement exchange were both concrete and immanent 
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(not quite actualized); the movement was not just separated spatially from 
the original moment, but it was temporally stretched and distributed across 
more than one body.
Moments of improvised movement generated by our process varied in in-
tensity—sometimes powerful and almost derailing other actions, and some-
times subtle and insinuating. A tweet arrived, and I just did not know what 
to do with it. I waited, slept on it, and moved around it and finally my body 
was comfortable improvising it. A temporal and rhythmic quality that does 
not exist very well in the studio or in stage performances took root: sus-
tained inertia or protracted stillness. This was an expansion of the hiatus in 
con- tact, the “- ” of con- tact.
My attitude toward my mobile phone shifted through this process. It was 
imbued with anticipated corporeal potential. Not just a device in motion, 
it became a device for motion. The simple sound or vibration of a received 
tweet, even if not retrieved then and there, could enact a shift in body state. 
The mobile phone might still be buried in my bag or pocket as I stood on 
a crowded train platform, but part of me was already aware of movement 
waiting to be deciphered. I was in a state of anticipation, waiting to receive. 
I lived in my body differently, as if the body state of the studio was filtered 
into my daily life. This was a distinct sensory reconfiguration that coincided 
with being in a state of dance while outwardly shifting very little. This was 
also an example of lived social aesthetics that freed art from being defined 
according to canons of representation or dance vocabulary and based it on 
a form of sensory apprehension. Echoing the earlier discussion on Twitter 
etiquette, this form of aesthetics is not as much a mode of doing as a mode 
of being (Rancière 2009a, 29).
The IntuiTweet research has not yet articulated a clear definition of move-
ment intuition—the original research question—but in many respects we 
obtained a better working definition. I located movement intuition in prac-
tice and began to sense subtle variations in improvisatory content: a move-
ment impulse was not quite the same thing as a movement sensation; a 
movement desire had a different temporality from a movement intuition. 
Each was distinct but overlapped with the others. None was more primor-
dial, or basic, than the others, but each existed differently as a complex 
somatic, kinetic, and cognitive assemblage. The working definition offered 
here is that a movement intuition is understood by sensing what it is not: 
it is not an impulse, a sensation, or a desire. This is a highly unsatisfactory 
definition by most standards, but it possesses its own sort of fuzzy logic 
and it is, in a circular way, an intuition of what is an intuition by ruling out 
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what is not an intuition. It is also not unlike the moment of anesthetic in 
the aesthetic: distinguished in terms of what it interrupts. The artistic pro-
cess shifted the research goals and resulted in IntuiTweet being valuable for 
its contribution to conceptual, corporeal, and methodological knowledge.18
Improvisation as Mode of Social Interaction
I argued earlier that Small Acts and IntuiTweet were located in the domain 
of social aesthetics and that both involved a form of improvisation related 
to contact improvisation. The con- tact in Small Acts was made up of the ebbs 
and flows of improvisation between the movements of audience members 
and performers; in IntuiTweet, con- tact was fostered by movement trans-
lated into texts and transformed through a distributed network of bodies. In 
the final section of this chapter, I argue that these improvisation practices 
can also be seen as models for social interaction and that a particular con-
struction of the body is implicated. Social interaction consists not simply of 
the material, gestural, and linguistic exchanges in the practice of daily life; 
it has the wider connotations of creating or re- creating bonds among people 
and gives rise to “new modes of confrontation or participation” (Rancière 
2009a, 21). The improvisation central to social interaction is the crafting, 
moment by moment, of shared narratives and spaces using the devices of 
existence available to us: the mechanisms, movements, and media of life. 
Further, the understanding of improvisation that weaves its way through 
this chapter is pinned on a particular approach to embodied subjectivity: 
intercorporeality.
Consistent with the flow of ideas throughout this chapter, here, too, we 
see how Bourriaud can be used to initiate reflections on improvisation; Ran-
cière, to clarify and ground; and Derrida, to render subtler and more com-
plex. Bourriaud does not explicitly address improvisation but structures art 
in such a way that improvisation may be read into it. He locates the work 
of art at a “social interstice,” says it is “a state of encounter,” and indicates 
that transitivity is a “forever unfinished discursiveness” (Rancière 2009a, 
16–18, 26). The bodies engaged in these discursive encounters remain im-
plicit rather than articulated. The redistribution of the forms of sensory ex-
perience on which Rancière bases his notion of aesthetics operates through 
most dance forms, to greater or lesser degrees, but is most evident in con-
tact improvisation. Nancy Stark Smith describes contact as a form of move-
ment “based on the communication between two or more moving bodies 
that are in physical contact and their combined relationship to the physical 
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laws that govern their motion—gravity, momentum, inertia.” Stark Smith 
goes on to say that “alertness is developed in order to work in an energetic 
state of physical disorientation.”19 It is easy to rhapsodize about fluidity and 
synchronicity in contact improvisation resulting in a union of intent and 
motion. Considering instead the inertia and disorientation, gravity and tem-
porality, of movement improvisation we see how touch may be varied, spo-
radic, and inconsistent but is all the stronger because of these qualities. In 
other words, we can see the role for the anesthetic in the aesthetic of con-
tact: moments of slippage or waiting, disorientation, or searching. The ex-
periences of Small Acts and IntuiTweet reveal how both improvisation and 
social interactions (particularly through social networking) are less about 
connections than they are about non- coincidence.
Once this terrain of slippage, inertia, and inconsistency is acknowledged 
it is valuable to turn once again to Derrida out of respect for the complexity 
of improvisation. Beginning with the body itself, in his reading of Merleau- 
Ponty, Derrida (2005, 207–8) reminds us that when my right hand touches 
my left, it is nothing less than the body of the other that is animated before 
me. This can mean that I am never fully in control or cognizant of myself, 
but it can also mean, in a truly networked sense, a certain dispersion of sens-
ing. Any dancer who has performed with other dancers knows that it is as if 
one’s proprioceptive awareness extends across all other bodies onstage; the 
others sense for me and with me. In terms that are uncannily relevant to the 
dispersed, asynchronous contact achieved through IntuiTweet, Derrida em-
phasizes a non- coincidence of a body with itself that “allows the articula-
tion, conjuncture, or joining un ajointement (however inadequate and inter-
ruptible) between several heterogeneous sensible experiences” (350). These 
heterogeneous experiences in dance improvisation are the lives and bodies 
of the separate dancers but can at the same time be read as the tensions of 
sensory data and physical motion within one dancing body—impulses, sen-
sations, knowledge, and intuition that pull in different directions within 
one body. The conjunctions, whether joining several people within a social 
network over time or joining several senses within one body in a single mo-
ment, are always inadequate and interruptible. Derrida reminds us that we 
are inadequate and un- identical to ourselves.
In addition to being a faithful account of the complexity of improvisa-
tion, Derrida’s words are striking for depicting people linked, fallibly and 
disjointedly, through a technological system that itself is akin to a sensory 
body. We are deeply non- coincident, inconsistent, and asynchronous. Fol-
lowing the IntuiTweet instructions, the participants received sensory infor-
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mation from another heterogeneous sensible being through a distributed 
and de- spatialized system; this information became meaningful individually 
and collectively once it was enacted and shared. I suggest that our ability 
in IntuiTweet to integrate information that was non- identical to ourselves 
was due to our being deeply disrupted and non- identical within ourselves 
to begin with. We did not fight this state. We improvised with and through 
the layers of disruption. In the broad sweep of this project, the tweets with 
explicit movement information were less significant than the gaps between 
tweets—how the movement grew or developed quietly or in unexpected 
bursts, without our controlling or shaping it. This permits a deeper under-
standing of the anesthetic. It is important to see that it is not simply a binary 
opposite of the aesthetic but, rather, a field or event space of less consoli-
dated, less determined, less categorizable qualities of social interaction.
Discussions of improvisation in dance do not always include consider-
ations of the social. In improvisation, one exists in the immediacy of the 
present moment, but that does not mean it is clear, consistent, or context- 
free. Some dancers feel that improvisation happens in a state of emptiness. 
Cathérine Kintzler has written eloquently of the paradoxes of the void (le 
vide) in improvisation. She challenges the suggestion that improvisation 
happens in a clean, almost pure, internal corporeal space. The paradox she 
identifies is that the improvised dance gesture pulls away from habitual 
bodily movement to craft new patterns of movement at the same time that it 
distances itself from transcendental pretensions that actually constrain the 
body. Consistent with but also extending Rancière, Kintzler writes that this 
improvisatory act of making a void is one of shattering the immediate au-
thority of the sensible, existing modes of being and expectations.20 But is it 
social? In discourses on dance, the question arises as to whether it is possible 
to improvise alone. Some dancers believe we always improvise alone, and 
others insist we never do so, even when we are solitary. Nancy can be used to 
shift the perspective somewhat so we no longer expect a direct answer to the 
question of whether we improvise alone or not. At stake is not the singular or 
plural but of a state of betweenness: “The with, understood in terms of exis-
tence, must therefore be elaborated as a quite particular space—the word 
space being understood here in both the literal sense, since the existents are 
also bodies, extended beings, and in a figurative sense, which would answer 
the question: ‘What takes place between us?’” (Nancy 2008, 119).
IntuiTweet revealed that the dance of daily life takes place between us. 
The focus and intensity of the engagement that dancers, accustomed to the 
studio, bring to the crafting of tweets using mobile phones shed light on how 
284 kozel
these devices affect and transform our expressive and corporeal behavior 
beyond the studio. Small Acts foregrounded the collective practices of move-
ment, perception, and constructions of narrative of a particular community. 
Embedded in these examples is a definition of the social that is innately 
intercorporeal. This follows a basic phenomenological perspective informed 
by the late writings of Merleau- Ponty in which the relation between people 
is not construed in terms of the self or identities as much as it is about inter-
corporeality, a field of multiple embodied exchanges (Diprose 2002; Kozel 
2007; Merleau- Ponty 1968). The boundaries between bodies are inherently 
fluid, and each person is taken to be a multiply sensed incarnate being per-
petually engaged in a dance between subject and object, between one being 
and another. An emphasis on intercorporeality does not eschew politics and 
the social for, following Merleau- Ponty, perception, agency, and subjectivity 
in general take place as a body opened up to the bodies of others.
Like the dancers in IntuiTweet, the body is porous: receiving impulses 
from others, being derailed by others to greater or lesser degrees, and re-
formulating the traces of others into new transmissions or relations. It is 
because the body is constituted in relation to others that it is ambiguous, 
opened to the world and to others, and so can act at all. Rosalyn Diprose 
explains intercorporeality in Merleau- Ponty based on an understanding of 
the self as “a lived body ambiguously caught between subject and object” 
(Merleau- Ponty 1968, 69). In other words, I am who I am because you exist. 
The “I” and “you” lose further distinction in intercorporeality when the 
Merleau- Pontian relation of reversibility is recognized to occur in the most 
fundamental sensory engagement with the world. Each of us is already per-
meated by otherness; even when we touch the world we are touched in re-
turn, we see and are seen, we listen as we speak. These ever more fragmen-
tary moments of sliding between being- subject and being- object are how 
we exist in the world. These are fundamentally improvisational in that I am 
forever acting and responding, without really having a starting point in one 
or the other modality. These moments are also fundamentally relational.
Returning, at the end of this chapter, to the devices of existence: improvi-
sation is one way to navigate the world. The argument is ontological in that 
it refers to a state of being in the world; it is experiential in that it refers to 
concrete sensory engagement with others; and it is haptic in that it is based 
on touch. We are not left to our own devices as much as we participate in the 
devising of our worlds. A message we can take from relational aesthetics is 
that the beginnings of a path, a formula, a game, or a story may be given to 
us by an artist or a choreographer, but we are expected to take it from there 
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and improvise. Improvisation, even when it is crisp, fluid, or truly inspired, 
is still a play across the hiatus of con- tact. To use another set of metaphors, 
it is messy. It slips and slides; it lingers or ends before it has fully started; it 
glides in and out of shadow; it gets distracted. It becomes tired and sad and 
has moments of unruly joy. It spirals off in leaps of fancy. It hurts and needs 
comfort. The implication of this disruption of space, time, and materiality 
is that any encounter with otherness in all of its forms—whether another 
person, a sound, a movement, or an unexpected event—invites a moment of 
improvisation. Improvisation is a mode of social interaction.
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chApter 13
THE DRAMATURGY OF SPONTANEITY
Improvising the Social in Theater
Zoë Svendsen
It seemed fitting that these good improvisations so often  
began in the blurred space between lunch break and  
performance, between the everyday and the fantastic.
—Tim Etchells (1999, 52)
This is how Tim Etchells, artistic director of Forced Entertainment, the 
quintessential postmodern British experimental theater company, sums up 
the alchemical interaction between sociability and aesthetics at the heart 
of theatrical experimentation.1 The “between” is the subject of this chapter, 
which will explore the multifaceted ways in which social relations are re-
vealed or reconfigured by being placed in the service of aesthetic practice, 
“between the everyday and the fantastic,” in the contemporary making of 
theater in Britain.
Most works for the theater depict social relations at the level of narrative, 
focusing on family, friendship groups, or other power structures. Further, 
the making of the modern theater, from Schiller through Brecht to the hap-
penings of the 1960s, has frequently been motivated by a desire for social 
change (Kershaw 1992; Rancière 2009b). Nevertheless, the social relations 
specifically produced within and by the conventional spatial codes of the 
theater itself are rarely remarked on by theater scholars. These conventions 
form the backdrop to this discussion of the place of improvisation within 
dramaturgical practice in theater, which argues that theatrical aesthetics 
frequently rely on an oscillation between improvisation in the moment and 
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prearranged composition, resulting in performance dramaturgies that seek 
to imply spontaneity while nevertheless firmly structuring audiences’ ex-
perience. The theatrical aesthetics described in this chapter thereby prob-
lematize the assertion of a “relational” aesthetics as a distinct—and re-
cent—category of art (Bourriaud 2002). That is, I argue that the use of social 
relations as a tool in the production of aesthetics is not merely a recent phe-
nomenon, as implied by the rhetoric of relational aesthetics. Instead, this 
chapter examines how questions of the social are key to understanding the 
operations of theatricality within any given historical moment. To do so, I 
examine the influence of modernist aesthetics—against which Nicolas Bour-
riaud defines relational aesthetics—on theater. This leads to a discussion of 
how the discourse of theatrical improvisation functions in this context, and 
how it offers a space for acknowledging social practice.
Three distinct works in which I have been involved as a director, drama-
turg, or writer will then illustrate varying ways in which the sociability of 
improvisational practice can be placed in service of aesthetic structures: 
Discombobulator (2009–10), an interdisciplinary performance that incorpo-
rated dance, live composition of electronic music, and video; Four Men and a 
Poker Game (2008), an adaptation of Brecht’s short story; and 3rd Ring Out: 
Rehearsing the Future (2010–11), a multimedia audience- interactive perfor-
mance. Each incorporates a response to the conventional organization of 
social relations in theater, and each differently demonstrates how the con-
flicting histories of modern aesthetics and the social in theater might be 
brought into dialogue.
Aesthetics against the Social in Modernism
In theater, the reminder through the incursion of the social through the 
presence of the audience that art’s putative autonomy is a cultural construct 
returns over and over to disturb the sovereignty of the work. This is the 
ground of modernist antagonism to theater and becomes no less than a call 
to arms in defense of art in Michael Fried’s widely cited formulation:
The success, even the survival, of the arts has come increasingly to depend 
on their ability to defeat theatre. This is perhaps nowhere more evident 
than within theatre itself, where the need to defeat what I have been call-
ing theater has chiefly made itself felt as the need to establish a drasti-
cally different relation to its audience. (The relevant texts are, of course, 
Brecht and Artaud.) For theatre has an audience—it exists for one—in a 
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way other arts do not; in fact, this more than anything else is what mod-
ernist sensibility finds intolerable in theatre generally. (Fried 1967, 163; 
emphasis added)
What Fried (1980, 109) calls “theater” is the acknowledgment of co- presence 
in the structural relation between artwork and audience. In his later full- 
length work, Absorption and Theatricality, Fried uses the term “absorption” 
in opposition to theatricality. He terms any invitation by an artwork to a so-
cial relation in the viewer’s present, “theatricality.” He makes extensive use 
of the eighteenth- century French theorist Denis Diderot’s writings on paint-
ing to suggest that the primary condition of possibility for absorption is non- 
reciprocity between the expressivity of the artwork and its reception by the 
viewer. Implicit in Fried’s argument is the notion that an artwork’s “aware-
ness” of being spectated lays bare in an embarrassing way the relationship of 
service between the product and the consumer of that product. Fried quotes 
Diderot at length on a painting depicting Susanna and the Elders: the nude 
subject remains modest not only because she hides herself from the other 
figures depicted but, crucially, because the painting is composed to make it 
clear that the subject does not “know” that her nakedness is being revealed 
to the viewer of the painting (96–97). On this view, the artwork remains au-
tonomous only as long as the social relations in the here and now that bring 
it into being are sublimated or denied.
However, attending to the aesthetic practices of the theater of “Western 
industrial or post- industrial modernity” (Ridout 2006, 6) reveals their spe-
cifically social character, belying the distinction between aesthetics and so-
cial relations posited by Fried. One of the reasons that theater consistently 
fails to live up to the attempts of practitioners to dispense with any ac-
knowledgement of social interaction in the here and now is that it is in the 
nature of theater to be real as well as representational: “[Theater] is really 
a language whose words consist to an unusual degree of things that are 
what they seem to be. In theater, image and object, pretense and pretender, 
sign- vehicle and content, draw unusually close. . . . In the theatre light is 
brightness pretending to be brightness, a chair is a chair pretending to be 
another chair, and so on” (States 1985, 20). Using this at once doubleness of 
theatricality, contemporary theater increasingly acknowledges its capacity 
not only for representing social relations, but also for shaping the sociality 
of the occasion. In these moments, we hover between experiencing the stage 
as itself and as a signifier. Joe Kelleher and Nicholas Ridout (2007, 104) sug-
gest that exploitation of this both- and feature of theatricality lies at the 
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heart of the operations of the contemporary Italian director Romeo Castel-
lucci’s theater. “Then, everything became very clear,” they write. “The veils 
had been lifted, and we looked straight into the wide open space of a marble 
box in which every action seemed to have its own proper name and to need 
no explanation. In English, there is a phrase with which one can signal one’s 
approval of this kind of straight- talking: calling a spade a spade. Suddenly, 
this theatre seemed to be presenting spades as spades. Each action of the 
episode took place, as it were, in broad daylight.”
Nevertheless, while embodied performance provides an ideal ground 
for explorations of aesthetics beyond Friedian high modernism, and has 
been embraced in contemporary art discourse as such, the history of the 
nineteenth- century and twentieth- century theater was one of social prac-
tices designed to corral an audience toward the type of absorbed attention 
that Fried cited much later as a precondition of aesthetic experience. Au-
gust Strindberg (2008), the late nineteenth- century Swedish playwright 
and theorist, developed a program for an “intimate theater” that is exem-
plary for modernist theatrical works that display a desire for independence 
from their audiences. Strindberg’s aim to diminish sociability in the theater 
of his time—with techniques such as darkness in the auditorium, banning 
boxes and applause during performances, and stopping actors from direct-
ing their lines specifically to the audience—was directly linked to the belief 
that such interaction would be detrimental to absorbed attention, allow-
ing an audience to “escape from the suggestive influence of the dramatist- 
hypnotist” (68–69). Such absorption involves a self- forgetting, an immer-
sion in the time posited by the fictional realm in place of real physical time 
(Fried 1980). In this, paradoxically, the audience enters the theater to leave 
the present moment of the social behind—or, at least, relegate it to periph-
eral vision. In a standard proscenium arch or end- on space, everything out-
side the triangle inscribed in space by the gaze trained on the theatrical 
scene—with the eye at the apex—is excluded. Absorption in the onstage 
action within the literal and metaphorical frame of theatrical representation 
dissolves the social position from which the subject is seeing.
The “small stage and a small auditorium” were particularly important in 
the founding of Strindberg’s “intimate theater” as a solution to the funda-
mental problem of realism in large spaces. To be seen and heard, the scale 
of the actors’ gestures and vocal projection must be commensurate with the 
size of the whole theater space and not the size of the imagined space of the 
fiction. Therefore, a large space is always overtly “for” the audience rather 
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than apparently independent of it. This concern with how the relationship 
between actor and audience might disturb Strindberg’s (2008, 66) desired 
illusion of artistic autonomy extends to disciplining not only the audience 
but also the actors: “I do fervently wish that vital scenes should not be per-
formed next to the prompter’s box, as duets designed to elicit applause, but 
rather located to that part of the stage the action dictates.”
The trend throughout the mid- twentieth century in Britain was generally 
toward designing theaters and encouraging audience behavior to set social 
interaction aside in the focus on mimetic action onstage (Rebellato 1999; 
Shepherd and Womack 1996; Wiles 2003). The changing behavioral code for 
theater reception corresponded with a shift in the class base of theatergoing 
audiences from working class to middle class in the early to mid- century 
(Shepherd and Womack 1996). Dan Rebellato identifies a particular mo-
ment in which the cultural dominance of this theater was cemented: in the 
attitude of the directors, writers, and actors at the Royal Court to its audi-
ence in the 1950s and 1960s. No longer regarded as “patrons,” who were 
“exercising an assumed right because that role made them the arbiters of 
taste” (Kershaw 2004, 299), Rebellato (1999, 111–13) convincingly demon-
strates how audiences at the Royal Court were treated as “clients,” assumed 
to lack a specialist knowledge that would enable them to make valid judg-
ments—the dark side of the Royal Court’s championing of the artist’s “right 
to fail.” In the case of the Royal Court, the text of the play rather than any 
given production was regarded as the artistic object (101–2). The elision of 
the “literary” play and its theatrical production allowed for an ideologi-
cal unity of the artwork that was, however, threatened if the audiences’ 
presence had to be taken into account: “The Royal Courtiers wanted their 
unique and self- present moments of pure expressivity to be seen—in other 
words, they wanted an audience—but if an audience is required, how can 
the ‘original’ object be complete? A theater that requires an audience’s ap-
proval locates that audience on the interior of its texts, allows it to mark an 
absence within the text, requiring completion and confirmation. . . . But if 
that text is already complete, the audience is exiled to a position of pure ex-
teriority, leaving the integrity of the text intact” (110–11).
The Court’s founder, George Devine, commented that “the Royal Court 
ideal is to be likened to an art gallery or a literary magazine” (Rebellato 
1999, 113), explicitly allying the Court with other arts that traditionally fo-
cused on individual genius rather than creative collaboration. Devine’s aspi-
ration to emulate such artistic practices, which privilege individual author-
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ship and artistic autonomy, offers a direct denial of the permeability of 
social and aesthetic practices specific to theater.
The conventions of the modern theater are directly related to attempts 
to deny the sociality of the theatrical event. These conventions include sit-
ting in the dark in rows facing the stage, in silence, with minimum interfer-
ence from other spectators in the aural or visual field. Nevertheless, over 
the course of the twentieth century innumerable companies, performances, 
and events have formulated methods to overcome these conventions, seek-
ing a mode of theater that does not separate stage and audience. From the 
anti- institutional avant- garde practices of Surrealists, Dadaists, and Futur-
ists, to Brechtian epic, to the socialist theater companies that took theater 
directly “to the people” in Britain of the 1960s and 1970s (Kershaw 1992), 
theater makers consistently have sought some form of direct social engage-
ment with audiences. In some cases, the shift toward an acknowledgment of 
the sociality of the occasion is manifested in a move toward performances 
that return the job of framing the event to the audience by offering a spa-
tial dramaturgy that allows audience members to wander at will through a 
series of arenas in which a loose narrative is being generated. In the produc-
tion of Faust by the British performance company Punchdrunk in 2007, for 
example, a several- story warehouse offered multiple opportunities to chose 
how to experience the performance. As spectators, we “know” that a repre-
sentation of the story of Faust is taking place somewhere in the building, but 
we are not always there to see it.
In coining the phrase “relational aesthetics” in the late 1990s, Bourriaud 
offered a rubric within aesthetic theory for the categorization of works 
that saw social relations as material from which the very artwork could be 
constructed, laying claim to the practicing of social relations as art in the 
broadest possible sense. The aesthetics of autonomous art, as represented by 
Fried and other modernists, such as Clement Greenberg (1993), correspond 
to what Bourriaud (2002, 14) delineates as the “assertion of an independent 
and private symbolic space,” where the term “private” is equated with the 
individual imagination. It is against this “private symbolic” realm that Bour-
riaud defines the openly socially participatory function of “relational aes-
thetics.” Yet the naming under a single rubric of a multiplicity of practices 
that encode different formulations of social relations has been rightly criti-
cized for suggesting that in the context of standardized practices in late capi-
talism, attention to social relations is in itself a positive, political act (Bishop 
2004). Further, whether due to the failure to overcome or the refusal to deny 
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social contingency, theater aesthetics could be said to have been always 
already relational, always rehearsing the possibility of social communities.
Improvisation in Theater
Improvisation plays a key role in the history of theater as a socially oriented 
practice. Some go as far as to describe all acting as in some way a process of 
improvisation (Frost and Yarrow 1990, 1), while the contemporary philoso-
pher David Velleman (2009) has used improvisation in acting as a model for 
considering moral action. Perhaps it is the difficulty of defining the bound-
aries of improvisation within established theater practice that accounts for 
the lack of theoretical writing on theatrical improvisation when compared 
with musical improvisation. Most often discussed in the context of “how- 
to” practical handbooks, the idea of improvisation in theater is consistently 
allied, often implicitly, with sociability (Frost and Yarrow 1990; Nachmano-
vitch 1990; Spolin 1973).
The definition of “improvisation” given by Anthony Frost and Ralph Yar-
row (1990, 1) encodes the commonly assigned attributes of the activity: 
of spontaneity, the foregrounding of the human, and the alertness to the 
specific moment in space and time of the performance; “the skill of using 
bodies, space, all human resources, to generate a coherent physical expres-
sion of an idea, a situation, a character (even, perhaps, a text); to do this 
spontaneously, in response to the immediate stimuli of one’s environment, 
and to do it à l’improviste: as though taken by surprise, without precon-
ceptions.” The success of improvisation on these terms is equated with an 
Artaudian infusion of life into art: “Where improvisation is most effective, 
most spontaneous, least ‘blocked’ by taboo, habit or shyness, it comes close 
to a condition of integration with the environment or context” (2). Theater 
practices that focus on improvisation as the primary condition of perfor-
mance have often sought to dissolve the division between performers and 
audiences, encouraging participation from spectators: from Ken Campbell’s 
“improvathons” to Keith Johnstone’s “Theatresports” (1999).2 The director, 
teacher, and actor Viola Spolin of Chicago was one of the earliest practition-
ers in the twentieth century to formalize game playing into a system for 
theatrical creativity. Having trained as a settlement worker at Neva Boyd’s 
Group Work School in Chicago in the 1920s, Spolin developed theatrical 
improvisation techniques as part of her work as a drama supervisor in the 
late 1930s for the Chicago branch of the Works Progress Administration’s 
Recreational Project (Robinson et al. 1989). Spolin’s (1973, 4) stated aim 
the drAmAturGy oF spontAneity 295
was to help “both teacher and student find personal freedom.” Her procedu-
ral guide espouses a humanist credo that is common to much discussion of 
theatrical improvisation as emancipatory and productive of selfhood. Like 
Frost and Yarrow, Spolin privileges the impression of spontaneity fostered 
by improvisational action: “Through spontaneity we are re- formed into our-
selves. It creates an explosion that for the moment frees us from handed- 
down frames of reference, memory choked with old facts and information 
and undigested theories and techniques of other peoples’ findings. . . . The 
intuitive can only respond in immediacy—right now. It comes bearing its 
gifts in the moment of spontaneity, the moment when we are freed to re-
late and act, involving ourselves in the moving, changing world around us” 
(4). From the vantage point of the present, statements such as this (see also 
Crickmay and Tufnell 1990; Polsky 1998) mystify improvisation’s relation to 
the social (Mermikides and Smart 2010), disregarding the many pressures 
brought to bear on any occasion of apparent immediacy. Nevertheless, what 
is revealed by such descriptions of spontaneity is the orientation of atten-
tion in time toward the present: “Attention is focused on the moment when 
things take shape” (Frost and Yarrow 1990, 2; see also Crickmay and Tufnell 
1990). The “community” that is thereby established, however temporarily, 
is generated through interaction in the present.
However, the orientation of participants’ attention is trained not on the 
sociality of the occasion but on the co- production of a (temporal) construc-
tion that is not conceived of as social: the theatrical event. Co- attending in 
this way to construction requires listening and reciprocity, practices that are 
highly valued within social paradigms in Western culture. In her research on 
jazz, Ingrid Monson (1996, 73) has examined in detail how metaphors used 
by jazz musicians point to the parallels between social and aesthetic prac-
tice through their use of terms such as “talking,” “conversation,” and “say-
ing something” as common designations for “good improvisation.” These 
terms actively emphasize the “interpersonal, face- to- face quality of impro-
visation” (78). Monson’s examples suggest how notions of spontaneity are 
reciprocally related to perceptions of (lack of ) effort required in improvis-
ing together (80), while pointing to the effort required to set up the condi-
tions in which such spontaneity becomes possible:
Nearly every musician who talked to me mentioned the importance of lis-
tening in good ensemble playing. Listening in an active sense—being able 
to respond to musical opportunities or to correct mistakes—is implicit in 
the way that musicians use this term. . . . Listening affects what musicians 
296 sVendsen
decide to play at a particular moment. . . . This spontaneity is absolutely 
central in the jazz improvisational aesthetic. (Monson 1996, 84)
The importance of listening—of paying attention to one another—is mir-
rored in the discourse of improvisation in theater. The director and teacher 
Chris Johnston (2006) prefaces his guide to improvisation by quoting Miles 
Davis: “Play what you hear, not what you know.” Tina Bicât and Chris Bald-
win (2002, 7) suggest as a prerequisite for collaborative devising the injunc-
tion that “each member of the company must listen and talk to the others 
with trust and attention,” to enable them to be “sensitive to the dynamics of 
intense collaborative group work.”
Spontaneity is here equated with the social present; stories of emancipa-
tion through improvisation and stories of improvisation as equivalent not to 
“art” but to “life” both trade on the same binary of art as autonomous and 
improvisation as heteronomous—that is, a social act. The values attributed 
to “liveness” often entail that the uniqueness of any given performance is 
emphasized over that which is repeated (Auslander 1999). Indeed, the idea 
that performance is unrepeatable, ephemeral, and exclusively shared by 
those present at the time connects with performance art’s emphasis on en-
tropy (R. Ferguson 1998) and with Peggy Phelan’s (1993, 146) famous claim 
that “performance’s being becomes itself through disappearance,” leaving 
“no visible trace” and thereby evading commodification.3 Although Phelan’s 
ontology of performance allows for the radical contingency of such struc-
turing—that is, the ever present awareness in performance that it could go 
wrong, it underplays the desire inherent in many performances, not only 
in theater but also in performance art—that it should go right. The work to 
make performances repeatable is not merely the result of theater’s compro-
mise with a capitalist economy (Rebellato 2006; Ridout 2006). It also im-
plies an attempt to wrest a precarious stability for temporally contingent 
artistic practice in the face of inevitable entropy.
Although from the perspective of practice I would therefore contest the 
privileging of the ephemeral in performance, like many other theater makers 
I can remember moments of extraordinary improvisation in rehearsal— 
moments that could be reenacted or reconstructed but never with the same 
degree of affect. From long- running West End plays to internationally fran-
chised musicals, there are significant—and commercially dominant—parts 
of the theater sector that are distinctly more focused on product than pro-
cess (Rebellato 2009, 39–46). Improvisation in theater has long been key to 
countering performance art’s charge of the deadliness of theater, supposedly 
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brought about by the commodification of the event and resulting in a “Mc-
Theater” (39).
There is, on the other hand, a fine line between improvisation as con-
structed within a performance aesthetic, thereby implying spontaneity, 
freedom, and non- repeatable liveness, and the threat of a collapse of the 
construct into sociality. This is illustrated by the description provided on 
the British theater company Forced Entertainment’s website of the perfor-
mance Bloody Mess in 2004. Forced Entertainment has long challenged the 
“rules” of dramatic theater, yet the company tacitly relies on social rules for 
how audience members have become used to engaging with theatrical per-
formance: keeping still and quiet to enable absorption in the moment, not 
interacting with the scene played before them, and so on. The description 
of Bloody Mess enacts the performance’s rejection of dramatic structure by 
merely listing its components, working by accumulation:
A strobe light flickers, pointed at the ground. A pair of clowns in smeared 
make- up start an ugly fight that threatens to take over the stage. . . . A 
delinquent cheerleader dances and yells. A woman weeps in a fit of oper-
atic grief then stops, changes costume and starts again. The strains of 
Deep Purple or maybe Black Sabbath blast from the [public address sys-
tem] only to be replaced by the Bach Cello Suites. A bloke starts to tell 
the history of the world from the Big Bang onwards but is quickly inter-
rupted. A sound check. An interview. A seductive monologue. Rock- gig 
roadies creep across the stage—bringing disco lights, new speakers and a 
microphone that no one really wants.4
What we see at work here is representation destabilized; the notion of a pre-
cise and repeatable dramaturgy, destabilized; and a revelation of the being 
here and now of performance, of the potential for failure. Yet the provoca-
tive note at the end of the text is less, or more, than a joke: “Genuine audi-
ence members only. No drunks. No timewasters.” Only the performers, and 
not the audience, are allowed to improvise. If the audience members are as 
cavalier with the social rules of theater as Forced Entertainment are in their 
testing of traditions of representation, mimesis, and narrative, then the edi-
fice collapses into a “real” mess. It is a condition of the aesthetic of perfor-
mance that its contingency is held up to view—contained within the geo-
metric frame of representation. For Forced Entertainment, if the audience 
were actually to join in, the performance would no longer be art.
The pleasure taken in the live, the improvised, is partially relief from the 
effort of construction, and partly an acknowledgment of the precariousness 
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of any attempt to create a stable structure. Overt improvisation can further 
operate as a tacit (and sometimes delusional) claim that we are all “in it 
together.” Some twentieth- century theater architects have sought a balance 
between an aesthetics of distance and an appreciation of the social dimen-
sion of theatergoing. In this they conceptualize the former as an “other” to 
the latter, each with its distinct form of spatial operation, in which archi-
tectural features that enable social interaction require defending against the 
hegemony of architectures that focus attention solely on the stage (Leacroft 
1949; Mackintosh 1993).5 It is therefore not as an “other” to but as consti-
tutive of theater aesthetics that improvisational practices have particular 
force within the creation of rehearsed structures. As Monson demonstrates, 
certain kinds of social engagement are a prerequisite of the aesthetics of im-
provisation. Improvisation is enabled through a complex interaction among 
social principles, harnessed for aesthetic production, which effect the con-
ditions of possibility for attention to be focused on invention in the moment. 
The discourse valorizes spontaneity, yet habit, genre expectations, and a 
shared language of improvisational techniques all feature as the building 
blocks of potentiality in the creative present, whether or not they are ac-
knowledged as such (Heddon and Milling 2006).
Case Study I: Discombobulator
A first example of an integrated practice of sociability and aesthetics in per-
formance work in which I have been involved as dramaturg and director was 
specifically organized around, and thereby commented on, the conventions 
of the theater of modernity in which the audience is imagined as silent—if 
not altogether absent. Discombobulator (2009–10) illustrated how, in theat-
rical performance, improvisation is often dependent on containment within 
a structured frame and is produced spatially and temporally through im-
plicit, and sometimes explicit, rules.6 The pleasure is partially determined by 
the recognition that improvisation functions like a riff, a flourish of sponta-
neous invention that plays on a preordained structure, rather than a collapse 
into the time scale and improvisational nature of life. Discombobulator used 
the conventions of a proscenium arch theater space—notably, the pictorial-
ism of audiences’ orientation to a framed scene, the darkness of the audito-
rium, and the convention of staying silent. Both dance and music were par-
tially improvised, with movement within a specific sphere of light triggering 
electronic music through the use of motion- capture technology. The music 
produced thereby was then manipulated and recomposed live. Simulta-
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neously, the music gave signals to the dancer, Ben Duke, within the schema 
of the storytelling. As a result, the improvisation within each element be-
came reciprocally related and, due to the simplicity of binding sound di-
rectly to movement, potentially indiscernible to an audience as improvisa-
tion. Invention here was overtly delimited by a set of pre- agreed parameters 
for what constitutes aesthetic practice.
Discombobulator thereby offered a short theatrical essay on agency and 
lack of it, in which by means of motion capture technology, a dancer ap-
peared to dance into existence a vast backdrop image of a virtual world 
that would start to disappear again whenever he stopped moving. Duke’s 
improvised movements also generated the watery sounds that opened the 
performance. The dancer appeared to discover his agency through the gen-
eration of sound, concurrently with the audience. His naïve testing, plea-
sure, and confusion—in relation to the apparent sonic responsiveness of the 
air around him—produced ripples of laughter in the audience in an age- 
old technique that is familiar from clowning traditions. The virtual world, 
displayed on a backdrop covering the entirety of the back of the stage, ap-
peared to imply a paradise beyond an old, broken- down house façade, with 
a door that would disappear whenever Duke moved out of the light and 
toward it. Once his efforts had apparently “fixed” the image, virtual versions 
of the dancer began to appear. Sometimes the virtual figure would appear to 
interact with the real figure; then it would be multiplied into three virtual 
versions, each of which turned and stared at the real figure.7
Improvisation was used to imply entrapment within an aesthetic struc-
ture—the live struggling against the machinery of the theater. Discombobu-
lator offered a direct response to the particular space in which it was first 
performed: the Teatro Piccolo Arsenale in Venice,8 a cavernous hall into 
which a traditional proscenium arch, a pictorially orientated space, had 
been built. Castellucci describes the “violence” of such purpose- built the-
aters when discussing the Municipal Theater in Marseille: “The relation to 
the public is very hard and violent because it is obliged to offer up ‘spec-
tacle’; everything is prepared in such a way that something has to happen. 
There is coercion; there is a relationship of violence in this waiting for the 
‘spectacle.’ . . . There is no possibility of passage or circulation between the 
audience and the stage, there’s a clear separation” (quoted in Kelleher and 
Ridout 2007, 204). Discombobulator used the “violence” of a space that holds 
every action up as “spectacle” as the frame for an interactive mechanism 
that then thematized the limitations of human agency. Within this frame-
work, the improvised appeal to the audience achieved a poignancy that was 
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both comforting and impotent. The tension between the pre- structured and 
the improvised resulted in a final sequence of frenzied movement that ulti-
mately brought physical collapse. The live body fought the machine- like 
mechanism of theater and lost.
Case Study II: Four Men and a Poker Game
In addition to being used to destabilize performance, this doubleness of the-
ater—which plays both on presence (in the theater, in social time) and on 
aesthetic distance (the bridge to a fictional realm)—can also be harnessed to 
use social relations among the audience members to reinforce the aesthetic 
construct. This was the case with Four Men and a Poker Game by Brecht, a 
short story I adapted and directed for the stage with the composer and mu-
sician David Paul Jones.9 The story itself is a parable of capitalism figured 
through four champion swimmers playing poker on a ship from Havana to 
New York. The harnessing of pre- established social relations to aesthetic 
effect was predicated on a reconfiguration of the spatial relationship be-
tween audience and performers, away from the conventional form used in 
Discombobulator. The performance setting of the story was a backroom bar; 
the audience sat at small tables throughout the space, with a passageway 
left for the Glaswegian actor David McKay to use as he moved among the 
audience. Jones played his own score, which was largely pre- composed but 
allowed space for musical improvisation. The composition was tightly en-
meshed in the rhythm of the performance as a whole, at times appearing to 
take the story to a more abstract level. The story itself was told by McKay 
rather than acted out, but this telling was situated quasi- dramatically, in 
that the audience were “cast” as punters in the bar, listening to a man telling 
a story to live piano. This gentle fiction established the situation of storytell-
ing in which the audience participated, providing a framework for listening.
The performance relied both on the maintenance of the social rules gov-
erning audiences’ behavior that apply in standard theater spaces, but not in 
bars (i.e., that the audience would not move about or talk to one another 
and would attend to the story), and on the capacity of small improvised acts 
of engagement between the performer and individual audience members to 
elide the actual space and time of the theater with the fictional realm indi-
cated. Improvised interaction included the preamble to the telling of the 
story, additional invented text delivered to individual audience members, 
and the deliberate making of eye contact. The improvisation both estab-
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lished the fiction of the bar and made the telling of the story occur not in 
some fictional other time but in the here and now.
Improvisation in performance can collapse the distance implicitly posited 
by the aesthetic structure between the time frame of the fiction and the 
actual time of experiencing in the theater. The concentration of the actor 
and the audience is aligned, in concert, focused on the present moment 
rather than on memory or reconstruction. This is facilitated by a turn to the 
social relations of the theater within the aesthetic frame, performed through 
a sleight of hand that reconfigures social time as aesthetic time. Neverthe-
less, in the schema of Four Men and a Poker Game, it soon became clear that 
the audience would not be coerced into interacting as co- performers, for 
the here- and- now set- up for the storytelling functioned merely as a hold-
ing place for a move into an imaginative realm that was created almost 
entirely aurally. Indeed, the social proximity of strangers in a formation 
at once familiar from a social perspective (a bar) and unfamiliar from a 
theatrical perspective (other spectators were always directly in each audi-
ence member’s visual frame) provided encouragement to retreat into the 
private imaginative realm generated by the focus of the storytelling. The 
lighting shifted in the course of the performance, from lighting the audience 
strongly—emphasizing the sociability of the space—to isolating the actor in 
light, with the audience now in shadow, as the grip of the mental projection 
created by the story took hold.
This interplay between the social and the fictional did, however, fore-
ground the vulgar reality of the monetized relation between performer and 
audience (cf. Rebellato 2006; Ridout 2006). The audience pays and the per-
formers perform—the story will be told from start to finish. The decision 
to insert a break in the storytelling about a third of the way through not 
only paid homage to Brecht in its disruption of any absorption in the imag-
ined world of the story, but also acted as a reminder of the contingency of 
performance. This disruption took the form of a cigarette break—for the 
actor but not for the audience. Jones stopped playing the piano, and McKay 
left the playing space to smoke a cigarette, which he had to do outside due 
to smoking regulations. About half of the audience could see what McKay 
was doing and almost invariably would discuss this loudly enough for the 
other half of the audience to know what was happening. In his review in 
the Herald, the critic Neil Cooper identified this moment as interrupting 
“the flow.”10 As intended, it did not “work” aesthetically; instead, it dis-
rupted (and revealed) the service culture that underlies social expectations 
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of performance. (During one performance in Glasgow, someone muttered 
loudly about not having paid for a ticket to wait while the actor had a fag 
break.) It further served the performance by offering a semblance of spon-
taneity for the rest of the performance and infusing the aesthetic construc-
tion with a fragility or non- inevitability that shored up the tension of the 
storytelling. This playfulness is fundamental to the experience of improvisa-
tion—the knowledge that it could be different, that what is being performed 
is contingent on the moment at hand.
Case Study III: 3rd Ring Out
3rd Ring Out: Rehearsing the Future (2010–11) goes much further than the 
previous two examples in playing on the porousness of social and aesthetic 
relations.11 It works from the premise of the apparently relational toward an 
immersion in a fictive scenario that functions in line with the aesthetics of 
tradition that Bourriaud terms “private, symbolic.” 3rd Ring Out is at once a 
performance, a game, a simulation, and an artistic event, eliding artistic and 
social practice in the production of an emergency planning–style rehearsal 
for a climate- changed future. It takes place in two shipping containers, 
the interiors of which resemble smart emergency planning cells. Split into 
groups and ushered into separate containers, spectators experience an inter-
active simulation of events that unfold as a result of climate change; the 
scenarios are led by two performers who play “team leaders.” At key points, 
the audience members vote on decisions that then affect the course of the 
narrative. The performance toured to five locations in the United Kingdom 
in the spring of 2010; in each location, the scenario was adapted so that the 
narrative was specific to, and offered an accurate projection of the future of, 
each city in which it was performed. The fictional scenario took the audi-
ence forward into a future of global warming, from now until 2033, explor-
ing the potential human consequences of climate change. It used scientific 
research to imagine how the world might be altered and what impact this 
might have on the United Kingdom. The production offered an interlinked 
web of potential catastrophes with far- reaching geopolitical consequences, 
such as mass migration and competition for resources.
The act of watching and interacting with the performance could be under-
stood as itself a social practice, in the form of an exercise or rehearsal of the 
sorts of ethical dilemmas that might arise on the basis of problems caused 
by a destabilized climate. The project had a rather different genesis from its 
current focus on climate change. It emerged from a series of investigations 
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into rehearsing for disaster, which began with looking at Cold War models 
of exercises that tested civic administration systems for post- apocalyptic 
governance, and moved on to explore contemporary emergency- planning 
procedures, including plans for dealing with terrorism. The research also 
encompassed interviews with people experienced in rehearsing responses 
to nuclear attack.
A major influence on 3rd Ring Out is Stages of Emergency, in which the 
theater historian Tracy Davis explores Cold War nuclear exercises through 
the paradigm of rehearsal and performance. Davis’s discussion of how these 
procedural rehearsals extend into everyday life in the present was an impor-
tant catalyst for the project. Davis (2007, 2) suggests that civil defense has 
been “resurrected as homeland security”—that is, “Our small gestures—
globalized through compliance at foreign airports and corporate offices, on 
public transport and in gatherings of all kinds—occur on a massive scale 
and are habituated into routines. . . . The mantra of the ‘what- if ’ keeps the 
gestures fresh.” Davis here extends the concept of “rehearsal” beyond the 
specialized functions of emergency planning, suggesting how such prac-
tices now suffuse everyday life, with their function as rehearsal rendered 
invisible. This characterization of such practices, in combination with our 
research for the project, had powerful implications for both the structure 
of 3rd Ring Out and its politics. First, Davis’s point reveals how these proce-
dures can be construed as rehearsals for civil obedience. Anyone who flies 
regularly or visits public institutions in London or New York is well versed 
in obeying instructions to remove items of clothing, open bags for searching, 
and so on, regardless of any opinion on the part of the individuals searching 
and being searched as to the point or the efficacy of these actions.
What this suggests is that “belief” as such is not important in relation to 
such rehearsals; rather, what matters is compliance. This was precisely the 
most surprising and intriguing aspect of the research into Cold War exer-
cises for 3rd Ring Out: the interviewees who had participated in such re-
hearsals often did so regardless of their beliefs in the efficacy or otherwise of 
the exercise—or, indeed, their perception of the likelihood of the outbreak 
of nuclear war.12 It also seems clear that, from American “duck and cover” 
procedures for schoolchildren in the 1950s to British “protect and survive” 
leaflets in the 1980s, it was widely believed that these activities would not 
adequately respond to the catastrophe unleashed by a nuclear bomb. Davis 
(2007, 10) quotes a director of the U.S. Federal Civil Defense Administra-
tion, who told Canadian officials in 1955 about his conviction that, having 
seen footage of a test of the new hydrogen bomb, “‘Duck and Cover’ [is] 
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dead. You don’t duck from the explosion of a nuclear weapon, you die, that’s 
all.” However, this lack of belief in its efficacy did not prevent participants 
from taking the rehearsal itself seriously. The “if” of the “what- if” did not 
need to be particularly stable to—as Davis puts it—“keep the gesture fresh.” 
Whether you pass through airport security and mentally mock the inade-
quacy of the procedure, see it cynically or paranoically as a fear- mongering 
exercise on the part of governments, or believe wholeheartedly in its ca-
pacity to deter terrorists is irrelevant as long as you comply.
Returning to 3rd Ring Out, this observation remains an important struc-
tural point, but one that can be framed in a more positive light. 3rd Ring Out 
grafts the kinds of compliance afforded by theater etiquette onto the com-
pliance required for the participation in such rehearsals. Aided by the “as- 
if” symbolic space of performance, the emphasis on practicing, rather than 
believing, sets to one side a technical debate over likelihood and probability 
that continues to choke popular discussions of climate change. Instead, the 
practicing focuses on the relationship between procedure and action: by 
voting, the audience participates in the ethics of decision making. Even if as 
an audience member you are simply obeying instructions, at the very least 
you will have rehearsed your attitude to the rehearsal—dystopian, utopian, 
or merely cynical.
Furthermore, and returning to the question of improvisation in perfor-
mance, from discussion with emergency planners it seems that the most 
effective exercises are not those that prescribe precise courses of action, but 
those that are effectively guidance notes for improvisation. The scenarios 
provided to the civil servant “players” of nuclear war exercises look un-
cannily like the sort of instructions provided to actors when improvising a 
scene in rehearsal. The methodology of Katie Mitchell, a former associate 
director of London’s National Theatre, suggests that actors require a certain 
set of tools to be able to improvise well. In relation to the scene at hand, 
they need to know what their aim is, what the situation is (this includes the 
setting and the relationship with one another in the scene), how long they 
have, and where they are (Velleman 2009). These are precisely the elements 
provided to civil servants in briefing documents for nuclear exercises: in-
structions for improvisation.13
In the blurred space “between the everyday and the fantastic” (Etchells 
1999, 52), it is clear that it is the underlying conditions for improvisation 
that are key to its artistic efficacy. For 2011, one of the containers was con-
verted into an installation and conversation space—a “strategy” cell—while 
performances took place in what was now characterized as the “emergency” 
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cell.14 While the performance “rehearses” short- term responses to an emer-
gency, the installation improvised strategies for alternative, and sustainable, 
futures. The installation also offered a discursive space that was more explic-
itly “relational” than the performance. The opportunity to respond immedi-
ately to the provocations offered by the performance by suggesting ideas 
for the future of the city was welcomed by audiences at the Watford Imag-
ine Festival and the Edinburgh Fringe Festival 2011.15 What became clear in 
the Watford iteration of the installation was that an invitation to the audi-
ence members to improvise is not sufficient. The reliance of improvisational 
practices on pre- structured relationships was revealed by a general habitual 
recourse on the part of the audience to opinion poll– type responses to the 
question of a better future, from “more police on the high street” to “more 
hospitals.” In the absence of an explicit “art” structure, the social relations 
reproduced borrowed from think tank or Council consultation– type events. 
The challenge for this aspect of 3rd Ring Out became to harness the patent 
enthusiasm for being offered a forum for response (hundreds of responses 
were gathered in Watford) to an alternative practice that moved into less 
familiar and more creative territory. To this end, for the Edinburgh perfor-
mances, seven artists from the city or nearby were invited to respond to 
suggestions made by the public for the city’s future. Their creation of a net-
work of consequences integrated the suggestions from the public into a com-
prehensive and imaginatively appealing projection for Edinburgh’s future.16
While the response to the installation revealed a hunger for community 
engagement, 3rd Ring Out problematizes the simple equation of participa-
tion with community that is explicit in Bourriaud’s concept of relational 
aesthetics. An apparent community within the performance is estab-
lished through the performers’ continuous acknowledgment of the twelve 
audience- participants, intensified by their physical proximity in the small 
space of the shipping container, sitting around a shared table. However, the 
anonymous voting disrupts the chimera of consensus that participatory the-
ater can foster. While the codes of dialogue among strangers might soften or 
disguise disagreement in the desire for a polite and ultimately impersonal 
consensus, the requirement to make a private decision for each vote, which 
then may or may not reflect the majority view, opens up the possibility of 
dissent. The voting outcomes repeatedly acknowledge that groups of people 
who experience performances together are not communities that express a 
joint identity. This was felt particularly acutely by some audience members 
in response to the question within the scenario of whether to accept refu-
gees. Participants would share anecdotes of their shock when the majority 
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of others at the same performance, for example, voted against refugees, a 
difference of opinion that implied a rift in a socially liberal consensus about 
human rights and that therefore challenged preconceptions about the values 
held by their fellow theatergoers. 3rd Ring Out not only did not promise an 
emancipatory community politics or indulge in fantasies of the audience 
as a collective social body, but it demonstrated the fallacy promulgated by 
Bourriaud of assuming that such vague goodwill, constructed from the eti-
quette governing behavior in theaters (or, indeed, in art galleries), can ulti-
mately be equated with genuine community.
Notes
1. See http://www.forcedentertainment.com/. Accessed July 15, 2016.
2. See http://www.guardian.co.uk/stage/2005/dec/22/theatre2. Accessed July 
15, 2016.
3. For an excellent and succinct account of the historical antagonism between 
theater studies and performances studies, see Ridout, 2006, esp. 5–10.
4. See http://www.forcedentertainment.com/project/bloody- mess/. Accessed 
July 15, 2016.
5. After the brief hegemony of proscenium arch and end- on spatial configura-
tions in the mid- twentieth century theater, shifts toward more “inclusive” spaces 
in the twenty- first century include the building of the Royal Shakespeare Com-
pany’s new theater at Stratford- upon- Avon, modeled architecturally on a Renais-
sance courtyard theater, which both privileges interaction with the audience and 
satisfies a trend towards the historical “authenticity” fostered particularly at the 
reconstructed Globe Theatre in London. Both of these refer back to earlier his-
torical periods in which engagement between audiences and the stage were the 
norm. The architecturally flexible Young Vic in London, built in 1970 as a tem-
porary space and refurbished permanently in 2004–2006, is another example of 
a socially “inclusive” space, while the majority of London fringe theaters offer 
alterable seating and an undeniable social proximity.
6. Discombobulator was a fifteen- minute- long interdisciplinary piece made over 
ten days for a workshop performance at the Contemporary Music Festival of the 
Venice Biennale 2009. It was performed in London at the Purcell Rooms in 2010 
as part of the annual international dance festival, Dance Umbrella.
7. See http://www.southbankcentre.co.uk/find/dance- performance/tickets/ben 
- duke- will- duke- dario- palermo- zoë- svendsen- 53908. Accessed July 15, 2016.
8. See http://www.labiennale.org/en/dance/venues/teatro_piccolo_arsenale 
.html. Accessed July 15, 2016.
9. Four Men and a Poker Game, adapted and directed by Zoë Svendsen from a 
translation by John Willet of Brecht’s short story “Four Men and a Poker Game,” 
with music composed by David Paul Jones; performed by David McKay at North-
ern Stage, Newcastle, and The Tron, Glasgow, November 2008.
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10. Neil Cooper, “Four Men and a Poker Game, Tron Theatre, Glasgow,” Her-
ald Scotland, November 21, 2008, http://metisarts.co.uk/four- men- and- a- poker 
- game/. Accessed July 15, 2016.
11. 3rd Ring Out toured the United Kingdom in May– July 2010, performing at 
the Norfolk and Norwich Festival; in Newcastle, in association with Northern 
Stage; in Cambridge, in association with the Junction; at the Pulse Festival in Ips-
wich; and at the Greenwich and Docklands International Festival in London. In 
2011, a new version of 3rd Ring Out was presented at the Watford Imagine Festival 
and at the Edinburgh Fringe Festival.
12. All the interviews are gathered on the Internet under http://www.the 
bunkerproject.info. Accessed July 15, 2016.
13. For extensive examples of nuclear exercise briefing documents, see British 
National Archives, ho322/309, lAb12/1028, lAb12/1019; Cambridge Library 
Local Studies Collection, W12–0702F/C45.8.
14. See http://www.3rdringout.com/strategy- cell/. Accessed July 15, 2016.
15. 3rd Ring Out was performed six times a day, with the installation open to 
the public for eight hours on June 24–28, 2011, at the Watford Imagine Festival. 
It was then presented at the Edinburgh Fringe Festival, situated on the Grass-
market, August 18–28, 2011.
16. The work of the seven artists is archived at http://www.3rdringout.com 
/blog/. Accessed July 15, 2016.
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